Contemporary Accounting Research最新文献

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CAR Ad Hoc Reviewers 2024 / RCC Réviseurs ad hoc 2024
IF 3.2 3区 管理学
Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-03-18 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.13029
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引用次数: 0
Endogeneity and the economic consequences of tax avoidance
IF 3.2 3区 管理学
Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-01-27 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.13017
Scott D. Dyreng, Robert W. Hills, Christina M. Lewellen, Bradley P. Lindsey
{"title":"Endogeneity and the economic consequences of tax avoidance","authors":"Scott D. Dyreng,&nbsp;Robert W. Hills,&nbsp;Christina M. Lewellen,&nbsp;Bradley P. Lindsey","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.13017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.13017","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Academic research investigating the economic consequences of tax avoidance is almost always interested in the consequences of intentional, deliberate actions undertaken to reduce taxes relative to income. Therefore, it is crucial that such research distinguishes between intentional and incidental tax avoidance, since failure to do so can create endogeneity concerns and lead to incomplete and incorrect economic inferences. In this paper, we first develop a framework that conceptually defines and distinguishes between intentional and incidental tax avoidance. We highlight that the endogeneity problem arises because intentional tax avoidance is not directly observable. We consider two approaches to mitigating endogeneity concerns and apply these approaches by reexamining two influential studies that investigate the economic consequences of tax avoidance. We show how controlling for past accounting losses eliminates the effect of tax avoidance on credit spreads (Hasan et al. 2014, <i>Journal of Financial Economics, 113</i>(1), 109–130) and how using an instrumental variables approach changes the sign of the relation between tax sheltering and stock price crash risk (Kim et al., 2011, <i>Journal of Financial Economics, 100</i>(3), 639–662). Overall, our paper punctuates the importance of both (1) conceptually distinguishing between incidental and intentional tax avoidance and (2) econometrically addressing the challenges that arise when empirical differentiation between incidental and intentional tax avoidance is important to the research question.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"42 1","pages":"702-730"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2025-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.13017","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143646268","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Talking down the competitors: How do investment banking relationships influence analysts' forecasts?
IF 3.2 3区 管理学
Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-01-23 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.13018
Fangbo Si, Xiaoxu Yu, Huai Zhang
{"title":"Talking down the competitors: How do investment banking relationships influence analysts' forecasts?","authors":"Fangbo Si,&nbsp;Xiaoxu Yu,&nbsp;Huai Zhang","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.13018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.13018","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Our study reveals that financial analysts issue more pessimistic forecasts for their investment banking clients' competitors than for unrelated firms. Our evidence is consistent with this behavior stemming from analysts' strategic incentives rather than their true beliefs. We find that analysts' pessimism for the client's competitors is more pronounced when the client is more important to analysts' brokerage houses, when high uncertainty prevents competitors from detecting analysts' strategic motives, and when analysts' brokerage houses are less prestigious. Additionally, we explore the economic consequences of the pessimism from the perspectives of the covered firms, brokerage houses, and financial analysts. Finally, we consider the impact of the 2003 Global Analyst Research Settlement. Overall, our results demonstrate that issuing pessimistic forecasts for clients' competitors is an understudied channel through which analysts curry favor with their investment banking clients.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"42 1","pages":"673-701"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2025-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143646330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Preventing fraudulent financial reporting with reputational signals of strategic auditors
IF 3.2 3区 管理学
Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-01-17 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.13012
Chezham (Chez) L. Sealy, Chad A. Simon
{"title":"Preventing fraudulent financial reporting with reputational signals of strategic auditors","authors":"Chezham (Chez) L. Sealy,&nbsp;Chad A. Simon","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.13012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.13012","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Financial reporting fraud continues to cost companies millions of dollars annually and is a major source of concern for regulators, stakeholders, and auditors. While academic research has largely focused on external auditors' fraud detection efforts, we analyze whether auditors can help <i>prevent</i> occurrences of fraud through low-cost reputational signals of higher “strategic reasoning”; strategic reasoning refers to strategies that individuals take in light of the anticipated actions of others (see van der Hoek et al., 2005, A logic for strategic reasoning, AAMAS '05, 157−164). Specifically, we consider the potential impact on manager behavior of signaling whether audit professionals use zero-, first-, and second-order audit approaches. Zero-order audit approaches involve making decisions based mostly on the auditor's incentives, first-order approaches involve decisions based mostly on the client's incentives, and second- or higher-order audit approaches involve decisions based on the client's incentives while recognizing that the client will respond to the auditor's decisions (see Wilks &amp; Zimbelman, 2004, <i>Accounting Horizons</i>, <i>18</i>(3), 173–184). Using a context-rich experiment in which manager participants have no history of interacting with the auditor, we find that the likelihood of fraud occurring is lower when it is signaled that audit partners and their teams use a first- or second-order strategic audit approach compared to a zero-order approach, due to an increase in the perceived likelihood of the auditor detecting fraud. We also consider whether signaling an auditor's level of strategic reasoning influences the level of effort used to conceal fraud and find an increase in the expected level of fraud effort for managers in the first- and second-order audit conditions.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"42 1","pages":"649-672"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2025-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143645676","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Improvements in investment efficiency prior to a mandated accounting change: Evidence from ASC 842
