{"title":"Happily ever after? Lender diversification and performance sensitivity in post-IPO loans","authors":"Luca X. Lin , Xiaoyu Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102774","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102774","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Going public reduces information asymmetry between a firm’s incumbent and potential new lenders. However, we show that while loan spreads are lower in post-IPO loans due to increased lender competition, the likelihood of having interest-increasing performance-pricing, which automatically increases spreads if firm performance deteriorates, is substantially heightened, only for loans from new lenders. This indicates that new lenders remain skeptical despite a more “level playing field.” Newly public firms need to commit to performance-sensitive debt to convince outside lenders, despite gaining a credible mechanism to disseminate information to them. Pricing grids do get amended more often ex-post for such loans, reflecting a lender learning process. Newly public firms are indeed still more likely to obtain loans from new lenders post-IPO. Our results suggest that performance pricing can serve to address the remaining information gap with new lenders beyond hard-information disclosure, allowing firms to better diversify their lender base.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"92 ","pages":"Article 102774"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2025-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143715224","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Financial distress and return: A finite mixture approach","authors":"Zhuo Cheng (June) , Jing Fang","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102779","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102779","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Using finite mixture models, we find that financial distress is related to realized return negatively (positively) for one (the other) latent group. The negative (positive) relation concentrates in firms with large negative (positive) realized return; the likelihood for a firm to be in the latent group with a positive relation is negatively related to its price-to-value ratio estimate and mispricing score, both of which measure relative mispricing. The mispricing-correction component of realized return is negative (positive) for overvalued (undervalued) firms and decreases (increases) with corrected overvaluation (undervaluation). Overall, our findings are consistent with the view that mispricing—undervaluation and overvaluation—is larger for firms with higher financial distress. Evident in our findings, an overall negative relation between financial distress and realized return is driven by the negative relation between financial distress and the mispricing-correction component for overvalued firms and, therefore, it is not at odds with the risk-reward paradigm.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"92 ","pages":"Article 102779"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2025-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143735149","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Anti-corruption and corporate investment: Evidence from financial disclosure laws","authors":"Wendi Huang , Ye Peng","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102769","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102769","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate the impact of anti-corruption regulations on corporate investment by leveraging the implementation of global financial disclosure laws. Our findings reveal that, subsequent to the adoption of these laws, there is a reduction in the rate of corporate investment, alongside an enhancement in investment efficiency. This suggests that anti-corruption policies serve to curb firms’ excessive investment, which is often fueled by government subsidies in corrupt environments. Our analysis provides valuable insights into the advantages of anti-corruption laws and carries significant policy implications.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"92 ","pages":"Article 102769"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2025-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143686506","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Predation by stock price manipulation","authors":"Rafael Matta , Sergio H. Rocha , Paulo Vaz","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102770","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102770","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We develop a model in which feedback effects from equity markets allow uninformed traders to profit by short selling a firm’s stock while going long on its product market competitor. As this strategy distorts the investment of the firm targeted by short selling to the benefit of its rival, we label it <em>predation by stock price manipulation</em>. A short selling ban does not prevent manipulation since the speculator can still induce a firm to underinvest by establishing a long position in its rival. Our analysis unveils how competitive interactions among firms expand the scope of manipulation, providing new insights into equity markets and short sales regulation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"92 ","pages":"Article 102770"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2025-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143686509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Seeking blessings by doing good: Top executive superstitions and corporate philanthropy","authors":"Xianjun Cai , Lin Liao , Yukun Pan , Kun Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102775","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102775","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Corporate giving is a substantial expenditure for firms. However, understanding the motives behind such spending remains challenging. This study tests the agency motive of corporate philanthropy by investigating top executives' zodiac year superstition, a culturally embedded, time-varying phenomenon. We find that firms led by board chairs in their zodiac years exhibit a significant increase in charitable donations, with the effects being stronger for firms led by board chairs with lower educational attainment and a lack of overseas experience, as well as non–state owned firms, underperforming firms, and firms with weak corporate governance. Furthermore, these increases in charitable donations are temporary and do not translate into long-term philanthropic commitments or improved firm performance, corroborating their agency-driven nature. Overall, our study provides new insights into the role of managerial beliefs and preferences in shaping corporate behavior.