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Social interactions in investment decisions: Evidence from fund managers' common site visits 投资决策中的社会互动：来自基金经理共同实地考察的证据
IF 6.9 1区 经济学
Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2026-07-01 Epub Date: 2026-06-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2026.103032
Yangming Bao, Yun Chen, Feifei Zhu
{"title":"Social interactions in investment decisions: Evidence from fund managers' common site visits","authors":"Yangming Bao,&nbsp;Yun Chen,&nbsp;Feifei Zhu","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2026.103032","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2026.103032","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates how social interactions among fund managers influence their investment decisions. Exploiting a unique dataset of corporate site visits in China, we document that managers who co-attend site visits exhibit significantly greater portfolio similarity subsequently, with the estimated incremental same-day effect implying an increase in holding overlap equal to 7.56% of the sample mean. To mitigate concerns that such alignment reflects pre-existing shared preferences or common information environments, we employ multiple identification strategies, including extensive controls, high-dimensional fixed effects, and a falsification test based on future co-visits. The effect is larger for repeated co-visits, consistent with a trust-based mechanism of information exchange. Further analysis of trading patterns reveals that co-visiting managers exhibit greater similarity in trades, a greater propensity to invest in opaque stocks, and superior risk-adjusted returns, suggesting that these co-visits facilitate the exchange of economically relevant private information.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"100 ","pages":"Article 103032"},"PeriodicalIF":6.9,"publicationDate":"2026-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148524371","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Does common ownership raise antitrust concerns? 共同所有权是否会引发反垄断担忧？
IF 6.9 1区 经济学
Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2026-07-01 Epub Date: 2026-06-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2026.103037
Huaizhou Li, Leo Liu, Ronald Masulis, Jason Zein
{"title":"Does common ownership raise antitrust concerns?","authors":"Huaizhou Li,&nbsp;Leo Liu,&nbsp;Ronald Masulis,&nbsp;Jason Zein","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2026.103037","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2026.103037","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Common ownership has raised growing antitrust concerns. We compile a comprehensive dataset of U.S. antitrust litigation cases from the Federal Trade Commission, the Department of Justice, and consumer-initiated lawsuits to shed light on these concerns. We find no robust relationship between common ownership of firm-pairs and the likelihood of these firms being jointly sued. Furthermore, common ownership is negatively associated with potential channels of collusion, such as interlocking directors and competitor-benchmarked executive pay. Evidence from institutional mergers and S&amp;P 500 additions of rival firms supports our main conclusions. Overall, our results offer little support for the view that common ownership promotes explicit collusion.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"100 ","pages":"Article 103037"},"PeriodicalIF":6.9,"publicationDate":"2026-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148524368","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Do creditor rights reduce tunneling? Evidence from India’s bankruptcy law reforms 债权会减少挖洞吗？来自印度破产法改革的证据
IF 6.9 1区 经济学
Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2026-07-01 Epub Date: 2026-06-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2026.103034
Prasanna Gai, Akshat Singh, Asha Sundaram, Gautham Udupa
{"title":"Do creditor rights reduce tunneling? Evidence from India’s bankruptcy law reforms","authors":"Prasanna Gai,&nbsp;Akshat Singh,&nbsp;Asha Sundaram,&nbsp;Gautham Udupa","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2026.103034","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2026.103034","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the impact of a bankruptcy reform that improved creditor rights and legal efficiency on the tunneling of funds through related party transactions within corporate group in India. We exploit a triple difference estimation strategy comparing related party transactions between a ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ group of financially distressed firms, before and after reform, and in Indian states where court systems were less efficient relative to other states. Improved creditor rights reduced tunneling by inducing borrowers to reduce financial related party transactions, which resulted in voluntary deleveraging of bank debt.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"100 ","pages":"Article 103034"},"PeriodicalIF":6.9,"publicationDate":"2026-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148524370","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The role of growth strategies in acquisitions 成长战略在收购中的作用
IF 6.9 1区 经济学
Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2026-07-01 Epub Date: 2026-06-12 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2026.103036
Yang Bai, Fred Bereskin, Micah S. Officer, Jing Wang
{"title":"The role of growth strategies in acquisitions","authors":"Yang Bai,&nbsp;Fred Bereskin,&nbsp;Micah S. Officer,&nbsp;Jing Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2026.103036","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2026.103036","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Using labor skill demand disclosed in job postings as a proxy for firms' growth strategies, we find that similar growth strategies increase the likelihood of two firms merging. In particular, a firm is more likely to become a target as its labor skill demand becomes more similar to that of its potential acquirer. Similar growth strategies ameliorate post-merger integration challenges in facilitating merger deals. Following the merger, the combined firm continues hiring the same skills, consistent with the growth strategy persisting. These types of mergers experience more synergies and superior operating performance.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"100 ","pages":"Article 103036"},"PeriodicalIF":6.9,"publicationDate":"2026-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148524373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Regulatory centralization and corporate green innovation: Evidence from personnel authority reform in China 监管集中化与企业绿色创新：来自中国人事权力改革的证据
