Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics最新文献_第8页

Confessions of an Antinatalist Philosopher. 一个反生育哲学家的自白》。

IF 1.8 4区医学

Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics Pub Date : 2024-01-02 DOI: 10.1017/S0963180123000634

Matti Häyry

引用次数: 0

Leveraging a Sturdy Norm: How Ethicists Really Argue - ERRATUM. 利用稳固的规范：伦理学家如何进行真正的论证 - ERRATUM.

IF 1.8 4区医学

Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics Pub Date : 2024-01-02 DOI: 10.1017/S096318012300066X

David DeGrazia

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Naming and Describing Disability in Law and Medicine. 在法律和医学中命名和描述残疾。

IF 1.8 4区医学

Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics Pub Date : 2024-01-02 DOI: 10.1017/S0963180123000609

Heloise Robinson, Jonathan Herring

{"title":"Naming and Describing Disability in Law and Medicine.","authors":"Heloise Robinson, Jonathan Herring","doi":"10.1017/S0963180123000609","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0963180123000609","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores the effects of naming and describing disability in law and medicine. Instead of focusing on substantive issues like medical treatment or legal rights, it will address questions which arise in relation to the use of language itself. When a label which is attached to a disability is associated with a negative meaning, this can have a profound effect on the individual concerned and can create stigma. Overly negative descriptions of disabilities can be misleading, not only for the individual, but also more broadly in society, if there are inaccurate perceptions about disability in the social context. This article will examine some relevant examples of terminology, where these issues arise. It will also suggest that the role of medicine and the law in naming and describing disability is particularly important because in these areas there is, perhaps more than anywhere else, a recognized source of authority for the choice of terminology. Labels and descriptions used in the medical and legal contexts can not only perpetuate existing stigmatization of disabled people, but can also contribute to creating stigma at its source, given that the words used in these contexts can constitute an exercise of power.","PeriodicalId":55300,"journal":{"name":"Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics","volume":" ","pages":"1-12"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139075937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Sam's Story: Reflections on Suicide and the Doctor/Patient Relationship. 山姆的故事：关于自杀和医患关系的思考》。

IF 1.8 4区医学

Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics Pub Date : 2024-01-02 DOI: 10.1017/S0963180123000610

William Andereck

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Social Support: From Exclusion Criteria to Medical Service. 社会支持：从排除标准到医疗服务。

IF 1.8 4区医学

Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics Pub Date : 2024-01-01 Epub Date: 2023-02-16 DOI: 10.1017/S0963180123000014

Jacob M Appel

引用次数: 0

Discrimination Based on Personal Responsibility: Luck Egalitarianism and Healthcare Priority Setting. 基于个人责任的歧视：Luck Egalitarianism and Healthcare Priority Setting.

IF 1.8 4区医学

Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics Pub Date : 2024-01-01 Epub Date: 2023-08-30 DOI: 10.1017/S0963180123000415

Andreas Albertsen

引用次数: 0

Precision Medicine and Rough Justice: Wicked Problems. 精准医疗与粗暴司法：邪恶的问题。

IF 1.8 4区医学

Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics Pub Date : 2024-01-01 Epub Date: 2023-06-16 DOI: 10.1017/S0963180123000312

Leonard M Fleck

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Synthesizing Methuselah: The Question of Artificial Agelessness. 合成玛土撒拉：人工衰老的问题。

IF 1.8 4区医学

Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics Pub Date : 2024-01-01 Epub Date: 2023-09-22 DOI: 10.1017/S0963180123000488

