{"title":"Credit information sharing and investment efficiency: Cross-country evidence","authors":"Fangfang Hou, Muhabie Mekonnen Mengistu, Jeffrey Ng, Janus Jian Zhang","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12972","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1911-3846.12972","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Credit information sharing allows creditors to obtain borrowers' relevant credit information, and it can improve borrowers' investment outcomes that are funded by debt. Using reforms to European countries' public credit registries (PCRs) to capture mandated information sharing among creditors, we examine the impact of such sharing on firms' investment efficiency. We find that information sharing enhances firms' investment efficiency, which we measure by their investment-<i>q</i> sensitivity. This finding is consistent with credit information sharing enabling creditors to better screen borrowers to mitigate adverse selection and enhancing borrower discipline to avoid a bad credit record, which leads to the borrower making more efficient investments. We also document that the information sharing effect is more pronounced when firms rely more on debt financing, when the shared credit information is more accessible, when firms' information environment is more opaque, and when there is a greater information monopoly in the banking system. We offer supplementary evidence that the effect is also more salient when PCRs have characteristics that suggest more effective credit information sharing. Overall, our paper offers new insight into whether and how information sharing in credit markets enhances firms' investment efficiency. More broadly, it highlights how making more borrower information available to creditors can have important economic spillover effects on firm outcomes.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"41 4","pages":"2099-2133"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2024-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.12972","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142179745","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Prospective evaluation of a new audit standard: Expert rhetoric and flexibility in cost-benefit analysis","authors":"Stephanie Donahue, Bertrand Malsch","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12973","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1911-3846.12973","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The objective of this research is to better understand experts' contributions to the prospective evaluation of a new audit standard—in this case, key audit matter (KAM) reporting. To this end, we assisted the Canadian Auditing and Assurance Standards Board by leading its consultation of 22 expert financial statement users. The methodology employed to observe our participants' opinions and cognitive processes involves thought protocol and interviews. By analyzing the rhetorical base of experts' prospective analysis, we show that our participants' arguments are often laden with postulates and lack data points, leading to generalizations. Sounder arguments entail more nuanced views but lead to uncertainties. We therefore highlight a tension between the rhetorical content of experts' insights and the calculative rationality of a cost-benefit analysis. We also find that experts with less cognitive flexibility are less likely to be supportive of the adoption of a standard implying a change of habits in the way they process information. This tension and cognitive bias generate a significant interpretive challenge to determine a clear and dominant stance in the consultation. We discuss the implications of these findings for the legitimacy of prospective evaluations and the conduct of cost-benefit consultations with experts. We also contribute to the literature on KAMs by substantiating concerns about the value of extended auditor reports to users.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"41 4","pages":"2075-2098"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2024-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.12973","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142179746","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"“The client can get caught out”: Tax structure maintainability and the intricacies of tax planning aggressiveness","authors":"Maryse Mayer, Yves Gendron","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12971","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1911-3846.12971","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this field study, we examine tax advisors' decision-making process when developing tax planning arrangements. Through interviews with 40 tax advisors, our analysis indicates that tax savings may come at a price in practice by unveiling adverse post-implementation experiences shared by tax partners. Partners find themselves in a tricky position at the time they form their recommendation as they cannot be certain that their client will be able to “live with their tax structure”—that is, maintain it and cope with the inherent risks once implemented. Their main concern is that their client may “get caught out” by a structure too aggressive or complicated for them, having no control over the client's behavior once the plan is implemented. This has significant implications in the tax planning decision-making process as these concerns shape how partners adapt their work to their client's perceived competency and possibly restrain corporate firms' tax aggressiveness. Following Feller and Schanz (2017, <i>Contemporary Accounting Research</i>, <i>34</i>(1), 494–524), we conceive of this as the fourth hurdle of tax planning— whether a tax structure is maintainable, as perceived by tax advisors—and unpack how it operates. Interestingly, restraining the client's tax planning aggressiveness (and the corresponding potential tax savings) is not necessarily perceived by partners as detrimental to the client relationship. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of tax planning in action, highlighting how tax partners seek to influence their client's tax planning aggressiveness.