Contemporary Accounting Research最新文献_第6页

Talking down the competitors: How do investment banking relationships influence analysts' forecasts? 贬低竞争对手：投行关系如何影响分析师的预测？

IF 3.2 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-01-23 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.13018

Fangbo Si, Xiaoxu Yu, Huai Zhang

引用次数: 0

Preventing fraudulent financial reporting with reputational signals of strategic auditors 利用战略审计师的声誉信号防止虚假财务报告

IF 3.2 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-01-17 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.13012

Chezham (Chez) L. Sealy, Chad A. Simon

{"title":"Preventing fraudulent financial reporting with reputational signals of strategic auditors","authors":"Chezham (Chez) L. Sealy, Chad A. Simon","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.13012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.13012","url":null,"abstract":"Financial reporting fraud continues to cost companies millions of dollars annually and is a major source of concern for regulators, stakeholders, and auditors. While academic research has largely focused on external auditors' fraud detection efforts, we analyze whether auditors can help prevent occurrences of fraud through low-cost reputational signals of higher “strategic reasoning”; strategic reasoning refers to strategies that individuals take in light of the anticipated actions of others (see van der Hoek et al., 2005, A logic for strategic reasoning, AAMAS '05, 157−164). Specifically, we consider the potential impact on manager behavior of signaling whether audit professionals use zero-, first-, and second-order audit approaches. Zero-order audit approaches involve making decisions based mostly on the auditor's incentives, first-order approaches involve decisions based mostly on the client's incentives, and second- or higher-order audit approaches involve decisions based on the client's incentives while recognizing that the client will respond to the auditor's decisions (see Wilks & Zimbelman, 2004, Accounting Horizons, 18(3), 173–184). Using a context-rich experiment in which manager participants have no history of interacting with the auditor, we find that the likelihood of fraud occurring is lower when it is signaled that audit partners and their teams use a first- or second-order strategic audit approach compared to a zero-order approach, due to an increase in the perceived likelihood of the auditor detecting fraud. We also consider whether signaling an auditor's level of strategic reasoning influences the level of effort used to conceal fraud and find an increase in the expected level of fraud effort for managers in the first- and second-order audit conditions.","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"42 1","pages":"649-672"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2025-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143645676","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Improvements in investment efficiency prior to a mandated accounting change: Evidence from ASC 842 强制性会计变更前投资效率的改进：来自ASC 842的证据

IF 3.2 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-01-09 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.13007

Derek Christensen, Daniel P. Lynch, Clay Partridge

{"title":"Improvements in investment efficiency prior to a mandated accounting change: Evidence from ASC 842","authors":"Derek Christensen, Daniel P. Lynch, Clay Partridge","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.13007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.13007","url":null,"abstract":"Prior literature on the relationship between financial reporting and investment efficiency generally overlooks the connection between firms' financial and managerial reporting systems. As a result, it is difficult to determine whether increases in the quality of firms' internal information environments (IIQ) and/or the quality of their external information environments (EIQ) explain improvements in investment efficiency following financial reporting changes. Leveraging the transition window to the new lease standard (Accounting Standards Codification [ASC] 842), we use a difference-in-differences design and find that firms that materially change their internal controls due to ASC 842 (treatment firms) significantly improve their investment efficiency in the final year of the transition window. Multiple falsification tests rule out that contemporaneous improvements in treatment firms' EIQ explain our finding. Additional channel analyses suggest the increases in IIQ for treatment firms predominantly alleviate moral hazard risk between central and divisional managers within the firm, leading to a reduction in empire building. Our findings extend the literature on the relationship between financial reporting and investment efficiency. They also contribute to the literature on the consequences of ASC 842 by answering the FASB's call for research on how ASC 842 affects firms' asset utilizations.","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"42 1","pages":"615-648"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2025-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143645881","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The consequences of expanded audit reports for small and risky companies 扩大审计报告对小型和高风险公司的影响

