Asia Policy最新文献

{"title":"Indonesia's Great-Power Management in the Indo-Pacific: The Balancing Behavior of a \"Dove State\"","authors":"V. Shekhar","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0062","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0062","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This essay investigates Indonesia's strategic thinking toward the Indo-Pacific region amid changing great-power politics and examines both the principal drivers shaping Indonesia's strategic choices and the challenges facing Indonesian diplomacy in the region.main argument The Indo-Pacific region, born out of the great powers' efforts to forge new strategic alignments and reset the balance of power in Asia, is headed for a multi-tiered polarization that provides a challenging geostrategic context for Indonesia in the coming years. The U.S. and China form the two poles shaping the global and regional balance of power. Indonesia no longer holds a positive view toward the U.S.-China relationship in the Indo-Pacific region, and this gloomy view has prompted Jakarta to craft a foreign policy that mirrors what some experts refer to as \"dove state\" behavior. As a dove state, Indonesia has sought to balance its interests while navigating the uncertainties of the great-power rivalry. However, the strength of Indonesian diplomacy is likely to depend on the country's ability to walk a middle path as well as its ability to both keep ASEAN together and position the grouping as a credible regional architecture.policy implications • Indonesia is a status-quo power and is likely to oppose any policy initiative that amplifies the risk of great-power conflict or instability in the region.• As a developing country, a populist democracy, and an emerging market, Indonesia will respond proactively and positively to overtures that advance the country's economic development.• Great-power bellicosity and a weakened ASEAN may push Indonesia to be more insular and concentrate on partnerships that support Jakarta's development agenda.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"123 - 149"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46843521","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Signals, Deterrence, and the Quad","authors":"Ketian Zhang","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0069","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0069","url":null,"abstract":"T he United States and its allies have the capability to deter China, and have successfully done so, from their worst-case scenario—a major militarized conflict. However, three factors reduce the effectiveness of their deterrence: the lack of clear signals, excessive media exposure, and divergent interests among Quad members. The Quad can be useful, but only if the United States maintains well-defined signals of commitment while clarifying the stakes. As it currently stands, the Quad does not successfully deter Chinese actions in territorial disputes. China has not shied away from using military coercion in its land border disputes with India. In June 2020, for instance, Chinese and Indian troops clashed violently along the disputed land border in the Galwan Valley, resulting in casualties on both sides.1 Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi told India to “stop transgressions into China-controlled territories” and to “refrain from actions changing the status quo along the border,” representing a clear indication of coercive intent.2 Moreover, although China prefers to utilize nonmilitary—or so-called gray-zone—coercion in maritime disputes in the South and East China Seas, such coercive measures can themselves be destabilizing.3 This essay assesses factors influencing the likelihood of successful deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region by using China’s land and maritime territorial disputes as examples. It addresses two questions: what signals of resolve are necessary for effective deterrence, and does the Quad enhance","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"43 - 48"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49333156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Caught in the Middle? Middle Powers amid U.S.-China Competition","authors":"Hoo Tiang Boon, Sarah Teo","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0058","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0058","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This essay provides an overview of this special issue, which seeks to better understand middle-power thinking and strategies in coping with the escalating competition between the U.S. and China.main argument Competition is now the primary format of U.S.-China relations, spanning key dimensions of international politics. The pressures radiating from this structural shift have led Indo-Pacific states to calibrate their policies to this new geostrategic circumstance. This special issue focuses on the responses of a category of regional states understood as middle powers. How have regional middle powers adapted to the intensifying U.S.-China rivalry? What are the considerations and drivers that inform their coping strategies? To address these salient, policy-relevant questions, this special issue spotlights six Indo-Pacific middle powers—namely, Australia, South Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, and Pakistan—and unpacks their logic and ways of navigating the complexities of the Sino-U.S. rivalry. The insights derived in this issue contribute to broader policy thinking on the evolving choices of middle powers and are instructive for the strategic policies of other regional states in an era of great-power competition.policy implications • Amid the growing U.S.-China contest, regional middle powers perceive a narrowing strategic space for maneuverability.• This reduced strategic space does not equate to decreasing strategic autonomy, however. Regional middle powers retain considerable agency to mold their own paths and that of the broader strategic environment, including developing options to mitigate any fallout from the Sino-U.S. rivalry.• A considerable degree of this middle-power agency is animated by elite calculations of the respective domestic interests at stake.• Strategic ambiguity toward China and the U.S. remains the dominant policy preference of most middle powers probed in this issue.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"59 - 76"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46960152","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Quad as a Security Actor","authors":"Tanvi Madan","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0065","url":null,"abstract":"When the Quad briefly emerged in 2007-8 among Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, this minilateral was referred to as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. Although some member states occasionally still use that term-often casually-it has been eschewed as a formal designation. Indeed, Quad members have gone out of their way to highlight a softer purpose rather than a security framing for the coalition. They have emphasized the idea of the group as a solutions provider for regional problems, including the Covid-19 crisis and climate change, while simultaneously officials have either denied or downplayed the grouping's security dimension.1 In September 2021, for instance, a senior U.S. official emphasized that the Quad \"is not a regional security organization.