IF 3.2 3区 管理学
Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-01-09 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.13007
Derek Christensen, Daniel P. Lynch, Clay Partridge
{"title":"Improvements in investment efficiency prior to a mandated accounting change: Evidence from ASC 842","authors":"Derek Christensen,&nbsp;Daniel P. Lynch,&nbsp;Clay Partridge","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.13007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.13007","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Prior literature on the relationship between financial reporting and investment efficiency generally overlooks the connection between firms' financial and managerial reporting systems. As a result, it is difficult to determine whether increases in the quality of firms' internal information environments (IIQ) and/or the quality of their external information environments (EIQ) explain improvements in investment efficiency following financial reporting changes. Leveraging the transition window to the new lease standard (Accounting Standards Codification [ASC] 842), we use a difference-in-differences design and find that firms that materially change their internal controls due to ASC 842 (treatment firms) significantly improve their investment efficiency in the final year of the transition window. Multiple falsification tests rule out that contemporaneous improvements in treatment firms' EIQ explain our finding. Additional channel analyses suggest the increases in IIQ for treatment firms predominantly alleviate moral hazard risk between central and divisional managers within the firm, leading to a reduction in empire building. Our findings extend the literature on the relationship between financial reporting and investment efficiency. They also contribute to the literature on the consequences of ASC 842 by answering the FASB's call for research on how ASC 842 affects firms' asset utilizations.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"42 1","pages":"615-648"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2025-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143645881","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The consequences of expanded audit reports for small and risky companies
IF 3.2 3区 管理学
Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-01-02 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.13011
Elizabeth Gutierrez, Miguel Minutti-Meza, Kay W. Tatum, Maria Vulcheva
{"title":"The consequences of expanded audit reports for small and risky companies","authors":"Elizabeth Gutierrez,&nbsp;Miguel Minutti-Meza,&nbsp;Kay W. Tatum,&nbsp;Maria Vulcheva","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.13011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.13011","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The United Kingdom mandated expanded audit reports in two waves, starting in 2013 and 2017, respectively. Prior studies of the first wave, which included large and highly regulated companies, concluded that expanded reports have limited incremental value. We focus on the second wave, which included companies listed on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). The AIM is characterized by emerging companies that are smaller, riskier, and subject to lighter regulatory requirements and to private monitoring. We examine whether investors and other stakeholders benefit from expanded reports in this setting. We document that AIM companies have shorter expanded reports and fewer key audit matters. Next, we demonstrate that these reports have negligible incremental information value for investors or consequences for the quality and cost of audits. Finally, although we find that some variations in the expanded reports' content are associated with investor reactions to the annual report and with audit fees, variations in external monitoring and company size do not play an incremental role. By focusing on a set of companies with weaker information environments, our findings help to extend the conclusions from prior studies about the limited incremental value of expanded reports.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"42 1","pages":"576-614"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2025-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.13011","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143646155","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Cost-benefit trade-offs in acquirers' goodwill valuations
IF 3.2 3区 管理学
Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-01-02 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.13010
Lisa Koonce, Sara Toynbee, Brian J. White
{"title":"Cost-benefit trade-offs in acquirers' goodwill valuations","authors":"Lisa Koonce,&nbsp;Sara Toynbee,&nbsp;Brian J. White","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.13010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.13010","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Academic and anecdotal evidence suggests that acquirers prefer to record higher goodwill values in business combinations so they can benefit from higher post-acquisition earnings when goodwill is only tested for impairment. We conduct multiple experiments to test the hypothesis that this perspective ignores two costs that acquirers may also consider. Specifically, goodwill generally carries negative market perceptions and is associated with a risk of costly future impairment losses. Our results indicate that consideration of these two costs offsets acquirers' preferences for the earnings benefit of upwardly biasing goodwill. We also document that when there is no earnings benefit from higher goodwill valuations—namely, in a setting where goodwill is amortized to expense—we observe acquirers downwardly biasing goodwill values. Overall, our findings add nuance to our understanding of managerial discretion in the context of business combinations.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"42 1","pages":"553-575"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2025-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143646154","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
