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Epistemic Functions of Replicability in Experimental Sciences: Defending the Orthodox View. 实验科学中可复制性的认知功能:捍卫正统观点
IF 0.9 4区 哲学
Foundations of Science Pub Date : 2024-01-01 Epub Date: 2023-02-18 DOI: 10.1007/s10699-023-09901-4
Michał Sikorski, Mattia Andreoletti
{"title":"Epistemic Functions of Replicability in Experimental Sciences: Defending the Orthodox View.","authors":"Michał Sikorski, Mattia Andreoletti","doi":"10.1007/s10699-023-09901-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10699-023-09901-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Replicability is widely regarded as one of the defining features of science and its pursuit is one of the main postulates of meta-research, a discipline emerging in response to the replicability crisis. At the same time, replicability is typically treated with caution by philosophers of science. In this paper, we reassess the value of replicability from an epistemic perspective. We defend the orthodox view, according to which replications are always epistemically useful, against the more prudent view that claims that it is useful in very limited circumstances. Additionally, we argue that we can learn more about the original experiment and the limits of the discovered effect from replications at different levels. We hold that replicability is a crucial feature of experimental results and scientists should continue to strive to secure it.</p>","PeriodicalId":55146,"journal":{"name":"Foundations of Science","volume":" ","pages":"1071-1088"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11569024/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42187998","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Formal Layer of {Brain and Mind} and Emerging Consciousness in Physical Systems {大脑和意识}的形式层和在物理系统中出现的意识
IF 0.9 4区 哲学
Foundations of Science Pub Date : 2023-11-28 DOI: 10.1007/s10699-023-09937-6
Jerzy Król, Andrew Schumann
{"title":"The Formal Layer of {Brain and Mind} and Emerging Consciousness in Physical Systems","authors":"Jerzy Król, Andrew Schumann","doi":"10.1007/s10699-023-09937-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-023-09937-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We consider consciousness attributed to systems in space-time which can be purely physical without biological background and focus on the mathematical understanding of the phenomenon. It is shown that the set theory based on sets in the foundations of mathematics, when switched to set theory based on ZFC models, is a very promising mathematical tool in explaining the brain/mind complex and the emergence of consciousness in natural and artificial systems. We formalise consciousness-supporting systems in physical space-time, but this is localised in open domains of spatial regions and the result of this process is a family of different ZFC models. Random forcing, as in set theory, corresponds precisely to the random influence on the system of external stimuli, and the principles of reflection of set theory explain the conscious internal reaction of the system. We also develop the conscious Turing machines which have their external ZFC environment and the dynamics is encoded in the random forcing changing models of ZFC in which Turing machines with oracles are formulated. The construction is applied to cooperating families of conscious agents which, due to the reflection principle, can be reduced to the implementation of certain concurrent games with different levels of self-reflection.\u0000</p>","PeriodicalId":55146,"journal":{"name":"Foundations of Science","volume":"63 11","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138449831","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Epidemiological Models and Epistemic Perspectives: How Scientific Pluralism may be Misconstrued 流行病学模型和认知视角:科学多元主义如何被误解
IF 0.9 4区 哲学
Foundations of Science Pub Date : 2023-11-16 DOI: 10.1007/s10699-023-09936-7
Nicolò Gaj
{"title":"Epidemiological Models and Epistemic Perspectives: How Scientific Pluralism may be Misconstrued","authors":"Nicolò Gaj","doi":"10.1007/s10699-023-09936-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-023-09936-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In a scenario characterized by unpredictable developments, such as the recent COVID-19 pandemic, epidemiological models have played a leading part, having been especially widely deployed for forecasting purposes. In this paper, two real-world examples of modeling are examined in support of the proposition that science can convey inconsistent as well as genuinely perspectival representations of the world. Reciprocally inconsistent outcomes are grounded on incompatible assumptions, whereas perspectival outcomes are grounded on compatible assumptions and illuminate different aspects of the same object of interest. In both cases, models should be viewed as expressions of specific assumptions and unconstrained choices on the part of those designing them. The coexistence of a variety of models reflects a primary feature of science, namely its pluralism. It is herein proposed that recent over-exposure to science’s inner workings and disputes such as those pertaining to models, may have led the public to perceive pluralism as a flaw—or more specifically, as disunity or fragmentation, which in turn may have been interpreted as a sign of unreliability. In conclusion, given the inescapability of pluralism, suggestions are offered as to how to counteract distorted perceptions of science, and thereby enhance scientific literacy.</p>","PeriodicalId":55146,"journal":{"name":"Foundations of Science","volume":"28 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138293488","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Does Logic Have a History at All? 逻辑有历史吗?
