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Anti-collusion leniency legislations and IPO activity: Worldwide evidence 反合谋宽大处理法与 IPO 活动：全球证据
IF 7.2 1区 经济学
Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2024-10-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102691
Huu Nhan Duong , Abhinav Goyal , Leon Zolotoy
{"title":"Anti-collusion leniency legislations and IPO activity: Worldwide evidence","authors":"Huu Nhan Duong ,&nbsp;Abhinav Goyal ,&nbsp;Leon Zolotoy","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102691","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102691","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the impact of the staggered adoption of anti-collusion leniency legislations around the world on IPO activity. We document that the passage of leniency legislations prompts IPO activity. The effect is amplified in more concentrated industries, while it is mitigated in countries with more stringent competition laws in place and countries in which investors have a lower ability to diversify risk in the financial market. Collectively, these findings are consistent with the view that, by enhancing product market competition, leniency legislations increase the benefits for firms from going public, resulting in higher IPO activity. The results of supplemental analyses suggest that the passage of leniency legislations leads to less underpriced IPOs and a more efficient use of IPO proceeds, and prompts firms with less proprietary information to go public.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102691"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2024-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142592923","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Reserves regulation and the risk-taking channel 储备金监管与风险承担渠道
IF 7.2 1区 经济学
Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2024-10-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102689
Manthos Delis , Sotirios Kokas , Alexandros Kontonikas
{"title":"Reserves regulation and the risk-taking channel","authors":"Manthos Delis ,&nbsp;Sotirios Kokas ,&nbsp;Alexandros Kontonikas","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102689","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102689","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine how a policy change by the FDIC, which unexpectedly exempted some banks, affects corporate lending via changes in reserves during the Quantitative Easing (QE) era. To address the endogeneity of reserves, we use a unique hand-collected dataset on the bank’s share of exemption from the policy shift, and differentiate between loan demand and loan supply. We find important differences in loan-level outcomes, attributed to the heterogeneous impact of the new regulation on the net return on holding reserves. The effectiveness of the risk-taking channel is significantly weaker for banks with larger exemption shares and this has real effects in terms of borrowers’ leverage, growth, and return on assets.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102689"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2024-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142586514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Private equity buyouts & firm exporting in crisis periods: Exploring a new channel 危机时期的私募股权收购与企业出口：探索新渠道
IF 7.2 1区 经济学
Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2024-10-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102686
Paul Lavery , Marina-Eliza Spaliara , Holger Görg
{"title":"Private equity buyouts & firm exporting in crisis periods: Exploring a new channel","authors":"Paul Lavery ,&nbsp;Marina-Eliza Spaliara ,&nbsp;Holger Görg","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102686","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102686","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines whether private equity (PE)-backed companies are better able to remain active on export markets compared to similar non-PE firms, when hit by a negative shock. We look at two such recent shocks, namely the global financial crisis (GFC) and COVID-19 pandemic. We construct two matched samples, one for each crisis period, to assess the resilience of exporting under PE ownership in recessionary periods. We then explore how improvements in working capital management allow PE-backed firms to engage in international activities and maintain their export relationships relative to similar, non-PE-backed firms. Our results show that the export activities of PE-backed firms are significantly more resilient to the effects of the GFC but less pronounced following COVID-19. PE investment enhances working capital management, which in turn improves the persistence in export markets at the onset of the crises.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102686"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2024-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142572505","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Sibling co-management and cost of capital: Evidence from Chinese listed family firms 兄弟姐妹共同管理与资本成本：来自中国上市家族企业的证据
IF 7.2 1区 经济学
Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2024-10-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102690
Nianhang Xu , Danwen Song , Rongrong Xie , Kam C. Chan
{"title":"Sibling co-management and cost of capital: Evidence from Chinese listed family firms","authors":"Nianhang Xu ,&nbsp;Danwen Song ,&nbsp;Rongrong Xie ,&nbsp;Kam C. Chan","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102690","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102690","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study whether sibling co-management affects the cost of capital for family firms in China. We find that sibling co-management strongly correlates with a lower cost of capital. We identify three mechanisms through which sibling co-managers (including directors) influence the cost of capital: providing coinsurance, enhancing corporate governance, and facilitating communication with investors. Furthermore, the effect is more pronounced for firms operating in regions with weaker legal environments and firms with auditors from non-Big 4 accounting firms. However, sibling co-management may also hinder external financing due to higher uncertainty during family power transfer periods. In addition, the value of sibling co-management is more salient for financially constrained firms and those in which at least one of the co-manager siblings has a finance background. Overall, the findings suggest that family firms benefit from sibling co-management, resulting in a lower cost of capital, despite the challenges that arise during family power transfer.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102690"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2024-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142572504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Long-term institutional investors and climate change news Beta 长期机构投资者与气候变化新闻贝塔
IF 7.2 1区 经济学
Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2024-10-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102693
Ashrafee Hossain , Abdullah-Al Masum , Ramzi Benkraiem
{"title":"Long-term institutional investors and climate change news Beta","authors":"Ashrafee Hossain ,&nbsp;Abdullah-Al Masum ,&nbsp;Ramzi Benkraiem","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102693","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102693","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We predict and confirm that long-term institutional investors (LTIOs) play an important role in mitigating the negative market perceptions of US stocks following mainstream print media coverage of climate change. We observe a stronger effect of LTIOs for companies that lack corporate social responsibility and have less diverse and more co-opted boards. Overall, these findings indicate that the US equity market views LTIOs as effective monitors who can help guide companies facing climate risks toward a more sustainable trajectory.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102693"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2024-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142572619","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The real effects of distressed bank mergers 不良银行兼并的实际影响
IF 7.2 1区 经济学
Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2024-10-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102674
Valeriya Dinger , Christian Schmidt , Erik Theissen
