Journal of Corporate Finance最新文献_第6页

Does litigation risk matter for the choice between bank debt and public debt? 诉讼风险对银行债务和公共债务之间的选择是否重要？

IF 7.2 1区经济学

Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2024-10-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102688

H. Kent Baker , Hatem Rjiba , Samir Saadi , Syrine Sassi

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引用次数: 0

State ownership and financial reporting quality: Evidence from natural advantage industries

IF 7.2 1区经济学

Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2024-10-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102687

Narjess Boubakri , Art Durnev , Igor Oliveira dos Santos

引用次数: 0

The fed information shocks and the market for corporate control: Predictive and causal effects 美联储信息冲击与公司控制权市场：预测效应和因果效应

IF 7.2 1区经济学

Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2024-10-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102681

Samer Adra , Leonidas G. Barbopoulos , Anthony Saunders

引用次数: 0

The gender gap in executive promotions 高管晋升中的性别差距

IF 7.2 1区经济学

Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2024-10-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102680

Jing Xu

引用次数: 0

Optimal financing of highly innovative projects under double moral hazard 双重道德风险下高度创新项目的最佳融资方式

IF 7.2 1区经济学

Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2024-10-14 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102684

Gino Loyola , Yolanda Portilla

引用次数: 0

Does relaxing household credit constraints hurt small business lending? Evidence from a policy change in Texas 放宽家庭信贷限制是否会损害小企业贷款？得克萨斯州政策变化的证据

IF 7.2 1区经济学

Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2024-10-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102682

Berrak Bahadir , Inci Gumus , Matthew Schaffer

{"title":"Does relaxing household credit constraints hurt small business lending? Evidence from a policy change in Texas","authors":"Berrak Bahadir , Inci Gumus , Matthew Schaffer","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102682","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102682","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies the relationship between household credit and small business loans using the 1997 liberalization of home equity lending in Texas. First, we build a closed economy general equilibrium model that examines two opposing channels: a negative crowding out effect and a positive collateral effect. Our analysis shows that, following a household credit expansion, the crowding out effect dominates and leads to an overall decline in firm borrowing. We test this result empirically by exploiting the liberalization of home equity loans in Texas. The exogenous increase in household credit brought on by the liberalization results in a crowding out of business lending, as small business loan growth declines by roughly 20 percentage points. This negative effect is dampened in counties that experienced stronger house price growth, providing evidence of a subsidiary collateral effect. We further explore the bank-level factors that could influence the strength of the crowding out effect and find that the effect is weaker for banks with easier access to funding and a specialization in business lending.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102682"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2024-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142432662","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The effect of bond ownership structure on ESG performance 债券所有权结构对环境、社会和公司治理绩效的影响

IF 7.2 1区经济学

Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2024-10-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102678

Hye Seung Lee , Jesus M. Salas , Ke Shen , Ke Yang

引用次数: 0

Compensation peer effects of corporate social responsibility 企业社会责任的薪酬同行效应

IF 7.2 1区经济学

Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2024-10-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102679

Yuyuan Chang , Nicolai J. Foss , Shuping Li , Jing Xie

{"title":"Compensation peer effects of corporate social responsibility","authors":"Yuyuan Chang , Nicolai J. Foss , Shuping Li , Jing Xie","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102679","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102679","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This article examines the role of CEOs' personal incentives in steering their firms' CSR initiatives following their compensation peers, subsequently influencing their career trajectories within their current firms. Specifically, we find that firms exhibit better corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance if their compensation peer (CP) firms demonstrated superior CSR performance in the prior year (i.e., the CP effect). To mitigate the endogeneity concern, we conduct analyses based on the termination (initiation) of CPs' peer relation with the focal firm, a benchmark test, and an instrumental variable analysis. To establish the mechanisms of internal monetary rewards from their firms and enhanced external career tournaments in the labor market, we show the CP effect is stronger if the focal company CEOs have compensation contracts specifying CSR performance targets, face a larger compensation shortfall relative to their CP counterparts, operate in closer geographical proximity to those CP CEOs, or hire more compensation consultants. Furthermore, we find that the probability and quantity of CSR contracts received by focal firms' CEOs increase with CPs' lagged CSR. CEOs receive higher compensation than those in CP firms after they deliver better CSR performance than their CPs. Overall, our paper highlights the role of CEOs' personal incentives in steering their firms' CSR initiatives, subsequently influencing their career trajectories within their current organizations.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102679"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2024-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142441186","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Supply chain vertical common ownership and cost of loans 供应链纵向共同所有权和贷款成本

IF 7.2 1区经济学

Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2024-10-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102677

Haowen Tian , Junkai Wang , Sirui Wu

{"title":"Supply chain vertical common ownership and cost of loans","authors":"Haowen Tian , Junkai Wang , Sirui Wu","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102677","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102677","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study explores how vertical common ownership reduces supply chain risk and influences creditors' decisions, focusing on the cost of loans. Findings reveal that creditors view such firms as less likely to default, evidenced by lower loan spreads. This effect is stronger for suppliers with more relationship-specific investments, weaker bargaining power, higher information asymmetry, and long-term common institutional ownership. Results remain robust through quasi-natural experiments from financial institutions' M&As, supplier-customer pair analyses, etc. We also compare vertical common ownership with the horizontal one and demonstrate its incremental contributions. Moreover, the fraction of customer sales and the institutional investors' share ownership likely influence the likelihood of vertical common ownership, with our results consistently holding under Heckman analysis. Overall, the results suggest that vertical common ownership enhances coordination and monitoring, reducing risks and creditor risk premiums. The findings may offer valuable insights into managing supply chain risks and understanding their financial implications.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102677"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2024-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142428546","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Impact of internal governance on investment policy: Evidence from CEO voluntary turnovers 内部治理对投资政策的影响：首席执行官自愿离职的证据

IF 7.2 1区经济学

Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2024-09-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102676

Ivan E. Brick , Darius Palia , Yankuo Qiao

{"title":"Impact of internal governance on investment policy: Evidence from CEO voluntary turnovers","authors":"Ivan E. Brick , Darius Palia , Yankuo Qiao","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102676","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102676","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The theoretical and empirical literature suggests that CEO might not make risky long-term investments if the CEO believes that the benefit of such investments would not materialize or is not recognized by the market until after the CEO has retired. This paper tests the predictions of the Acharya, Myers, and Rajan (2011) internal governance model to counteract the CEO’s tendency to forego such investments on a sample of voluntary CEO turnovers. We find that the optimal level of sharing of tasks between the CEO and her top-management team, the firm’s internal governance, is dependent on the CEO’s career horizon. Additionally, we find the effect of internal governance only matters for older CEOs. We also find that the closer the internal governance is to the optimal level, the smaller is the underinvestment for an older outgoing CEO. We find that the new incoming CEO divests profitably the assets acquired under good internal governance. Finally, we find that optimal internal governance is found to have positive effects on corporate innovation. Our results are robust to continuous matching by generalized propensity score and controlling for the CEO’s explicit pay-performance sensitivity, succession plan, and pay duration.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102676"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2024-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142445679","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0