Asia Policy最新文献

{"title":"Introduction: The Rise of Asian State Actors in the Arctic","authors":"Angela Wang","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0002","url":null,"abstract":"T raditionally an isolated and low-tension region, the Arctic is known for its extraordinary beauty and pristine wilderness. The region is recognized as one of the last resource-rich frontiers—it holds 22% of the world’s oil and natural gas resources, is home to more than 21,000 known species, and contains two commercially viable shipping routes that could potentially reshape the future of international trade.1 As the sea ice over the central Arctic Ocean has long kept the region inaccessible, Arctic affairs have customarily been prioritized on the policy agendas of only the eight Arctic states—Canada, Denmark (via Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States. However, this situation has begun to change in recent decades as the region becomes more accessible due to climate change, ecological degradation, and a consequent rise in economic and geostrategic opportunities. The Arctic is now a new frontier that has piqued the interest of international actors, especially ones from the Asia-Pacific region. In 2013, at the Kiruna Ministerial Meeting in Sweden, the Arctic Council granted China, Japan, India, South Korea, and Singapore the status of observer states.2 The Arctic Council is a critical governmental forum for Arctic cooperation with decisions made by the eight Arctic nations and the permanent participants.3 Although observer members are limited to observation of the work of the council and involvement in specific working groups, prior to the Kiruna decision the council’s observer states only comprised European countries. The admission of these Asian observers was","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41603584","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Puppets or Agents? \"Thugs-for-Hire\" and Brokers between State and Society","authors":"J. Mittelstaedt","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0014","url":null,"abstract":"I t is difficult to read Lynette H. Ong’s Outsourcing Repression: Everyday State Power in Contemporary China and not be constantly reminded of China’s pandemic response, in which the Chinese party-state implemented often harsh and controversial lockdowns. The local nature of the lockdowns, however, allowed the top leadership to distance itself from excesses, with Xi Jinping early in the pandemic even blaming “some localities” for misimplementation and “criminal acts.”1 But this tactic is not only a privilege of the central government. The local party-state also deploys third-party agents to shield itself from blame for oftentimes crude implementation and to enhance its capacity. Outsourcing Repression, based on Ong’s fieldwork conducted before the Covid-19 outbreak, exposes these mechanisms used by the local party-states and reveals deeper underlying structures in their operations. The book, therefore, is timely, examining how the government can marshal third-party agents to implement often unpopular policies and exact compliance from the citizenry. In the book, Ong distinguishes between “thugs-for-hire” and “brokers” that together constitute “everyday state power” (p. 3), which she defines as “the state’s exercise of power through society, or via society itself” (p. 5). As she notes, the categories are “conceptually distinct and by and large mutually exclusive” (p. 99). Thugs-for-hire use violent coercion (p. 31) to impose the party-state’s will, thereby representing the “stick” that, in the ideal case, lends plausible deniability to the state. “Brokers,” on the other hand, are largely nonviolent (p. 99), use emotional mobilization to persuade and psychologically coerce participants, and are “legitimizing vehicles of state repression” (p. 33). Their success hinges on “legitimacy, or legitimation by the actor who persuades” (p. 36). While this might augment state","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43253128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Kishida's Climate Policy and Opportunities for U.S.-Japan Cooperation","authors":"Yves Tiberghien","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0007","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This essay summarizes key trends and drivers in Japan's climate policy, with an emphasis on the acceleration of commitments and policies that has taken place during the Suga and Kishida cabinets, and reviews the policy implications.main argumentJapan's climate policy development has been dominated by a technocratic policy triangle that includes the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry; politicians within the dominant Liberal Democratic Party; and industry. This triangle has generated cautious policymaking characterized by gradualism and a focus on the long-term viability of existing industrial assets. However, the acceleration of climate policy under the Suga and Kishida governments of the last two years has been driven by political leadership in response to both competition in East Asia and overtures from the Biden administration. Most crucially, Japan's stepped-up commitments include a comprehensive vision of economic and energy security that views the current competition over green technology in the Indo-Pacific as crucial for future economic competitiveness. Under the Green Transformation (GX) strategy, industrial policy is back.policy implications • Energy security and industrial competitiveness are driving the new Japanese approach to climate policy. In the context of a tighter geopolitical environment in the Indo-Pacific area, this approach opens more avenues for cooperation with key allies and partners.