Contemporary Accounting Research最新文献_第3页

The effects and potential benefits of audit committee oversight in a strategic setting 审计委员会在战略背景下进行监督的效果和潜在益处

IF 3.2 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-08-13 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12964

Evelyn R. Patterson, J. Reed Smith, Samuel L. Tiras

{"title":"The effects and potential benefits of audit committee oversight in a strategic setting","authors":"Evelyn R. Patterson, J. Reed Smith, Samuel L. Tiras","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12964","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12964","url":null,"abstract":"Since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, many notable frauds have been tied to ineffective audit committee (AC) oversight. As a result, AC oversight is of continuing interest, and regulators continue to debate this issue, garnering a growing body of research focused on the role played by the AC. But little theoretical research exists to guide analytical and empirical researchers investigating AC oversight. The purpose of this study is to provide theoretical guidance by examining AC oversight in a strategic setting. We focus on the AC's role in overseeing internal controls (ICs) and the impact of whether the AC relies on management in designing the controls. We characterize how the nature of control risk changes and how IC strength is associated with the amount of managerial fraud, expected probability of fraud detection (which, on average, equates to audit effort), and audit quality (assessed as 1 − audit risk) across two settings defined by the degree of AC oversight. As one example that highlights the need for theoretical guidance, we consider the literature's presumption that IC strength is negatively associated with audit effort. We find that this association may be positive or negative as IC changes, where the association varies with the degree of direct AC oversight and the change in payoff parameters.","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"41 3","pages":"2013-2040"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2024-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.12964","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142170053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Maintaining maintenance: The real effects of financial reporting for infrastructure 维护保养：基础设施财务报告的实际效果

IF 3.2 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-08-08 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12970

Ryan P. McDonough, Claire J. Yan

{"title":"Maintaining maintenance: The real effects of financial reporting for infrastructure","authors":"Ryan P. McDonough, Claire J. Yan","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12970","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1911-3846.12970","url":null,"abstract":"We use the adoption of General Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 34 (GASB 34) to examine whether disclosing information in states' financial reports influences their investment decisions. GASB 34 requires governments to report on general infrastructure assets and permits either the standard depreciation approach or the modified approach. The modified approach requires additional disclosures, a step which we argue promotes greater transparency about a government's infrastructure and can potentially facilitate infrastructure investment decisions. We find a robust positive association between the modified approach and investment in infrastructure maintenance. Additional evidence demonstrates a more pronounced effect when external monitoring is likely higher and government officials are likely better informed as a result of the increased disclosure. We further find that states using the modified approach are less likely to cut or divert funds intended for infrastructure maintenance. Our study suggests that disclosing information in governments' financial reports can have real effects, such as mitigating underinvestment in infrastructure maintenance, which governments often defer to future periods in violation of the interperiod equity principle and to the detriment of society.","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"41 3","pages":"1952-1985"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2024-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.12970","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141925518","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Sell-side analysts as social intermediaries 作为社会中介的卖方分析师

IF 3.2 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-08-06 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12968

Guangyu Li, Crawford Spence, Zhong Chen

引用次数: 0

How do investors value the publication of tax information? Evidence from the European public country-by-country reporting 投资者如何看待税务信息的公布？来自欧洲公共国别报告的证据

IF 3.2 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-07-19 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12965

Raphael Müller, Christoph Spengel, Stefan Weck

{"title":"How do investors value the publication of tax information? Evidence from the European public country-by-country reporting","authors":"Raphael Müller, Christoph Spengel, Stefan Weck","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12965","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1911-3846.12965","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the costs associated with public disclosure, as opposed to confidential reporting, of tax country-by-country reporting (CbCR) information. Our study addresses a critical knowledge gap, considering the growing adoption of public tax transparency measures. We aim to illuminate this matter by examining the expected costs for firms of making previously confidential CbCR information publicly available. The fact that the information was previously confidentially reported to the tax authorities allows us to assess the cost of publication in isolation. Employing an event study methodology, we provide early evidence on the capital market reaction to this new requirement on a sample of European firms falling within its scope. We document a significantly negative cumulative average abnormal return of EUR 47 billion to 64 billion for up to 3 days following the announcement. Additional cross-sectional results suggest that concerns about the reputational costs arising from public scrutiny and the proprietary costs from disclosing sensitive business information outweigh the potential benefits of an extended information environment from an investor perspective. Our findings highlight that the public disclosure of tax information imposes significant—and likely unintended—costs from a firm perspective. This aspect should be carefully considered when developing tax transparency measures.","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"41 3","pages":"1893-1924"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2024-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.12965","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141745767","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The general anti-avoidance rule 一般反避税规则

IF 3.2 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-07-19 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12963

Mary Cowx, Jon N. Kerr

引用次数: 0

Institutional dual holdings and expected crash risk: Evidence from mergers between lenders and equity holders 机构双重持股与预期崩盘风险：来自贷款人和股权持有人合并的证据

IF 3.2 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-07-18 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12966

Bing Li, Zhenbin Liu, Jeffrey Pittman, Shijie Yang

{"title":"Institutional dual holdings and expected crash risk: Evidence from mergers between lenders and equity holders","authors":"Bing Li, Zhenbin Liu, Jeffrey Pittman, Shijie Yang","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12966","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1911-3846.12966","url":null,"abstract":"Exploiting mergers between lenders and shareholders of the same firm as an exogenous shock to shareholder–creditor conflicts, we examine the causal effect of these conflicts on firms' ex ante expected stock price crash risk evident in the options implied volatility smirk. The decrease in conflicts of interest between lenders and shareholders induces dual holders to encourage the disclosure of more information to alleviate costly information asymmetry with other investors and better execute their oversight role in constraining managers' bad news suppression. Consistent with expectations, we find that a firm's ex ante expected crash risk declines after a shareholder–creditor merger. We also report strong, robust evidence that the negative impact of mergers on firms' expected crash risk increases when institutional investors or lenders have a greater stake in the treatment firms or when shareholder–creditor conflicts are apt to be exacerbated. Additionally, we document that firms issue management earnings forecasts (especially bad news forecasts) more frequently after these mergers. Finally, we find that expected crash risk decreases more after mergers in firms suffering worse information asymmetry and with weak monitoring mechanisms. Our evidence suggests that option market participants value the dual holder's role in deterring managers' bad news hoarding.","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"41 3","pages":"1819-1850"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2024-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141737300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The effect of securities litigation risk on firm value and disclosure 证券诉讼风险对公司价值和信息披露的影响