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"41 4","pages":"2047-2074"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2024-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.12971","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142179748","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Trading off managerial and investor uncertainty in firm disclosure: Evidence from R&D investments and management guidance","authors":"Svenja Dube","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12969","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12969","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Classic disclosure theory suggests that investor uncertainty increases the probability of discretionary disclosure, while managerial uncertainty decreases this disclosure. Because R&D projects are inherently risky, R&D-intensive firms face high managerial uncertainty as well as high investor uncertainty. This paper empirically examines how R&D intensity impacts the provision, horizon, and content of management earnings guidance. To address endogeneity concerns, state-level R&D tax credits serve as an instrumental variable for R&D intensity. I find that high R&D firms do not provide less earnings guidance than low R&D firms. However, they issue more quarterly guidance but less annual guidance. This substitution strengthens when there is high managerial uncertainty about the success of R&D projects. Consistent with litigation risk leading to asymmetric disclosure incentives, the decrease in annual earnings guidance is concentrated in positive guidance. Overall, the results imply that firms modify the horizon and content of their earnings guidance by substituting long-term positive guidance with short-term guidance when managerial uncertainty discourages the issuance of the former.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"41 3","pages":"1986-2012"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2024-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142170055","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Evelyn R. Patterson, J. Reed Smith, Samuel L. Tiras
{"title":"The effects and potential benefits of audit committee oversight in a strategic setting","authors":"Evelyn R. Patterson, J. Reed Smith, Samuel L. Tiras","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12964","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12964","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, many notable frauds have been tied to ineffective audit committee (AC) oversight. As a result, AC oversight is of continuing interest, and regulators continue to debate this issue, garnering a growing body of research focused on the role played by the AC. But little theoretical research exists to guide analytical and empirical researchers investigating AC oversight. The purpose of this study is to provide theoretical guidance by examining AC oversight in a strategic setting. We focus on the AC's role in overseeing internal controls (ICs) and the impact of whether the AC relies on management in designing the controls. We characterize how the nature of control risk changes and how IC strength is associated with the amount of managerial fraud, expected probability of fraud detection (which, on average, equates to audit effort), and audit quality (assessed as 1 − audit risk) across two settings defined by the degree of AC oversight. As one example that highlights the need for theoretical guidance, we consider the literature's presumption that IC strength is negatively associated with audit effort. We find that this association may be positive or negative as IC changes, where the association varies with the degree of direct AC oversight and the change in payoff parameters.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"41 3","pages":"2013-2040"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2024-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.12964","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142170053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Maintaining maintenance: The real effects of financial reporting for infrastructure","authors":"Ryan P. McDonough, Claire J. Yan","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12970","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1911-3846.12970","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We use the adoption of General Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 34 (GASB 34) to examine whether disclosing information in states' financial reports influences their investment decisions. GASB 34 requires governments to report on general infrastructure assets and permits either the standard depreciation approach or the modified approach. The modified approach requires additional disclosures, a step which we argue promotes greater transparency about a government's infrastructure and can potentially facilitate infrastructure investment decisions. We find a robust positive association between the modified approach and investment in infrastructure maintenance. Additional evidence demonstrates a more pronounced effect when external monitoring is likely higher and government officials are likely better informed as a result of the increased disclosure. We further find that states using the modified approach are less likely to cut or divert funds intended for infrastructure maintenance. Our study suggests that disclosing information in governments' financial reports can have real effects, such as mitigating underinvestment in infrastructure maintenance, which governments often defer to future periods in violation of the interperiod equity principle and to the detriment of society.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"41 3","pages":"1952-1985"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2024-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.12970","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141925518","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Sell-side analysts as social intermediaries","authors":"Guangyu Li, Crawford Spence, Zhong Chen","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12968","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12968","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Recent research on sell-side analysts emphasizes the centrality of social ties and social interactions to what they do. However, we know little about how analysts create or maintain relationships over both the short and long terms. We remedy that in this qualitative study by illustrating the microlevel processes that analysts engage in as part of developing a network of relations around them. Starting from the premise that economic actions are embedded in social relations and drawing on interviews with analysts, fund managers, and investor relations officers in China, we show how analysts forge both weak and strong social ties to create an infrastructure of social networks that is foundational to information intermediation. This perspective broadens our understanding of sell-side analysts as social, rather than solely information, intermediaries and highlights how information asymmetries often have a social basis.