Contemporary Accounting Research最新文献_第10页

“The client can get caught out”: Tax structure maintainability and the intricacies of tax planning aggressiveness "客户可能会被套牢"：税务结构的可维护性和税务筹划的复杂性

IF 3.2 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-08-19 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12971

Maryse Mayer, Yves Gendron

{"title":"“The client can get caught out”: Tax structure maintainability and the intricacies of tax planning aggressiveness","authors":"Maryse Mayer, Yves Gendron","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12971","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1911-3846.12971","url":null,"abstract":"In this field study, we examine tax advisors' decision-making process when developing tax planning arrangements. Through interviews with 40 tax advisors, our analysis indicates that tax savings may come at a price in practice by unveiling adverse post-implementation experiences shared by tax partners. Partners find themselves in a tricky position at the time they form their recommendation as they cannot be certain that their client will be able to “live with their tax structure”—that is, maintain it and cope with the inherent risks once implemented. Their main concern is that their client may “get caught out” by a structure too aggressive or complicated for them, having no control over the client's behavior once the plan is implemented. This has significant implications in the tax planning decision-making process as these concerns shape how partners adapt their work to their client's perceived competency and possibly restrain corporate firms' tax aggressiveness. Following Feller and Schanz (2017, Contemporary Accounting Research, 34(1), 494–524), we conceive of this as the fourth hurdle of tax planning— whether a tax structure is maintainable, as perceived by tax advisors—and unpack how it operates. Interestingly, restraining the client's tax planning aggressiveness (and the corresponding potential tax savings) is not necessarily perceived by partners as detrimental to the client relationship. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of tax planning in action, highlighting how tax partners seek to influence their client's tax planning aggressiveness.","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"41 4","pages":"2047-2074"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2024-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.12971","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142179748","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Trading off managerial and investor uncertainty in firm disclosure: Evidence from R&D investments and management guidance 企业信息披露中管理者和投资者不确定性的权衡：研发投资和管理指导的证据

IF 3.2 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-08-16 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12969

Svenja Dube

{"title":"Trading off managerial and investor uncertainty in firm disclosure: Evidence from R&D investments and management guidance","authors":"Svenja Dube","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12969","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12969","url":null,"abstract":"Classic disclosure theory suggests that investor uncertainty increases the probability of discretionary disclosure, while managerial uncertainty decreases this disclosure. Because R&D projects are inherently risky, R&D-intensive firms face high managerial uncertainty as well as high investor uncertainty. This paper empirically examines how R&D intensity impacts the provision, horizon, and content of management earnings guidance. To address endogeneity concerns, state-level R&D tax credits serve as an instrumental variable for R&D intensity. I find that high R&D firms do not provide less earnings guidance than low R&D firms. However, they issue more quarterly guidance but less annual guidance. This substitution strengthens when there is high managerial uncertainty about the success of R&D projects. Consistent with litigation risk leading to asymmetric disclosure incentives, the decrease in annual earnings guidance is concentrated in positive guidance. Overall, the results imply that firms modify the horizon and content of their earnings guidance by substituting long-term positive guidance with short-term guidance when managerial uncertainty discourages the issuance of the former.","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"41 3","pages":"1986-2012"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2024-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142170055","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The effects and potential benefits of audit committee oversight in a strategic setting 审计委员会在战略背景下进行监督的效果和潜在益处

IF 3.2 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-08-13 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12964

Evelyn R. Patterson, J. Reed Smith, Samuel L. Tiras

{"title":"The effects and potential benefits of audit committee oversight in a strategic setting","authors":"Evelyn R. Patterson, J. Reed Smith, Samuel L. Tiras","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12964","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12964","url":null,"abstract":"Since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, many notable frauds have been tied to ineffective audit committee (AC) oversight. As a result, AC oversight is of continuing interest, and regulators continue to debate this issue, garnering a growing body of research focused on the role played by the AC. But little theoretical research exists to guide analytical and empirical researchers investigating AC oversight. The purpose of this study is to provide theoretical guidance by examining AC oversight in a strategic setting. We focus on the AC's role in overseeing internal controls (ICs) and the impact of whether the AC relies on management in designing the controls. We characterize how the nature of control risk changes and how IC strength is associated with the amount of managerial fraud, expected probability of fraud detection (which, on average, equates to audit effort), and audit quality (assessed as 1 − audit risk) across two settings defined by the degree of AC oversight. As one example that highlights the need for theoretical guidance, we consider the literature's presumption that IC strength is negatively associated with audit effort. We find that this association may be positive or negative as IC changes, where the association varies with the degree of direct AC oversight and the change in payoff parameters.","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"41 3","pages":"2013-2040"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2024-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.12964","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142170053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Maintaining maintenance: The real effects of financial reporting for infrastructure 维护保养：基础设施财务报告的实际效果

IF 3.2 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-08-08 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12970

Ryan P. McDonough, Claire J. Yan

{"title":"Maintaining maintenance: The real effects of financial reporting for infrastructure","authors":"Ryan P. McDonough, Claire J. Yan","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12970","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1911-3846.12970","url":null,"abstract":"We use the adoption of General Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 34 (GASB 34) to examine whether disclosing information in states' financial reports influences their investment decisions. GASB 34 requires governments to report on general infrastructure assets and permits either the standard depreciation approach or the modified approach. The modified approach requires additional disclosures, a step which we argue promotes greater transparency about a government's infrastructure and can potentially facilitate infrastructure investment decisions. We find a robust positive association between the modified approach and investment in infrastructure maintenance. Additional evidence demonstrates a more pronounced effect when external monitoring is likely higher and government officials are likely better informed as a result of the increased disclosure. We further find that states using the modified approach are less likely to cut or divert funds intended for infrastructure maintenance. Our study suggests that disclosing information in governments' financial reports can have real effects, such as mitigating underinvestment in infrastructure maintenance, which governments often defer to future periods in violation of the interperiod equity principle and to the detriment of society.","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"41 3","pages":"1952-1985"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2024-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.12970","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141925518","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Sell-side analysts as social intermediaries 作为社会中介的卖方分析师