• The Kishida cabinet is emphasizing several key policy sectors: solar energy, nuclear energy revival, ammonia and hydrogen innovation in combination with continued clean coal use, and electric vehicles.• Japan's climate policy approach will have a strong focus on innovation, competition, and industrial renewal, focusing as much on the supply side as the demand side.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66395577","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Russia–South Korea Relationship after Russia's Invasion of Ukraine and Implications for the U.S.-ROK Alliance","authors":"Anthony V. Rinna","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0009","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This essay examines the potential for shifts in Russia's strategy toward the Korean Peninsula in light of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and South Korea's reaction.main argumentFor nearly 30 years, Russia has pursued a strategy of \"diplomatic equidistance\" toward the Korean Peninsula. By striving to maintain relatively balanced ties with both North and South Korea, the Kremlin has attempted to preserve a degree of influence on its eastern periphery in Northeast Asia, which is largely dominated by the U.S. and China. Pyongyang's and Seoul's respective responses to Russia's military aggression in Eastern Europe, however, have opened the possibility that Moscow could shift toward a strategy that favors North Korea over South Korea.policy implications• Should Russia decide to pursue closer ties with North Korea at a time when Russia–South Korea relations have cooled, the Kremlin may find that supporting the North could increase its influence in Northeast Asia as well as present a challenge to the U.S. Nevertheless, Moscow would also risk losing the limited influence on the Korean Peninsula it has acquired as a result of its equidistance strategy.• South Korea faces a period of uncertainty in relations with Russia since the invasion of Ukraine. While it is unlikely that Moscow and Seoul will enact the economic cooperation that they had previously envisioned, South Korea may hope to salvage ties with Russia to improve the balance on the Korean Peninsula. Yet with increased fears that North Korea–Russia relations may strengthen, South Korea has reason to be skeptical of cooperation.• The U.S. will need to be prepared for several possible developments in terms of Russia's standing on the Korean Peninsula. Should South Korea elect to try to preserve cooperation with Russia, this may cause a further rift in the U.S.–South Korea alliance. If Moscow doubles down on its relationship with Pyongyang, Seoul and Washington will need to be prepared to jointly address such a development with implications for the Northeast Asian subregion and Russia-U.S. ties.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44732014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Exposing Repression Behind the Scenes","authors":"Yao Li","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0013","url":null,"abstract":"I n the post–Cold War era, incumbents in authoritarian regimes have increased their toolkit for repression. In addition to blatant, forceful forms of repression (such as making mass arrests and shooting protesters), less visible, more sophisticated means of coercion have become vital components of a regime’s repertoire to stifle unrest. Joining a bourgeoning literature on authoritarian repression, Lynette H. Ong’s book Outsourcing Repression: Everyday State Power in Contemporary China presents a rigorous account of how the Chinese state takes advantage of nonstate actors to impose violent and nonviolent methods of social control. In particular, the book elaborates on how authorities hire private agents (e.g., thugs and gangsters) and rely on grassroots brokers (including local elders and members of urban residents’ committees) to neutralize social protests against land appropriation and housing demolition in urban and rural China. Outsourcing Repression is highly relevant for anyone seeking to understand state repression, urbanization, and Chinese politics. Regarding violent acts carried out by thugs-for-hire, Ong describes these thugs’ typical profile and the conditions under which they operate. She argues that such everyday repression is a lower-cost strategy that can minimize the likelihood of social protest and violent backlash—as long as any violence remains low-intensity, severe casualties or significant confrontations do not result, and no overt government complicity is involved. Yet, once any of these conditions fails to be satisfied, thugs-for-hire are no longer a low-cost repressive measure but a liability to the hiring authority. This paves the way for the state to increasingly turn to brokers and nonviolent tactics to resolve conflicts in demolition projects. These brokers are classified into three types (political, social, and economic), depending on the sources of their brokerage—whether their power or legitimacy stems from their state or quasi-state status, their social capital, or their role in bridging information asymmetry between state and society.