IF 6.9 1区 经济学
Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2026-07-01 Epub Date: 2026-06-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2026.103040
Dongmin Kong, Chenhao Liu, Ling Zhu
{"title":"Regulatory centralization and corporate green innovation: Evidence from personnel authority reform in China","authors":"Dongmin Kong,&nbsp;Chenhao Liu,&nbsp;Ling Zhu","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2026.103040","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2026.103040","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine how enforcement credibility is associated with corporate green innovation investment. Exploiting China's 2016 Environmental Vertical Management Reform, which centralized environmental regulator appointments and created variation in regulatory credibility, our results suggest that enhanced enforcement credibility is associated with a 21.1% increase in green patent grants using Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation. Mechanism analysis reveals that firms respond through coordinated reallocation of financial and human capital: increasing R&amp;D intensity, shifting hiring toward green-specialized personnel, and expanding their pools of green inventors. These input expansions are accompanied by improved innovation efficiency, treated firms generate more green patents per unit of R&amp;D spending and reorient their patent portfolios toward environmental technologies, without deterioration in accounting performance or market valuation. This pattern is more consistent with strategic capability-building than with pure compliance costs, though we cannot directly estimate terminal net present value from a 10-year panel. Effects are significantly attenuated for financially constrained firms, directly linking the regulatory channel to capital allocation mechanisms, and amplified where local governments signal stronger environmental commitment. Our findings contribute to the corporate finance literature on how external governance shapes internal resource allocation and investment efficiency under regulatory pressure.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"100 ","pages":"Article 103040"},"PeriodicalIF":6.9,"publicationDate":"2026-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148524297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Antitrust policies and corporate tax avoidance: International evidence 反垄断政策与企业避税：国际证据
IF 6.9 1区 经济学
Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2026-07-01 Epub Date: 2026-06-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2026.103043
Taejin Jung, Sunhwa Choi, Jaehee Jo, Hee-Yeon Sunwoo
{"title":"Antitrust policies and corporate tax avoidance: International evidence","authors":"Taejin Jung,&nbsp;Sunhwa Choi,&nbsp;Jaehee Jo,&nbsp;Hee-Yeon Sunwoo","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2026.103043","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2026.103043","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine how a country's antitrust policies influence corporate tax strategies. Using comprehensive data on competition laws and the adoption of leniency programs across 51 non-U.S. countries, we find that firms tend to engage in greater tax avoidance when faced with more stringent antitrust policies. The effect of antitrust laws on tax avoidance is more pronounced in countries with stronger institutions, suggesting that less concern about rent extraction encourages managers to engage in greater tax planning. Finally, we find evidence that country-level corporate income tax revenue decreases as antitrust laws strengthen, suggesting potential unintended consequences. Overall, our study sheds light on the interplay between antitrust policies and firms' tax strategies, offering valuable insights for policymakers.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"100 ","pages":"Article 103043"},"PeriodicalIF":6.9,"publicationDate":"2026-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148524298","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Risky corporate savings and stock liquidity 高风险的公司储蓄和股票流动性
IF 6.9 1区 经济学
Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2026-07-01 Epub Date: 2026-06-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2026.103035
Qifan Zhai, Yuyuan Chang, Qing (Clara) Zhou
{"title":"Risky corporate savings and stock liquidity","authors":"Qifan Zhai,&nbsp;Yuyuan Chang,&nbsp;Qing (Clara) Zhou","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2026.103035","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2026.103035","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Non-financial firms hold substantial risky financial assets, yet their capital market consequences remain underexplored. We exploit transaction-level disclosures of Chinese firms’ investments in wealth management products (WMPs) to examine the effect of such holdings on stock liquidity. Because investors cannot distinguish cash management from opportunistic use, opaque holdings generate a lemons-type pooling problem that depresses liquidity. Panel regressions confirm a negative association between WMP holdings and stock liquidity. WMP holdings are also associated with lower investment and firm value, though less so when cash management motives are credible. To identify the mechanism, we exploit a 2018 regulation that enhanced product transparency and restricted opportunistic use, while leaving firm-level disclosure and characteristics unchanged. Treated firms subsequently experience a 7.8% decline in illiquidity. The effect is stronger for firms holding more opaque products and for firms with weaker governance, tighter financial constraints, and misaligned managerial incentives, and is concentrated at initial WMP entry. Our results show that asset-level opacity, rather than risky financial asset exposure per se, imposes a capital market penalty.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"100 ","pages":"Article 103035"},"PeriodicalIF":6.9,"publicationDate":"2026-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148524295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Female board directorship and employee pay: International evidence from board gender diversity reforms 女性董事和员工薪酬：来自董事会性别多元化改革的国际证据
