Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics最新文献

{"title":"Developing Novel Tools for Bioethics Education: ACECS and the Visual Analytics Dashboard.","authors":"Stowe Locke Teti, Kelly Armstrong","doi":"10.1017/S0963180124000732","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0963180124000732","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The translation of bedside experience to pedagogical content presents a unique challenge for the field of bioethics. The contributions are multidisciplinary, the practices are heterogeneous, and the work product is characteristically nuanced. While academic bioethics education programs have proliferated, developing content and pedagogy sufficient to teach clinical ethics effectively remains a longstanding challenge. The authors identify three reasons why progress towards this goal has been slow. First, there is a lack of robust, empirical knowledge for education focused on praxis. Second, the methods employed in academic education tend to focus on traditional didactic approaches rather than engendering competency through interaction and practice-the principle means by which clinical ethicists work. Third, the data practitioners have captured has not been presented in a medium educators and students can most meaningfully interact with.In this paper, the authors describe a novel pedagogical tool: the Armstrong Clinical Ethics Coding System (ACECS) and interactive visual analytics dashboard. Together, these components comprise an educational platform that utilizes the empirical data collected by the institution's ethics service. The tool offers four advantages. First, it aids with the identification of ethical issues that present during a consultation at that specific institution or medical unit by making use of a <i>lingua franca</i> comprehensible to both ethicists and non-ethicists. Second, content is centered on issue frequency, type, and relation to other issues. Iterating through cases, requestors, or hospital units allows one to understand cases typologically and through metanarratives that reveal relationships and subtle patterns. Third, the use of interactive data visualizations and data storytelling aids comprehension and retention. Fourth, the process of using the system necessitates understanding the manifold ways each case can be understood, accommodating a wide range of perspectives and ethical lenses, enhancing case analysis and self-reflection conducive to life-long learning.</p>","PeriodicalId":55300,"journal":{"name":"Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics","volume":" ","pages":"1-18"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143257213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Why We Should Be Experientialists about Suffering.","authors":"Michael S Brady","doi":"10.1017/S096318012500009X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S096318012500009X","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Increased interest in suffering has given rise to different accounts of what suffering is. This paper focuses the debate between experientialists and non-experientialists about suffering. The former hold that suffering is necessarily experiential-for instance, because it is necessarily unpleasant or painful; the latter deny this-for instance, because one can suffer when and because one's objective properties are damaged, even if one does not experience this. After surveying how the two accounts fare on a range of issues, the paper presents a decisive argument in favor of experientialism. The central claim is that non-experientialist accounts cannot accommodate cases of suffering that are virtuous and that directly <i>contribute to</i> some objective good.</p>","PeriodicalId":55300,"journal":{"name":"Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics","volume":" ","pages":"1-11"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143257359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Objective Suffering: What is it? What Could it be?","authors":"Tyler Tate","doi":"10.1017/S0963180125000040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0963180125000040","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>There is an ongoing debate in bioethics regarding the nature of suffering. This conversation revolves around the following question: What kind of thing, exactly, is suffering? Specifically, is suffering a subjective phenomenon-intrinsically linked to personhood, personal values, feelings, and lived experience-or an objective affair, amenable to impersonal criteria and existing as an independent feature of the natural world? Notably, the implications of this determination are politically and ethically significant. This essay attempts to bring clarity to the subjective versus objective debate in suffering scholarship by examining the history of the concept of \"objectivity,\" and putting that history in conversation with physician Eric Cassell's famous theory of suffering. It concludes with a novel, albeit tentative, definition of suffering: suffering is the experience of a gap between how things are and how things ought to be.</p>","PeriodicalId":55300,"journal":{"name":"Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics","volume":" ","pages":"1-9"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143257358","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Collective Reflective Equilibrium, Algorithmic Bioethics and Complex Ethics.","authors":"Julian Savulescu","doi":"10.1017/S0963180124000719","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0963180124000719","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>John Harris has made many seminal contributions to bioethics. Two of these are in the ethics of resource allocation. Firstly, he proposed the \"fair innings argument\" which was the first sufficientarian approach to distributive justice. Resources should be provided to ensure people have a fair innings-when Harris first wrote this, around 70 years of life, but perhaps now 80. Secondly, Harris famously advanced the egalitarian position in response to utilitarian approaches to allocation (such as maximizing Quality Adjusted Life Years [QALYs]) that what people want is the greatest chance of the longest, best quality life for themselves, and justice requires treating these claims equally. Harris thus proposed both sufficientarian and egalitarian approaches. This chapter compares these approaches with utilitarian and contractualist approaches and provides a methodology for deciding among these (Collective Reflective Equilibrium). This methodology is applied to the allocation of ventilators in the pandemic (as an example) and an ethical algorithm for their deployment created. This paper describes the concept of algorithmic bioethics as a way of addressing pluralism of values and context specificity of moral judgment and policy, and addressing complex ethics.</p>","PeriodicalId":55300,"journal":{"name":"Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics","volume":" ","pages":"1-16"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143081601","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Public Reason in Times of Corona: Countering Disinformation in the Netherlands.","authors":"Martin Buijsen","doi":"10.1017/S0963180125000027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0963180125000027","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Who should decide what passes for disinformation in a liberal democracy? During the COVID-19 pandemic, a committee set up by the Dutch Ministry of Health was actively blocking disinformation. The committee comprised civil servants, communication experts, public health experts, and representatives of commercial online platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn. To a large extent, vaccine hesitancy was attributed to disinformation, defined as misinformation (or data misinterpreted) with harmful intent. In this study, the question is answered by reflecting on what is needed for us to honor public reason: reasonableness, the willingness to engage in public discourse properly, and trust in the institutions of liberal democracy.