CEO (in)activism and investor decisions
IF 3.2 3区 管理学
Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-12-30 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.13004
Michael T. Durney, Joseph A. Johnson, Roshan K. Sinha, Donald Young
{"title":"CEO (in)activism and investor decisions","authors":"Michael T. Durney,&nbsp;Joseph A. Johnson,&nbsp;Roshan K. Sinha,&nbsp;Donald Young","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.13004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.13004","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Many CEOs engage in activism by publicly expressing their views on social, environmental, and political issues, while other CEOs refrain from doing so—a behavior we term CEO inactivism. We use two experiments to examine how CEO (in)activism impacts investor decisions. Our results are consistent with our theoretical predictions. When a CEO expresses an activist position that is consistent versus inconsistent with investors' views, investors invest more in the CEO's firm because they perceive the CEO more positively. We also find that CEO inactivism can lead to investment decisions that are as favorable as when the CEO expresses a position consistent with investors' views; our process evidence suggests that this may occur because CEO inactivism increases the likelihood that investors believe the CEO shares their position on a social issue. Finally, we do not find evidence that investor decisions are influenced by whether CEO (in)activism is in response to an external prompt. This study contributes to the emerging literature on CEO activism, a unique form of voluntary disclosure, by providing evidence about how CEO (in)activism influences investors. We also contribute to the literature examining the impact of social media disclosure on investor decisions. Finally, our findings have practical implications for CEOs, who increasingly face external pressures to engage in activism.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"42 1","pages":"525-552"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2024-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.13004","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143646223","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Measuring systemic risk: A financial statement–based approach for insurance firms and banks
IF 3.2 3区 管理学
Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-12-27 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.13008
Venkat Peddireddy, Shiva Rajgopal
{"title":"Measuring systemic risk: A financial statement–based approach for insurance firms and banks","authors":"Venkat Peddireddy,&nbsp;Shiva Rajgopal","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.13008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.13008","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We introduce CRISK, a financial statement–based measure, to assess the systemic risk contribution of a financial firm. CRISK measures the capital shortfall of a financial firm conditional on severe distress in the entire system. Our measure complements the market-based measure, SRISK, introduced by Acharya et al. (2012, <i>American Economic Review</i>, <i>102</i>(3), 59–64) and Brownlees and Engle (2017, <i>Review of Financial Studies</i>, <i>30</i>(1), 48–79), in identifying systemically risky financial firms. While SRISK provides a timelier assessment using real-time stock market data, CRISK offers a more nuanced approach using accounting information and is tailored to the distinct characteristics of insurance firms and commercial banks. Our empirical analysis shows that (1) compared to CRISK, SRISK tends to overestimate capital shortfalls for insurance firms and for banks that hold a substantial portion of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation–insured deposits while underestimating capital shortfalls for banks heavily reliant on uninsured deposits; (2) CRISK estimates of capital shortfall closely align with the actual capital injections received by financial firms during the financial crisis of 2007–2009; and (3) CRISK exhibits a significant positive correlation with short interest. Based on our findings, we recommend using SRISK as an initial screening tool to identify potential systemically risky financial firms, followed by refining the list and validating the expected capital shortfall using CRISK.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"42 1","pages":"490-524"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2024-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.13008","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143646288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
“No comment”: Language frictions and the IASB's due process
IF 3.2 3区 管理学
Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-12-16 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.13001
Eduardo Flores, Brian R. Monsen, Emily Shafron, Christopher G. Yust
{"title":"“No comment”: Language frictions and the IASB's due process","authors":"Eduardo Flores,&nbsp;Brian R. Monsen,&nbsp;Emily Shafron,&nbsp;Christopher G. Yust","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.13001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.13001","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The IASB asserts that global stakeholder participation in the standard-setting process is critical for developing and maintaining high-quality accounting standards. However, the myriad languages used in countries that apply IFRS may impede this participation. We find that the IASB is less likely to receive comment letters from stakeholders in countries with languages that are linguistically distant from English. We also find that comment letters from more linguistically distant stakeholders are less likely to be quoted in IASB staff-prepared comment letter summaries, suggesting that they have less influence in the redeliberation process. Path analyses show that this result arises from language frictions being associated with reduced writing quality and originality. We also find that language frictions prevent participation in other standard-setting communication channels. Collectively, language frictions appear to impede the IASB's efforts to equitably obtain and consider valuable global feedback.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"42 1","pages":"446-489"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2024-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.13001","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143645876","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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