Contemporary Accounting Research最新文献

{"title":"Does analyst participation in earnings conference calls curb real activities earnings management?","authors":"Yuan Ji,&nbsp;Oded Rozenbaum","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.70015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.70015","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Sell-side equity analysts serve as external monitors, yet evidence on how they fulfill this monitoring role remains limited. We examine whether analysts utilize earnings conference calls to monitor firms suspected of real earnings management and assess the implications of such monitoring. Our findings reveal that analysts are more likely to ask about discretionary expenses during conference calls of firms suspected of lowering these expenses to meet or narrowly beat analysts' expectations. These questions are associated with lower subsequent EPS forecast revisions, indicating a potential cost to managers. Moreover, analysts' questions on discretionary expenses to suspect firms are linked to subsequent increases in discretionary expenses and a lower likelihood of meeting or narrowly beating analysts' earnings expectations in the following 2 years. Overall, our results suggest that analysts' active participation in earnings conference calls potentially discourages managers from engaging in real earnings management.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"43 1","pages":"169-200"},"PeriodicalIF":3.8,"publicationDate":"2026-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.70015","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147567950","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Theory of Investors' Disclosure","authors":"Pingyang Gao,&nbsp;Jinzhi Lu","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.70017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.70017","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We investigate investors' voluntary disclosure decisions under uncertainty about their information endowment. In our model, an investor may receive initial evidence about a target firm. Conditional on learning the initial evidence, the investor may receive additional evidence that helps them interpret the initial evidence. The investor takes a position in the firm's stock, then voluntarily discloses some or all of their findings, and finally closes their position after the disclosure. We present two main findings. First, the investor will always disclose the initial evidence, even though the market is uncertain about whether the investor possesses such evidence. Second, the investor's disclosure strategy of the additional evidence increases stock price volatility: they disclose extreme news and withhold moderate news. Due to the withholding of the additional evidence, misleading disclosure arises as an equilibrium outcome, where the investor's report decreases (increases) price despite their news being good (bad). These results remain robust when considering the target firm's endogenous response to the investor's report.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"43 1","pages":"266-289"},"PeriodicalIF":3.8,"publicationDate":"2026-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147563888","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Who Gets Stitches? The Effects of Rewarding Whistleblowers and Protecting Their Identity on Subsequent Willingness to Work With Others","authors":"Ryan D. Sommerfeldt","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.70025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.70025","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Companies are strongly encouraged to implement whistleblowing programs to help detect and deter misconduct in organizations, but whistleblowers often face ostracism, as their coworkers are less willing to work with them (the whistleblower effect). Rewarding the whistleblower and protecting the whistleblower's identity are two highly recommended features of whistleblowing programs that aim to encourage reporting. Across two experiments, I examine the spillover effects of these whistleblowing program features on how willing employees are to work with their coworkers after reporting occurs. I find that providing a reward to the whistleblower exacerbates the whistleblower effect, leading employees to work even less with the whistleblower (the reward effect). I also find that protecting the whistleblower's identity removes the reward effect but does not remove the whistleblower effect. Instead, the whistleblower effect is extended to neutral coworkers. As a result, when employees do not know the identity of the whistleblower, they view their coworkers less as separate individuals and are less willing to work with everyone in their group.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"43 1","pages":"487-509"},"PeriodicalIF":3.8,"publicationDate":"2026-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147569739","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Nontax Use of Tax Havens: Evidence From Captive Insurance","authors":"Bradford F. Hepfer,&nbsp;Jaron H. Wilde,&nbsp;Ryan J. Wilson","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.70023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.70023","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Corporate tax avoidance is a recurring focus of policy-makers, the media, activist groups, and researchers. This focus often centers on multinational enterprises' (MNEs) use of tax havens, with a wide body of research utilizing MNEs' tax haven use as evidence of corporate tax avoidance activities. However, the common assumption that MNEs operate in tax havens only for tax avoidance purposes overlooks the role tax havens play as homes for captive insurance entities, which allow firms to secure “self” insurance coverage but do not provide obvious differential federal tax benefits. When we remove the effect of captives on tax haven–based measures, we observe a roughly threefold increase in the magnitude of tax savings specifically associated with haven noncaptive activity. We document that nonfinancial firms' use of captive insurance occurs in approximately 11% of firm-years and spans nearly all Fama–French 49 industries. We construct a haven captive use determinants model, with strong discriminatory power and compelling out-of-sample corroboration tests, that future research can employ to account for firms' use of haven captives. Our findings underscore the importance of separating captive and noncaptive-related haven activities.