{"title":"Negative effects of delayed retirement: Employment protection of older workers and firm value","authors":"Atsushi Chino","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102886","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102886","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Does protecting the employment of older workers affect firm value? We investigate this question by leveraging a labor-market reform in Japan that mandated firms to retain older employees beyond the statutory retirement age if those employees wished to continue working. An event study analysis reveals that firms with higher exposure to the reform experienced lower short-run abnormal stock returns around the announcement date. Long-run difference-in-differences estimates provide supporting evidence. In affected firms, average wages rose following the reform, but worker productivity remained unchanged. We also find that the number of patent applications declined in the affected firms. These findings suggest that mandatory employment protection for older workers—when not accompanied by productivity gains—can negatively impact firm value.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"95 ","pages":"Article 102886"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2025-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145044985","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does brand capital influence corporate environmental policies? Evidence from toxic release inventory data","authors":"Md Ismail Haidar , Mark Kroll , Nam H. Nguyen","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102885","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102885","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate the relationship between brand capital and corporate environmental policies using toxic chemical release data. Using a sample of 4752 publicly listed U.S. firm-year observations from 1991 to 2020, we find that brand capital is significantly and negatively related to firm's toxic emissions, suggesting that firms with stronger brand capital tend to exhibit more environmentally responsible behavior. Further evidence reveals that the effect of brand capital on corporate environmental policies is more pronounced for firms in communities that prefer stringent environmental regulations. Additional analysis points to increased financial stability, environmental innovations, and environmental abatement investments as the mechanisms behind the documented effect of brand capital on firms' environmental policies. The results are robust to numerous robustness tests, including the use of alternative measures of brand capital, environmental policies, and several endogeneity tests. The results support the idea that strong brand capital can promote environmental responsibility in firms.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"95 ","pages":"Article 102885"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2025-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145044984","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Thorsten Beck , Consuelo Silva-Buston , Wolf Wagner
{"title":"Supervisory arbitrage and real effects","authors":"Thorsten Beck , Consuelo Silva-Buston , Wolf Wagner","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102861","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102861","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine the effects of cross-border supervisory arbitrage on corporate lending and firm performance. We show that subsidiaries of banking groups improve loan conditions for firms when the group’s opportunities to take risks in other countries are curbed. The expansion in lending is targeted towards firms of higher quality and firms that the group is already familiar with. The improved lending conditions have positive real effects, allowing recipient firms to increase capital spending and leading to higher profits. Taken together, our results suggest that there can be benefits for firms in countries that receive lending inflows due to the supervisory arbitrage.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"95 ","pages":"Article 102861"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2025-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145019723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Shareholder litigation rights, CEO turnover, and board monitoring","authors":"Hue Hwa Au Yong, Blake Loriot, Yulia Merkoulova","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102882","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102882","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate how shareholder litigation rights impact CEO turnover decisions and board oversight. We exploit an unexpected court ruling that increased hurdles for shareholders of Ninth Circuit firms to initiate securities class action lawsuits. After the ruling, the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to performance decreases for firms in the Ninth Circuit. Additionally, board independence declines and directors of Ninth Circuit firms attend fewer meetings and hold more external board positions after the decision. These effects are exacerbated in firms that lack monitoring from institutional shareholders. For firms dependent on shareholder litigation, the reduction in litigation rights was economically significant and led to a 9.72 % decline in firm value.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"95 ","pages":"Article 102882"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2025-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145044983","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Democracy, dividends, and corporate valuation","authors":"Loc T. Bui","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102879","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102879","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine the impact of institutional democracy on firm value through the lens of dividend policies. Using instrumental variables, we find strong evidence that democracy improves dividends in an international sample of 18,410 unique firms across 63 countries over the 1991–2018 period. This effect is more pronounced for firms with high agency costs, or those in countries with weak legal protection for shareholders. Our evidence is robust to alternative measures of democracy and a battery of tests addressing the challenges associated with the instruments. Furthermore, dividends are capitalized at a higher rate in more democratic countries, especially for firms with high growth options. To the extent that investors are willing to pay a premium for firms that distribute more dividends, the democracy-induced dividends add to corporate value beyond the premium associated with shareholder rights-induced dividends. Overall, our results highlight that institutional democracy is an important, yet unexplored, determinant of corporate valuation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"95 ","pages":"Article 102879"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2025-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145095903","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bankers’ pay and the evolving structure of US banking","authors":"Ronald W. Anderson , Karin Jõeveer","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102864","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102864","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider the determinants of pay in US banks since 1986 using a new structural model in which banking firms are matched in rank order with management teams of varying talent. We calibrate the model to data from US bank holding companies focussing on labor’s share of bank value-added, the level of bankers’ pay and its sensitivity to bank performance. We find that three changes in banking regulation have shaped bankers’ pay in the last three decades: (1) removal of obstacles to interstate banking set off a process of banking consolidation in the 1990s, (2) deregulation at the end of the 1990’s allowing banks to pursue non-interest income has driven a trend toward higher pay and higher incentive pay, (3) tougher regulations following the financial crisis imposing an implicit tax on size and complexity has moderated pay in large banks but in so-doing has allowed smaller banks to take on business outside of standard credit intermediation resulting higher pay in those banks. Taking these structural changes into account we find a tendency over three decades for a decline in labor’s share, in line with superstar effects implied by our structural model.