当自杀不是自尽时:预先决定和心理中断--第二部分。

IF 1.5 4区 医学 Q3 HEALTH CARE SCIENCES & SERVICES
Suzanne E Dowie
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引用次数: 0

摘要

德里克-帕菲特(Derek Parfit)关于个人身份的观点提出了这样一个问题,即在病人失去心理连续性的情况下,是否应该尊重拒绝救生治疗的预先决定;这意味着这些预先决定根本不是自我决定的。然而,与其接受一个未知的形而上学 "进一步的事实 "支撑着行动的统一性,不如接受帕菲特的观点,但对其在道德上的含义提出不同的解释。本文的第二部分认为,契约义务为尊重拒绝拯救生命和/或维持生命的医疗的预先决定提供了道德基础;预先决定与人寿保险单和遗嘱合同等契约有相似之处,这些契约在心理上因死亡而中断时生效。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
When Suicide is not a Self-Killing: Advance Decisions and Psychological Discontinuity-Part II.

Derek Parfit's view of personal identity raises questions about whether advance decisions refusing life-saving treatment should be honored in cases where a patient loses psychological continuity; it implies that these advance decisions would not be self-determining at all. However, rather than accepting that an unknown metaphysical 'further fact' underpins agential unity, one can accept Parfit's view but offer a different account of what it implies morally. Part II of this article argues that contractual obligations provide a moral basis for honoring advance decisions refusing life-saving and/or life-sustaining medical treatment; advance decisions have similarities to contracts, such as life insurance policies and will-contracts, that come into effect when the psychological discontinuity is through death.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.90
自引率
11.10%
发文量
127
审稿时长
>12 weeks
期刊介绍: The Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics is designed to address the challenges of biology, medicine and healthcare and to meet the needs of professionals serving on healthcare ethics committees in hospitals, nursing homes, hospices and rehabilitation centres. The aim of the journal is to serve as the international forum for the wide range of serious and urgent issues faced by members of healthcare ethics committees, physicians, nurses, social workers, clergy, lawyers and community representatives.
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