IF 3.2 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-01-02 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.13011

Elizabeth Gutierrez, Miguel Minutti-Meza, Kay W. Tatum, Maria Vulcheva

{"title":"The consequences of expanded audit reports for small and risky companies","authors":"Elizabeth Gutierrez, Miguel Minutti-Meza, Kay W. Tatum, Maria Vulcheva","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.13011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.13011","url":null,"abstract":"The United Kingdom mandated expanded audit reports in two waves, starting in 2013 and 2017, respectively. Prior studies of the first wave, which included large and highly regulated companies, concluded that expanded reports have limited incremental value. We focus on the second wave, which included companies listed on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). The AIM is characterized by emerging companies that are smaller, riskier, and subject to lighter regulatory requirements and to private monitoring. We examine whether investors and other stakeholders benefit from expanded reports in this setting. We document that AIM companies have shorter expanded reports and fewer key audit matters. Next, we demonstrate that these reports have negligible incremental information value for investors or consequences for the quality and cost of audits. Finally, although we find that some variations in the expanded reports' content are associated with investor reactions to the annual report and with audit fees, variations in external monitoring and company size do not play an incremental role. By focusing on a set of companies with weaker information environments, our findings help to extend the conclusions from prior studies about the limited incremental value of expanded reports.","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"42 1","pages":"576-614"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2025-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.13011","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143646155","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Cost-benefit trade-offs in acquirers' goodwill valuations 收购方商誉估值中的成本效益权衡

IF 3.2 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-01-02 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.13010

Lisa Koonce, Sara Toynbee, Brian J. White

引用次数: 0

CEO (in)activism and investor decisions CEO的行动主义和投资者的决策

IF 3.2 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-12-30 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.13004

Michael T. Durney, Joseph A. Johnson, Roshan K. Sinha, Donald Young

{"title":"CEO (in)activism and investor decisions","authors":"Michael T. Durney, Joseph A. Johnson, Roshan K. Sinha, Donald Young","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.13004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.13004","url":null,"abstract":"Many CEOs engage in activism by publicly expressing their views on social, environmental, and political issues, while other CEOs refrain from doing so—a behavior we term CEO inactivism. We use two experiments to examine how CEO (in)activism impacts investor decisions. Our results are consistent with our theoretical predictions. When a CEO expresses an activist position that is consistent versus inconsistent with investors' views, investors invest more in the CEO's firm because they perceive the CEO more positively. We also find that CEO inactivism can lead to investment decisions that are as favorable as when the CEO expresses a position consistent with investors' views; our process evidence suggests that this may occur because CEO inactivism increases the likelihood that investors believe the CEO shares their position on a social issue. Finally, we do not find evidence that investor decisions are influenced by whether CEO (in)activism is in response to an external prompt. This study contributes to the emerging literature on CEO activism, a unique form of voluntary disclosure, by providing evidence about how CEO (in)activism influences investors. We also contribute to the literature examining the impact of social media disclosure on investor decisions. Finally, our findings have practical implications for CEOs, who increasingly face external pressures to engage in activism.","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"42 1","pages":"525-552"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2024-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.13004","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143646223","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Measuring systemic risk: A financial statement–based approach for insurance firms and banks 衡量系统风险：保险公司和银行基于财务报表的方法

IF 3.2 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-12-27 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.13008

