Asia Policy最新文献

{"title":"Entrenching Authoritarian Rule and Thailand's Foreign Policy Dilemma as a Middle Power","authors":"Enze Han","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0056","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This essay explores the strategies that Thailand has used to navigate the great-power competition between the U.S. and China as well as the factors that are driving contemporary Thailand's foreign policy orientation and dilemmas.main argument Recent Thai governments, whether authoritarian or democratically elected, have maintained amicable relations with Beijing while retaining close military cooperation with Washington. However, domestic political dynamics within Thailand are critical to the past and future trajectory of Thailand's bilateral relations with the U.S. and China. Bangkok's reversion toward authoritarian military rule over the past few years has created a different logic in its foreign relations. For the U.S., Thailand's authoritarian turn, although not to Washington's liking, can be tolerated as long as Thailand continues to serve U.S. strategic interests in the region. For China, cordial relations with the incumbent military government of Thailand pave the way for closer economic and political relations, yet anti-authoritarian sentiment within Thailand holds China liable and condemns China's complicity in Thailand's turn to military rule. Thus, balancing Thailand's domestic political dynamic with the foreign policy interests of the U.S. and China is the defining feature of Bangkok's maneuvering act between the two great powers.policy implications • As U.S.-China relations grow more tense, countries in Southeast Asia are feeling the squeeze from both sides. These states sense they need to prepare for choosing between the two powers while trying to delay or prevent such a choice from being necessary.• Thailand's turn toward domestic authoritarian rule creates a dilemma for both the U.S. and China. For the U.S., there is a need to tolerate an authoritarian government in Bangkok to maintain stable military and security cooperation. For China, Thailand's domestic political situation creates a backlash against Chinese interests in the country.• The current military government in Thailand is likely to prioritize its own domestic political legitimacy over relations with either power and will take advantage of the Sino-U.S. competition however best suits its own regime survival.• If Thailand reverts to a democratically elected government with popular support, healthy relationships with both China and the U.S. are more likely to result and endure.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41654024","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Navigating the Great-Power Competition: Pakistan and Its Relationship with the United States and China","authors":"Y. Hassan","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0057","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This essay draws on insights from hedging theory to examine how Pakistan, as a middle power, can navigate key strategic and domestic factors in its policies in response to the growing great-power competition between the U.S. and China.main argument Until recently, Pakistan had deftly taken advantage of its position in the U.S.-China-Pakistan strategic triangle to improve its security vis-à-vis India. Intensification of U.S.-China great-power competition, with the U.S. embracing India as a bulwark against China and the closer alignment of Pakistan-China strategic interests, puts Pakistan in a security dilemma. Islamabad faces challenges in navigating this great-power competition as the role of middle powers increases. Hedging theory shows how Islamabad could gain from a working relationship with Washington on strategic interests, despite Pakistan's aligned interests with China. Pakistan's new national policy, with an emphasis on geoeconomics over geopolitics, will be important for work with both powers.policy implications • Pakistan can count on China's consistent friendship, given Chinese economic and security investments, irrespective of Beijing's own strategic interests in fostering this relationship.• Even if broad-based, nontransactional relations seem unlikely in the near future, areas of mutual interest remain between the U.S. and Pakistan. Through engagement and frank conversation, the U.S. can improve nuclear facilities and safeguard nuclear assets, which would also address Islamabad's suspicion that Washington aims to defang its nuclear capabilities and sabotage Chinese investment in Pakistan.• The U.S. can aid Pakistan in its policy paradigm shift from security to geoeconomics, which would help address Washington's own long-pending demands that Islamabad ease security paranoia about India. By aiding economic reforms and reducing India-Pakistan tensions, the U.S. can foster internal stability and external peace for Pakistan, preventing Islamabad from completely embracing Beijing.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45166831","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Challenge of Avoiding War","authors":"Carla P. Freeman","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0070","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0070","url":null,"abstract":"F or scholars and practitioners alike, few tasks are more important than understanding why wars happen. Wars, to paraphrase Martin Luther or Benito Mussolini, turn the wheels of history—they can catapult states to power or topple them into the ash heap of history. But as long as there have been wars, there have been disagreements over their causes. To quote the writer Svetlana Alexievich, “War remains, as it always has been, one of the chief human mysteries.”1 Perhaps the unpredictability, complexity, and occasional inscrutability of wars’ origins make structuralist explanations for them so appealing. The roots of realism lie in the contemplation of warfare. Thucydides, that Greek font of classical realism, reacted to the Peloponnesian War; Machiavelli to the Italian wars of the Renaissance; E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, Raymond Aron, and other foundational scholars of “modern” realism to the horrors of World Wars I and II. Through the wide aperture of systemic international political theory, wars are the consequence of disruptive shifts in the distribution of international power. This is a simple and powerful idea—but it is not entirely persuasive, as evidenced by the enduring debates within realism and between realism and other schools of international relations theory, to say nothing of the gap between the worlds of academia and policymaking. After all, conflict has not accompanied all power shifts. This suggests that power shifts and wars do not have to go hand in hand. War, in other words, is avoidable. For experts who watch changes to the relative distribution of international power, it has been apparent for decades that a power shift is underway. However, it was not until around the 2008 global financial crisis that this shift became undeniable—the People’s Republic of China had emerged as a serious rival to the United