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"95 ","pages":"Article 102864"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2025-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144912809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Don M. Autore , Spencer Barnes , Nicholas Clarke , Andrew Schrowang
{"title":"Corporate share repurchases and the 2023 excise tax","authors":"Don M. Autore , Spencer Barnes , Nicholas Clarke , Andrew Schrowang","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102881","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102881","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 imposes a 1 % excise tax on US corporate share repurchases, effective January 1, 2023. The tax's implementation is associated with a significant decline in corporate repurchases that is not offset by a corresponding increase in dividends. Aggregate repurchases decline from about $1 trillion in 2022 to just over $800 billion in 2023, and the average firm reduces quarterly repurchases (as a fraction of market capitalization) by roughly 25 %. The decline in repurchases by US firms far exceeds a contemporaneous decline in repurchases by Canadian firms, is large in a historical context, and is not driven by firm fundamentals. Tax-induced cuts to repurchases are associated with an increase in cash but no increase in investment, implying that the tax has not generated the stated policy objective.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"95 ","pages":"Article 102881"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2025-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144908419","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
José Antonio Pérez-Amuedo , M. Kabir Hassan , Reza Houston
{"title":"The ripple effect: How subsidies transform firm behavior","authors":"José Antonio Pérez-Amuedo , M. Kabir Hassan , Reza Houston","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102880","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102880","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study examines how government support influences firm behavior across profitability, investment, and employment. Using a comprehensive database linking local, state, and federal subsidies to firm-level financial data, we assess how different subsidy types shape firm decisions. We find that cost-reducing subsidies are more effective than revenue-increasing ones in boosting profitability, employment, and strategic investment. Firms that commit to hiring or capital investment upon receiving subsidies achieve superior outcomes. These findings highlight the importance of aligning subsidy design with firm-level incentives and broader economic goals.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"95 ","pages":"Article 102880"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2025-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144916992","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jin Huang , Xiangyu Lin , Xiaomeng Shi , S. Sarah Zhang
{"title":"Market pressure or regulatory pressure? U.S. small bank pre-emptive IT investment to data privacy regulation","authors":"Jin Huang , Xiangyu Lin , Xiaomeng Shi , S. Sarah Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102863","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102863","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We assess small banks' responses to announcements of state-level proposals of Privacy Protection Acts (PPAs). Employing a Difference-in-Differences framework, we uncover the proactive actions taken by U.S. small banks in anticipation of these proposals. Our findings reveal that the announcement of PPA proposals leads to a 35.46% increase in IT investment by U.S. small banks, primarily driven by market pressure, with regulatory pressure playing a more limited role. Particularly, evidence suggests that banks with greater competitive threats from their rivals are motivated to enhance their IT investments due to market pressures. However, our research also finds that this surge in IT investment does not immediately translate into benefits for small banks.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"95 ","pages":"Article 102863"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2025-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144887066","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abu Amin , Md Miran Hossain , Narae Lee , Samir Saadi
{"title":"Corporate political activities and firms' carbon emissions","authors":"Abu Amin , Md Miran Hossain , Narae Lee , Samir Saadi","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102862","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102862","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study investigates the relationship between corporate political activities (CPA) and a firm's carbon emissions level. We test two competing hypotheses suggesting that political connections either incentivize firms toward stricter environmental standards through reputational pressures or enable higher emissions via regulatory leniency and compromised governance. Utilizing a large sample of U.S. firms, we find robust evidence that politically connected firms have significantly higher carbon emissions. Specifically, adding one politically connected independent director increases absolute emissions by approximately 20% and emission intensity by 16%. These results remain consistent after extensive robustness checks and addressing endogeneity through a stacked difference-in-differences design around director turnover events. We further identify regulatory leniency and weakened environmental governance as mechanisms driving these higher emissions. Cross-sectional analyses reveal that the CPA-emissions relationship is stronger in politically conservative states, financially constrained firms, competitive industries, and complex organizations, whereas institutional investors help mitigate this effect. Our findings highlight how corporate political strategies exacerbate environmental externalities, contributing to the understanding of the broader ecological and societal consequences of firms' nonmarket behaviors.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"95 ","pages":"Article 102862"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2025-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144889470","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}