报告偏差和反馈效应†

IF 3.2 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Hui Chen, Evgeny Petrov
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引用次数: 0

摘要

股票价格通常会为公司管理者提供可用于实际决策的新信息。研究通常侧重于事前披露政策,并表明市场反馈的存在会挤掉公司的披露。我们转而研究了经理人的事后偏差激励,发现市场反馈会放大多报偏差,但不一定会放大少报偏差,这是由三种相互作用的效应造成的。首先,由于信息质量的下降会挤占投机者获取私人信息的机会并提高投资效率,因此无论在哪种报告情况下(信息配给效应),经理人都会在有反馈的情况下增加报告偏差。其次,管理者在多报的情况下偏差更大,而在少报的情况下偏差更小,因为报告更有利的信息会挤占私人信息的获取,因为投机者预期后续投资会更高,从而获得更高的交易利润(投资规模效应)。第三,市场反馈不仅通过投机者的信息获取影响报告偏差,还直接通过做市商的定价功能影响报告偏差。具体来说,做市商会降低价格折扣,因为他预期经理人可能会从价格中了解到正确的信息,从而提高投资效率。由于预期在有反馈的情况下会有较低的价格惩罚,经理人在多报情况下会有更大的偏差,而在少报情况下会有较小的偏差(投资修正效应)。总之,我们的研究结果表明,当经理人可以通过价格进行学习时,赋予公司报告自由裁量权可以提高投资效率和公司价值。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Reporting bias and feedback effect

Stock prices often provide firm managers with new information that can be used in real decisions. Studies generally focus on the ex ante disclosure policy and show that the presence of market feedback crowds out firms' disclosure. We instead examine a manager's ex post biasing incentives and find that market feedback amplifies overreporting bias, but not necessarily underreporting bias, due to three interacting effects. First, the manager biases the report more with feedback since decreased information quality crowds in the speculator's private information acquisition and improves investment efficiency, regardless of the reporting scenario (the information rationing effect). Second, the manager biases more in the overreporting scenario and less in the underreporting scenario, because reporting more favorable information crowds in private information acquisition, as the speculator expects a higher subsequent investment and therefore higher trading profits (the investment scale effect). Third, market feedback influences reporting bias not only through the speculator's information acquisition but also directly through the market maker's pricing function. Specifically, the market maker decreases the price discount, as he expects that the manager may learn correct information from the price and may invest more efficiently. Expecting a lower price penalty in the presence of feedback, the manager biases more in the overreporting scenario and less in the underreporting scenario (the investment correction effect). Overall, our results suggest that granting firms reporting discretion could improve investment efficiency and firm value when managers can learn through price.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.20
自引率
11.10%
发文量
97
期刊介绍: Contemporary Accounting Research (CAR) is the premiere research journal of the Canadian Academic Accounting Association, which publishes leading- edge research that contributes to our understanding of all aspects of accounting"s role within organizations, markets or society. Canadian based, increasingly global in scope, CAR seeks to reflect the geographical and intellectual diversity in accounting research. To accomplish this, CAR will continue to publish in its traditional areas of excellence, while seeking to more fully represent other research streams in its pages, so as to continue and expand its tradition of excellence.
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