Richard B Gibson

{"title":"Synthesizing Methuselah: The Question of Artificial Agelessness.","authors":"Richard B Gibson","doi":"10.1017/S0963180123000488","DOIUrl":"10.1017/S0963180123000488","url":null,"abstract":"As biological organisms, we age and, eventually, die. However, age's deteriorating effects may not be universal. Some theoretical entities, due to their synthetic composition, could exist independently from aging-artificial general intelligence (AGI). With adequate resource access, an AGI could theoretically be ageless and would be, in some sense, immortal. Yet, this need not be inevitable. Designers could imbue AGIs with artificial mortality via an internal shut-off point. The question, though, is, should they? Should researchers curtail an AGI's potentially endless lifespan by deliberately making it mortal? It is this question that this article explores. First, it considers what type of AGI is under discussion before outlining how such beings could be ageless. Then, after clarifying the type of immortality under discussion and arguing that imbuing an AGI with synthetic aging would be person-affecting, the article explores four core conundrums: (i) deliberately causing a morally significant being's death; (ii) immortality's associated harms; (iii) concerns about immortality's unequal assignment; and (iv) the danger of immortal AGI overlords. The article concludes that while prudence requires we create an aging AGI, in the face of the material harm such an action would constitute, this is an insufficient reason to justify doing so.","PeriodicalId":55300,"journal":{"name":"Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics","volume":" ","pages":"60-75"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41140388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Federalism for Bioethics? 生物伦理学的联邦制？

IF 1.8 4区医学

Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics Pub Date : 2024-01-01 Epub Date: 2023-09-22 DOI: 10.1017/S0963180123000476

Leslie Francis, John Francis

{"title":"Federalism for Bioethics?","authors":"Leslie Francis, John Francis","doi":"10.1017/S0963180123000476","DOIUrl":"10.1017/S0963180123000476","url":null,"abstract":"In the wake of the Dobbs decision withdrawing federal constitutional protection for reproductive rights, the United States is in the throes of federalist conflicts. Some states are enacting draconian prohibitions of abortion or gender-affirming care, whereas other states are attempting to shield providers and their patients seeking care. This article explores standard arguments supporting federalism, including that it allows for cultural differences to remain along with a structure that provides for the advantages of common security and commerce, that it provides a laboratory for confined experiments, that it is government closer to the people and thus more informed about local needs and preferences, and that it creates layers of government that can constrain one another and thus doubly protect rights. We contend that these arguments do not justify significant differences among states with respect to the recognition of important aspects of well-being; significant injustices among subnational units cannot be justified by federalism. However, as nonideal theorists, we also observe that federalism presents the possibility of some states protecting rights that others do not. Assuming that movement among subnational units is protected, those who are fortunate enough to be able to travel will be able to access rights they cannot access at home. Nonetheless, movement may not be readily available to minors, people without documentation, people with disabilities, people who lack economic resources, or people who have responsibilities that preclude travel. Only rights protection at the federal level will suffice in such cases.","PeriodicalId":55300,"journal":{"name":"Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics","volume":" ","pages":"112-120"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41174588","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

When Is Something an Alternative? A General Account Applied to Animal-Free Alternatives to Animal Research. 什么时候是替代品？适用于动物研究的无动物替代品的一般说明。

IF 1.8 4区医学

Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics Pub Date : 2024-01-01 Epub Date: 2023-06-08 DOI: 10.1017/S0963180123000300

Koen Kramer

{"title":"When Is Something an Alternative? A General Account Applied to Animal-Free Alternatives to Animal Research.","authors":"Koen Kramer","doi":"10.1017/S0963180123000300","DOIUrl":"10.1017/S0963180123000300","url":null,"abstract":"The first \"R\" from animal research ethics prescribes the replacement of animal experiments with animal-free alternatives. However, the question of when an animal-free method qualifies as an alternative to animal experiments remains unresolved.Drawing lessons from another debate in which the word \"alternative\" is central, the ethical debate on alternatives to germline genome editing, this paper develops a general account of when something qualifies as an alternative to something. It proposes three ethically significant conditions that technique, method, or approach X must meet to qualify as an alternative to Y: (1) X must address the same problem as Y, under an appropriate description of that problem; (2) X must have a reasonable chance of success, compared to Y, in solving the problem; and (3) X must not be ethically unacceptable as a solution. If X meets all these conditions, its relative advantages and disadvantages determine whether it is preferable, indifferent, or dispreferable as an alternative to Y.This account is then applied to the question of whether animal-free research methods qualify as alternatives to animal research. Doing so breaks down the debate around this question into more focused (ethical and other) issues and illustrates the potential of the account.","PeriodicalId":55300,"journal":{"name":"Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics","volume":" ","pages":"89-101"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9948250","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0