IF 0.9 4区 哲学
Foundations of Science Pub Date : 2023-11-14 DOI: 10.1007/s10699-023-09933-w
Jens Lemanski
{"title":"Does Logic Have a History at All?","authors":"Jens Lemanski","doi":"10.1007/s10699-023-09933-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-023-09933-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p>To believe that logic has no history might at first seem peculiar today. But since the early 20th century, this position has been repeatedly conflated with logical monism of Kantian provenance. This logical monism asserts that only one logic is authoritative, thereby rendering all other research in the field marginal and negating the possibility of acknowledging a history of logic. In this paper, I will show how this and many related issues have developed, and that they are founded on only one prominent statement by Kant. I will argue, however, that this statement takes on a very different meaning in a broader context of the history and philosophy of science, and that Kant and his supporters never advocated the logical monism that they are still said to hold today.\u0000</p>","PeriodicalId":55146,"journal":{"name":"Foundations of Science","volume":"74 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"110423258","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
What is Post-normal Science? A Personal Encounter 什么是后常态科学?个人邂逅
IF 0.9 4区 哲学
Foundations of Science Pub Date : 2023-11-10 DOI: 10.1007/s10699-023-09932-x
Andrea Saltelli
{"title":"What is Post-normal Science? A Personal Encounter","authors":"Andrea Saltelli","doi":"10.1007/s10699-023-09932-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-023-09932-x","url":null,"abstract":"<p>What is post-normal science? What are the reasons for, and consequences of, encountering it in one’s professional life? Here I share my own experience of readings, practices and discussions with the fathers, supporters and detractors of PNS. After a short description of PNS and of my own experience with it, I review some common criticism levelled to PNS from different authors and conclude reflecting on how PNS—difficult to explain and translate into formulae or checklists—provides its practitioners with useful keys to open relevant doors to understanding, and might be especially suited to face the present intersecting crises befalling the use of science for policy.</p>","PeriodicalId":55146,"journal":{"name":"Foundations of Science","volume":"62 12","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72365238","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Permutation Arguments and Kunen’s Inconsistency Theorem 排列论证与库宁不一致定理
IF 0.9 4区 哲学
Foundations of Science Pub Date : 2023-11-10 DOI: 10.1007/s10699-023-09931-y
A. Salch
{"title":"Permutation Arguments and Kunen’s Inconsistency Theorem","authors":"A. Salch","doi":"10.1007/s10699-023-09931-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-023-09931-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I offer a variant of Putnam’s “permutation argument,” originally an argument against metaphysical realism. This variant is called the “natural permutation argument.” I explain how the natural permutation argument generates a form of referential inscrutability which is not resolvable by consideration of “natural properties” in the sense of Lewis’s response to Putnam. However, unlike the classical permutation argument (which is applicable to nearly all interpretations of all first-order theories), the natural permutation argument only applies to interpretations which have some special symmetries. I give an analysis of the interpretations to which the natural permutation argument does apply, and I explain how, when it fails to apply, the referential inscrutability generated by permutation arguments is resolvable by a Lewisian strategy. In order to demonstrate how these problems of referential inscrutability play out in an a priori setting relevant to philosophy, I discuss the applicability of the natural permutation argument in set-theoretic reasoning. I use the well-known Kunen inconsistency theorem to show that, in Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory, the Axiom of Choice is sufficient to resolve referential inscrutability. I then explain how, as a result of a recent theorem of Daghighi–Golshani–Hamkins–Jeřábek, in certain non-well-founded set theories the natural permutation argument does yield an intractable inscrutability of reference.</p>","PeriodicalId":55146,"journal":{"name":"Foundations of Science","volume":"31 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91398517","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Platonism of Modern Physical Science: Historical Roots and “Rational Reconstruction” 现代物理科学的柏拉图主义:历史根源与“理性重构”
IF 0.9 4区 哲学
Foundations of Science Pub Date : 2023-11-07 DOI: 10.1007/s10699-023-09935-8
Ragnar Fjelland
