Thorsten Beck , Consuelo Silva-Buston , Wolf Wagner
{"title":"Supervisory arbitrage and real effects","authors":"Thorsten Beck , Consuelo Silva-Buston , Wolf Wagner","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102861","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102861","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine the effects of cross-border supervisory arbitrage on corporate lending and firm performance. We show that subsidiaries of banking groups improve loan conditions for firms when the group’s opportunities to take risks in other countries are curbed. The expansion in lending is targeted towards firms of higher quality and firms that the group is already familiar with. The improved lending conditions have positive real effects, allowing recipient firms to increase capital spending and leading to higher profits. Taken together, our results suggest that there can be benefits for firms in countries that receive lending inflows due to the supervisory arbitrage.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"95 ","pages":"Article 102861"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2025-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145019723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Xiao Chen , Narisa Tianjing Dai , Ming Liu , Raymond H.Y. So , Zhiyuan Simon Tan
{"title":"Can government policies tackle maturity mismatches? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China","authors":"Xiao Chen , Narisa Tianjing Dai , Ming Liu , Raymond H.Y. So , Zhiyuan Simon Tan","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102889","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102889","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Investment-financing maturity mismatches are common among firms worldwide, yet little is known about how government interventions can tackle them. This paper investigates China's Industry-Finance Cooperation Pilot Program as a quasi-natural experiment to examine whether, to what extent, and through what mechanisms government policies can address maturity mismatches. Using a multi-period difference-in-differences (DID) model and a sample of publicly listed A-share firms in China from 2014 to 2022, we find that the pilot program significantly reduces maturity mismatches by improving bank-firm information flows, reducing banks' concerns over moral hazard, and narrowing the term spread between short- and long-term interest rates. These findings provide empirical evidence that government policies can simultaneously tackle both supply and demand causes of maturity mismatches. Cross-sectional analyses reveal that the mismatch alleviation effect is strongest among non-state-owned enterprises, firms with low collateral availability, financially constrained firms, and those in highly competitive industries. Further, we find that alleviating maturity mismatches enhances firm stability, lowers financial distress, and improves market valuation, suggesting that these mismatches often reflect firms' “forced choices” rather than strategic preferences. Finally, analysis of bank-level data shows that the pilot program not only benefits firms but also reduces banks' credit and financial risks. Overall, this paper offers novel insights for policymakers by demonstrating how government interventions can improve corporate financing decisions while reducing systemic financial risks. It contributes to the broader corporate finance literature by highlighting the importance of credit availability in fostering financial stability and sustainable growth, particularly in emerging markets.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"95 ","pages":"Article 102889"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2025-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145044986","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Shareholder litigation rights, CEO turnover, and board monitoring","authors":"Hue Hwa Au Yong, Blake Loriot, Yulia Merkoulova","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102882","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102882","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate how shareholder litigation rights impact CEO turnover decisions and board oversight. We exploit an unexpected court ruling that increased hurdles for shareholders of Ninth Circuit firms to initiate securities class action lawsuits. After the ruling, the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to performance decreases for firms in the Ninth Circuit. Additionally, board independence declines and directors of Ninth Circuit firms attend fewer meetings and hold more external board positions after the decision. These effects are exacerbated in firms that lack monitoring from institutional shareholders. For firms dependent on shareholder litigation, the reduction in litigation rights was economically significant and led to a 9.72 % decline in firm value.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"95 ","pages":"Article 102882"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2025-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145044983","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Xingxing Hu , Bingxuan Lin , Huilong Liu , Xiaowei Xu
{"title":"Institutional voids and business group dynamics: Evidence from judicial reform in China1","authors":"Xingxing Hu , Bingxuan Lin , Huilong Liu , Xiaowei Xu","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102894","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102894","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The influence of external institutional environments on the internal functioning of business groups remains a critical yet underexplored area of research. In this paper, we focus on China's pro-market judicial reforms and examine how these reforms affect internal product and service transactions within business groups, finding that such reforms significantly reduce intra-group transactions. We further demonstrate that this decline reflects a strategic substitution toward external market transactions rather than an overall contraction in firm operations, and that the effect is not driven by managerial self-dealing but aligns with institutional voids theory. The effect is particularly pronounced in regions with underdeveloped product markets and weaker informal institutions, and in firms with lower reputations and stronger political connections. Moreover, our results hold consistently across various transaction types, whether seller- or buyer-initiated, service- or goods-related, and remain robust across alternative regression models, explanations, and regardless of the geographic proximity of group firms. These findings contribute to understanding the role of internal transactions within business groups in addressing institutional voids and add to the broader literature on how business groups emerge and adapt in response to gaps in institutional frameworks.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"95 ","pages":"Article 102894"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2025-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145095902","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jin Huang , Xiangyu Lin , Xiaomeng Shi , S. Sarah Zhang
{"title":"Market pressure or regulatory pressure? U.S. small bank pre-emptive IT investment to data privacy regulation","authors":"Jin Huang , Xiangyu Lin , Xiaomeng Shi , S. Sarah Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102863","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102863","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We assess small banks' responses to announcements of state-level proposals of Privacy Protection Acts (PPAs). Employing a Difference-in-Differences framework, we uncover the proactive actions taken by U.S. small banks in anticipation of these proposals. Our findings reveal that the announcement of PPA proposals leads to a 35.46% increase in IT investment by U.S. small banks, primarily driven by market pressure, with regulatory pressure playing a more limited role. Particularly, evidence suggests that banks with greater competitive threats from their rivals are motivated to enhance their IT investments due to market pressures. However, our research also finds that this surge in IT investment does not immediately translate into benefits for small banks.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"95 ","pages":"Article 102863"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2025-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144887066","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Oliver Zhen Li , Yupeng Lin , Jinping Zhang , Zilong Zhang
