Contemporary Accounting Research最新文献_第2页

Institutional dual holdings and expected crash risk: Evidence from mergers between lenders and equity holders 机构双重持股与预期崩盘风险：来自贷款人和股权持有人合并的证据

IF 3.2 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-07-18 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12966

Bing Li, Zhenbin Liu, Jeffrey Pittman, Shijie Yang

{"title":"Institutional dual holdings and expected crash risk: Evidence from mergers between lenders and equity holders","authors":"Bing Li, Zhenbin Liu, Jeffrey Pittman, Shijie Yang","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12966","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1911-3846.12966","url":null,"abstract":"Exploiting mergers between lenders and shareholders of the same firm as an exogenous shock to shareholder–creditor conflicts, we examine the causal effect of these conflicts on firms' ex ante expected stock price crash risk evident in the options implied volatility smirk. The decrease in conflicts of interest between lenders and shareholders induces dual holders to encourage the disclosure of more information to alleviate costly information asymmetry with other investors and better execute their oversight role in constraining managers' bad news suppression. Consistent with expectations, we find that a firm's ex ante expected crash risk declines after a shareholder–creditor merger. We also report strong, robust evidence that the negative impact of mergers on firms' expected crash risk increases when institutional investors or lenders have a greater stake in the treatment firms or when shareholder–creditor conflicts are apt to be exacerbated. Additionally, we document that firms issue management earnings forecasts (especially bad news forecasts) more frequently after these mergers. Finally, we find that expected crash risk decreases more after mergers in firms suffering worse information asymmetry and with weak monitoring mechanisms. Our evidence suggests that option market participants value the dual holder's role in deterring managers' bad news hoarding.","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2024-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141737300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The effect of securities litigation risk on firm value and disclosure 证券诉讼风险对公司价值和信息披露的影响

IF 3.2 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-07-02 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12960

Dain C. Donelson, Christian M. Hutzler, Brian R. Monsen, Christopher G. Yust

引用次数: 0

Performance measure skewness and the structure of CEO compensation: Theory and evidence 绩效衡量偏度与 CEO 薪酬结构：理论与证据

IF 3.2 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-06-21 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12959

Pierre Chaigneau, Woo-Jin Chang, Stephen A. Hillegeist

{"title":"Performance measure skewness and the structure of CEO compensation: Theory and evidence","authors":"Pierre Chaigneau, Woo-Jin Chang, Stephen A. Hillegeist","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12959","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1911-3846.12959","url":null,"abstract":"While research has analyzed how the structure of incentive pay relates to the dispersion of the performance measure distribution, as measured by its variance or volatility, we examine how it relates to the asymmetry of the distribution, as measured by its skewness. In contrast to the variance, skewness affects the relative informativeness of high and low performance about the agent's effort, which determines the relative efficiency of providing rewards and punishments for incentive purposes. Therefore, skewness is an important determinant of compensation convexity, which is determined by the relative holdings of stock and options. Consistent with our analytical and numerical results, we find that the skewness of expected earnings is negatively associated with the convexity of CEO compensation. Our results are economically significant, robust to alternative specifications, and do not appear to be driven by reverse causality. In addition, we find that earnings skewness is negatively associated with total CEO compensation and that this association is driven by lower options-based compensation. These findings are consistent with CEOs preferring positively skewed performance metrics. Overall, we provide theoretical, numerical, and empirical evidence suggesting that skewness is a more important determinant of the convexity and structure of CEO compensation than volatility.","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2024-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141506442","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

CEO gender and responses to shareholder activism 首席执行官的性别和对股东激进主义的反应

IF 3.2 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-06-11 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12962

Scott C. Jackson, Kristina M. Rennekamp, Blake A. Steenhoven

{"title":"CEO gender and responses to shareholder activism","authors":"Scott C. Jackson, Kristina M. Rennekamp, Blake A. Steenhoven","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12962","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1911-3846.12962","url":null,"abstract":"Recent literature finds that firms led by female CEOs are more likely to be targeted by activist shareholders and that female CEOs are more likely to cooperate with activist shareholders' requests. Our study complements this literature by using two controlled experiments and a series of semi-structured interviews with CEOs and CFOs to investigate how a CEO's response to shareholder activism influences investors' reactions and whether these reactions differ depending on the gender of the CEO or on how their response is explained. In the first experiment, we find that investors evaluate a firm as less attractive when a female CEO uses an uncooperative response rather than a cooperative response to shareholder activism, absent any explanation for the CEO's response. Conversely, investors evaluate a firm as less attractive when a male CEO uses a cooperative response rather than an uncooperative response. In the second experiment, where there is an added explanation for the CEO response, we find that investors react more positively to a female CEO's uncooperative response when the explanation is more communal (vs. agentic). Our interviews with CEOs and CFOs provide insights into how the gender of firms' leadership may play a role when activist shareholders target firms. Our results collectively suggest that investors rely on gender stereotypes when evaluating the responses of male and female executives to shareholder activism and that these evaluations affect their investment judgments. Our results also suggest a potential alternative explanation for the finding that female CEOs are more likely to cooperate with activist shareholders than are male CEOs. Rather than inherent differences in the management styles of male and female CEOs, responses to activist shareholders may be driven, at least in part, by managers anticipating that they will be penalized by investors for deviating from gender-stereotypical behavior.","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2024-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.12962","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141506554","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Political incentives and analyst bias: Evidence from China 政治激励与分析师偏见：来自中国的证据