{"title":"The Platonism of Modern Physical Science: Historical Roots and “Rational Reconstruction”","authors":"Ragnar Fjelland","doi":"10.1007/s10699-023-09935-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-023-09935-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Perhaps the most influential historian of science of the last century, Alexandre Koyré, famously argued that the icon of modern science, Galileo Galilei, was a Platonist who had hardly performed experiments. Koyré has been followed by other historians and philosophers of science. In addition, it is not difficult to find examples of Platonists in contemporary science, in particular in the physical sciences. A famous example is the icon of twenty century physics, Albert Einstein. This paper addresses two questions related to the Platonism of modern physical science. The first is: How is Galileo’s Platonism compatible with the fact that he did perform experiments? The solution to this apparent paradox can be found in Plato’s late dialogue <i>Timaeus</i>. In the dialogue the world has been created by a divine craftsman according to an original plan. The task of the scientist is not primarily to describe the material world, but to reconstruct the original plan. This view has later been known as “God’s Eye View”. The second question is: If a God’s Eye View is unattainable, how is it possible to give a “rational reconstruction” of Galileo’s Platonism? The key-word is <i>idealisation</i>. It is further argued that idealisation is intimately related to technology. Technology is required to realize ideal experimental conditions, and the results are in its turn implemented in technology. The implication is that the quest for unity in science, based on physics as the basic science, should be replaced by the recognition of the diversity of the sciences.</p>","PeriodicalId":55146,"journal":{"name":"Foundations of Science","volume":"60 7","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71474908","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Hamilton, Hamiltonian Mechanics, and Causation 哈密尔顿、哈密尔顿力学和因果关系
IF 0.9 4区 哲学
Foundations of Science Pub Date : 2023-11-06 DOI: 10.1007/s10699-023-09923-y
Christopher Gregory Weaver
{"title":"Hamilton, Hamiltonian Mechanics, and Causation","authors":"Christopher Gregory Weaver","doi":"10.1007/s10699-023-09923-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-023-09923-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I show how Sir William Rowan Hamilton’s philosophical commitments led him to a causal interpretation of classical mechanics. I argue that Hamilton’s metaphysics of causation was injected into his dynamics by way of a causal interpretation of force. I then detail how forces are indispensable to both Hamilton’s formulation of classical mechanics and what we now call Hamiltonian mechanics (i.e., the modern formulation). On this point, my efforts primarily consist of showing that the contemporary orthodox interpretation of potential energy is the interpretation found in Hamilton’s work. Hamilton called the potential energy function the “force-function” because he believed that it represents forces at work in the world. Various non-historical arguments for this orthodox interpretation of potential energy are provided, and matters are concluded by showing that in classical Hamiltonian mechanics, facts about the potential energies of systems are grounded in facts about forces. Thus, if one can tolerate the view that forces are causes of motion, then Hamilton provides one with a road map for transporting causation into one of the most mathematically sophisticated formulations of classical mechanics, viz., Hamiltonian mechanics.</p>","PeriodicalId":55146,"journal":{"name":"Foundations of Science","volume":"60 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71474909","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Simulated Data in Empirical Science 实证科学中的模拟数据
IF 0.9 4区 哲学
Foundations of Science Pub Date : 2023-11-06 DOI: 10.1007/s10699-023-09934-9
Aki Lehtinen, Jani Raerinne
{"title":"Simulated Data in Empirical Science","authors":"Aki Lehtinen, Jani Raerinne","doi":"10.1007/s10699-023-09934-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-023-09934-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper provides the first systematic epistemological account of simulated data in empirical science. We focus on the epistemic issues modelers face when they generate simulated data to solve problems with empirical datasets, research tools, or experiments. We argue that for simulated data to count as epistemically reliable, a simulation <i>model</i> does not have to mimic its target. Instead, some models take empirical data as a target, and simulated <i>data</i> may successfully mimic such a target even if the model does not. We show how to distinguish between simulated and empirical data, and we also offer a definition of simulation that can accommodate Monte Carlo models. We shed light on the epistemology of simulated data by providing a taxonomy of four different mimicking relations that differ concerning the nature of the relation or relata. We illustrate mimicking relations with examples from different sciences. Our main claim is that the epistemic evaluation of simulated data should start with recognizing the diversity of mimicking relations rather than presuming that only one relation existed.</p>","PeriodicalId":55146,"journal":{"name":"Foundations of Science","volume":"60 8","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71474907","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Recurrence in Lissajous Curves and the Visual Representation of Tuning Systems 利萨曲线的递归性与调谐系统的视觉表示
IF 0.9 4区 哲学
Foundations of Science Pub Date : 2023-10-21 DOI: 10.1007/s10699-023-09930-z
Carlos A. Sierra
{"title":"Recurrence in Lissajous Curves and the Visual Representation of Tuning Systems","authors":"Carlos A. Sierra","doi":"10.1007/s10699-023-09930-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-023-09930-z","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":55146,"journal":{"name":"Foundations of Science","volume":"34 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50166761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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