Asia Policy最新文献

{"title":"Minilaterals and Deterrence: A Critical New Nexus","authors":"Arzan Tarapore, Brendan Taylor","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0068","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0068","url":null,"abstract":"As countries around the Indo-Pacific strive to manage the challenges of China’s growing power and assertiveness, they have emphasized two concepts. First, they have increasingly embraced “minilateral” groupings—small, issue-based, informal, and uninstitutionalized partnerships—as a way of coordinating international policy action. This trend has been building gradually for over two decades, ever since the emergence of mechanisms such as the U.S.-Japan-Korea Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group in the late 1990s and the U.S.Australia-Japan Trilateral Strategic Dialogue during the early 2000s. But these groupings sharply expanded in number and ambition in the 2010s. The standard-bearer of the minilateral model is the Quad—comprising Australia, India, Japan, and the United States—which was resuscitated in 2017 and now involves regular summit-level meetings. The boldest minilateral is AUKUS, announced in 2021, which brings together alreadyclose allies Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to further deepen defense technology cooperation, including the provision of nuclear-powered submarines to Australia. Second, the United States and its allies, such as Australia and Japan, have renewed their commitment to deterrence to maintain regional stability. Rather than relying on institutions to deepen regional integration, which was their preferred option after the end of the Cold War, they are designing defense policies to dissuade potential adversaries, especially China, from revisionist behavior. For example, “integrated deterrence” has been highlighted as the centerpiece of the Biden administration’s emerging","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48051520","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Circles of Strategy, Circuits of Risk: Rudd's Guide to Xi's China","authors":"R. Medcalf","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0072","url":null,"abstract":"F ormer leaders rarely hit the mark when writing books proclaiming expertise and sage advice on world affairs. In his book The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the U.S. and Xi Jinping’s China, Kevin Rudd thankfully breaks that rule. This book is largely what the title implies—an insightful overview on China’s strategic goals, the danger of conflict with the United States, and ideas to reduce those risks. That makes this book particularly refreshing for what it is not. As a former prime minister and foreign minister, and still a close confidante of many international leaders, Rudd could easily have foregrounded his own experience, accomplishments, frustrations, and conversations. As an Australian, he could have emphasized the agency of third countries, such as his own, in shaping regional security or supposedly mediating great-power differences. As a China expert—which he unquestionably is—he could have articulated Beijing’s policy imperatives in ways that feigned clarity while actually signifying that nonspecialists could never hope to divine the mysteries of Chinese statecraft. And in stressing the hazards of war between the United States and China, he could have wallowed in sanctimony, blame, and doom. Mercifully, these temptations have been resisted. Instead, this book is genuinely useful, accessible, and timely, and it deserves to be widely read by policymakers, journalists, students, businesspeople, and concerned citizens alike. The style and format suggest many years of thinking behind a compressed burst of writing. This is, therefore, not an academic tome—the text does not contain a single footnote or reference—but it should not be skimmed through as simply a long piece of opinion or journalism. The Avoidable War is also highly readable. As a political leader, Rudd’s reputation included a tendency to the technocratic. This makes it doubly refreshing that the style of this book is largely jargon-free, engaging, and to the point. In a sense, this book is two in one: an objective explainer of Xi Jinping’s worldview and a survival (or, more precisely, coexistence) guide to the deepening U.S.-China struggle. Combining the two is logical, as the","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43268197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Australia's Great-Power Threat Perceptions and Leadership Responses","authors":"Peter K. Lee, A. Carr","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0059","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0059","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This essay argues that Australia's choices in the U.S.-China rivalry have been significantly shaped by the different role conceptions of the country's prime ministers, producing outcomes at odds with structural expectations for middle-power behavior.main argument Australia's relations with China and the U.S. are in a state of flux. Relations with Beijing have turned antagonistic, though trade continues apace. Meanwhile, relations with Washington seem infused by intimacy, yet also feature regular bouts of divergence. Three explanations are commonly offered to explain Australia's evolving relations with both great powers: the changing balance of power, alliance pressure, and national interests. However, none of these sufficiently explain variations in why and how Australia has behaved in recent years. Instead, the different role conceptions of Australia's three prime ministers between 2013 and 2022—Tony Abbott, Malcolm Turnbull, and Scott Morrison—better explain Australia's choices. Specifically, a typology of role conceptions based on these leaders' domains of interest and desire for change shows how they responded differently to similar external pressures and thus demonstrates the decisive impact of leaders in how middle powers respond to great powers. It is still too early to identify Anthony Albanese's leadership role conception, given his recent election in May 2022, but a domestic role conception is likely.policy implications • Australia's recent choices and actions toward China and the U.S. have been far more contingent and leader-driven than is often reflected in the debate over middle-power responses to great-power competition.• A deeper appreciation of domestic political dynamics and the personal motivations of national leaders can help explain responses that do not conform to straightforward balancing choices.• There is considerable scope for middle-power agency even as domestic and international constraints narrow the availability of alternative leadership role conceptions.