The review of international organizations最新文献_第3页

Less is more: Property rights and dictators’ demand for foreign direct investment 少即是多：产权与独裁者对外国直接投资的需求

The review of international organizations Pub Date : 2025-01-20 DOI: 10.1007/s11558-024-09583-y

Jacque Gao, Frederick R. Chen

{"title":"Less is more: Property rights and dictators’ demand for foreign direct investment","authors":"Jacque Gao, Frederick R. Chen","doi":"10.1007/s11558-024-09583-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-024-09583-y","url":null,"abstract":"Past studies in political economy have established a link between domestic property rights protection and foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. However, the underlying mechanism remains unclear, given that foreign investors often enjoy more robust property rights protection through international arbitration under investment treaties or potential intervention by their home governments. In this article, we develop a demand-side theory of how domestic property rights affect the flow of FDI into authoritarian regimes. Specifically, dictators with weaker property rights can extract more rents through restrictive FDI policies due to their greater ability to expropriate domestic enterprises than foreign ones. As competition from foreign investors decreases domestic firms’ profits, these dictators tend to impose stricter FDI regulations to maximize rent extraction, despite the potential benefits of FDI for regime stability through wage increases. Therefore, the relationship between domestic property rights and FDI is driven by dictators’ demand, even if foreign investors’ supply remains constant. This article advances our understanding of the determinants of economic liberalization and the effects of FDI in authoritarian regimes.","PeriodicalId":75182,"journal":{"name":"The review of international organizations","volume":"100 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142990252","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

International organizations in national parliamentary debates 国家议会辩论中的国际组织

The review of international organizations Pub Date : 2025-01-06 DOI: 10.1007/s11558-024-09577-w

Tom Hunter, Stefanie Walter

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Decision-making in the United Nations General Assembly: A comprehensive database of resolution-related decisions 联合国大会决策：与决议有关的决定的综合数据库

The review of international organizations Pub Date : 2025-01-06 DOI: 10.1007/s11558-024-09580-1

Joshua Fjelstul, Simon Hug, Christopher Kilby

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Institutional innovation in response to backlash: How members are circumventing the WTO impasse 应对反弹的制度创新：成员国如何绕过WTO僵局

The review of international organizations Pub Date : 2024-12-20 DOI: 10.1007/s11558-024-09579-8

Krzysztof Pelc

{"title":"Institutional innovation in response to backlash: How members are circumventing the WTO impasse","authors":"Krzysztof Pelc","doi":"10.1007/s11558-024-09579-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-024-09579-8","url":null,"abstract":"In response to the impasse caused by the US blockade of the World Trade Organization’s dispute settlement body, 52 Member-states have converged on a innovative workaround: the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA). This article asks two questions related to this singular, yet overlooked initiative in global governance: first, what determines who joins a novel enforcement mechanism in the midst of a global “backlash” against trade liberalization? Secondly, does the MPIA work? Examining countries’ trade policy in the run-up to the MPIA’s creation suggests that the main motivation for MPIA participation is the possibility to challenge trade partners’ measures; vulnerability to others’ challenges, conversely, does not deter joining. The same analysis can be used to predict subsequent MPIA entrants, in ways that match anecdotal evidence. A corollary finding is that insofar as the US reasons similarly to other countries, its trade profile suggests it does not stand to gain much from more credible enforcement, which may explain its lack of zeal during WTO reform negotiations. Secondly, looking at dyadic trade measures over time, we offer evidence that even at this early stage, the MPIA generates deterrence among its members, and this effect is growing. From an institutional standpoint, the experiment appears to be working: the MPIA is not only an interim solution, but also a prototype for institutional innovation in the face of backlash.","PeriodicalId":75182,"journal":{"name":"The review of international organizations","volume":"112 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142869900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Why settle?: Partisan-based explanation of investor-state dispute outcomes 为什么解决?：投资者-国家争端结果的党派解释

The review of international organizations Pub Date : 2024-12-09 DOI: 10.1007/s11558-024-09576-x

