{"title":"Economic magnitudes within reason","authors":"Zack Liu , Adam Winegar","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102707","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102707","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A common method of calculating economic magnitudes is to multiply the regression coefficient of the variable of interest by its sample standard deviation. This method is often problematic in finance settings when researchers use granular fixed effects. We show that in many recently published finance papers and for many common finance variables, the sample standard deviation is much larger than the within-group variation that identifies the regression coefficient, and that within-group changes of this magnitude are rare. Without additional assumptions, this common approach can significantly inflate the economic magnitude of the identified effect and impact the comparison of effects among different variables of interest. We recommend using within-group measures of variation to improve the interpretation of economic magnitudes in this setting.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"91 ","pages":"Article 102707"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2025-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143148547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Corporate ownership and ESG performance","authors":"Belén Villalonga , Peter Tufano , Boya Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102732","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102732","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Using a sample of 3083 firms from 62 countries over 18 years, we analyze how the structure and identity of firms' material owners influence their Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) performance. We find that firms with founding families or other individual investors as owners underperform, unless family members serve as CEOs, when they outperform all others. Non-family management and government entities also perform significantly better in most analyses. These results are robust to multiple data and methodological stress tests. Our findings show that ownership matters for ESG performance and give us an indication of the preferences of different types of owners regarding ESG.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"91 ","pages":"Article 102732"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2025-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143148624","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Understanding stock price behavior around external financing","authors":"Min Cao , J. Spencer Martin , Yaqiong Yao","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102730","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102730","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The negative association between pre-financing price run-ups and post-financing price drift-downs is well documented in the literature. We find that firms experiencing pre-financing run-ups and firms experiencing post-financing long-term underperformance may not always be the same firms. The firms with high levels of cash flows experience pre-financing price run-ups but do not suffer post-financing price drift-downs. On the other hand, firms with low cash flow levels do not have pre-financing price run-ups but experience post-financing long-term underperformance even after controlling for various well-documented anomalies. Profitability analyses around external financing suggest that high-cash-flow firms' pre-financing price run-ups could be driven by their robust profitability, whereas low-cash-flow firms' post-financing underperformance might be attributable to their losses.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"91 ","pages":"Article 102730"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2024-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143148545","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Beyond Russell reconstitution: A re-examination of methodologies for natural experiments","authors":"Wei Wei , Alex Young","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102685","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102685","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We develop a framework for screening and validating empirical designs in natural experiments. As an illustration of the framework, we establish a common testing ground for three popular research designs – instrumental variables (IV), fuzzy regression discontinuity (FRD), and difference-in-differences (DiD) – that exploit the annual Russell 1000/2000 Indexes reconstitution. Of the three designs, we find that only the IV approach spuriously detects large and statistically significant “effects” that by construction should be immaterial and statistically indistinguishable from zero. We advocate the use of simulation evidence to support key identifying assumptions for future research designs based on natural experiments.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"91 ","pages":"Article 102685"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2024-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143148548","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Laurence Cohen , Cristiano Bellavitis , Peter Wirtz
{"title":"Explaining the involvement and investment of women in business angel groups: The impact of organizational context and investment experience","authors":"Laurence Cohen , Cristiano Bellavitis , Peter Wirtz","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102729","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102729","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This research contributes to the scarce but growing literature on women angel investors. More specifically, leveraging stereotype threat theory, we investigate the role played by the social environment in shaping investing behavior across genders. This study offers a comparison between female angels from a stereotype-threat–free environment and (a) male angels, and (b) female angel investors investing in a strongly male-dominated environment. Using proprietary survey data of 96 business angels, our findings confirm that the social context plays an important role in explaining female investment behavior and involvement in BA-group activities. We find that women in a female-only group do not feature investment behavior that differs significantly from men. Whereas women who invest as a minority in a male-dominated environment tend to behave differently. Investment experience, however, moderates the influence of male-dominated environments on female investment behavior. The study confirms earlier exploratory findings related to the role of stereotype threat in female business angel activity at the individual level. Contributing to stereotype threat theory and gender studies in the business angel literature, our findings suggest that the historically marginal contribution of women is a result of the social construction of their role in the finance industry, in which stereotype threats may be particularly prevalent, rather than of supposedly innate features of gender.