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48842905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Strategy of Distribution for Addressing the PLA of 2025–30","authors":"Eric W. Sayers","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0067","url":null,"abstract":"T oday’s military balance in the western Pacific is the product of the successful 25-year effort by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to build a military capability that specifically targets and holds at risk U.S. air and maritime forces. Since the Taiwan Strait crisis in the mid-1990s, China has worked diligently to exploit vulnerabilities in U.S. forces and mitigate U.S. strengths. The PRC’s geography, strategy, and military systems place the U.S. military—and the interests it defends—at significant risk. There is reason to believe that Beijing could now successfully launch a lightning attack that would seize a strategic advantage or objective. This, in turn, would force Washington either to accept the result of an attempted fait accompli or to engage in a high-risk military conflict to dislodge People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces from their target. This wicked problem is further exacerbated by the time horizons that the United States and its allies confront when planning to address the PLA as a challenge over multiple decades. Anything is possible in the arena of defense planning when timelines are pushed well into the future. It is convenient for Washington to focus on the military challenge the PRC will pose in the 2030s and beyond, when exciting emerging technologies and new military hardware promise to offer operational capabilities that can theoretically close the gap between the two militaries but do not yet exist. Yet Washington would be falling into a temporal planning trap if it only organized to address the PRC military dilemma of 2035. As the past year has demonstrated, Beijing has escalated its use of coercion and aggression in areas of significant U.S. interest in the western Pacific. Given this reality, the Pentagon, lawmakers, and the White House need a strategy that can effectively deter the PLA in the near to medium term (2025–30). The grave costs, potential for miscalculation, and impact of the eroding military","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46961640","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Fit for Purpose: Can Southeast Asian Minilateralism Deter?","authors":"Evan A. Laksmana.","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0064","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0064","url":null,"abstract":"I n examining the development of minilaterals anchored in Southeast Asia, this essay considers whether and, if so, how this subregion could contribute to broader capabilities to deter military aggression. The essay argues that Southeast Asia’s experience with minilateralism is much more limited, focused, and functionally driven by specific security challenges such as armed robbery. It is unlikely that Southeast Asian states will be comfortable with a broader minilateral arrangement involving extraregional powers designed to deter China or sideline existing mechanisms led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). For better or worse, a more limited and functionally driven minilateralism gives Southeast Asian states more control over the direction, scope, and quality of cooperation. As well, analysts from the subregion have warned of the possibility that Indo-Pacific minilateral arrangements could become platforms for major powers to extend their influence.1 The essay is divided into three parts. First, it provides an overview of the recent history of minilateralism in Southeast Asia, with a focus on the Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP) between Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand as well as trilateral security cooperation between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. It also briefly notes other experiences of minilateralism involving Southeast Asian states beyond the security realm. Next, the essay highlights the different features of minilateralism anchored in Southeast Asia in contrast to U.S.-anchored minilateralism and assesses the likelihood of Southeast Asian–led arrangements contributing to a broader deterrence effort against China. Finally, the essay offers several policy considerations regarding whether and, if so, how Southeast Asian–led minilateralism can be of strategic salience in the Indo-Pacific security landscape.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43828473","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"South Korea's Investment in the U.S.-ROK Alliance: A Case Study of the New Southern Policy","authors":"Jae Jeok Park, E. Tan","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0060","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This essay argues that South Korea's deliberate efforts to find nexuses between its New Southern Policy (NSP) and the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy is an investment in insurance for the U.S.-ROK alliance.main argument South Korea has been exploring connections between its NSP and the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy at the request of, if not pressure from, the U.S. South Korea has expanded the NSP's scope to include nontraditional security and target areas in the South Pacific. This policy choice is, in part, an investment in insurance for the U.S.