</p>","PeriodicalId":55300,"journal":{"name":"Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics","volume":" ","pages":"1-13"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143048847","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Applying Rawls' Theory of Public Reason to Controversies over Parental Surrogacy.","authors":"Jacob M Appel","doi":"10.1017/S0963180125000015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0963180125000015","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Parental surrogacy remains a highly controversial issue in contemporary ethics with considerable variation in the legal approaches of different jurisdictions. Finding a societal consensus on the issue remains highly elusive. John Rawls' theory of public reason, first developed in his <i>A Theory of Justice</i> (1971), offers a unifying model of political discourse and engagement that enables reasonable citizens to accept policies that they do not necessarily support at a personal level. The theory established a promising framework for private citizens with distinct moral positions on the subject to find common ground and, in doing so, to negotiate a consensus regarding the degree and nature of regulation that is palatable to all rational citizens.</p>","PeriodicalId":55300,"journal":{"name":"Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics","volume":" ","pages":"1-12"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143048844","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Values of Life: 40 years of The Value of Life.","authors":"Tuija Takala, Matti Häyry, Rebecca Bennett, Søren Holm","doi":"10.1017/S0963180124000550","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0963180124000550","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This special section brings together international scholars celebrating the 40^th anniversary of John Harris' book, <i>The Value of Life: An Introduction to Medical Ethics</i> (1985), and John Harris and his contributions to the field of bioethics more generally.</p>","PeriodicalId":55300,"journal":{"name":"Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics","volume":" ","pages":"1-3"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143016750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Making Sense of John Harris and <i>The Value of Life</i>: An Enigma, Wrapped in Mysterious Contradictions, inside an Absence of Theoretical Commitments?","authors":"John Coggon","doi":"10.1017/S0963180124000586","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0963180124000586","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This paper critically engages with the work of John Harris. Its central focus is his 1985 book, <i>The Value of Life</i>: a foundational text in philosophical bioethics, whose relevance and resonance continue firmly to endure. My aim is to examine what it says-and omits to say-about political authority. Through analysis of apparent and substantive contradictions, and of John's core focus on moral reasons rather than a basic moral theory, I argue that John says too little about the founding of political obligation. This is so even while he sees political obligation as morally required. I argue that the framings he gives in favor of moral requirements to accept political obligations are particularly significant because they indicate problems in the fundamentality and import of the idea of respect for persons as it features in <i>The Value of Life.</i></p>","PeriodicalId":55300,"journal":{"name":"Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics","volume":" ","pages":"1-10"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143016772","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"How Much Does Suffering Matter?","authors":"Brent M Kious","doi":"10.1017/S096318012400080X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S096318012400080X","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Ethicists frequently suppose that suffering has special moral significance. It is often claimed that a main goal of medicine-perhaps its primary goal-is the alleviation of human suffering. Following Eric Cassell and others, this essay considers suffering understood as the experience of distress-negative emotions-in response to threats to something that one cares about. It examines whether, on this value-based account of suffering, we should accept the claim that suffering has special moral significance. It argues that we should not: suffering does not add significantly to the value of other human interests and rarely changes our moral obligations itself; it merely seems to have strong moral relevance because it often attends to interests that matter. This is because negative emotions themselves have only limited moral significance, which is due to the fact that their primary mental role is to indicate to us the relative importance of non-emotional goods.</p>","PeriodicalId":55300,"journal":{"name":"Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics","volume":" ","pages":"1-12"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143016769","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Best Interests and Decisions to Withdraw Life-Sustaining Treatment from a Conscious, Incapacitated Patient.","authors":"L Syd M Johnson, Kathy L Cerminara","doi":"10.1017/S0963180124000793","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0963180124000793","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Conscious but incapacitated patients need protection from both undertreatment and overtreatment, for they are exceptionally vulnerable, and dependent on others to act in their interests. In the United States, the law prioritizes autonomy over best interests in decision making. Yet U.S. courts, using both substituted judgment and best interests decision making standards, frequently prohibit the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from conscious but incapacitated patients, such as those in the minimally conscious state, even when ostensibly seeking to determine what patients would have wanted. In the United Kingdom, under the Mental Capacity Act of 2005, courts decide on the best interests of incapacitated patients by, in part, taking into account the past wishes and values of the patient. This paper examines and compares those ethicolegal approaches to decision making on behalf of conscious but incapacitated patients. We argue for a limited interpretation of best interests such that the standard is properly used only when the preferences of a conscious, but incapacitated patient are unknown and unknowable. When patient preferences and values are known or can be reasonably inferred, using a holistic, all-things-considered substituted judgment standard respects patient autonomy.</p>","PeriodicalId":55300,"journal":{"name":"Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics","volume":" ","pages":"1-17"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143016767","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}