IF 3.2 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-07-02 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12960

Dain C. Donelson, Christian M. Hutzler, Brian R. Monsen, Christopher G. Yust

引用次数: 0

Performance measure skewness and the structure of CEO compensation: Theory and evidence 绩效衡量偏度与 CEO 薪酬结构：理论与证据

IF 3.2 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-06-21 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12959

Pierre Chaigneau, Woo-Jin Chang, Stephen A. Hillegeist

{"title":"Performance measure skewness and the structure of CEO compensation: Theory and evidence","authors":"Pierre Chaigneau, Woo-Jin Chang, Stephen A. Hillegeist","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12959","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1911-3846.12959","url":null,"abstract":"While research has analyzed how the structure of incentive pay relates to the dispersion of the performance measure distribution, as measured by its variance or volatility, we examine how it relates to the asymmetry of the distribution, as measured by its skewness. In contrast to the variance, skewness affects the relative informativeness of high and low performance about the agent's effort, which determines the relative efficiency of providing rewards and punishments for incentive purposes. Therefore, skewness is an important determinant of compensation convexity, which is determined by the relative holdings of stock and options. Consistent with our analytical and numerical results, we find that the skewness of expected earnings is negatively associated with the convexity of CEO compensation. Our results are economically significant, robust to alternative specifications, and do not appear to be driven by reverse causality. In addition, we find that earnings skewness is negatively associated with total CEO compensation and that this association is driven by lower options-based compensation. These findings are consistent with CEOs preferring positively skewed performance metrics. Overall, we provide theoretical, numerical, and empirical evidence suggesting that skewness is a more important determinant of the convexity and structure of CEO compensation than volatility.","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"41 3","pages":"1754-1784"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2024-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141506442","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

CEO gender and responses to shareholder activism 首席执行官的性别和对股东激进主义的反应

IF 3.2 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-06-11 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12962

Scott C. Jackson, Kristina M. Rennekamp, Blake A. Steenhoven

{"title":"CEO gender and responses to shareholder activism","authors":"Scott C. Jackson, Kristina M. Rennekamp, Blake A. Steenhoven","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12962","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1911-3846.12962","url":null,"abstract":"Recent literature finds that firms led by female CEOs are more likely to be targeted by activist shareholders and that female CEOs are more likely to cooperate with activist shareholders' requests. Our study complements this literature by using two controlled experiments and a series of semi-structured interviews with CEOs and CFOs to investigate how a CEO's response to shareholder activism influences investors' reactions and whether these reactions differ depending on the gender of the CEO or on how their response is explained. In the first experiment, we find that investors evaluate a firm as less attractive when a female CEO uses an uncooperative response rather than a cooperative response to shareholder activism, absent any explanation for the CEO's response. Conversely, investors evaluate a firm as less attractive when a male CEO uses a cooperative response rather than an uncooperative response. In the second experiment, where there is an added explanation for the CEO response, we find that investors react more positively to a female CEO's uncooperative response when the explanation is more communal (vs. agentic). Our interviews with CEOs and CFOs provide insights into how the gender of firms' leadership may play a role when activist shareholders target firms. Our results collectively suggest that investors rely on gender stereotypes when evaluating the responses of male and female executives to shareholder activism and that these evaluations affect their investment judgments. Our results also suggest a potential alternative explanation for the finding that female CEOs are more likely to cooperate with activist shareholders than are male CEOs. Rather than inherent differences in the management styles of male and female CEOs, responses to activist shareholders may be driven, at least in part, by managers anticipating that they will be penalized by investors for deviating from gender-stereotypical behavior.","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"41 3","pages":"1726-1753"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2024-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.12962","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141506554","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Political incentives and analyst bias: Evidence from China 政治激励与分析师偏见：来自中国的证据

IF 3.2 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-06-10 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12953

Jeffrey Pittman, Zhifeng Yang, Sijia Yu, Haoran Zhu

{"title":"Political incentives and analyst bias: Evidence from China","authors":"Jeffrey Pittman, Zhifeng Yang, Sijia Yu, Haoran Zhu","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12953","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1911-3846.12953","url":null,"abstract":"This study extends extant research on the determinants of financial analyst bias by examining the role that political incentives play. Using a series of scheduled provincial political events in China, we document that analysts are significantly more likely to issue favorable recommendations or revise their recommendations upward during political event periods, and the effect of political events on optimism is larger for analysts employed by brokerage firms affiliated with politicians. Cross-sectional evidence suggests that the impact of political events on analyst optimism is concentrated in those provinces where capital market development is a more important performance indicator for politicians or where the incumbent politicians face a pending promotion. Stock return analyses reveal that favorable recommendations issued during political event periods are significantly less profitable in the long run and are less credible according to investor perceptions. Reinforcing our main evidence, we also find that financial analysts are more likely to issue optimistic earnings forecasts during political event periods. Collectively, our results imply that political incentives distort analyst opinions and political-economic factors affect the corporate information environment in China.","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"41 3","pages":"1695-1725"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2024-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141364926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0