J. A. Nescolarde-Selva, J. L. Usó-Doménech, L. Segura-Abad, H. Gash
{"title":"Beliefs, Epistemic Regress and Doxastic Justification","authors":"J. A. Nescolarde-Selva, J. L. Usó-Doménech, L. Segura-Abad, H. Gash","doi":"10.1007/s10699-023-09927-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-023-09927-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>By justification we understand what makes a belief epistemologically viable: generally this is considered knowledge that is true. The problem is defining this with a higher degree of precision because this is where different conflicting conceptions appear. On the one hand, we can understand justification as what makes it reasonable to acquire or maintain a belief; on the other, it is what increases the probability that the belief is true. This work tries to prove that beliefs depend on other beliefs that are epistemically justified and that such beliefs are the result of (i.e., they arise from) our privileged intuition of reality. For this, we examine the concept of epistemic regress. Epistemic reasons authorize a proposition P to be the conclusion of an argument in which such reasons function as premises and are vulnerable to epistemic regress. The three most important approaches to epistemic regress are Infinitism, Coherentism and Foundationalism.</p>","PeriodicalId":55146,"journal":{"name":"Foundations of Science","volume":"5 8","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71435171","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Violating the KCBS Inequality with a Toy Mechanism","authors":"Alisson Tezzin","doi":"10.1007/s10699-023-09928-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-023-09928-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In recent years, much research has been devoted to exploring contextuality in systems that are not strictly quantum, like classical light, and many theory-independent frameworks for contextuality analysis have been developed. It has raised the debate on the meaning of contextuality outside the quantum realm, and also on whether—and, if so, when—it can be regarded as a signature of non-classicality. In this paper, we try to contribute to this debate by showing a very simple “thought experiment” or “toy mechanism” where a classical object (i.e., an object obeying the laws of classical physics) is used to generate experimental data violating the KCBS inequality. As with most thought experiments, the idea is to simplify the discussion and to shed light on issues that in real experiments, or from a purely theoretical perspective, may be cumbersome. We give special attention to the distinction between classical realism and classicality, and to the contrast between contextuality within and beyond quantum theory.\u0000</p>","PeriodicalId":55146,"journal":{"name":"Foundations of Science","volume":"33 14","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50166893","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Function of Scientific Concepts","authors":"Hyundeuk Cheon","doi":"10.1007/s10699-023-09929-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-023-09929-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The function of concepts must be taken seriously to understand the scientific practices of developing and working with concepts. Despite its significance, little philosophical attention has been paid to the function of concepts. A notable exception is Brigandt (2010), who suggests incorporating the epistemic goal pursued with the concept’s use as an additional semantic property along with the reference and inferential role. The suggestion, however, has at least two limitations. First, his proposal to introduce epistemic goals as the third component of concepts lacks independent grounding, except to account for the rationality of semantic change (the Grounding Problem). Second, it is hardly justified to consider epistemic goals as a semantic property (the Misplacement Problem). To remedy these predicaments, we suggest a new perspective that takes concepts as cognitive entities with a 2-layered structure rather than as merely linguistic entities and develop an account of the function of concepts. We provide empirical evidence showing that functional information affects our cognitive processes. It is claimed that the function of concepts is not a semantic property but a type of meta-information regulating a body of concept-constitutive information.</p>","PeriodicalId":55146,"journal":{"name":"Foundations of Science","volume":"33 24","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50166883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bridging Informal Reasoning and Formal Proving: The Role of Argumentation in Proof-Events","authors":"Sofia Almpani, Petros Stefaneas","doi":"10.1007/s10699-023-09926-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-023-09926-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper explores the relationship between informal reasoning, creativity in mathematics, and problem solving. It underscores the importance of environments that promote interaction, hypothesis generation, examination, refutation, derivation of new solutions, drawing conclusions, and reasoning with others, as key factors in enhancing mathematical creativity. Drawing on argumentation logic, the paper proposes a novel approach to uncover specific characteristics in the development of formalized proving using “proof-events.” Argumentation logic can offer reasoning mechanisms that facilitate these environments. This paper proposes how argumentation can be implemented to discover certain characteristics in the development of formalized proving with “proof-events”. The concept of a proof-event was introduced by Goguen who described mathematical proof as a multi-agent social event involving not only “classical” formal proofs, but also other informal proving actions such as deficient or alleged proofs. Argumentation is an integral component of the discovery process for a mathematical proof since a proof necessitates a dialogue between provers and interpreters to clarify and resolve gaps or assumptions. By formalizing proof-events through argumentation, this paper demonstrates how informal reasoning and conflicts arising during the proving process can be effectively simulated. The paper presents an extended version of the proof-events calculus, rooted in argumentation theories, and highlights the intricate relationships among proof, human reasoning, cognitive processes, creativity, and mathematical arguments.