States. An idea which had quietly percolated within both states for years, that they were on an ineluctable","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41624367","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Indonesia's Great-Power Management in the Indo-Pacific: The Balancing Behavior of a \"Dove State\"","authors":"V. Shekhar","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0062","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0062","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This essay investigates Indonesia's strategic thinking toward the Indo-Pacific region amid changing great-power politics and examines both the principal drivers shaping Indonesia's strategic choices and the challenges facing Indonesian diplomacy in the region.main argument The Indo-Pacific region, born out of the great powers' efforts to forge new strategic alignments and reset the balance of power in Asia, is headed for a multi-tiered polarization that provides a challenging geostrategic context for Indonesia in the coming years. The U.S. and China form the two poles shaping the global and regional balance of power. Indonesia no longer holds a positive view toward the U.S.-China relationship in the Indo-Pacific region, and this gloomy view has prompted Jakarta to craft a foreign policy that mirrors what some experts refer to as \"dove state\" behavior. As a dove state, Indonesia has sought to balance its interests while navigating the uncertainties of the great-power rivalry. However, the strength of Indonesian diplomacy is likely to depend on the country's ability to walk a middle path as well as its ability to both keep ASEAN together and position the grouping as a credible regional architecture.policy implications • Indonesia is a status-quo power and is likely to oppose any policy initiative that amplifies the risk of great-power conflict or instability in the region.• As a developing country, a populist democracy, and an emerging market, Indonesia will respond proactively and positively to overtures that advance the country's economic development.• Great-power bellicosity and a weakened ASEAN may push Indonesia to be more insular and concentrate on partnerships that support Jakarta's development agenda.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46843521","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Signals, Deterrence, and the Quad","authors":"Ketian Zhang","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0069","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0069","url":null,"abstract":"T he United States and its allies have the capability to deter China, and have successfully done so, from their worst-case scenario—a major militarized conflict. However, three factors reduce the effectiveness of their deterrence: the lack of clear signals, excessive media exposure, and divergent interests among Quad members. The Quad can be useful, but only if the United States maintains well-defined signals of commitment while clarifying the stakes. As it currently stands, the Quad does not successfully deter Chinese actions in territorial disputes. China has not shied away from using military coercion in its land border disputes with India. In June 2020, for instance, Chinese and Indian troops clashed violently along the disputed land border in the Galwan Valley, resulting in casualties on both sides.1 Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi told India to “stop transgressions into China-controlled territories” and to “refrain from actions changing the status quo along the border,” representing a clear indication of coercive intent.2 Moreover, although China prefers to utilize nonmilitary—or so-called gray-zone—coercion in maritime disputes in the South and East China Seas, such coercive measures can themselves be destabilizing.3 This essay assesses factors influencing the likelihood of successful deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region by using China’s land and maritime territorial disputes as examples. It addresses two questions: what signals of resolve are necessary for effective deterrence, and does the Quad enhance","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49333156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Quad as a Security Actor","authors":"Tanvi Madan","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0065","url":null,"abstract":"When the Quad briefly emerged in 2007-8 among Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, this minilateral was referred to as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. Although some member states occasionally still use that term-often casually-it has been eschewed as a formal designation. Indeed, Quad members have gone out of their way to highlight a softer purpose rather than a security framing for the coalition. They have emphasized the idea of the group as a solutions provider for regional problems, including the Covid-19 crisis and climate change, while simultaneously officials have either denied or downplayed the grouping's security dimension.1 In September 2021, for instance, a senior U.S. official emphasized that the Quad \"is not a regional security organization.\" The official further added that \"there is not a military dimension...or security dimension\" to the grouping.2However, while the Quad is not a regional security organization or alliance and does not involve formal security commitments or treaty obligations, it does have security and even some military dimensions. This element may not be evident in members' public statements, but as this essay argues, it is a key component of the Quad and the cooperation between its members.The Quad's resurrection lay in the need to respond to a security challenge-a more assertive and powerful China. This was not the only driver, but without it, the Quad was neither necessary nor possible. The member states' desire to respond to this challenge by shaping a favorable balance of power and building resilience in the region has led to several lines of effort, including in the defense and security domains. Among other elements, these interactions have involved building on a relatively low base of member-state interconnection in these sectors, particularly with India. Members' engagement in these realms has been evident in three areas: (1) security consultations and activities via the Quad, (2) sub-Quad activities, involving the deepening of ties between the Quad partners bilaterally and trilaterally, and (3) supra-Quad activities, consisting of member-state cooperation with other like-minded partners.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41498037","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Caught in the Middle? Middle Powers amid U.S.-China Competition","authors":"Hoo Tiang Boon, Sarah Teo","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0058","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0058","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This essay provides an overview of this special issue, which seeks to better understand middle-power thinking and strategies in coping with the escalating competition between the U.S. and China.main argument Competition is now the primary format of U.S.