IF 6.9 1区 经济学
Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2026-07-01 Epub Date: 2026-06-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2026.103039
Jiqing Bian, Douglas J. Cumming, Jin Lei, Yan Wang
{"title":"Female board directorship and employee pay: International evidence from board gender diversity reforms","authors":"Jiqing Bian,&nbsp;Douglas J. Cumming,&nbsp;Jin Lei,&nbsp;Yan Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2026.103039","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2026.103039","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study examines how female board representation affects average employee pay (AEP). Using stacked difference-in-differences regressions on firm-year data from 65 countries spanning 1995 to 2019, we document a robust negative effect of board gender diversity reforms on AEP, with the effect concentrated in firms with high pre-reform agency costs. The reforms also increase female representation on governance, nominating, and compensation committees, consistent with female directors strengthening board monitoring and curbing agency-driven employee overcompensation. The negative effect on AEP is statistically insignificant in environments with strong employee bargaining power and in firms whose pre-reform pay is already below industry averages, highlighting important boundary conditions related to institutional constraints and female directors' stakeholder sensitivity. Analyses further show that the reforms reduce layoffs, which partially explains the decline in AEP through a wage and job security trade-off that preserves human capital while improving operating efficiency. The reforms also increase financial leverage, and this increase partially mediates the decline in AEP by imposing stronger external discipline on labor costs. Moreover, treated firms exhibit lower total staff costs, higher labor cost efficiency, and higher operating profit margins. Overall, the evidence suggests that female directors play a dual role by strengthening cost discipline and governance while also incorporating stakeholder-sensitive considerations, thereby reconciling shareholder–employee conflicts and supporting long-term firm sustainability.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"100 ","pages":"Article 103039"},"PeriodicalIF":6.9,"publicationDate":"2026-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148524369","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How managers frame capital budgeting in investor communications 管理者如何在投资者沟通中构建资本预算
IF 6.9 1区 经济学
Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2026-07-01 Epub Date: 2026-06-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2026.103033
Robert Battalio, Tim Loughran, Bill McDonald
{"title":"How managers frame capital budgeting in investor communications","authors":"Robert Battalio,&nbsp;Tim Loughran,&nbsp;Bill McDonald","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2026.103033","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2026.103033","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We create a lexicon of 46 capital budgeting terms and document managers' use of capital budgeting language in earnings conference calls from 2010 to 2023. Managers of large firms generating more positive financial performance tend to talk more about capital budgeting. Managers use the non-GAAP term <em>EBITDA</em> significantly more often when a company's net income is negative. Companies that mention <em>payback</em> rather than <em>net present value</em> are smaller in size, have lower R&amp;D intensity, and are younger. Finally, we document a statistically significant and negative relation between capital budgeting language usage during the call and next year's Tobin's Q.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"100 ","pages":"Article 103033"},"PeriodicalIF":6.9,"publicationDate":"2026-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148524372","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Insider trading with options: Evidence from rank-and-file employees 期权内幕交易：来自普通员工的证据
IF 5.9 1区 经济学
Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2026.102963
Matteo Vacca
{"title":"Insider trading with options: Evidence from rank-and-file employees","authors":"Matteo Vacca","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2026.102963","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2026.102963","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Using trading data from Finland, I document that some rank-and-file employees purchase options written on their employers’ stocks. These purchases are associated with subsequent weekly excess returns of approximately 60 basis points in the underlying stocks. The association is most pronounced before earnings announcements, extends to firms in the employer’s supply chain, is not explained by industry knowledge or trading skill, and weakens upon job separation. The results suggest that some rank-and-file employees attempt to exploit informational advantages by trading in the option market, raising questions about firms’ disclosure policies and the alignment of employee incentives with market efficiency.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"98 ","pages":"Article 102963"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146073909","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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