{"title":"背离ESG?主权评级下调对企业可持续性的影响","authors":"Periklis Boumparis , Chris Florackis , Omrane Guedhami , Sushil Sainani","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102856","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine how sovereign rating downgrades affect firms' environmental, social, and governance (ESG) policies, leveraging the sovereign “ceiling” rule as a quasi-natural experiment that generates exogenous variation in corporate credit ratings. Under this rule, firms originally rated at or above the sovereign rating (bound firms) face a higher likelihood of downgrade following a sovereign downgrade. Using a difference-in-differences (DiD) setting, we find that bound firms experience a decline in ESG performance following a sovereign downgrade. This decline occurs only after the downgrade, not before, validating the parallel trends assumption. Our analysis further indicates that this effect is not driven by financing frictions and is concentrated in countries with a shareholder-centric orientation, and among firms with low institutional ownership from countries with strong social norms. Additional evidence suggests that affected firms experience an increase in ESG-related incidents, damaging their reputation post-downgrade. Overall, our findings underscore the crucial role of sovereign risk in shaping corporate sustainability practices.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"94 ","pages":"Article 102856"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9000,"publicationDate":"2025-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Backing away from ESG? The effect of sovereign rating downgrades on corporate sustainability\",\"authors\":\"Periklis Boumparis , Chris Florackis , Omrane Guedhami , Sushil Sainani\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102856\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>We examine how sovereign rating downgrades affect firms' environmental, social, and governance (ESG) policies, leveraging the sovereign “ceiling” rule as a quasi-natural experiment that generates exogenous variation in corporate credit ratings. Under this rule, firms originally rated at or above the sovereign rating (bound firms) face a higher likelihood of downgrade following a sovereign downgrade. Using a difference-in-differences (DiD) setting, we find that bound firms experience a decline in ESG performance following a sovereign downgrade. This decline occurs only after the downgrade, not before, validating the parallel trends assumption. Our analysis further indicates that this effect is not driven by financing frictions and is concentrated in countries with a shareholder-centric orientation, and among firms with low institutional ownership from countries with strong social norms. Additional evidence suggests that affected firms experience an increase in ESG-related incidents, damaging their reputation post-downgrade. Overall, our findings underscore the crucial role of sovereign risk in shaping corporate sustainability practices.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":15525,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Corporate Finance\",\"volume\":\"94 \",\"pages\":\"Article 102856\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":5.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-07-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Corporate Finance\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119925001245\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Corporate Finance","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119925001245","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Backing away from ESG? The effect of sovereign rating downgrades on corporate sustainability
We examine how sovereign rating downgrades affect firms' environmental, social, and governance (ESG) policies, leveraging the sovereign “ceiling” rule as a quasi-natural experiment that generates exogenous variation in corporate credit ratings. Under this rule, firms originally rated at or above the sovereign rating (bound firms) face a higher likelihood of downgrade following a sovereign downgrade. Using a difference-in-differences (DiD) setting, we find that bound firms experience a decline in ESG performance following a sovereign downgrade. This decline occurs only after the downgrade, not before, validating the parallel trends assumption. Our analysis further indicates that this effect is not driven by financing frictions and is concentrated in countries with a shareholder-centric orientation, and among firms with low institutional ownership from countries with strong social norms. Additional evidence suggests that affected firms experience an increase in ESG-related incidents, damaging their reputation post-downgrade. Overall, our findings underscore the crucial role of sovereign risk in shaping corporate sustainability practices.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Corporate Finance aims to publish high quality, original manuscripts that analyze issues related to corporate finance. Contributions can be of a theoretical, empirical, or clinical nature. Topical areas of interest include, but are not limited to: financial structure, payout policies, corporate restructuring, financial contracts, corporate governance arrangements, the economics of organizations, the influence of legal structures, and international financial management. Papers that apply asset pricing and microstructure analysis to corporate finance issues are also welcome.