-ROK alliance to bolster the partnership and ensure a U.S. security commitment to the Korean Peninsula. Were South Korea not to accommodate the U.S. strategy, Washington might reduce its commitment to the alliance in response. However, adjusting to some elements of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy also gives South Korea leeway to engage more with China without causing the perception that it is strategically tilting toward China.policy implications • As the U.S. and South Korea increase their cooperation for infrastructure investment in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Pacific Islands, South Korea should demonstrate its interest in coordinating in minilateral settings with Japan, Australia, and India. Doing so would create greater space for South Korea to also participate in China's Belt and Road Initiative more broadly without causing the U.S. to misperceive that South Korea is tilting toward China.• Enhancing cooperation with the Quad states in regional maritime security can give South Korea more room to engage with China in responding to regional nontraditional security issues.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41505142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific","authors":"O. Mastro","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0066","url":null,"abstract":"A s China’s military might and tendency toward regional aggression grow, the United States and its allies are increasingly concerned with deterrence. Their strategies seek to prevent Beijing from disrupting the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific by, for example, invading Taiwan or conducting gray-zone operations in the South China Sea. One of those strategies was to revive the Quad grouping with Australia, Japan, India, and the United States in 2017 to protect freedom of navigation and promote democratic values.1 In the period since, the Quad has become implicitly—or explicitly, at least on the part of the United States—aimed at countering China’s malign activities in the Indo-Pacific region.2 Statements from the February 2022 Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting highlighted the threat of “unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force and coercion” in the South and East China Seas while also reaffirming the Quad’s commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific.3 Although the Quad has been reluctant to directly address security cooperation, the 2020 and 2021 joint military Malabar exercises revealed a shared focus on improving interoperability.4 Yet deterring China with minilateral groupings of states is more complex and difficult than traditional deterrence theory might suggest. This essay lays out some of the unique characteristics of the China challenge before considering how minilaterals can best enhance deterrence in these circumstances.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42524665","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Is War in the Asia-Pacific Avoidable?","authors":"J. Liow","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0071","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0071","url":null,"abstract":"W hat happens when a rising power meets an established power? This is a fundamental question that has exercised strategic thinkers for centuries, in the process producing a voluminous scholarship that can easily fill multiple libraries. Crucially, however, this is not an abstract question that merely fans the flames of intellectual curiosity. If ongoing developments on the global stage are any measure, it is the signal question of our time—and will remain so for some years to come—as the world witnesses the alarmingly steep descent of Sino-U.S. relations into the realms of great-power competition and rivalry. This being the case, how to prevent both powers from drifting into war has become of paramount importance not only for them but for the entire international community. The main theme of The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the U.S. and Xi Jinping’s China is the management of the Sino-U.S. relationship for the purpose of avoiding open conflict in the coming decade. Few are as well-placed to write this book as its author Kevin Rudd, the Mandarin-speaking former prime minister of Australia and current president of the Asia Society. In it, Rudd brings his wealth of experience and considerable powers of analysis to bear on efforts to navigate the twists and turns of this most vital yet complex of great-power bilateral relationships, helping the reader understand not only how we came to the present state of affairs but, just as important, how both great powers can best manage their competitive relationship so as to prevent the outbreak of war. In essence, The Avoidable War sets out to do three things. First, it provides a thoughtful discussion that describes how and why the bilateral relationship has arrived at this point. This discussion commands the lion’s share of attention in the book. While Rudd does not attribute blame exclusively to China—indeed, he correctly highlights the dearth of understanding and familiarity in the United States with China that has led to inaccurate views and mischaracterizations—he does nevertheless draw attention to the outcome of the more assertive turn in international affairs that has taken place under the leadership of Chinese president","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44814736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}