IF 3.2 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-08-06 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12968

Guangyu Li, Crawford Spence, Zhong Chen

引用次数: 0

How do investors value the publication of tax information? Evidence from the European public country-by-country reporting 投资者如何看待税务信息的公布？来自欧洲公共国别报告的证据

IF 3.2 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-07-19 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12965

Raphael Müller, Christoph Spengel, Stefan Weck

{"title":"How do investors value the publication of tax information? Evidence from the European public country-by-country reporting","authors":"Raphael Müller, Christoph Spengel, Stefan Weck","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12965","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1911-3846.12965","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the costs associated with public disclosure, as opposed to confidential reporting, of tax country-by-country reporting (CbCR) information. Our study addresses a critical knowledge gap, considering the growing adoption of public tax transparency measures. We aim to illuminate this matter by examining the expected costs for firms of making previously confidential CbCR information publicly available. The fact that the information was previously confidentially reported to the tax authorities allows us to assess the cost of publication in isolation. Employing an event study methodology, we provide early evidence on the capital market reaction to this new requirement on a sample of European firms falling within its scope. We document a significantly negative cumulative average abnormal return of EUR 47 billion to 64 billion for up to 3 days following the announcement. Additional cross-sectional results suggest that concerns about the reputational costs arising from public scrutiny and the proprietary costs from disclosing sensitive business information outweigh the potential benefits of an extended information environment from an investor perspective. Our findings highlight that the public disclosure of tax information imposes significant—and likely unintended—costs from a firm perspective. This aspect should be carefully considered when developing tax transparency measures.","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"41 3","pages":"1893-1924"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2024-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.12965","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141745767","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The general anti-avoidance rule 一般反避税规则

IF 3.2 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-07-19 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12963

Mary Cowx, Jon N. Kerr

引用次数: 0

Institutional dual holdings and expected crash risk: Evidence from mergers between lenders and equity holders 机构双重持股与预期崩盘风险：来自贷款人和股权持有人合并的证据

IF 3.2 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-07-18 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12966

Bing Li, Zhenbin Liu, Jeffrey Pittman, Shijie Yang

{"title":"Institutional dual holdings and expected crash risk: Evidence from mergers between lenders and equity holders","authors":"Bing Li, Zhenbin Liu, Jeffrey Pittman, Shijie Yang","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12966","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1911-3846.12966","url":null,"abstract":"Exploiting mergers between lenders and shareholders of the same firm as an exogenous shock to shareholder–creditor conflicts, we examine the causal effect of these conflicts on firms' ex ante expected stock price crash risk evident in the options implied volatility smirk. The decrease in conflicts of interest between lenders and shareholders induces dual holders to encourage the disclosure of more information to alleviate costly information asymmetry with other investors and better execute their oversight role in constraining managers' bad news suppression. Consistent with expectations, we find that a firm's ex ante expected crash risk declines after a shareholder–creditor merger. We also report strong, robust evidence that the negative impact of mergers on firms' expected crash risk increases when institutional investors or lenders have a greater stake in the treatment firms or when shareholder–creditor conflicts are apt to be exacerbated. Additionally, we document that firms issue management earnings forecasts (especially bad news forecasts) more frequently after these mergers. Finally, we find that expected crash risk decreases more after mergers in firms suffering worse information asymmetry and with weak monitoring mechanisms. Our evidence suggests that option market participants value the dual holder's role in deterring managers' bad news hoarding.","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"41 3","pages":"1819-1850"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2024-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141737300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The effect of securities litigation risk on firm value and disclosure 证券诉讼风险对公司价值和信息披露的影响

IF 3.2 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-07-02 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12960

Dain C. Donelson, Christian M. Hutzler, Brian R. Monsen, Christopher G. Yust

引用次数: 0

Performance measure skewness and the structure of CEO compensation: Theory and evidence 绩效衡量偏度与 CEO 薪酬结构：理论与证据

IF 3.2 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-06-21 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12959

Pierre Chaigneau, Woo-Jin Chang, Stephen A. Hillegeist

{"title":"Performance measure skewness and the structure of CEO compensation: Theory and evidence","authors":"Pierre Chaigneau, Woo-Jin Chang, Stephen A. Hillegeist","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12959","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1911-3846.12959","url":null,"abstract":"While research has analyzed how the structure of incentive pay relates to the dispersion of the performance measure distribution, as measured by its variance or volatility, we examine how it relates to the asymmetry of the distribution, as measured by its skewness. In contrast to the variance, skewness affects the relative informativeness of high and low performance about the agent's effort, which determines the relative efficiency of providing rewards and punishments for incentive purposes. Therefore, skewness is an important determinant of compensation convexity, which is determined by the relative holdings of stock and options. Consistent with our analytical and numerical results, we find that the skewness of expected earnings is negatively associated with the convexity of CEO compensation. Our results are economically significant, robust to alternative specifications, and do not appear to be driven by reverse causality. In addition, we find that earnings skewness is negatively associated with total CEO compensation and that this association is driven by lower options-based compensation. These findings are consistent with CEOs preferring positively skewed performance metrics. Overall, we provide theoretical, numerical, and empirical evidence suggesting that skewness is a more important determinant of the convexity and structure of CEO compensation than volatility.","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"41 3","pages":"1754-1784"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2024-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141506442","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0