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Majority-of-the-minority shareholder votes and investment efficiency 少数服从多数的股东投票与投资效率
IF 7.2 1区 经济学
Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2024-08-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102656
Ning Cao , Paul B. McGuinness , Chao Xi
{"title":"Majority-of-the-minority shareholder votes and investment efficiency","authors":"Ning Cao ,&nbsp;Paul B. McGuinness ,&nbsp;Chao Xi","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102656","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102656","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In an environment where concentrated share ownership is the norm, we ask whether Majority-of-the-Minority (MoM) votes curb controlling shareholder overreach and investment inefficiency. We consider MoM votes on controller-based related party transactions in China. Such votes give minority parties potential veto power. We report strong association between shareholder disapprovals on controller-based investment related MoM proposals and the underlying entity's investment plans. This association is robust to a battery of tests, including assessment of pre-vote consultation between minority and controlling shareholders and an exogenous regulatory shock. We also report increased likelihood of informal securities enforcements in the year following MoM shareholder disapproval.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102656"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2024-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142238120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Insider pledging: Its information content and forced sale 内部人员质押：其信息内容和强制出售
IF 7.2 1区 经济学
Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2024-08-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102655
Hung-Kun Chen , Shing-yang Hu
{"title":"Insider pledging: Its information content and forced sale","authors":"Hung-Kun Chen ,&nbsp;Shing-yang Hu","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102655","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102655","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper investigates the information content of insider pledging and the forced sale of pledged shares using U.S. data. Contrary to warnings from proxy advisors and the media about insider pledging and suggestions for its prohibition, our findings show that insider pledging announcements do not negatively impact shareholder wealth. Firms with insider pledging experience positive one-year abnormal stock returns and higher future profitability after the disclosure of pledging, indicating that insider pledging signals a firm's better growth prospects. These positive abnormal returns observed after the disclosure of insider pledging are more pronounced in firms with better corporate governance and are associated with pledging by certain insiders with superior information. In addition, we find that the stock price does not significantly decline following the forced sale of pledged shares, indicating that the forced sale does not pose downside risks for shareholders. Overall, our results suggest that insider pledging is not detrimental to shareholder value in the U.S., contrary to findings reported in the literature on emerging markets.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102655"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2024-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142096876","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Corruption and insider trading 腐败和内幕交易
IF 7.2 1区 经济学
Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2024-08-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102654
Kyriacos Kyriacou, Siming Liu, Bryan Mase
{"title":"Corruption and insider trading","authors":"Kyriacos Kyriacou,&nbsp;Siming Liu,&nbsp;Bryan Mase","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102654","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102654","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We investigate firm corruption in China by extracting a measure of corruption from published financial statements and use this to demonstrate that corruption impacts the trading decisions of insiders. Specifically, we show that insiders in firms that are more corrupt trade more aggressively, and they are more willing to trade on their private information as evidenced by the increased informativeness of their trades, in respect of both purchases and sales. This link between firm corruption and trade informativeness is robust to the inclusion of a number of factors that are known to influence the informativeness of such trades, including trade characteristics, insider characteristics and the firm's information environment. We also consider the effect of the appointment of a new CEO or Chair. Overall, corruption related trade informativeness holds consistently for both purchases and sales. Finally, we show that this measure of corruption is robust to the inclusion of several alternative indicators of corporate misconduct.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102654"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2024-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119924001160/pdfft?md5=8f40da7b3891ff79e3a61d9c116bdf1a&pid=1-s2.0-S0929119924001160-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142096973","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Do options trading activities affect underlying firms' asymmetric cost behavior? 期权交易活动是否会影响标的公司的非对称成本行为？
IF 7.2 1区 经济学
Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2024-08-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102657
Mohammad Hendijani Zadeh , Zahra Jalali
