{"title":"Peer effects in subjective performance evaluation","authors":"Gavin Cassar, Taeho Ko","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12876","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12876","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We investigate the influence of peer quality on subjective performance evaluation using 75,413 ratings of 130 employees from 6,908 raters in a business school setting. We find that subjective performance ratings are lower for employees with higher quality peer groups in both randomized and nonrandomized settings. Using a novel long-window setting, we observe peer effects persisting, but slowly decaying, for several months even when priming raters with the employees' previous performance information. We find that the strength of the peer effects is greater for focal employees with weaker performance, for the peers with higher attribute similarity, and when the performance of peers is more extreme. Overall, we find strong and persistent peer effects in subjective performance evaluation.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.12876","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50140246","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"CEO career concerns in early tenure and corporate social responsibility reporting","authors":"Long Chen, Chih-Hsien Liao, Albert Tsang, Li Yu","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12874","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12874","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The literature on corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure focuses on its economic consequences, but little is known about motivations—especially CEO personal incentives—behind such disclosure. Using an array of CSR reporting measures, we find that career concerns of CEOs early in their tenure motivate them to use voluntary CSR reporting as a signaling mechanism. The negative association between CEO tenure and CSR reporting is more pronounced in firms with stronger information intermediaries—that is, a higher level of socially responsible investors, a higher number of analysts following, and a higher level of media coverage. We also find that CEOs early in their tenure receive more personal benefits after voluntary CSR reporting, in terms of higher total compensation, better reputation, and less turnover, than CEOs later in their tenure. Taken together, the findings of our study lend support to the conjecture that CEO career concerns early in their tenure can be an important determinant of firms' voluntary CSR reporting.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.12874","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50135041","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Kenneth Lee, Mark Aleksanyan, Elaine Harris, Melina Manochin
{"title":"Throwing in the towel: What happens when analysts' recommendations go wrong?","authors":"Kenneth Lee, Mark Aleksanyan, Elaine Harris, Melina Manochin","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12875","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1911-3846.12875","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Every analyst will experience stock recommendation failures during their career. Unlike many other professions, these pivotal moments occur in the full glare of clients, colleagues, equity-sales teams, and the media. This research explores the practices of analysts up to and beyond the point where, faced with a failing recommendation, they contemplate “throwing in the towel” on their recommendation. Based on empirical evidence gathered from interviews with sell-side analysts and their key interlocutors—equity-sales specialists, investors, and investor relations officers—this paper uncovers several new empirical insights into the recommendation practices of analysts. The main argument made in the paper is that capitulation practices emerge from the specific contextual framework of individual recommendations and the analyst's conduct as a knowledgeable, emotional human agent. We identify several contextual contingencies of stock recommendations that underpin how a capitulation episode unfolds, including the temporal proximity of the capitulation to the original recommendation; the importance and profile of the stock to the analyst's reputation (“franchise intensity”); the level of interest/reaction from clients, equity-sales teams and corporates; the nature/cause of recommendation failure; and recommendation boldness. Our study provides evidence that what an analyst does when faced with a failing recommendation cannot be reduced to a predictable, rational process and informs our understanding of observed practices such as the reluctance of analysts to capitulate and why “recommendation paralysis” often follows a recommendation capitulation.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.12875","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49552812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Enterprise system implementation and cash flow volatility","authors":"Alfred Z. Liu, Morton Pincus, Sean Xin Xu","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12872","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12872","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study investigates the financial and operational implications of enterprise systems (ESs) in corporate risk management. Using matched difference-in-differences analyses based on ES implementation events, we document a significant reduction in the volatility of operating cash flows following ES implementations. We further show that ES implementers have better post-implementation operational efficiency than matched non-ES firms and better manage sales, costs of sales, working capital, and operating expenses to reduce operating cash flow volatility. Consistent with the benefits of lower cash flow volatility documented in prior literature, we find ES implementers demonstrate higher investment efficiency, lower reliance on external financing, and higher debt capacity post-ES-implementation than the matched non-ES firms. Our study sheds light on the economic benefits of utilizing ESs in corporate risk management and in so doing responds to the paucity of empirical research in this area.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.12872","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50144818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Managerial performance evaluation and organizational form","authors":"Michael Krapp, Wolfgang Schultze, Andreas Weiler","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12873","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12873","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study the relative efficiency of centralized versus decentralized organizational forms given optimized managerial performance evaluation within an incomplete contracting framework with risk-averse agents under moral hazard. Decentralization and performance evaluation are complementary control choices and the efficiency of an organizational form depends on the design of performance evaluation. Divisions can make relationship-specific investments that not only improve firm performance, but also increase compensation risk. We find that pure divisional performance evaluation is optimal under centralization, whereas under decentralization, optimal compensation contracts include a combination of divisional and firm-wide performance evaluation. When comparing both organizational forms, we find that the optimal form depends on managers’ degree of risk-aversion and the uncertainty of the business environment. Contrary to previous literature, we find that centralization dominates in many situations, particularly at high degrees of risk-aversion and high uncertainty.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.12873","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50144819","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Technological peer pressure and skill specificity of job postings","authors":"Yi Cao, Shijun Cheng, Jennifer Wu Tucker, Chi Wan","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12870","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1911-3846.12870","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Human capital is a major impetus for technological innovation. We examine the relation between the technological dimension of product market competition and the disclosure of skill requirements in job postings. On the one hand, technological competition may raise the urgency of recruiting tech talent and make firms provide more specific skill requirements. On the other hand, technological competition can increase the proprietary costs of skill requirement disclosure. Using technological peer pressure as a measure of technological competition, we find that firms facing intense technological competition provide more specific skill requirements for tech positions, suggesting that the disclosure benefits outweigh the proprietary costs when firms face pressure to innovate. The effect of technological peer pressure is more pronounced among firms that make only incremental innovations and less pronounced among firms that rely on trade secrets or have greater industry peer presence in close geographical proximity. Our study documents a distinct relationship between technological competition and voluntary disclosure targeted to labor market participants.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48637764","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Qintao Fan, Nicole Bastian Johnson, Thomas Pfeiffer