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"91 ","pages":"Article 102729"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2024-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143148549","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Beta estimation precision and corporate investment efficiency","authors":"Lee Biggerstaff, Brad Goldie, Haimanot Kassa","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102728","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102728","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Survey evidence suggests most firms use the CAPM to estimate their cost of equity. Previous research has documented these estimates can be extremely imprecise. We study the impact of the precision of beta estimates on firm investment decisions, and find that firms with precise beta estimates invest closer to their expected levels. We employ quantile regressions to further examine the relationship between <em>Beta Precision</em> and investment levels and find that firms with more precise betas tend to avoid extremes in investment levels. Finally, we show that precision in the estimation of cost of equity is associated with higher risk-adjusted stock returns.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"91 ","pages":"Article 102728"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2024-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143148552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Personal financial incentives, corporate governance, and firms’ campaign contributions","authors":"Viktar Fedaseyeu , Lev Lvovskiy","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102724","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102724","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We find that corporate governance and executives’ personal financial incentives are important determinants of firms’ ability to extract benefits from political participation. Firms with more independent boards are more likely to establish corporate political action committees (PACs), and executives in such firms exhibit a stronger sensitivity of campaign contributions to their personal equity stakes. We also show that disperse ownership limits PACs’ ability to raise funds because even large firm-level benefits from political participation may become insignificant for individuals with small equity stakes. This may help explain why aggregate PAC contributions remain relatively small compared to the large firm-value benefits such contributions can provide. However, the negative effect of disperse ownership on political donations is mitigated by corporate governance, as well-governed firms are able to better align their managers’ incentives with the benefits from corporate political participation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"91 ","pages":"Article 102724"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2024-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143148553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Kose John , Barnabé Monnot , Peter Mueller , Fahad Saleh , Caspar Schwarz-Schilling
{"title":"Economics of Ethereum","authors":"Kose John , Barnabé Monnot , Peter Mueller , Fahad Saleh , Caspar Schwarz-Schilling","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102718","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102718","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We provide comprehensive background regarding the Ethereum blockchain protocol, focusing especially on the economic incentives of participants. We begin by clarifying the transaction life-cycle from the user perspective, explaining how user transactions are submitted and settled on the blockchain. Thereafter, we explain how the Ethereum protocol selects proposers to propose blocks of transactions for inclusion on the blockchain and also attesters to vote for or against those blocks. We discuss both how the Proof-of-Stake protocol is used to select proposers and attesters, and also how the Gasper protocol is used to aggregate attester votes which thereby determine the finalized blockchain. Finally, we discuss how builders, searchers and relays have arisen to support and enhance the Ethereum block production process. Through our discussion, we clarify the economic trade-offs faced by each participant and the associated real-world decision variables for each participant.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"91 ","pages":"Article 102718"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2024-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143147512","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Andreas Charitou , Irene Karamanou , Anastasia Kopita
{"title":"Discontinuing analyst coverage due to resource reallocation: Euphemism for unfavorable firm outlook?","authors":"Andreas Charitou , Irene Karamanou , Anastasia Kopita","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102725","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102725","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Following the SRO rulings' requirement that analysts announce coverage terminations including either their final rating or the reason for the termination, we find 86.7 % of the voluntary terminations being attributed to ‘resources’ reallocation’ and only 13.3 % to firm poor outlook. Developing a classification algorithm to split the reallocation terminations into performance-based terminations (those driven by the dropped firm's poor outlook) and resource-constrained terminations (those unrelated to firm performance), we show that although the market's reaction to the termination announcement does not differ between the two sub-samples, future returns and financial performance of the performance-based sample significantly underperform those of the resource-constrained sample. We perform a number of additional analyses, including the use of terminations explicitly attributed to firm bleak output, to ex ante differentiate between the two types of reallocation terminations. We conclude that analysts withhold unfavorable news through the provision of news-neutral reasonings, in contrast to the regulators' intentions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"91 ","pages":"Article 102725"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2024-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143148550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Executive compensation and secured debt: Evidence from REITs","authors":"Ying Li , Lingxiao Li , Bing Zhu","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102727","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102727","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper explores the impact of executive compensation structure on firm debt choices. To analyze the relationship between executive compensation and firm debt structure via the managerial effort channel, we extend the theoretical model developed by <span><span>Boot et al. (1991)</span></span> by incorporating an agent-principal model. We employ data from US Equity Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) to empirically assess the model's implications. The evidence presented in this study reveals that when executive compensation exhibits a higher sensitivity to the firm's stock price (represented by a higher <em>Delta</em>), the firm tends to use a greater proportion of secured debt within its overall debt structure. This phenomenon can be attributed to the managerial effort channel: firms with higher <em>Delta</em> values tend to engage in investments that are more effort-sensitive, and these investment choices are positively associated with increased utilization of secured debt, where the collateral plays the role of incentivizing the manager to put more effort into projects – an “effort-lifting” behavior. These findings hold for an expanded sample consisting of firms from all industries. Our analysis offers a fresh perspective on the use of collateral and executive compensation as a tool to mitigate principal-agent problems.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"91 ","pages":"Article 102727"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2024-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143147514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}