Misconduct in the SPAC market: Evidence from venture capital exits

Abstract

This paper investigates the performance of venture capital-backed (VC-backed) firms upon their exits through mergers with special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) or “more traditional” initial public offerings (IPOs) during the recent SPAC wave. Compared to their IPO peers, VC-backed ventures merging with SPACs tend to exhibit smaller size, less current and analyst-projected future profitability, and additional characteristics that indicate lower venture quality. Notably, SPACs merging with VC-backed ventures demonstrate significant underperformance relative to both SPACs merging with non-VC-backed companies and “standard” IPOs. This suggests that VCs may have exploited a relative lack of regulation and investor naivety. They may have presented their lower-quality ventures as appealing opportunities for mergers with SPACs, which resulted in their substantial underperformance.