-China relations, spanning key dimensions of international politics. The pressures radiating from this structural shift have led Indo-Pacific states to calibrate their policies to this new geostrategic circumstance. This special issue focuses on the responses of a category of regional states understood as middle powers. How have regional middle powers adapted to the intensifying U.S.-China rivalry? What are the considerations and drivers that inform their coping strategies? To address these salient, policy-relevant questions, this special issue spotlights six Indo-Pacific middle powers—namely, Australia, South Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, and Pakistan—and unpacks their logic and ways of navigating the complexities of the Sino-U.S. rivalry. The insights derived in this issue contribute to broader policy thinking on the evolving choices of middle powers and are instructive for the strategic policies of other regional states in an era of great-power competition.policy implications • Amid the growing U.S.-China contest, regional middle powers perceive a narrowing strategic space for maneuverability.• This reduced strategic space does not equate to decreasing strategic autonomy, however. Regional middle powers retain considerable agency to mold their own paths and that of the broader strategic environment, including developing options to mitigate any fallout from the Sino-U.S. rivalry.• A considerable degree of this middle-power agency is animated by elite calculations of the respective domestic interests at stake.• Strategic ambiguity toward China and the U.S. remains the dominant policy preference of most middle powers probed in this issue.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46960152","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"U.S.-China \"Extreme Competition\" and the Drumbeat of War","authors":"Susan Thornton","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0074","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41444486","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Recasting U.S.-Japan Ties in a New Era of Economic Security","authors":"S. Goto","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0055","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0055","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This essay examines the evolution of U.S.-Japan economic relations from competition for global markets to cooperation in staving off the threats confronting the rules-based economic order by focusing on the challenges both countries face from China's weaponization of economic dominance.main argument Once the biggest thorn to bilateral relations, trade is no longer the obstacle between Japan and the U.S. that it once was. Instead, shared economic interests not only are bringing Tokyo and Washington together more closely but the two countries are leading the way to coordinate efforts to protect the rules-based liberal economic order and stave off economic coercion from China. But Japan and the U.S. need the support of other countries in Asia, Europe, and beyond to develop an economic security framework that protects the critical technologies of this new economic era and prevents abuse of economic influence. Tokyo's ability to reach across the Indo-Pacific and establish trust in building an economic architecture with new rules of engagement is leading to more equalized relations between Japan and the U.S. and a larger voice for Japan in regional affairs.policy implications • A baseline understanding between Japan and the U.S. regarding what constitutes economic security and what the threats are to protecting growth has been made clear. A slew of bilateral and multilateral initiatives has ensued as a result, but there is significant overlap among them. If the partnerships are to be effective, efforts should be consolidated and streamlined.• Japan's more realist approach to dealing with the China challenge, whereby values-based diplomacy does not supersede efforts to focus on common interests and shared challenges, resonates in the Indo-Pacific. If the U.S. continues to look to Japan's political and economic leadership, the prospects for engaging more successfully with Southeast Asian states will improve.• Protecting technologies and cooperation in technology innovation is vital for defense purposes as well as for economic expansion. At the same time, the global economy continues to face significant challenges from the disruptions caused by the Covid-19 pandemic and rising geopolitical risks. A focus on conventional economic concerns, including growth prospects and market access, cannot be sidelined if there is to be effective cooperation between industrialized nations and the global South.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45619596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"\"No One Can Force Vietnam to Choose Sides\": Vietnam as a Self-Reliant Middle Power","authors":"Phan Xuan Dung","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0061","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0061","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This essay examines how Vietnam is adapting to U.S.-China rivalry and argues that Vietnam's room for strategic maneuverability is diminishing as it faces growing internal and external pressure for policy adjustments.main argument In the past few years, Vietnam has been increasingly labeled as a middle power. Vietnam's emerging middle-power status coincides with a shifting strategic environment marked by China's expansionism that has nudged Vietnam toward closer U.S. relations. However, Vietnam's persistent foreign policy of self-reliance and independence, informed by the country's historical experiences and concerns over regime security, ensures that Hanoi stays nonaligned. Thus, while retaining autonomy in developing closer U.S. ties, Vietnam strikes a delicate balance between the two superpowers. Instead of relying on a single security guarantor, Vietnam has actively sought to promote rules-based principles and multilateralism in advancing its national interests, particularly vis-à-vis the South China Sea and the Mekong River. However, external and internal developments have strained Vietnam's ability to balance between the two superpowers.policy implications • While increasingly wary of China's behavior, Vietnam is unlikely to enter a formal alliance with the U.S. due to its firmly held values of self-reliance and independence.• Vietnam will continue to leverage multidirectional diplomacy to shape regional security and economic architectures in an effort to counterbalance China's influence and reduce Vietnamese dependence on China.• Vietnam should exercise more flexibility and show greater resolve in protecting its national interests. To this end, without abandoning its foreign policy of self-reliance and independence, Vietnam should explore new options to advance security cooperation with other major and middle powers with which it shares strategic interests.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41907800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}