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45535785","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Author's Response: Walking China and the United States Back from the Abyss","authors":"Kevin Rudd","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0073","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44239902","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A New Strategic Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific","authors":"K. Koga","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0063","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0063","url":null,"abstract":"T he emergence of “strategic minilateralism” has been a trend in the Indo-Pacific since the second half of the 2010s. Although minilateral cooperation between the United States and its allies and partners started in the early 2000s, the late 2010s saw more institutionalized and strategically oriented forms of minilateral security collaboration begin to emerge from two main drivers: the rise of China and the lack of effective regional security mechanisms for responding to that rise.1 China’s rejection of the South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal ruling in July 2016 served as a particular catalyst for this new “strategic minilateralism” in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, Beijing’s growing regional influence, including through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has become more visible, drawing diplomatic support for China’s presence from its neighbors. In response to China’s rise and the threat it poses to U.S. regional primacy, Washington has attempted to link its bilateral alliances and partnerships together since the early 2000s, as shown in the establishment of the Australia-Japan-U.S. Trilateral Strategic Dialogue in 2002. Nevertheless, this effort has not yet proved to be sufficiently effective in pushing back against China. In this context, new strategic minilaterals, such as the Quad (comprising Australia, Japan, India, and the United States) and AUKUS (comprising Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), have been constructed. Examining the institutional development and key characteristics of the Indo-Pacific’s new strategic minilateralism, particularly the Quad and AUKUS, this essay argues that such frameworks are largely a Western construct that attempt to fill the expectation and capability gaps in regional security systems for underwriting the existing regional order. There are basically two types of minilateralism: one aims to shape the regional order through ruleand norm-making, while the other focuses on military cooperation to check rising powers’ behavior. Both share the same strategic","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44380294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Middle-Power Alignment in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Securing Agency through Neo-Middle-Power Diplomacy","authors":"S. Nagy","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0039","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This article explores how middle powers in the Indo-Pacific are engaging in a new type of diplomacy, one that includes lobbying, insulating, and rulemaking in the realms of security, trade, and international law, to protect their national interests from Sino-U.S. strategic competition.main argument The change in the power balance associated with China's re-emergence as Asia's largest economy has brought concerns about Sino-U.S. strategic competition and raised questions about U.S. leadership in the Indo-Pacific region among many U.S.-aligned middle powers, such as Australia, Japan, Canada, and India. Specific challenges that China is creating include fomenting instability in the maritime domain, fracturing the openness of the emerging digital economy, and practicing coercive economic behavior, to which middle powers are especially vulnerable. Therefore, the Indo-Pacific's middle powers are aligning to adapt to these changing dynamics and transforming their diplomacy and cooperation into \"neo-middle-power diplomacy.\" This new type of diplomacy is proactive and engages in behavior that includes lobbying, insulating, and rulemaking in the realms of security, trade, and international law. It aims to ensure that middle powers' interests are not deleteriously affected by the Sino-U.S. rivalry.policy implications • Like-minded middle powers should actively seek out alignment partners inside and outside the region based on a convergence of interests. U.S. involvement is preferred but not a prerequisite for alignment and cooperation.• Middle powers should focus cooperation on key areas based on the synergy of their respective comparative advantages. Ideally, these would stress capability-based contributions, such as intelligence gathering, rather than the capacity of the resources available for cooperation. Examples include regularized humanitarian and disaster-relief activities; maritime cooperation in the East and South China Seas, Taiwan Strait, and Indian Ocean; and joint transits in the Indo-Pacific.• Middle powers should prioritize their interests in free trade and \"data free flow with trust\" in the digital economy to both provide economic incentives to emerging states in the region and develop trade safety-net agreements that will allow them to support each other when subject to economic coercion.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48397515","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Understanding the Enigma of Putin's Russia","authors":"Christopher R. Miller","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0044","url":null,"abstract":"S everal months into the latest phase of the Russia-Ukraine War, it may seem like a strange time to refer to Russian president Vladimir Putin or his system of governance as “weak.” It certainly does not feel that way on the frontlines of Donbas as Russia brings to bear all its conventional might in a war of conquest, the type of conflict many analysts thought had gone out of fashion in Europe after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. If you had asked Russia watchers in the summer of 2021 about the likelihood of over 100,000 Russian soldiers marching into Ukraine, most would have seen the scenario as far-fetched. The entire field of Russian studies deserves tough questions about the adequacy of its methods for understanding Russian politics. If anyone has a credible claim to understand and explain Russian politics, though, it is Timothy Frye, who is arguably the leading figure in a new school of political science research that seeks to elucidate the inner logics of the Russian political system. Alongside numerous coauthors and former students, Frye’s research has examined topics such as the significance of Russian elections, public opinion, lobbying and corruption, and property rights and the rule of law. Weak Strongman: The Limits of Power in Putin’s Russia is Frye’s brilliant distillation of nearly 30 years of research on these themes. Despite this new wave of research about how Russia’s political system works, as Frye notes, there is a long history of relying on tropes rather than analysis in the field of Russian studies. It isn’t only Westerners like Churchill who have seen Russia as a land of riddles and enigmas; Russians’ analyses of their own country’s politics frequently rely on references to the country’s supposedly unique history, culture, or spirituality. Frye asks his readers to situate contemporary Russia not in the context of Ivan the Terrible or Leo Tolstoy but in that of other contemporary authoritarian states, ranging from Recep Erdogan’s Turkey to Viktor Orban’s Hungary to Nicolás Maduro’s Venezuela. As Weak Strongman shows, not everything about Russia is enigmatic. And despite his strongman image, Putin has an ability to control the Russian political system and state apparatus that is more circumscribed than it often appears.