Venkat Peddireddy, Shiva Rajgopal

{"title":"Measuring systemic risk: A financial statement–based approach for insurance firms and banks","authors":"Venkat Peddireddy, Shiva Rajgopal","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.13008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.13008","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce CRISK, a financial statement–based measure, to assess the systemic risk contribution of a financial firm. CRISK measures the capital shortfall of a financial firm conditional on severe distress in the entire system. Our measure complements the market-based measure, SRISK, introduced by Acharya et al. (2012, American Economic Review, 102(3), 59–64) and Brownlees and Engle (2017, Review of Financial Studies, 30(1), 48–79), in identifying systemically risky financial firms. While SRISK provides a timelier assessment using real-time stock market data, CRISK offers a more nuanced approach using accounting information and is tailored to the distinct characteristics of insurance firms and commercial banks. Our empirical analysis shows that (1) compared to CRISK, SRISK tends to overestimate capital shortfalls for insurance firms and for banks that hold a substantial portion of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation–insured deposits while underestimating capital shortfalls for banks heavily reliant on uninsured deposits; (2) CRISK estimates of capital shortfall closely align with the actual capital injections received by financial firms during the financial crisis of 2007–2009; and (3) CRISK exhibits a significant positive correlation with short interest. Based on our findings, we recommend using SRISK as an initial screening tool to identify potential systemically risky financial firms, followed by refining the list and validating the expected capital shortfall using CRISK.","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"42 1","pages":"490-524"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2024-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.13008","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143646288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

“No comment”: Language frictions and the IASB's due process “无可奉告”：语言摩擦与IASB的正当程序

IF 3.2 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-12-16 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.13001

Eduardo Flores, Brian R. Monsen, Emily Shafron, Christopher G. Yust

引用次数: 0

The impact of the classified voting system on corporate investment and equity value 分类投票制度对公司投资和股权价值的影响

IF 3.2 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-12-11 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.13002

Qinglu Jin, Sirui Wu

{"title":"The impact of the classified voting system on corporate investment and equity value","authors":"Qinglu Jin, Sirui Wu","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.13002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.13002","url":null,"abstract":"Granting decision rights to minority shareholders protects them from expropriation by controlling shareholders, but it simultaneously fosters a mismatch between decision rights and decision-relevant information. Using the setting of China's classified voting system (CVS), which requires minority shareholder approval for managerial proposals, this study investigates the effect of such a regulation on investment responsiveness to profitability and equity value attributable to growth options. Following the real-options-based valuation model, we document that the adoption of CVS diminishes both investment responsiveness and equity value. This reduction is attributed to heightened financial constraints following the CVS implementation. Further analyses show the negative impacts are more pronounced for firms experiencing greater information asymmetry, lower mutual fund holdings, and severe agency conflicts. Our evidence indicates that the efficacy of the regulation is contingent on the alignment between decision rights of minority shareholders and decision-relevant information available to them. Our findings thus provide insights to the regulators regarding the advantages and disadvantages of allowing minority shareholders direct influence over corporate decision-making.","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"42 1","pages":"391-417"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2024-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143645749","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Is more always better? An experimental examination of the effects of feedback frequency, narcissistic oversensitivity, and growth mindset on performance accuracy 越多越好吗？反馈频率、自恋过度敏感和成长心态对绩效准确性影响的实验研究

IF 3.2 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-12-11 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.13005

Joseph A. Johnson, Khim Kelly, Wioleta Olczak

{"title":"Is more always better? An experimental examination of the effects of feedback frequency, narcissistic oversensitivity, and growth mindset on performance accuracy","authors":"Joseph A. Johnson, Khim Kelly, Wioleta Olczak","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.13005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.13005","url":null,"abstract":"The provision of more frequent feedback to employees is increasing, although prior research has found mixed results as to the effect of increased feedback frequency on employee performance. Narcissism research identifies narcissistic oversensitivity as a key narcissistic subdimension that may result in particularly strong responses to performance feedback. We predict and find in an experiment that increased performance feedback frequency has a more negative impact on the performance accuracy of individuals with higher levels of narcissistic oversensitivity and that this negative interactive effect of feedback frequency and narcissistic oversensitivity is mitigated by the priming of a growth mindset. These results should be of practical interest to firms as they design their management control systems to improve employee performance, considering the variation in narcissistic oversensitivity among their employees. These results also contribute to recent accounting research on the effects of feedback frequency and employee mindsets.","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"42 1","pages":"418-445"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2024-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.13005","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143645791","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0