{"title":"The real effects of distressed bank mergers","authors":"Valeriya Dinger ,&nbsp;Christian Schmidt ,&nbsp;Erik Theissen","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102674","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102674","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We show that distressed bank mergers that are a widely used instrument for bank resolution have the potential to generate adverse real economic effects. We analyze distressed mergers of German savings banks and show that they represent exogenous shocks to the (initially non-distressed) acquiring bank. In the years after a distressed merger: (i) the performance of the acquiring savings bank deteriorates; (ii) the shock is transmitted to firms in the acquirer’s region which cut back their investments and reduce employment and (iii) the overall macroeconomic dynamics in the region of the acquirer deteriorates, leading to reductions in investment and employment growth. To support a causal interpretation of our results we perform several tests that confirm that local economic dynamics is affected by the shock to the acquiring bank and not by real economic contagion.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102674"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2024-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142592924","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Does litigation risk matter for the choice between bank debt and public debt? 诉讼风险对银行债务和公共债务之间的选择是否重要？
IF 7.2 1区 经济学
Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2024-10-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102688
H. Kent Baker , Hatem Rjiba , Samir Saadi , Syrine Sassi
{"title":"Does litigation risk matter for the choice between bank debt and public debt?","authors":"H. Kent Baker ,&nbsp;Hatem Rjiba ,&nbsp;Samir Saadi ,&nbsp;Syrine Sassi","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102688","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102688","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine the impact of liberal judge ideology, as an exogenous proxy for litigation risk, on firms' choice of debt structure. In line with the substitution of governance mechanisms hypothesis, we find that U.S. firms headquartered in circuits dominated by liberal judges rely less on bank debt financing. We also show that the substitution away from bank borrowing arising from liberal judge ideology leads to a greater reliance on other financing alternatives, such as public debt and equity financing. Additional analyses indicate that the effect of liberal judge ideology is amplified for firms operating in competitive markets, firms facing tighter financial constraints, and firms with more growth opportunities. The governance substitution effect is, however, less pronounced for firms with higher institutional ownership. Overall, our findings suggest that, by exacerbating litigation risk, liberal judge ideology induces firms to trade-off creditor governance stemming from bank debt with governance by litigation, thus decreasing their reliance on bank debt in favor of alternative financing sources with less strict constraints and lower monitoring of managerial behavior.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102688"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2024-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142572503","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
State ownership and financial reporting quality: Evidence from natural advantage industries 国有制与财务报告质量：来自天然优势产业的证据
IF 7.2 1区 经济学
Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2024-10-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102687
Narjess Boubakri , Art Durnev , Igor Oliveira dos Santos
{"title":"State ownership and financial reporting quality: Evidence from natural advantage industries","authors":"Narjess Boubakri ,&nbsp;Art Durnev ,&nbsp;Igor Oliveira dos Santos","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102687","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102687","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Using a hand-collected sample of state-owned enterprises and newly privatized firms around the globe, we examine financial reporting quality in natural advantage (substantial oil reserves or mineral deposits) industries. We find that ultimate state ownership tends to deteriorate financial reporting quality. Such a finding tends to occur particularly in countries with low shareholder minority protection, low financial development, high resource extraction intensity, low freedom of the press, collectivist societies, poor government anti-diversion policies, and in resource-dependent countries. Finally, we document that ultimate state ownership in the context of better financial reporting quality is associated with exacerbated capital expenditures, which indicate resource overextraction. Such a finding applies particularly to resource-dependent countries and civil-law countries.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"91 ","pages":"Article 102687"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2024-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143148110","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The fed information shocks and the market for corporate control: Predictive and causal effects 美联储信息冲击与公司控制权市场：预测效应和因果效应
IF 7.2 1区 经济学
Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2024-10-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102681
Samer Adra , Leonidas G. Barbopoulos , Anthony Saunders
{"title":"The fed information shocks and the market for corporate control: Predictive and causal effects","authors":"Samer Adra ,&nbsp;Leonidas G. Barbopoulos ,&nbsp;Anthony Saunders","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102681","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102681","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We show that contractionary monetary shocks, when reflecting a positive macroeconomic assessment by the Federal Reserve (hereafter “Fed”), predict an economic environment that is characterized by (a) a rise in M&amp;A activity, (b) a higher likelihood of M&amp;A completion, (c) larger bidder gains, (d) limited concerns about M&amp;A overpayment, and (e) higher premia offered by foreign bidders to U.S. targets. Further, Fed information shocks have a standalone and direct causal effect on market expectations of M&amp;A gains. That is, positive Fed information shocks trigger a positive revaluation of pending M&amp;A. This revaluation effect, which holds after controlling for macroeconomic conditions and changes in economic forecasts, is more pronounced in deals that are relatively large, financed with stock, and have received a negative initial market reaction. Overall, our results highlight the independent and credible signaling role of the Fed in the realm of M&amp;A.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"90 ","pages":"Article 102681"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2024-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142721700","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The gender gap in executive promotions 高管晋升中的性别差距
IF 7.2 1区 经济学
Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2024-10-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102680
Jing Xu
{"title":"The gender gap in executive promotions","authors":"Jing Xu","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102680","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102680","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines whether there is a gender promotion gap among executives. Using a comprehensive dataset of executives, I find that women’s promotion probability is 16% lower than men’s after controlling for educational and employment background, age, function, rank, and firm characteristics. The gap occurs partially because women are clustered in positions that support the business rather than positions with profit-and-loss responsibilities. Additionally, my analysis shows that product market competition, public attention on gender diversity, a respectful corporate culture, and board gender diversity alleviate the gender promotion gap. These findings support the notion that demand-side factors continue to hinder women’s advancement to leadership positions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102680"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2,"publicationDate":"2024-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142652156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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