Haillie Na-Kyung Lee, Jong Hyun Lee

{"title":"Why settle?: Partisan-based explanation of investor-state dispute outcomes","authors":"Haillie Na-Kyung Lee, Jong Hyun Lee","doi":"10.1007/s11558-024-09576-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-024-09576-x","url":null,"abstract":"This paper seeks to explain why some investor-state dispute cases are settled before reaching the ruling stage in democracies, focusing on disputes triggered by regulatory changes made by host government. Our argument is grounded in the domestic politics of the respondent country, specifically the partisan orientation of the incumbent government. When faced with regulatory investor claims, respondent governments must balance protecting domestic social welfare with promoting investment. Our theory is that right-leaning governments are more likely to settle because they are more willing to make regulatory concessions to appease foreign investors and attract investment. In contrast, left-leaning governments prefer arbitral rulings over settlements, as they view settlements as a capitulation to foreign investors’ demands at the expense of public welfare. Using original data from 335 investor-state disputes involving democratic host countries between 1994 and 2020, we find support for this claim. Moreover, we provide qualitative evidence from the investor-state dispute between TC Energy Corporation, a Canadian energy company, and the United States, as well as the investor-state disputes triggered by Argentina’s 2002 emergency measures, to confirm our hypothesized causal pathway linking government partisanship to the likelihood of settlement.","PeriodicalId":75182,"journal":{"name":"The review of international organizations","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142793896","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Commitment ambiguity and ambition in climate pledges 气候承诺的模糊性和野心

The review of international organizations Pub Date : 2024-12-03 DOI: 10.1007/s11558-024-09575-y

Vegard Tørstad, Vegard Wiborg

{"title":"Commitment ambiguity and ambition in climate pledges","authors":"Vegard Tørstad, Vegard Wiborg","doi":"10.1007/s11558-024-09575-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-024-09575-y","url":null,"abstract":"The Paris Agreement on climate change is built around a pledge-and-review system, wherein countries submit nationally determined pledges of mitigation commitments. While the agreement’s flexible design has attracted broad participation, its lenient informational requirements for pledges have also engendered considerable ambiguity in countries’ commitments. What are the implications of commitment ambiguity on the credibility of compliance and treaty effectiveness more broadly? This article sheds light on these questions by evaluating the relationship between commitment ambiguity and ambition in countries’ Paris pledges. We introduce a model that disentangles commitment ambiguity into two distinct forms: structural and strategic. We argue that structural ambiguity, which arises from constraints on the information necessary for governments to accurately assess their commitment potential, dampens the ambition levels of pledges. This prudence effect is driven by compliance concern: the anticipation of audience costs in case of non-compliance induces policymakers to adjust ambition downwards. Our empirical analysis of countries’ Nationally Determined Contributions demonstrates that ambiguous pledges exhibit lower ambition than precise ones. In line with our theory, this prudence effect of ambiguity is mainly pronounced among democracies, which face higher domestic audience costs in case of non-compliance with pledges than autocracies. This article contributes a novel theory of ambiguity and ambition in international institutions, which shows how audience-based compliance concerns can discipline cheap talk. Moreover, the article’s empirical findings provide insight into the credibility of countries’ climate pledges under the Paris Agreement, with implications for the treaty’s overall effectiveness prospects.","PeriodicalId":75182,"journal":{"name":"The review of international organizations","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142760329","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Cosmopolitan identity, authority, and domestic support of international organizations 国际组织的世界认同、权威和国内支持

The review of international organizations Pub Date : 2024-11-15 DOI: 10.1007/s11558-024-09573-0

Bernd Schlipphak, Constantin Schäfer, Oliver Treib

引用次数: 0

How effective is trade conditionality? Economic coercion in the Generalized System of Preferences 贸易条件的效力如何？普遍优惠制中的经济胁迫

The review of international organizations Pub Date : 2024-11-05 DOI: 10.1007/s11558-024-09570-3

