审计师变更和管理层发布盈利预测

IF 3.2 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Yonghong Jia, Xinghua Gao
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引用次数: 0

摘要

审计师变更是标志着审计师与客户关系中断的重大公司事件。以往的研究主要考察这种变更对审计质量和市场参与者投资决策的影响。我们研究的是审计师变更对前瞻性信息自愿披露的影响。由于中断可能对披露可信度产生不利影响,管理者可能会选择减少披露。或者,股东可能会要求增加披露以加强监督,因为审计师变更预示着公司与审计师之间可能存在问题。通过采用多重识别策略,我们发现在审计师变更后,公司不太可能发布管理层盈利预测(MEF)。我们还发现,治理质量减轻了审计师变更对发布管理层盈利预测的负面影响。此外,审计师变更与市场对预测发布的较低反应有关。总体证据与预测可信度降低的概念一致。最后,我们对审计师变更的特征进行了横截面分析,发现有证据表明,信号传递和预期后续审计质量是审计师变更与 MEFs 之间关联的内在机制。我们的研究首次提供了大样本证据,证明审计师变更对前瞻性信息的自愿披露具有破坏性影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

Auditor changes and management's issuance of earnings forecasts

Auditor changes and management's issuance of earnings forecasts

Auditor changes are significant corporate events marking disruptions in the auditor-client relationship. Prior studies have primarily examined the impact of such changes on audit quality and investment decisions of market participants. We study the effect of auditor changes on the voluntary disclosure of forward-looking information. Managers may choose to reduce disclosure due to the possible adverse effect of the disruptions on disclosure credibility. Alternatively, shareholders may demand increased disclosure to intensify monitoring, as the auditor change signals potential issues between the company and the auditor. Employing multiple identification strategies, we find that firms are less likely to issue management earnings forecasts (MEFs) following auditor changes. We also find that governance quality mitigates the negative impact of auditor changes on the issuance of MEFs. Additionally, auditor changes are associated with lower market reactions to forecast releases. The overall evidence is consistent with the notion of reduced forecast credibility. Lastly, we conduct cross-sectional analyses on characteristics of the auditor changes and find evidence consistent with signaling and anticipated successor audit quality to be underlying mechanisms for the association between auditor changes and MEFs. Our study provides the first large sample evidence that auditor changes have a disruptive effect on the voluntary disclosure of forward-looking information.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.20
自引率
11.10%
发文量
97
期刊介绍: Contemporary Accounting Research (CAR) is the premiere research journal of the Canadian Academic Accounting Association, which publishes leading- edge research that contributes to our understanding of all aspects of accounting"s role within organizations, markets or society. Canadian based, increasingly global in scope, CAR seeks to reflect the geographical and intellectual diversity in accounting research. To accomplish this, CAR will continue to publish in its traditional areas of excellence, while seeking to more fully represent other research streams in its pages, so as to continue and expand its tradition of excellence.
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