{"title":"Do options trading activities affect underlying firms' asymmetric cost behavior?","authors":"Mohammad Hendijani Zadeh ,&nbsp;Zahra Jalali","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102657","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102657","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We investigate whether options trading activities affect underlying firms' degree of cost stickiness. Using a panel of US companies, we find that options trading activities reduce the underlying firms' level of cost stickiness. Our findings are robust to alternative proxies for options trading activities and cost stickiness, two-stage least-squares regression, and two quasi-natural experiments. Additional analyses indicate that the negative effect of options trading activities on cost stickiness is more pronounced for firms with higher availability of cash flows and lower corporate governance and audit quality. Finally, we implement a mediator analysis and show that higher options trading activities improve underlying firms' investment efficiency as they have more efficient corporate resource allocation via lower levels of cost stickiness. Overall, our results underscore the monitoring and governance role of options trading activities in enhancing underlying firms' information environment and limiting their insiders' opportunistic behaviors, resulting in fewer corporate resource misallocation activities via reduced degrees of cost stickiness.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"88 ","pages":"Article 102657"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2024-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142087015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Do buy-side analysts in earnings conference calls manipulate stock prices? 买方分析师在财报电话会议上操纵股价吗？
IF 7.2 1区 经济学
Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2024-08-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102652
Gang Hu , Michael J. Jung , M.H. Franco Wong , Danlei Bonnie Yu , X. Frank Zhang
{"title":"Do buy-side analysts in earnings conference calls manipulate stock prices?","authors":"Gang Hu ,&nbsp;Michael J. Jung ,&nbsp;M.H. Franco Wong ,&nbsp;Danlei Bonnie Yu ,&nbsp;X. Frank Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102652","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102652","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We investigate the generalizability of widely perceived notions that buy-side analysts try to influence or manipulate a firm’s stock price by praising or criticizing management during a public earnings conference call. Despite two institutional factors that make it difficult to detect empirically, we find some evidence of stock influence behavior by using a combination of data on conference call transcripts and trading by the institutions that employ the buy-side analysts. However, we also find evidence consistent with the null hypothesis that buy-side analysts are acquiring information rather than manipulating the stock price. Subsample analyses suggest that stock influence is more detectable among hedge funds, while information acquisition is the norm among traditional buy-and-hold institutions. The evidence we provide on each behavior should be of interest to firm managers who host conference calls, market participants who use conference calls to collect company information, as well as regulators who monitor for possible market manipulation.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102652"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2024-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119924001147/pdfft?md5=84a4f645e8bd481a6241d78b66727594&pid=1-s2.0-S0929119924001147-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142164617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Navigating through cyberattacks: The role of tax aggressiveness 穿越网络攻击：税收积极性的作用
IF 7.2 1区 经济学
Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2024-08-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102649
Anh-Tuan Le , Henry Hongren Huang , Trung K. Do
{"title":"Navigating through cyberattacks: The role of tax aggressiveness","authors":"Anh-Tuan Le ,&nbsp;Henry Hongren Huang ,&nbsp;Trung K. Do","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102649","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102649","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This research investigates the impact of cyberattacks on tax aggressiveness using a difference-in-differences analysis with a matched sample. We find that firms experiencing cyberattacks are more likely to have lower cash effective tax rates and greater discretionary book-tax differences. We further show that cyberattacks have a greater impact on corporate tax aggressiveness when firms are more exposed to financial distress. Additional analyses show tax aggressiveness increases less when firms are in states with enactments of notification laws and firms with ex ante higher cybersecurity investment. Our aggregate results suggest that firms take more tax risky positions in response to greater financial distress and information asymmetry, which are attributed to the consequences of cyberattacks.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"88 ","pages":"Article 102649"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2024-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142084330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Pledgeability and bank lending technology 可质押性和银行借贷技术
IF 7.2 1区 经济学
Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2024-08-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102650
Tobias Dieler , Wei Zhai