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"41 3","pages":"1925-1951"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2024-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.12968","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142170237","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How do investors value the publication of tax information? Evidence from the European public country-by-country reporting","authors":"Raphael Müller, Christoph Spengel, Stefan Weck","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12965","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1911-3846.12965","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine the costs associated with public disclosure, as opposed to confidential reporting, of tax country-by-country reporting (CbCR) information. Our study addresses a critical knowledge gap, considering the growing adoption of public tax transparency measures. We aim to illuminate this matter by examining the expected costs for firms of making previously confidential CbCR information publicly available. The fact that the information was previously confidentially reported to the tax authorities allows us to assess the cost of publication in isolation. Employing an event study methodology, we provide early evidence on the capital market reaction to this new requirement on a sample of European firms falling within its scope. We document a significantly negative cumulative average abnormal return of EUR 47 billion to 64 billion for up to 3 days following the announcement. Additional cross-sectional results suggest that concerns about the reputational costs arising from public scrutiny and the proprietary costs from disclosing sensitive business information outweigh the potential benefits of an extended information environment from an investor perspective. Our findings highlight that the public disclosure of tax information imposes significant—and likely unintended—costs from a firm perspective. This aspect should be carefully considered when developing tax transparency measures.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"41 3","pages":"1893-1924"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2024-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.12965","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141745767","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The general anti-avoidance rule","authors":"Mary Cowx, Jon N. Kerr","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12963","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1911-3846.12963","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The general anti-avoidance rule, or GAAR, is an enforcement mechanism that gives a country's taxing authority broad power to deny a taxpayer tax benefits associated with any transaction. Although GAARs are becoming increasingly common, the presence of a GAAR is generally overlooked by researchers and thus has been left unstudied. In this paper, we provide an initial investigation by studying the effect of GAARs on firm-level corporate tax avoidance behaviors. Using an indicator for the enactment or strengthening of a GAAR within a country in a stacked difference-in-differences design, we find GAAR enactment is associated with a statistically and economically significant decrease in firm-level tax avoidance. Additional cross-sectional analyses show that the decline in tax avoidance occurs for conventional GAARs and economic substance-type rules, original and strengthened GAARs, and domestic and multinational firms. Results also show that the effect is strongest for firms with higher levels of pre-GAAR-enactment tax avoidance and for firms incorporated in countries where the burden of proof lies with the taxpayer.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"41 3","pages":"1851-1892"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2024-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141745766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Bing Li, Zhenbin Liu, Jeffrey Pittman, Shijie Yang
{"title":"Institutional dual holdings and expected crash risk: Evidence from mergers between lenders and equity holders","authors":"Bing Li, Zhenbin Liu, Jeffrey Pittman, Shijie Yang","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12966","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1911-3846.12966","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Exploiting mergers between lenders and shareholders of the same firm as an exogenous shock to shareholder–creditor conflicts, we examine the causal effect of these conflicts on firms' ex ante expected stock price crash risk evident in the options implied volatility smirk. The decrease in conflicts of interest between lenders and shareholders induces dual holders to encourage the disclosure of more information to alleviate costly information asymmetry with other investors and better execute their oversight role in constraining managers' bad news suppression. Consistent with expectations, we find that a firm's ex ante expected crash risk declines after a shareholder–creditor merger. We also report strong, robust evidence that the negative impact of mergers on firms' expected crash risk increases when institutional investors or lenders have a greater stake in the treatment firms or when shareholder–creditor conflicts are apt to be exacerbated. Additionally, we document that firms issue management earnings forecasts (especially bad news forecasts) more frequently after these mergers. Finally, we find that expected crash risk decreases more after mergers in firms suffering worse information asymmetry and with weak monitoring mechanisms. Our evidence suggests that option market participants value the dual holder's role in deterring managers' bad news hoarding.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"41 3","pages":"1819-1850"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2024-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141737300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}