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47052375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Chinese Vaccine Diplomacy in Africa","authors":"Cobus van Staden","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0054","url":null,"abstract":"M edicine has long played a key role in the Africa-China relationship. Since 1963, China has sent teams of medical volunteers to the continent annually to provide primary healthcare to underserved countries and targeted care related to particular diseases, notably malaria.1 China has also been instrumental in the development of a new generation of malaria medication, and the Ebola crisis of the 2010s created space for collaboration between China and other external partners on the continent. But most recently and most starkly, the Covid-19 pandemic has both validated and raised doubts about China-Africa medical cooperation, even as the virus ruthlessly exposed the realities of Africa’s wider global position. This essay assesses China’s diplomacy and cooperation with African countries in two stages of the Covid-19 pandemic: the early phase that focused on virus mitigation through personal protective equipment (PPE) and healthcare supplies, and a second phase that has focused on Covid-19 vaccine production and distribution. It argues that although China was more successful in partnering with Africa early in the pandemic, China has enjoyed diplomatic gains from the second stage due to the failure of the global North and its multilateral institutions to live up to their promises regarding sharing vaccines and vaccine intellectual property (IP). The essay examines China’s diplomacy and then turns to look at similar efforts of the global North. It concludes with observations about the recent Eighth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the lasting effects Covid-19 responses may have on Africa’s relationships with China and with traditional Western partners.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46331792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Status Complicated: In Zambia, China-Africa Is a Partnership Washington Should Not Necessarily Envy","authors":"Chiponda Chimbelu","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0048","url":null,"abstract":"T o better understand how Africans feel about China’s growing presence and influence on the continent, it is important to look both at the headlines and beyond them to explain how ordinary people may be interpreting events and forming opinions. This essay homes in on one country, Zambia, to try to better understand public perceptions about Chinese engagement. Measured in per capita terms, this southern African country is one of the leading destinations for Chinese investment. The growing presence of Chinese citizens in Zambia, along with their money and involvement in different areas of the economy, has caused controversy and even tragedy, including the loss of both Chinese and Zambian lives. In May 2020, three Chinese nationals were murdered by locals in the Zambian capital Lusaka. The attack followed repeated media reports of Chinese employers allegedly making workers stay on business premises for weeks to maintain production during the country’s first Covid-19 lockdown. The then mayor of Lusaka, Miles Sampa, was accused of stoking anti-China sentiment prior to the attack by blaming China for the Covid-19 pandemic and participating in raids on Chinese-owned businesses. He claimed he had uncovered labor abuses and discrimination against Zambians, describing their working conditions as “slavery.” Sampa also used racist language in videos of the raids that were posted on Facebook. Sampa later apologized for his actions and language in a statement to the media and assured foreign investors that his office would “support their businesses 100%.”1 But it is highly unlikely his apology ameliorated any damage he may have caused. Chinese involvement in Zambia was fraught long before he became mayor, mostly over issues regarding the treatment of Zambian workers by Chinese employers, which have been covered by both local and international media. In 2011, Human Rights Watch released a damning report that detailed abuse at Chinese-owned copper mines in","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48337226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Evolving Geopolitics of Economic Interdependence between the United States and China: Reflections on a Deteriorating Great-Power Relationship","authors":"Ali S. Wyne","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0046","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This essay explores why the U.S. and China have both come to adopt a more cautious view of globalization as their strategic frictions have intensified.main argument The U.S. and China were perhaps the two greatest beneficiaries of the phase of globalization that dated from roughly the mid-1970s to the 2008–9 global financial crisis. Now, however, each country assesses that a combination of intensifying domestic pressures and increasing external turbulence—in significant part the result of growing strategic frictions between the two states—is heightening the need for self-reliance. U.S.-China relations are poised to continue deteriorating as Washington and Beijing both take a dimmer view of their economic entanglement. That deterioration will shape but not dictate Asia's economic evolution.policy implications • The U.S. and China are both increasingly likely to see their economic interdependence not as a source of stability but as a vector of vulnerability.• Even so, the rhetoric around decoupling presently outpaces the reality; the U.S. and China will likely find it far more challenging to unwind their interdependence than they would like.• The extent to which the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework succeeds in shoring up U.S. economic competitiveness will be a crucial litmus test of Washington's staying power in Asia.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41275414","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}