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"92 ","pages":"Article 102775"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2025-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143686510","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Divided we fall: Congressional cycles, the stock market and firm performance","authors":"Joshua Livnat , Amir Rubin , Dan Segal","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102776","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102776","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study examines the impact of partisan control of the United States Congress on corporations and the economy. The findings indicate that economic performance is weaker when neither party holds a majority in both chambers of Congress, resulting in a divided Congress. We propose that this outcome may be attributed to a decrease in the level and quality of regulation during divided Congress terms. To analyze the immediate effects of regulation on the economy, we leverage congressional recess periods as a source of exogenous variation. Consistent with the conjecture that the composition of Congress affects the economy through its regulatory activity, we demonstrate that a divided Congress negatively impacts economic performance when Congress is in session but has no significant effect during recesses (when regulation does not occur). In conclusion, congressional cycles and the presence of effective regulation are shown to be crucial factors influencing economic activity.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"92 ","pages":"Article 102776"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2025-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143686508","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Editorial: Ownership and corporate social and sustainable policies","authors":"Morten Bennedsen , Joseph Fan , Stuart Gillan","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102777","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102777","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"93 ","pages":"Article 102777"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2025-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143844192","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Capitalization of operating leases and the cost of Bank loans","authors":"Joanna Golden , Xiaotao Kelvin Liu","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102773","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102773","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study investigates whether the cost of bank loans is associated with the adoption of new lease standards, which mandate firms to recognize operating leases and increase disclosures. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find robust evidence that treatment firms (i.e., borrowers with higher operating leases in the pre-implementation period) are associated with a greater decline in loan spreads. The effect is more pronounced among unrated firms, borrowers with more opaque pre-implementation financial disclosure, and loans syndicated by less sophisticated lenders. We also document that treatment firms are associated with a greater increase in the number of lenders, debt maturity, and credit ratings. Moreover, treatment firms experience a greater reduction in covenant intensity and covenant tightness. Collectively, our evidence suggests that compliance with ASC 842 improves the reporting reliability and disclosure quality of operating leases.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"92 ","pages":"Article 102773"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2025-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143686507","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Adrian Böhm , Christian Eufinger , Igor Kadach , Yuki Sakasai
{"title":"Green banking illusion? The influence of “Eco-Conscious” bank shareholders on credit allocation","authors":"Adrian Böhm , Christian Eufinger , Igor Kadach , Yuki Sakasai","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102767","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102767","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Can voluntary market-based initiatives effectively promote greener credit allocation? Our paper addresses this question by assessing the role of self-declared environmentally conscious bank shareholders, specifically those endorsing the UN Principles for Responsible Investment, in shaping the sustainability of bank loan portfolios. For our analysis, we utilize a comprehensive dataset that includes information on syndicated loans, firm-level emissions, and both bank and firm ownership and financial data. Controlling for loan demand, at the bank–firm level, we find no evidence of an association between a higher ownership stake by eco-conscious bank shareholders and shifts in banks’ loan allocation strategies between firms with low and high emissions. At the firm-level, we find that lending relationships with banks characterized by greater eco-conscious ownership are not associated with significantly improved environmental performance among borrower firms. Our analysis reveals that banks are treated differently by investors compared to non-financial firms, likely due to regulatory requirements and their unique governance structures, which might explain the observed lack of influence of eco-conscious bank shareholders. Our findings thus indicate the potential limitations of relying on self-declared eco-conscious bank shareholders to guide banks toward environmentally sustainable credit allocation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"92 ","pages":"Article 102767"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2025-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143628226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Corporate shutdowns in the time of Covid-19","authors":"Shradha Bindal, Kissan Joseph, Felix Meschke","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102766","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102766","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study examines the factors driving corporate headquarters shutdown decisions among S&P 500 firms during the early months of the Covid-19 pandemic. Using mobile phone data to estimate shutdown timing, we find that financial flexibility and CEO characteristics, such as pay duration, overconfidence, power, age or gender, do not influence shutdown decisions. Instead, work-from-home adaptability, local shelter-in-place mandates, and political alignment emerge as critical drivers. Democratic-leaning firms, particularly those led by Democratic-leaning CEOs, shut down significantly earlier than their counterparts. These findings highlight the importance of political and regulatory dynamics in shaping corporate responses during crises.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"92 ","pages":"Article 102766"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2025-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143686511","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}