{"title":"The impact of intrafirm incentive conflicts on the interplay between tax incidence and economic efficiency","authors":"Qintao Fan, Nicole Bastian Johnson, Thomas Pfeiffer","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12871","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1911-3846.12871","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study how corporate taxation interacts with intrafirm incentive conflicts between shareholders and managers and how this interaction impacts the firm's economic decisions and outcomes. In our model, investment under asymmetric information facilitates entrenchment and rent extraction by the privately informed manager. We show that when the future investment payoff is exogenous, a corporate tax cut increases managerial rents, reduces pre-tax investment profitability, increases the firm's optimal investment hurdle rate, and reduces investment. When the manager can exert upfront project development effort to increase the expected investment payoff, a tax rate reduction not only encourages more effort but also leads the firm to increase the investment hurdle rate to curtail rents. In equilibrium, a lower tax rate always benefits the manager, but the sensitivity of the project's return to the manager's effort determines whether the firm will increase or decrease investment in response to a tax cut, and whether the firm's resulting pre-tax profit will increase or decrease. Overall, our study shows that intrafirm incentive conflicts can be an important factor in the interplay between tax incidence and economic efficiency, two central themes in corporate tax policy debates.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.12871","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135492962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
John L. Abernathy, Jan (J.) Philipp Klaus, Linh Le, Adi Masli
{"title":"Does greater access to employees with information technology capability improve financial reporting quality?","authors":"John L. Abernathy, Jan (J.) Philipp Klaus, Linh Le, Adi Masli","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12869","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1911-3846.12869","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Although information technology (IT) plays an essential role in financial reporting, many companies today lack sufficient human capabilities to utilize IT competently. We examine the association between a firm's access to IT-capable labor and financial reporting quality (FRQ). We proxy for access to IT-capable labor using workforce measures in the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) where the firm operates, including (1) the number of IT-related college degrees relative to the total active workforce, (2) the level of education of IT graduates, (3) the income level of IT graduates, and (4) a composite measure. We find that firms in MSAs with a higher IT-competent labor force are associated with fewer financial reporting misstatements and internal control issues. This study contributes to the emerging literature stream examining the influence of geographic labor characteristics on firm-level outcomes and the research on the impact of IT capability on financial reporting processes. We also inform the current movement of integrating IT knowledge into the education curriculum.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45315731","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The interactive effect of organizational identification and reward type on reward valuation","authors":"Khim Kelly, Weiming Liu, Adam Presslee","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12868","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1911-3846.12868","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Recent management trends highlight two techniques firms use to motivate employee effort: (1) fostering employees' organizational identification (OI) and (2) offering employees tangible rewards such as gift cards instead of cash rewards. We use three studies to examine how OI affects employees' reward valuation and how such effects differ depending on the reward type. Study 1 is an experiment, demonstrating that increasing OI increases the emphasis participants place on a reward's symbolic value, which then increases the total value of the reward—to a larger extent when the reward is tangible than when it is cash. Study 2 is an experiment, providing evidence that Study 1 results are robust to using a tangible reward that is not socially consumed, that is selected either by the firm or by the employee, and that is either a good or poor fit with the employee's personal preference. Finally, Study 3 is a survey, asking respondents about actual rewards they received from their current employer and capturing their actual OI with their current employer. Results in Study 3 are inferentially similar to those in Study 1 and Study 2, albeit stronger for rewards of smaller monetary value. Collectively, these results highlight the particular benefit of strong OI on how employees value tangible rewards relative to cash rewards, which should be of interest to incentive system designers.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45580240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Eliciting deliberative and implemental mindsets in audit planning","authors":"Brett A. Rixom, David Plumlee","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12867","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1911-3846.12867","url":null,"abstract":"<p>There is concern that rather than critically deliberating specific circumstances, auditors focus on selecting and documenting defensible audit positions. Currently, subordinate auditors perform tasks mindful that they will be accountable for their work both inside (e.g., partners) and outside (e.g., PCAOB) the firm and adopt “implementation intentions” based on previous review experiences to guide their performance. In the context of fraud-detection planning, we consider an alternative approach in which subordinate auditors work under contingent reward agreements under which they will be compensated for effective fraud-detection plans. Lacking an anticipated course of action, they invoke a “deliberative mindset” in order to create a task strategy. In an experiment, auditors completed a fraud-detection planning task under contingent rewards, accountability, or anonymity. We find that auditors operating under contingent rewards used deliberative mindsets. They were better able to identify potential fraud, select more effective procedures, and plan more hours for effective procedures. Auditors under accountability completed the planning task based on implementation intentions. They focused on broadly increasing audit hours across procedures, including allocating significantly more hours to less effective procedures. Mediation analysis shows that improved planning performance resulted from the use of deliberative mindsets and not implementation intentions.</p>","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45896802","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}