Can we explain managerial non-answers during conference call Q&As?

IF 3.2 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Matthew Bamber, Pier-Luc Nappert
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Abstract

Management teams often avoid answering questions during conference call question and answer sessions (Q&As). Viewing this as an information asymmetry issue, accounting scholars have suggested that this behavior is ill-advised and that non-answers signal to investors the suppression of bad news. In this article, we demonstrate that this argument lacks nuance. Instead, we argue that answers and non-answers necessarily coexist and are codependent. Our contribution stems from our social interactionist lens, whereby we draw on interdisciplinary perspectives of workplace silence to make sense of our data. We propose three explanations for managerial non-answers, namely that they are used (1) defensively, (2) reflectively, and (3) negotiatively. Despite the seeming complexity, analysts claim they can make sense of what managers are able to say in this forum, and by extension, what they do (or perhaps, can) not. From here, we argue that analysts are socialized to managerial non-answers. Despite this, there is general concern that investors allow an innate fear of “silence” to prejudice their judgment of non-answers. Thus, we highlight a communication gap between management, intermediary, and investor. On the one hand, this implies a source of market inefficiency, but on the other it points toward a source of potential value in sell-side analyst work, specifically, their experience and expertise in social interaction.

Abstract Image

我们能在电话会议问答中解释管理层没有回答的问题吗?
管理团队经常避免在电话会议的问答环节(Q&As)中回答问题。会计学者认为这是一个信息不对称的问题,他们认为这种行为是不明智的,不给出答案向投资者发出了抑制坏消息的信号。在本文中,我们将证明这一论点缺乏细微差别。相反,我们认为答案和非答案必然共存并相互依赖。我们的贡献来自于我们的社会互动主义视角,即我们从工作场所沉默的跨学科角度来理解我们的数据。我们对管理上的不回答提出了三种解释,即它们被(1)防御性地使用,(2)反思性地使用,(3)协商性地使用。尽管看起来很复杂,但分析人士声称,他们能够理解管理者在这个论坛上能说什么,进而理解他们能做(或者可能不能)什么。从这里开始,我们认为分析师已经习惯于管理上的不回答。尽管如此,人们普遍担心,投资者对“沉默”的天生恐惧,会影响他们对没有答案的判断。因此,我们强调了管理层、中介机构和投资者之间的沟通差距。一方面,这意味着市场效率低下的根源,但另一方面,它指出了卖方分析师工作的潜在价值来源,特别是他们在社会互动方面的经验和专业知识。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.20
自引率
11.10%
发文量
97
期刊介绍: Contemporary Accounting Research (CAR) is the premiere research journal of the Canadian Academic Accounting Association, which publishes leading- edge research that contributes to our understanding of all aspects of accounting"s role within organizations, markets or society. Canadian based, increasingly global in scope, CAR seeks to reflect the geographical and intellectual diversity in accounting research. To accomplish this, CAR will continue to publish in its traditional areas of excellence, while seeking to more fully represent other research streams in its pages, so as to continue and expand its tradition of excellence.
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