\" The official further added that \"there is not a military dimension...or security dimension\" to the grouping.2However, while the Quad is not a regional security organization or alliance and does not involve formal security commitments or treaty obligations, it does have security and even some military dimensions. This element may not be evident in members' public statements, but as this essay argues, it is a key component of the Quad and the cooperation between its members.The Quad's resurrection lay in the need to respond to a security challenge-a more assertive and powerful China. This was not the only driver, but without it, the Quad was neither necessary nor possible. The member states' desire to respond to this challenge by shaping a favorable balance of power and building resilience in the region has led to several lines of effort, including in the defense and security domains. Among other elements, these interactions have involved building on a relatively low base of member-state interconnection in these sectors, particularly with India. Members' engagement in these realms has been evident in three areas: (1) security consultations and activities via the Quad, (2) sub-Quad activities, involving the deepening of ties between the Quad partners bilaterally and trilaterally, and (3) supra-Quad activities, consisting of member-state cooperation with other like-minded partners.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"49 - 56"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41498037","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"\"No One Can Force Vietnam to Choose Sides\": Vietnam as a Self-Reliant Middle Power","authors":"Phan Xuan Dung","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0061","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0061","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This essay examines how Vietnam is adapting to U.S.-China rivalry and argues that Vietnam's room for strategic maneuverability is diminishing as it faces growing internal and external pressure for policy adjustments.main argument In the past few years, Vietnam has been increasingly labeled as a middle power. Vietnam's emerging middle-power status coincides with a shifting strategic environment marked by China's expansionism that has nudged Vietnam toward closer U.S. relations. However, Vietnam's persistent foreign policy of self-reliance and independence, informed by the country's historical experiences and concerns over regime security, ensures that Hanoi stays nonaligned. Thus, while retaining autonomy in developing closer U.S. ties, Vietnam strikes a delicate balance between the two superpowers. Instead of relying on a single security guarantor, Vietnam has actively sought to promote rules-based principles and multilateralism in advancing its national interests, particularly vis-à-vis the South China Sea and the Mekong River. However, external and internal developments have strained Vietnam's ability to balance between the two superpowers.policy implications • While increasingly wary of China's behavior, Vietnam is unlikely to enter a formal alliance with the U.S. due to its firmly held values of self-reliance and independence.• Vietnam will continue to leverage multidirectional diplomacy to shape regional security and economic architectures in an effort to counterbalance China's influence and reduce Vietnamese dependence on China.• Vietnam should exercise more flexibility and show greater resolve in protecting its national interests. To this end, without abandoning its foreign policy of self-reliance and independence, Vietnam should explore new options to advance security cooperation with other major and middle powers with which it shares strategic interests.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"151 - 179"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41907800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"U.S.-China \"Extreme Competition\" and the Drumbeat of War","authors":"Susan Thornton","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0074","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"240 - 243"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41444486","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Minilaterals and Deterrence: A Critical New Nexus","authors":"Arzan Tarapore, Brendan Taylor","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0068","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0068","url":null,"abstract":"As countries around the Indo-Pacific strive to manage the challenges of China’s growing power and assertiveness, they have emphasized two concepts. First, they have increasingly embraced “minilateral” groupings—small, issue-based, informal, and uninstitutionalized partnerships—as a way of coordinating international policy action. This trend has been building gradually for over two decades, ever since the emergence of mechanisms such as the U.S.-Japan-Korea Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group in the late 1990s and the U.S.Australia-Japan Trilateral Strategic Dialogue during the early 2000s. But these groupings sharply expanded in number and ambition in the 2010s. The standard-bearer of the minilateral model is the Quad—comprising Australia, India, Japan, and the United States—which was resuscitated in 2017 and now involves regular summit-level meetings. The boldest minilateral is AUKUS, announced in 2021, which brings together alreadyclose allies Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to further deepen defense technology cooperation, including the provision of nuclear-powered submarines to Australia. Second, the United States and its allies, such as Australia and Japan, have renewed their commitment to deterrence to maintain regional stability. Rather than relying on institutions to deepen regional integration, which was their preferred option after the end of the Cold War, they are designing defense policies to dissuade potential adversaries, especially China, from revisionist behavior. For example, “integrated deterrence” has been highlighted as the centerpiece of the Biden administration’s emerging","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"2 - 7"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48051520","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Recasting U.S.-Japan Ties in a New Era of Economic Security","authors":"S. Goto","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0055","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0055","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This essay examines the evolution of U.S.