Does stakeholder orientation mitigate shareholder-employee conflicts? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment

IF 7.2 1区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2025-01-07 DOI:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102736

Douglas Cumming , Fanyu Lu , Limin Xu , Chia-Feng (Jeffrey) Yu

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Abstract

This paper examines the influence of stakeholder orientation on the shareholder-employee conflict characterized by the propensity of firms to engage in share purchases and leave employee pensions underfunded. Utilizing the enactment of US state-level constituency statutes, we find that firms in states that have adopted constituency statutes exhibit a weaker share repurchase-pension underfunding propensity, especially those with high default risk. The mechanism is through union intervention and labor representatives on boards. The effect is moderated for firms headquartered in high-social-capital regions, operating with higher human capital, possessing a history of employee litigation, and maintaining lower and short-horizon institutional ownership. After implementing constituency statutes, share repurchase announcements are associated with lower returns for firms with higher pension deficits. Our findings suggest that stakeholder orientation can discipline the shareholder-employee conflict.

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利益相关者导向是否能缓解股东-员工冲突？来自准自然实验的证据

本文考察了利益相关者取向对股东-员工冲突的影响，其特征是企业倾向于购买股票和员工养老金不足。利用美国州级选区法规的制定，我们发现采用选区法规的州的公司表现出较弱的股票回购-养老金资金不足倾向，特别是那些违约风险较高的公司。这种机制是通过工会干预和工会代表进入董事会来实现的。对于总部位于高社会资本地区、人力资本较高、员工诉讼历史悠久、机构所有权较低且短期的公司，这种影响有所缓和。在实施选区法规后，股票回购公告与较高养老金赤字的公司的较低回报相关。我们的研究结果表明，利益相关者导向可以约束股东-员工冲突。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of Corporate Finance BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

11.80

自引率

3.30%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Corporate Finance aims to publish high quality, original manuscripts that analyze issues related to corporate finance. Contributions can be of a theoretical, empirical, or clinical nature. Topical areas of interest include, but are not limited to: financial structure, payout policies, corporate restructuring, financial contracts, corporate governance arrangements, the economics of organizations, the influence of legal structures, and international financial management. Papers that apply asset pricing and microstructure analysis to corporate finance issues are also welcome.