{"title":"生存:债务复杂性作为延缓破产的机制","authors":"Jens Forssbæck , Håkan Jankensgård , Reda Moursli","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102804","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A complex and multi-layered liability structure with potentially overlapping claims on underlying collateral reduces expected recovery rates for creditors, which increases their incentives to keep otherwise insolvent firms afloat. Financially distressed firms may therefore seek to strategically “toxify” their capital structure to stave off future bankruptcy. In this article, we find evidence indicating that firms generate more debt complexity as they enter financial distress. Consistent with the idea that it operates as a bankruptcy-delaying mechanism, complexity reduces the probability of bankruptcy for any given level of financial distress.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"93 ","pages":"Article 102804"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2000,"publicationDate":"2025-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Stayin' alive: Debt complexity as a bankruptcy-delaying mechanism\",\"authors\":\"Jens Forssbæck , Håkan Jankensgård , Reda Moursli\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102804\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>A complex and multi-layered liability structure with potentially overlapping claims on underlying collateral reduces expected recovery rates for creditors, which increases their incentives to keep otherwise insolvent firms afloat. Financially distressed firms may therefore seek to strategically “toxify” their capital structure to stave off future bankruptcy. In this article, we find evidence indicating that firms generate more debt complexity as they enter financial distress. Consistent with the idea that it operates as a bankruptcy-delaying mechanism, complexity reduces the probability of bankruptcy for any given level of financial distress.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":15525,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Corporate Finance\",\"volume\":\"93 \",\"pages\":\"Article 102804\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":7.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-05-02\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Corporate Finance\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119925000720\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Corporate Finance","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119925000720","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Stayin' alive: Debt complexity as a bankruptcy-delaying mechanism
A complex and multi-layered liability structure with potentially overlapping claims on underlying collateral reduces expected recovery rates for creditors, which increases their incentives to keep otherwise insolvent firms afloat. Financially distressed firms may therefore seek to strategically “toxify” their capital structure to stave off future bankruptcy. In this article, we find evidence indicating that firms generate more debt complexity as they enter financial distress. Consistent with the idea that it operates as a bankruptcy-delaying mechanism, complexity reduces the probability of bankruptcy for any given level of financial distress.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Corporate Finance aims to publish high quality, original manuscripts that analyze issues related to corporate finance. Contributions can be of a theoretical, empirical, or clinical nature. Topical areas of interest include, but are not limited to: financial structure, payout policies, corporate restructuring, financial contracts, corporate governance arrangements, the economics of organizations, the influence of legal structures, and international financial management. Papers that apply asset pricing and microstructure analysis to corporate finance issues are also welcome.