IF 3.2 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-06-10 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12953

Jeffrey Pittman, Zhifeng Yang, Sijia Yu, Haoran Zhu

{"title":"Political incentives and analyst bias: Evidence from China","authors":"Jeffrey Pittman, Zhifeng Yang, Sijia Yu, Haoran Zhu","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12953","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1911-3846.12953","url":null,"abstract":"This study extends extant research on the determinants of financial analyst bias by examining the role that political incentives play. Using a series of scheduled provincial political events in China, we document that analysts are significantly more likely to issue favorable recommendations or revise their recommendations upward during political event periods, and the effect of political events on optimism is larger for analysts employed by brokerage firms affiliated with politicians. Cross-sectional evidence suggests that the impact of political events on analyst optimism is concentrated in those provinces where capital market development is a more important performance indicator for politicians or where the incumbent politicians face a pending promotion. Stock return analyses reveal that favorable recommendations issued during political event periods are significantly less profitable in the long run and are less credible according to investor perceptions. Reinforcing our main evidence, we also find that financial analysts are more likely to issue optimistic earnings forecasts during political event periods. Collectively, our results imply that political incentives distort analyst opinions and political-economic factors affect the corporate information environment in China.","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2024-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141364926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Can second-chance provisions increase the effectiveness of penalty contracts? Evidence from a quasi field experiment 二次机会条款能否提高处罚合同的效力？来自准现场实验的证据

IF 3.2 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-06-08 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12961

Clara Xiaoling Chen, Laura W. Wang, Anne Wu, Steve Yuching Wu

{"title":"Can second-chance provisions increase the effectiveness of penalty contracts? Evidence from a quasi field experiment","authors":"Clara Xiaoling Chen, Laura W. Wang, Anne Wu, Steve Yuching Wu","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12961","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1911-3846.12961","url":null,"abstract":"Penalty contracts are commonly utilized in developing countries. Such contracts may be perceived as unfair, potentially reducing employee motivation and performance. We predict that adding a second-chance provision, an opportunity to reverse a penalty for poor performance if subsequent performance improves, could improve the effectiveness of penalty contracts. In a quasi field experiment at a company with two manufacturing facilities in Taiwan, we treated one facility with a traditional-penalty contract without a second-chance provision and the other with a penalty contract with a second-chance provision. We observe a significant difference in the two treatment effects, with employee performance decreasing significantly after the traditional-penalty treatment but showing no decrease when a second-chance provision was included. Further analysis reveals that this difference is mediated by employees' fairness perceptions. These results provide valuable insights to governments, nongovernmental organizations, and multinationals as they work together to improve the fairness of global compensation practices.","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2024-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.12961","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141370038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Does auditor style influence non-GAAP earnings disclosure? 审计师风格是否会影响非美国通用会计准则的盈利披露？

IF 3.2 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-06-01 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12952

Frank Heflin, Jacqueline Tan, Karen Ton, Jasmine Wang

{"title":"Does auditor style influence non-GAAP earnings disclosure?","authors":"Frank Heflin, Jacqueline Tan, Karen Ton, Jasmine Wang","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12952","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1911-3846.12952","url":null,"abstract":"Regulators and practitioners have concerns that the lack of standardization in non-GAAP disclosure can make it challenging for users to process non-GAAP earnings and use it in decision-making. We examine whether auditor style extends beyond mandatory disclosures to induce similarity in non-GAAP earnings disclosures. Specifically, we find that clients audited by the same auditor are more likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings in a similar manner. We assess disclosure similarity using (1) the decision to disclose non-GAAP earnings, (2) the disclosure prominence of non-GAAP earnings in the earnings press release, (3) the discussion of non-GAAP earnings in the management discussion and analysis of the annual report, (4) the choice to exclude recurring items, and (5) the receipt of SEC comment letters related to non-GAAP earnings. We find that the association between auditor style and non-GAAP disclosure is determined by Big 4 accounting firms and clients audited by the same audit office. The results are stronger for larger audit offices and smaller clients. We provide evidence that auditors facilitate non-GAAP disclosure, which can improve compliance with SEC requirements and increase the standardization of non-GAAP earnings disclosures. Our results are relevant to current policy discussions regarding auditor involvement in unaudited non-GAAP earnings reporting.","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.12952","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141188683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The impacts of federal judge ideology on auditor litigation risk and auditor behavior 联邦法官意识形态对审计师诉讼风险和审计师行为的影响

IF 3.2 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-05-29 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12950

Liuchuang Li, Baolei Qi, Ping Zhang

引用次数: 0

Firm-level political risk and bank loan contracting 公司层面的政治风险和银行贷款契约

IF 3.2 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-05-29 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12951

Walid Saffar, Yang Wang, K. C. John Wei

引用次数: 0

Managers' career preferences and corporate culture 管理人员的职业偏好和企业文化

IF 3.2 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-05-16 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12948

Margaret A. Abernethy, Chung-Yu Hung, Like Jiang

引用次数: 0