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"43 1","pages":"398-431"},"PeriodicalIF":3.8,"publicationDate":"2026-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147564095","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Turnover experiences in public accounting and alumni's decisions to “give back”","authors":"Lindsay M. Andiola,&nbsp;Derek W. Dalton,&nbsp;Nancy L. Harp","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.70016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.70016","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study examines turnover experiences in public accounting, including the exit phase (from public accountants' initial thoughts of leaving to their exit) and the post-exit phase (from their exit to the present moment) of the turnover process. Drawing on social exchange theory and organizational support theory, we also investigate the relationship between these phases by exploring how turnover characteristics within the exit phase impact alumni's decisions to engage in post-employment citizenship in the post-exit phase (e.g., recommending the firm's services to others). Using the experiential questionnaire method, we rely upon two separate surveys to investigate the turnover process from the perspective of 284 firm alumni (“leavers”) and 83 experienced public accountants (“stayers”). Our process-based research method allows us to gather a large and rich data set that provides multiple perspectives on the turnover experience in public accounting. Our results not only provide insights into the underlying factors influencing turnover but also indicate several places in the turnover decision process where firms can strategically intervene. Finally, our results show that several turnover characteristics within the exit phase impact post-employment citizenship behaviors in the post-exit phase. Consequently, our results demonstrate that the characteristics that drive employees' decisions to leave the firm also play a significant role in shaping their post-employment citizenship behaviors following their departure.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"43 1","pages":"201-235"},"PeriodicalIF":3.8,"publicationDate":"2026-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.70016","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147570274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"An Explanation of Path Analysis and Recommendations for Best Practice","authors":"Clive Lennox,&nbsp;Carmen Payne-Mann","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.70019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.70019","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Path analysis has become increasingly popular, but many studies do not show a deep understanding of how path analysis works or the assumptions on which it relies. In this paper, we explain that path analysis is statistically equivalent to either OLS when the researcher assumes uncorrelated errors, or instrumental variable (IV) estimation when the researcher allows correlated errors and obtains identification using exclusion restrictions. We then identify two problems with the way path analysis is used. First, studies claim that they use path analysis to provide evidence on the causal process, but they assume away endogeneity by imposing the unrealistic assumption of uncorrelated errors. Second, many studies do not explicitly disclose their key assumptions, including the assumptions of uncorrelated errors or exclusion restrictions. This nondisclosure makes it difficult for a reader to determine whether endogeneity is assumed away or whether the study is attempting to address endogeneity. We conclude with detailed guidance for researchers who are considering whether to use path analysis in their research.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"43 1","pages":"290-313"},"PeriodicalIF":3.8,"publicationDate":"2026-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.70019","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147567184","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Losing Control: The Erosion of Disciplinary and Pastoral Power in Accounting Firms","authors":"Oriane Couchoux,&nbsp;Laurence Daoust,&nbsp;Bertrand Malsch","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.70028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.70028","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Accounting firms have traditionally operated as both elite and reinventive institutions that offer a structured and prestigious career path and enforce a deeply transformative socialization process for auditors. However, recent labor market shifts and evolving work preferences are challenging this regime of power, with significant implications for firms and their employees. Drawing on 31 semistructured interviews with auditors in Canada, our study examines how these changes are reshaping power dynamics within accounting firms. First, we find that firms are increasingly struggling to define and produce the <i>ideal</i> auditor. Instead, as we highlight, they are experiencing the emergence of the <i>default auditor</i>, a professional shaped more by labor market constraints and transactional engagement than by traditional firm-driven selection and disciplinary mechanisms. Second, we analyze the erosion of pastoral power (i.e., power rooted in guidance and care) within firms, as staff auditors prioritize <i>the care of the self,</i> while partners and managers (P&amp;Ms) increasingly struggle to establish and sustain pastoral relationships with their subordinates. As a result of this erosion, P&amp;Ms fluctuate between self-sacrifice (i.e., taking on additional responsibilities to compensate for auditors' disengagement) and a growing sense of inequity (i.e., feeling they are giving too much while receiving too little in return). To capture this growing impasse, we develop the concept of <i>disciplinary and pastoral paralysis</i>, a state in which P&amp;Ms can no longer rely on traditional mechanisms of discipline and punishment to enforce norms of professional conduct but also struggle to reinvent new forms of pastoral power. We examine the implications of this loss of control, questioning whether it represents a temporary shift or a more permanent transformation. Finally, we discuss the broader consequences of accounting firms becoming less like <i>normalizing</i> institutions and more like “<i>normal</i>” organizations.