{"title":"Pledgeability and bank lending technology","authors":"Tobias Dieler ,&nbsp;Wei Zhai","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102650","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102650","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>What is the effect of an expansion of eligible collateral on different lending technologies? We show that expanding eligible collateral (i) increases transactional (T) banks’ interest income and decreases relationship (R) banks’ interest income, (ii) increases average loan volume more for T- than for R-banks, (iii) decreases average loan risk and (iv) decreases T-banks’ non-interest income while it increases R-banks’ non-interest income. (v) In sum, T-banks’ profitability increases and R-bank’s profitability remains unaffected. Expanding the set of collateral from immovable to movable assets typically benefits SMEs because it allows them to obtain secured loans instead of unsecured ones. A-priori, it is unclear whether SMEs will continue borrowing from R-banks or switch to T-banks. R-banks benefit from customer relationships and T-banks have the collateral screening technology in place. We show that competition between T- and R-banks gives T-banks a comparative advantage, but R-banks can substitute lost interest income with non-interest income.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"88 ","pages":"Article 102650"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2024-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142084331","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Pre-IPO hype by affiliated analysts: Motives and consequences 关联分析师在首次公开募股前的炒作：动机与后果
IF 7.2 1区 经济学
Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2024-08-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102648
Yiming Qian , Xinjian Shao , Jingchi Liao
{"title":"Pre-IPO hype by affiliated analysts: Motives and consequences","authors":"Yiming Qian ,&nbsp;Xinjian Shao ,&nbsp;Jingchi Liao","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102648","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102648","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We provide the first study of underwriter-affiliated analysts' <em>pre-IPO</em> research coverage and its impact on stock prices. Using proprietary data on a sample of Chinese IPOs, we document that affiliated analysts make highly overoptimistic forecasts about IPO clients. Analyst hype inflates both the offer price and the aftermarket price. Consistent with the sentiment theory, IPO investors inadequately adjust to analyst hype because the offer price is set sufficiently lower than the aftermarket price. The results hold when we instrument analyst hype with a variable that affects their hyping incentive. We also utilize a regulatory change as a quasi-experiment. Our analysis contributes to the debate about regulations on pre-IPO information provision.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102648"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2024-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142122031","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Shadow union in local labor markets and corporate financing policies 当地劳动力市场的影子工会与企业融资政策
IF 7.2 1区 经济学
Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2024-08-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102644
DuckKi Cho, Lyungmae Choi
{"title":"Shadow union in local labor markets and corporate financing policies","authors":"DuckKi Cho,&nbsp;Lyungmae Choi","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102644","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102644","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper identifies an externality of a firm’s unionization that affects the financing decisions of non-unionized firms within a local labor market. We find that non-unionized firms increase their leverage ratios and hold less cash reserves following a union victory at other firms. This “shadow union” effect manifests through the heightened threat of unionization following shadow union organizing. Specifically, the effect is more pronounced when the probability of unionization rises by a larger margin and non-union firms face higher union rents conditional on being unionized. The threat appears credible enough to shape corporate financing decisions: shadow unions raise employees’ wages and the likelihood of subsequent union victories in the local labor market. Additional results indicate that the shadow union effect is distinct from leverage-mimicking behavior. Overall, our findings suggest that shadow labor market institutions create a strategic incentive for non-unionized firms to adopt less conservative financial policies to combat the union threat.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102644"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2024-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119924001068/pdfft?md5=2fda512df547918169a73621a4818e43&pid=1-s2.0-S0929119924001068-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142128518","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The role of the end time in experimental asset markets 结束时间在试验性资产市场中的作用
IF 7.2 1区 经济学
Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2024-08-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102647
Anita Kopányi-Peuker , Matthias Weber
{"title":"The role of the end time in experimental asset markets","authors":"Anita Kopányi-Peuker ,&nbsp;Matthias Weber","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102647","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102647","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>There are hundreds of scientific articles on experimental asset markets. Almost all of them use a short and definite horizon. This may be one of the starkest differences between experimental settings and real-world financial markets, which usually have indefinite and comparatively long horizons. We analyze the implications of different end time assumptions in an asset market experiment in which we vary the length of the horizon and whether the end time is definite or indefinite. We find very similar price dynamics with recurring bubbles in all treatments.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"88 ","pages":"Article 102647"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2024-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119924001093/pdfft?md5=1f83be1d81741cf4b3c9a97716d9987e&pid=1-s2.0-S0929119924001093-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142012122","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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