Michael-David Mangini

{"title":"How effective is trade conditionality? Economic coercion in the Generalized System of Preferences","authors":"Michael-David Mangini","doi":"10.1007/s11558-024-09570-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-024-09570-3","url":null,"abstract":"States often receive threats of economic coercion only after committing some transgression. While attention has been given to strategic selection in the imposition of sanctions – the notion that sanctions are imposed only after the threat of sanctions has failed to elicit compliance – selection also occurs at the threat stage. Does the possibility of economic coercion incentivize states to stay in line before they are directly threatened? This article makes two contributions. First, it presents a theory showing how the interaction between different types of threats can alter the strategic context of economic coercion in ways that potentially reverse the results of empirical analysis. It explains that states are likely to issue general threats, or threats targeting the behavior of a group of countries, when sanctions effectiveness is unknown or the identity of noncompliers is difficult to predict. Second, using quasi-experimental techniques, this article demonstrates that states actively manage the risk of losing access to a trade preference program by altering their policies. The article indicates the political consequences of economic linkages may be more extensive than previously believed.","PeriodicalId":75182,"journal":{"name":"The review of international organizations","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142580318","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Negotiating with your mouth full: Intergovernmental negotiations between transparency and confidentiality 满嘴跑火车的谈判：透明度与保密性之间的政府间谈判

The review of international organizations Pub Date : 2024-11-04 DOI: 10.1007/s11558-024-09572-1

Mareike Kleine, Samuel Huntington

{"title":"Negotiating with your mouth full: Intergovernmental negotiations between transparency and confidentiality","authors":"Mareike Kleine, Samuel Huntington","doi":"10.1007/s11558-024-09572-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-024-09572-1","url":null,"abstract":"Transparency lies at the heart of canonical theories of international negotiations and institutions—yet it is rarely directly measured or explained. This paper explores the potential downsides of transparency reforms in intergovernmental negotiations and institutions. We argue that as formal international meetings open up to the public, negotiators face incentives to shift deliberations to more informal and opaque venues, especially for sensitive and domestically contested issues. To test when and why this occurs, we present new data on three decades of intergovernmental negotiations in the Council of the European Union (1990–2019), and in particular the use of informal breaks where no minutes are taken. We find that recourse to such breaks—especially at lunch time—has increased substantially, and that ministers often take these opportunities to discuss controversial topics. We deploy quantitative and qualitative analyses to show that variations in informal breaks correlate both with institutional enhancements to transparency and with specific concerns over antagonistic political mobilization at home, notably in the form of Euroscepticism. These findings challenge received positive and normative theories about transparency in international institutions, and contribute to the literature on informal governance, negotiation studies, EU politics, and the transnational democratic deficit.","PeriodicalId":75182,"journal":{"name":"The review of international organizations","volume":"241 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142574628","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

How negative institutional power moderates contestation: Explaining dissatisfied powers’ strategies towards international institutions 负面机构权力如何缓和竞争：解释不满大国对国际机构的策略

The review of international organizations Pub Date : 2024-10-29 DOI: 10.1007/s11558-024-09574-z

Benjamin Daßler, Tim Heinkelmann-Wild, Andreas Kruck

{"title":"How negative institutional power moderates contestation: Explaining dissatisfied powers’ strategies towards international institutions","authors":"Benjamin Daßler, Tim Heinkelmann-Wild, Andreas Kruck","doi":"10.1007/s11558-024-09574-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-024-09574-z","url":null,"abstract":"International institutions are increasingly under attack from their member states, who embark on varying and sometimes escalating modes of contestation. At the same time, states’ negative institutional power, i.e. their opportunities to avoid undesired outcomes in international institutions, has been declining for some time. This paper claims that dissatisfied states’ negative institutional power endowments are key to understanding their varying contestation modes: the more limited (extensive) the negative institutional power of dissatisfied states in an institution, the more radical (moderate) modes of institutional contestation they will choose. We argue that, all else equal, states’ (1) inside options to prevent undesired outcomes within the institution and (2) their outside options to evade undesired outcomes by leaving the institution jointly condition whether they choose a strategy of voice, subversion, exit, or rollback to contest the dissatisfying institution. We assess the plausibility of our Negative Institutional Power Theory (NIPT) by means of four detailed case studies of the Trump Administration’s contestation of the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, the Paris Agreement, and the Iran Nuclear Deal. We demonstrate the generalizability of our arguments by assessing our claims across eight additional instances of other dissatisfied powers’ contesting different international institutions. The twelve case studies demonstrate that negative power matters for states’ choice of institutional contestation modes. Our findings suggest that whether, in the future, international institutions will be increasingly challenged from within and outside, can be influenced by reforms that grant (or deny) states negative institutional power.","PeriodicalId":75182,"journal":{"name":"The review of international organizations","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142536499","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0