{"title":"International bureaucrats under transparency: The case of the WTO TRIPS Council","authors":"Sojun Park, Minju Kim","doi":"10.1007/s11558-025-09606-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-025-09606-2","url":null,"abstract":"How does transparency affect the behavior of international bureaucrats tasked with facilitating negotiations? Existing theories offer opposing expectations—greater transparency might induce international bureaucrats to engage more with contentious issues that matter to the public or lead them to avoid those issues whenever possible. We assess these competing perspectives by analyzing the World Trade Organization (WTO)’s 2002 document de-restriction reform that enhanced transparency to the public. Specifically, we examine how prompt public disclosure of documents shapes the way the WTO Secretariat writes reports about the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Using network statistics to estimate the state preference distributions on key topics, we find that, after the reform, the WTO Secretariat is more likely to issue reports on polarized topics in negotiations, using accountability-enhancing words. Our analysis at the country-year level shows that the reform led to greater national newspaper coverage of the WTO TRIPS, which in turn raised public awareness. The results suggest that transparency could empower international bureaucrats to tackle divisive issues in times of member-state gridlock.","PeriodicalId":75182,"journal":{"name":"The review of international organizations","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145485627","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Experimental evidence on the financial consequences of international organization legitimacy","authors":"Jiseon Chang, Mirko Heinzel, Daniel Nielson","doi":"10.1007/s11558-025-09609-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-025-09609-z","url":null,"abstract":"International organizations (IOs) face growing resource constraints amid increasing scrutiny and legitimacy challenges from member states. In response, many IOs are seeking to diversify their funding sources by appealing to non-state actors, including individual donors. Yet, little is known about what motivates the public to contribute financially to IOs. This study investigates whether IOs’ efforts at self-legitimation influence donation behavior, distinguishing among three forms of legitimacy: (a) procedural, (b) performance-based, and (c) mandate-based. We examine the effects of legitimacy messaging on public donations to UNICEF through a series of pre-registered survey, field, and survey-based field experiments involving over 22 million Facebook users across five countries—Brazil, Egypt, India, Saudi Arabia, and the United Kingdom. Our findings indicate that legitimacy appeals have limited impact on individuals’ willingness or actual decisions to donate. These results suggest a need for further research into the practical implications of legitimacy in global governance.","PeriodicalId":75182,"journal":{"name":"The review of international organizations","volume":"70 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145441163","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How do higher-order punishment institutions shape cooperation and norm-enforcement?","authors":"Jan Philipp Krügel, Nicola Maaser","doi":"10.1007/s11558-025-09594-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-025-09594-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We explore, both theoretically and through a laboratory experiment, the impact of different forms of higher-order punishment on third-party behavior and cooperation levels within a public goods game. This investigation may shed light on how norms influence national governments, as monitored by international organizations or disciplined by electoral competition, and how these norms are subsequently enforced on and followed by domestic agents, e.g., businesses. Specifically, we compare two main treatments that represent the effects of competitive elections and external monitors in a stylized form. These treatments are contrasted with a control condition that lacks an additional layer of norm enforcement. While both higher-order punishment institutions enhance cooperation compared to the control, our findings reveal differences between the two scenarios: Evaluation of the third party by an uninvolved agent leads to heightened punishment and reduced free-riding, whereas competition between two third-party candidates results in more strategic and selective punitive actions.</p>","PeriodicalId":75182,"journal":{"name":"The review of international organizations","volume":"173 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143927243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Decolonization legacies and financial contributions to international organizations","authors":"Joowon Yi","doi":"10.1007/s11558-025-09592-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-025-09592-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article examines why some states emerging through decolonization are more actively contributing to international organizations (IOs) than others, focusing on their voluntary financial contributions to the United Nations System (UN). I argue that the birth legacies of states, particularly modes of decolonization, significantly influence their subsequent financial contributions to the UN. A regression analysis of 95 former colonies, mandates, and dependencies suggests that states with a negative legacy – derelict decolonization – provide larger financial contributions to the UN. This finding highlights the impact of colonial history on state behavior within IOs and suggests that former colonies may seek active participation in global governance, valuing international resources highly.</p>","PeriodicalId":75182,"journal":{"name":"The review of international organizations","volume":"47 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143910553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
T. Renee Bowen, J. Lawrence Broz, Christina J. Schneider
{"title":"Domestic politics and international organizations","authors":"T. Renee Bowen, J. Lawrence Broz, Christina J. Schneider","doi":"10.1007/s11558-025-09591-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-025-09591-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This introduction to the Special Issue reviews the existing literature on the domestic politics of international organizations (IOs), presenting them within a unified theoretical framework. We emphasize the central role of domestic forces in the study of IOs: how individual preferences are channeled through domestic political institutions, and ultimately inform a government’s foreign policy decisions toward and within IOs. We show that these forces can be distilled into a game between citizens in which they select welfare weights to be assigned to citizens across the globe. We refer to this as the <i>Citizens’ IO Game</i>. The contributions in this Special Issue and previous studies are discussed in the framework of the <i>Citizens’ IO Game</i>, which offers fresh insights into the intersection of domestic constitutions, politics, resource distribution, and IO membership and policy. We construct a specific application to trade policy to further clarify the role of the framework. Using this example, we show that global externalities can never be fully internalized through IOs when sovereignty is prioritized. We conclude by suggesting directions for future research on the domestic politics of IOs.