{"title":"Peer default and EDGAR searches","authors":"Oliver Zhen Li , Yupeng Lin , Jinping Zhang , Zilong Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102891","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102891","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We find that a borrower default causes an increase in investors' EDGAR searches for non-defaulting borrowers that share the same relationship bank. This effect is more pronounced when the lending relationship between the defaulting borrower and the defaulted-upon bank is stronger and when the reliance of non-defaulting borrowers on the defaulted-upon bank is greater. The co-movement of information acquisition for non-defaulting borrowers increases after the peer default, which leads to a co-movement in the issuance of management forecasts and a co-movement in stock returns. In sum, our research supports a network effect of peer defaults on information acquisition.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"95 ","pages":"Article 102891"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2025-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145095901","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abu Amin , Md Miran Hossain , Narae Lee , Samir Saadi
{"title":"Corporate political activities and firms' carbon emissions","authors":"Abu Amin , Md Miran Hossain , Narae Lee , Samir Saadi","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102862","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102862","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study investigates the relationship between corporate political activities (CPA) and a firm's carbon emissions level. We test two competing hypotheses suggesting that political connections either incentivize firms toward stricter environmental standards through reputational pressures or enable higher emissions via regulatory leniency and compromised governance. Utilizing a large sample of U.S. firms, we find robust evidence that politically connected firms have significantly higher carbon emissions. Specifically, adding one politically connected independent director increases absolute emissions by approximately 20% and emission intensity by 16%. These results remain consistent after extensive robustness checks and addressing endogeneity through a stacked difference-in-differences design around director turnover events. We further identify regulatory leniency and weakened environmental governance as mechanisms driving these higher emissions. Cross-sectional analyses reveal that the CPA-emissions relationship is stronger in politically conservative states, financially constrained firms, competitive industries, and complex organizations, whereas institutional investors help mitigate this effect. Our findings highlight how corporate political strategies exacerbate environmental externalities, contributing to the understanding of the broader ecological and societal consequences of firms' nonmarket behaviors.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"95 ","pages":"Article 102862"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2025-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144889470","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Don M. Autore , Spencer Barnes , Nicholas Clarke , Andrew Schrowang
{"title":"Corporate share repurchases and the 2023 excise tax","authors":"Don M. Autore , Spencer Barnes , Nicholas Clarke , Andrew Schrowang","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102881","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102881","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 imposes a 1 % excise tax on US corporate share repurchases, effective January 1, 2023. The tax's implementation is associated with a significant decline in corporate repurchases that is not offset by a corresponding increase in dividends. Aggregate repurchases decline from about $1 trillion in 2022 to just over $800 billion in 2023, and the average firm reduces quarterly repurchases (as a fraction of market capitalization) by roughly 25 %. The decline in repurchases by US firms far exceeds a contemporaneous decline in repurchases by Canadian firms, is large in a historical context, and is not driven by firm fundamentals. Tax-induced cuts to repurchases are associated with an increase in cash but no increase in investment, implying that the tax has not generated the stated policy objective.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"95 ","pages":"Article 102881"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2025-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144908419","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Democracy, dividends, and corporate valuation","authors":"Loc T. Bui","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102879","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102879","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine the impact of institutional democracy on firm value through the lens of dividend policies. Using instrumental variables, we find strong evidence that democracy improves dividends in an international sample of 18,410 unique firms across 63 countries over the 1991–2018 period. This effect is more pronounced for firms with high agency costs, or those in countries with weak legal protection for shareholders. Our evidence is robust to alternative measures of democracy and a battery of tests addressing the challenges associated with the instruments. Furthermore, dividends are capitalized at a higher rate in more democratic countries, especially for firms with high growth options. To the extent that investors are willing to pay a premium for firms that distribute more dividends, the democracy-induced dividends add to corporate value beyond the premium associated with shareholder rights-induced dividends. Overall, our results highlight that institutional democracy is an important, yet unexplored, determinant of corporate valuation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"95 ","pages":"Article 102879"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2025-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145095903","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
José Antonio Pérez-Amuedo , M. Kabir Hassan , Reza Houston
{"title":"The ripple effect: How subsidies transform firm behavior","authors":"José Antonio Pérez-Amuedo , M. Kabir Hassan , Reza Houston","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102880","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102880","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study examines how government support influences firm behavior across profitability, investment, and employment. Using a comprehensive database linking local, state, and federal subsidies to firm-level financial data, we assess how different subsidy types shape firm decisions. We find that cost-reducing subsidies are more effective than revenue-increasing ones in boosting profitability, employment, and strategic investment. Firms that commit to hiring or capital investment upon receiving subsidies achieve superior outcomes. These findings highlight the importance of aligning subsidy design with firm-level incentives and broader economic goals.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"95 ","pages":"Article 102880"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2025-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144916992","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}