</p>","PeriodicalId":55146,"journal":{"name":"Foundations of Science","volume":"33 11","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50166896","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Silence as a Cognitive Tool to Comprehend the Environment","authors":"Alger Sans Pinillos","doi":"10.1007/s10699-023-09925-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-023-09925-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article presents silence as a cognitive tool to comprehend the environment. Two dimensions of silence are addressed: a natural mechanism and human beings' social and cultural construction. There is a link between these two dimensions because, on the one hand, agents' cognitive strategies based on silence influence how meanings and uses of silence have been constructed. The meanings of silence we use are contextual shapers of silence-based cognitive strategies. Silence is analyzed as a resource for coping with ambiguity: situations perceived as uncertain provoke doubt and confusion because they can be understood differently or suggest different interpretations. These situations can occur in the face of epistemic disruption. The consequence is a transfer of the ambiguity property of these situations to the usual ways of relating to the world and people. The cognitive approach is based here on a semiotic-hermeneutic interpretation of silence from a phenomenological perspective. This accounts for a paradox: even if silence does not exist (the world is acoustic), it is real. The silence experience is a non-inferential cognitive capacity located at the base of perception: a stimulus that suggests a particular gesture as an action different from the usual one to deal with the environment.</p>","PeriodicalId":55146,"journal":{"name":"Foundations of Science","volume":"33 21","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50166886","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Clothing and the Discovery of Science","authors":"Ian Gilligan","doi":"10.1007/s10699-023-09924-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-023-09924-x","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In addition to natural curiosity, science is characterized by a number of psychological processes and perceptions. Among the psychological features, scientific enquiry relates to uncovering—or discovering—aspects of a world perceived as hidden from humans. A speculative theoretical model is presented, suggesting the evolution of science reflects psychological repercussions of wearing clothes. Specifically, the natural world is perceived as hidden due to the presence of clothing. Three components of scientific enquiry may arise from clothing: detachment from sensual experience, a perception that the world is veiled in mystery, and an intellectual desire to uncover the hidden structure of nature. Rather than beginning with the emergence of <i>Homo sapiens</i>, the proposed connection with clothing implies that psychological foundations for science began to develop during the last ice age, with the invention of complex clothes that fully covered the human body. After the end of the last ice age, elements of scientific thinking began to emerge in societies where clothing was worn routinely for psychosocial reasons, including modesty. Notably, a scientific attitude was essentially absent in hunter-gatherer communities where nakedness remained the norm. This novel perspective aims to advance the history and philosophy of science, revealing the emergence of science as a situated phenomenon contingent on humans being covered.</p>","PeriodicalId":55146,"journal":{"name":"Foundations of Science","volume":"32 26","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50166899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Physicalism Without the Idols of Mathematics","authors":"L. Szabó","doi":"10.1007/s10699-023-09920-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-023-09920-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":55146,"journal":{"name":"Foundations of Science","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48435133","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Deleuze’s Conception of Virtuality Versus Virtual Computer Objects","authors":"M. Czarnocka, Mariusz Mazurek","doi":"10.1007/s10699-023-09921-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-023-09921-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":55146,"journal":{"name":"Foundations of Science","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46551540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ontic and Epistemic Differentiation: Mechanistic Problems for Microbiology and Biology","authors":"F. Marcacci, Michał Oleksowicz, A. Conti","doi":"10.1007/s10699-023-09918-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-023-09918-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":55146,"journal":{"name":"Foundations of Science","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43284356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the Existence of a Preserved Ontology Posited by a High-Dimensional Bohmian Interpretation","authors":"Jorge Manero","doi":"10.1007/s10699-023-09919-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-023-09919-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":55146,"journal":{"name":"Foundations of Science","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49665212","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}