-Japan economic relations from competition for global markets to cooperation in staving off the threats confronting the rules-based economic order by focusing on the challenges both countries face from China's weaponization of economic dominance.main argument Once the biggest thorn to bilateral relations, trade is no longer the obstacle between Japan and the U.S. that it once was. Instead, shared economic interests not only are bringing Tokyo and Washington together more closely but the two countries are leading the way to coordinate efforts to protect the rules-based liberal economic order and stave off economic coercion from China. But Japan and the U.S. need the support of other countries in Asia, Europe, and beyond to develop an economic security framework that protects the critical technologies of this new economic era and prevents abuse of economic influence. Tokyo's ability to reach across the Indo-Pacific and establish trust in building an economic architecture with new rules of engagement is leading to more equalized relations between Japan and the U.S. and a larger voice for Japan in regional affairs.policy implications • A baseline understanding between Japan and the U.S. regarding what constitutes economic security and what the threats are to protecting growth has been made clear. A slew of bilateral and multilateral initiatives has ensued as a result, but there is significant overlap among them. If the partnerships are to be effective, efforts should be consolidated and streamlined.• Japan's more realist approach to dealing with the China challenge, whereby values-based diplomacy does not supersede efforts to focus on common interests and shared challenges, resonates in the Indo-Pacific. If the U.S. continues to look to Japan's political and economic leadership, the prospects for engaging more successfully with Southeast Asian states will improve.• Protecting technologies and cooperation in technology innovation is vital for defense purposes as well as for economic expansion. At the same time, the global economy continues to face significant challenges from the disruptions caused by the Covid-19 pandemic and rising geopolitical risks. A focus on conventional economic concerns, including growth prospects and market access, cannot be sidelined if there is to be effective cooperation between industrialized nations and the global South.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"225 - 238"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45619596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Circles of Strategy, Circuits of Risk: Rudd's Guide to Xi's China","authors":"R. Medcalf","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0072","url":null,"abstract":"F ormer leaders rarely hit the mark when writing books proclaiming expertise and sage advice on world affairs. In his book The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the U.S. and Xi Jinping’s China, Kevin Rudd thankfully breaks that rule. This book is largely what the title implies—an insightful overview on China’s strategic goals, the danger of conflict with the United States, and ideas to reduce those risks. That makes this book particularly refreshing for what it is not. As a former prime minister and foreign minister, and still a close confidante of many international leaders, Rudd could easily have foregrounded his own experience, accomplishments, frustrations, and conversations. As an Australian, he could have emphasized the agency of third countries, such as his own, in shaping regional security or supposedly mediating great-power differences. As a China expert—which he unquestionably is—he could have articulated Beijing’s policy imperatives in ways that feigned clarity while actually signifying that nonspecialists could never hope to divine the mysteries of Chinese statecraft. And in stressing the hazards of war between the United States and China, he could have wallowed in sanctimony, blame, and doom. Mercifully, these temptations have been resisted. Instead, this book is genuinely useful, accessible, and timely, and it deserves to be widely read by policymakers, journalists, students, businesspeople, and concerned citizens alike. The style and format suggest many years of thinking behind a compressed burst of writing. This is, therefore, not an academic tome—the text does not contain a single footnote or reference—but it should not be skimmed through as simply a long piece of opinion or journalism. The Avoidable War is also highly readable. As a political leader, Rudd’s reputation included a tendency to the technocratic. This makes it doubly refreshing that the style of this book is largely jargon-free, engaging, and to the point. In a sense, this book is two in one: an objective explainer of Xi Jinping’s worldview and a survival (or, more precisely, coexistence) guide to the deepening U.S.-China struggle. Combining the two is logical, as the","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"244 - 246"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43268197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Australia's Great-Power Threat Perceptions and Leadership Responses","authors":"Peter K. Lee, A. Carr","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0059","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0059","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This essay argues that Australia's choices in the U.S.-China rivalry have been significantly shaped by the different role conceptions of the country's prime ministers, producing outcomes at odds with structural expectations for middle-power behavior.main argument Australia's relations with China and the U.S. are in a state of flux. Relations with Beijing have turned antagonistic, though trade continues apace. Meanwhile, relations with Washington seem infused by intimacy, yet also feature regular bouts of divergence. Three explanations are commonly offered to explain Australia's evolving relations with both great powers: the changing balance of power, alliance pressure, and national interests. However, none of these sufficiently explain variations in why and how Australia has behaved in recent years. Instead, the different role conceptions of Australia's three prime ministers between 2013 and 2022—Tony Abbott, Malcolm Turnbull, and Scott Morrison—better explain Australia's choices. Specifically, a typology of role conceptions based on these leaders' domains of interest and desire for change shows how they responded differently to similar external pressures and thus demonstrates the decisive impact of leaders in how middle powers respond to great powers. It is still too early to identify Anthony Albanese's leadership role conception, given his recent election in May 2022, but a domestic role conception is likely.policy implications • Australia's recent choices and actions toward China and the U.S. have been far more contingent and leader-driven than is often reflected in the debate over middle-power responses to great-power competition.• A deeper appreciation of domestic political dynamics and the personal motivations of national leaders can help explain responses that do not conform to straightforward balancing choices.• There is considerable scope for middle-power agency even as domestic and international constraints narrow the availability of alternative leadership role conceptions.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"77 - 99"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45535785","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}