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"43 1","pages":"510-533"},"PeriodicalIF":3.8,"publicationDate":"2026-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.70028","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147570103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Redefining the partnership: A study on non-equity partners","authors":"Marie-Laure Vandenhaute,&nbsp;Kris Hardies","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.13077","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.13077","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Over the past decade, the audit profession has significantly increased its use of non-equity partners for private (non-listed) company audits. Such partners lead audit engagements and sign audit reports but do not share in the partnership's profits. Non-equity partner positions were introduced in response to increasing workloads and to retain talented individuals unsuited to or uninterested in equity partnership, either temporarily or permanently. Using data from Big 4 private company audits during the period 2008–2017, our analyses show that equity incentives affect auditors' reporting behavior and their clients' financial reporting quality. Non-equity partners are less likely to issue going-concern opinions to their financially distressed clients, their reporting is less accurate (i.e., more Type II errors), their reporting is less conservative, and their clients' financial reporting is of lower quality (i.e., more frequent reporting of small earnings increases and more tax restatements). We also find that equity incentives mitigate some of the negative effects of fee-based compensation on auditors' reporting behavior. Moreover, our findings suggest that incentives arising from ownership, rather than partners' innate differences or client differences, drive these associations.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"42 4","pages":"2983-3022"},"PeriodicalIF":3.8,"publicationDate":"2025-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145659473","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Managerial responses to changes in fair value accounting for equity securities","authors":"Sehwa Kim,&nbsp;Seil Kim,&nbsp;Carol Marquardt,&nbsp;Dongoh Shin","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.70009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.70009","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Accounting Standards Update (ASU) 2016-01 requires that unrealized gains and losses on equity investments (equity-URGL) previously recognized in other comprehensive income now be included in net income. Using a sample of public insurers, we examine how this accounting standard change influences managerial investment decisions, with a particular focus on the moderating effects of compensation contracting and financial reporting practices. We find that prior to ASU 2016-01, equity-URGL was positively associated with CEO compensation, but this association dissipates in the post-adoption period, when equity-URGL is more frequently excluded from CEO performance metrics. Despite purported concerns about increased earnings volatility due to the new reporting requirements, highly affected insurers do not significantly reduce the size or risk of their equity investment portfolios following ASU 2016-01, particularly when compensation metrics exclude equity-URGL. We also find that equity-URGL is more frequently excluded from non-GAAP earnings post-adoption, suggesting that managers adjust financial reporting practices as a response to the change. Moreover, highly affected insurers maintain the size and risk of their equity portfolios when equity-URGL is excluded from non-GAAP earnings. These findings suggest that managerial responses to ASU 2016-01 are influenced by a balance between incentive structures and the costs associated with adjusting investment strategies.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"42 4","pages":"2949-2982"},"PeriodicalIF":3.8,"publicationDate":"2025-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145659506","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Current expected credit loss model adoption","authors":"Aurelius Aaron,&nbsp;Xiaoli Jia,&nbsp;Jeffrey Ng,&nbsp;Janus Jian Zhang","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.13078","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.13078","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The mandatory switch from the incurred loss model to the more forward-looking current expected credit loss (CECL) model was originally scheduled to begin in 2020. However, when the COVID-19 pandemic started in early 2020, US regulators made the switch voluntary. Our study investigates how banks' exposure to the pandemic affects their decision to adopt CECL as well as adopting banks' pandemic-era pattern of loan loss provisions. First, consistent with pandemic-driven economic uncertainty reducing banks' willingness to adopt the new model, we find a negative association between banks' pandemic exposure and their CECL adoption. This association is more pronounced for banks with more lending opportunities, more lending competition, and worse loan quality. Second, compared with non-adopters, CECL adopters report more loan loss provisions during the pandemic's early period, and less or even negative loan loss provisions during the late period. The latter scenario reflects a reversal of earlier loan loss reserves and is more pronounced for banks with more exposure to states with a higher level of vaccination, consistent with banks having a more positive economic outlook because of improving pandemic conditions. Overall, our study offers useful insights into the adoption and implementation of accounting standards during periods of economic uncertainty.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"42 4","pages":"2915-2948"},"PeriodicalIF":3.8,"publicationDate":"2025-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145659729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}