</p>","PeriodicalId":75182,"journal":{"name":"The review of international organizations","volume":"53 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143884366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Balancing justice: Damages awarded by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights","authors":"Jillienne Haglund, Francesca Parente","doi":"10.1007/s11558-025-09590-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-025-09590-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p>International law reparations follow the principle of <i>restitutio in integrum</i> — to make the victim whole. But how do human rights judges apply this principle in practice when the victims are not states, but people whose lives may have been irreparably damaged? We examine this question in the context of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, where judges have frequently dealt with cases of forced disappearance, extrajudicial execution, and other severe physical integrity violations. Inter-American Court judges have substantial discretion in determining the value of awards, which provides the opportunity to create and apply their own criteria for justness. We argue that the awarding of damages is best understood as judges attempting to quantify, and, therefore, compensate suffering. However, judges must balance the goal of compensating suffering with economic and political considerations. We test these implications using an original dataset of monetary damages and victims in Inter-American Court of Human Rights cases through 2019 and find that the severity of rights violations, the number of victims involved in a case, and the identity of victims are associated with the value of monetary damages awarded by the IACtHR.</p>","PeriodicalId":75182,"journal":{"name":"The review of international organizations","volume":"37 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143736953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The brothers Karamazov go abroad: A dataset of Russian leaders’ foreign visits","authors":"Bulent Aras, Burcu Fazlioglu","doi":"10.1007/s11558-025-09584-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-025-09584-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study presents the “Russia Visits Dataset,” which records high-level visits by Russian leaders to foreign countries from 1991 to 2023, including official trips by presidents, prime ministers, and foreign ministers. Using probit regression analysis, the study reveals that strategic interests—such as political, economic, and military factors—predominantly shape the distribution of Russian leader visits, while domestic influences are found to have a limited role. The analysis also emphasizes the importance of international organizations, particularly the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), as a key driver of Russian state visits. The results suggest that previous visits by different leaders influence subsequent visits, indicating a coordinated and sequential approach to Russian diplomacy. The “Russia Visits Dataset” serves as a valuable resource for understanding the dynamics of Russian foreign policy and provides a foundation for future research into the motivations, impacts, and diplomatic strategies of Russian leader visits.</p>","PeriodicalId":75182,"journal":{"name":"The review of international organizations","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143417265","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Arianna Bondi, Leonardo Baccini, Matteo Fiorini, Bernard Hoekman, Carlo Altomonte, Italo Colantone
{"title":"Global value chains and the design of trade agreements","authors":"Arianna Bondi, Leonardo Baccini, Matteo Fiorini, Bernard Hoekman, Carlo Altomonte, Italo Colantone","doi":"10.1007/s11558-024-09581-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-024-09581-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We explore the role of global value chains (GVCs) in the design of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). We propose a theory that focuses on firms involved in GVC activities to identify the main actors pushing for deep trade integration. To address the critical issue of endogeneity of GVC trade flows for trade policy, our identification strategy exploits a transportation shock: the sharp increase in the maximum size of container ships, which more than quadrupled between 1995 and 2017. The key variation in our instrument hinges on the fact that only deep-water ports can accommodate these new larger ships. Armed with this instrument, we find that GVC trade increases the probability of forming deep PTAs that include provisions regulating both trade-related policies and domestic regulatory regimes. GVC trade is a driver of deep preferential trade liberalization.</p>","PeriodicalId":75182,"journal":{"name":"The review of international organizations","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143385105","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Locking in democracy? Transitions, returning autocratic elites, and human rights treaty commitment","authors":"Roman-Gabriel Olar","doi":"10.1007/s11558-024-09582-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-024-09582-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Under what conditions are new democracies more committed to human rights? Existing explanations focus on the logic of the democratic lock-in as elites in new democracies commit their countries to international human rights treaties and organizations to safeguard against future nondemocratic threats. However, this proposition receives mixed empirical support within the literature, and suffers of endogeneity as it treats all democratization episodes as equivalent. Building on insights from the democratization literature, this paper develops a novel theoretical framework that provides a more direct explanation on the conditions under which political elites in new democracies are more likely to commit to human rights treaties. Using a new measure of returning autocratic elites and an instrumental variable design, the results show that democratic cabinets with a higher share of former autocratic elites are less committed to the international human rights regime. These results have implications for democratic consolidation and human rights compliance.</p>","PeriodicalId":75182,"journal":{"name":"The review of international organizations","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143083695","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Power by Proxy: Participation as a Resource in Global Governance","authors":"Sabrina B. Arias, Richard Clark, Ayse Kaya","doi":"10.1007/s11558-025-09585-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-025-09585-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Member state participation is essential in global governance, affording international organizations (IOs) legitimacy and translating member state preferences into institutional attention. We contend that institutional leadership positions bolster states’ authority via “proxy representation,” in which states are grouped together and indirectly represented by one leader. We argue that by serving as proxy group leaders, even relatively weak states can obtain greater influence in IOs. We examine these expectations in the context of the IMF’s Executive Board, where wealthy states represent themselves directly while other states belong to multi-member constituencies in which leadership often rotates among members. Focusing on issues related to climate change discussions at the IMF—a key concern for Global South countries and an increasingly important issue in international finance—we examine the extent to which countries’ preferences over climate issues are expressed at IMF Board meetings. Using textual data based on 52,551 internal IMF documents from 1987-2017, we find evidence to support our theoretical expectations; states more effectively advance their preferences when they are proxy leaders — this finding holds robustly even for otherwise weak states. These results suggest that even in IOs with highly asymmetric decision-making, weaker states can gain voice through proxy representation. This has important and positive implications for IO legitimacy, as member state participation is integral to the livelihood of these institutions.</p>","PeriodicalId":75182,"journal":{"name":"The review of international organizations","volume":"37 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143084057","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}