{"title":"如何更好地理解普京治下的俄罗斯?","authors":"M. Katz","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0042","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"I n Weak Strongman: The Limits of Power in Putin’s Russia, Timothy Frye presents a strong case for how Russia’s current politics and policies cannot be fully understood as simply “a reflection either of Vladimir Putin’s worldview or Russia’s unique history and culture” (pp. vii–viii). Instead, Russia can—and should—be understood with reference to the growing social science literature on nondemocracies to see how Putin’s Russia is similar to or different from other autocratic regimes. Frye finds that Putin’s Russia is more similar to other personalist autocracies than to autocracies ruled by organizations such as the military or a ruling party. Frye is quite persuasive in making his argument, showing in successive chapters how Putin’s ability to maintain popularity, manipulate domestic elections, manage the economy, use repression, and control domestic media are all similar to what other personalist autocratic leaders have done (and continue to do) in other countries. What Frye shows so well is that Putin is not unique but can be better understood through comparison with other personalist autocrats. Indeed, the challenge for this reviewer is to try to find arguments about how to understand Putin’s Russia that the author did not consider (but might respond to in his reply to this essay). One is that while Putin’s Russia is not a military or party dictatorship, it may be more similar to a theocratic regime such as the Islamic Republic of Iran than a personalist regime. For instance, Putin’s and the Moscow patriarchy’s conflation of Russian Orthodoxy with Russian great-power nationalism is similar to the way in which first Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and then Ayatollah Ali Khamenei have conflated their interpretation of Shiism with Iran’s own great-power nationalism. In addition, the National Guard created under Putin in 2016 plays a similar role to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC) in preserving not just the regime but its ideology. It might be argued that the National Guard is far more powerful in Russia than the Moscow Patriarchy. Scholars studying Iran, however, see the IRGC as having become stronger vis-à-vis the Shiite clergy. The increasingly dominant role the IRGC is playing in","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"193 - 196"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3000,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"How Can Putin's Russia Be Best Understood?\",\"authors\":\"M. Katz\",\"doi\":\"10.1353/asp.2022.0042\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"I n Weak Strongman: The Limits of Power in Putin’s Russia, Timothy Frye presents a strong case for how Russia’s current politics and policies cannot be fully understood as simply “a reflection either of Vladimir Putin’s worldview or Russia’s unique history and culture” (pp. vii–viii). Instead, Russia can—and should—be understood with reference to the growing social science literature on nondemocracies to see how Putin’s Russia is similar to or different from other autocratic regimes. Frye finds that Putin’s Russia is more similar to other personalist autocracies than to autocracies ruled by organizations such as the military or a ruling party. Frye is quite persuasive in making his argument, showing in successive chapters how Putin’s ability to maintain popularity, manipulate domestic elections, manage the economy, use repression, and control domestic media are all similar to what other personalist autocratic leaders have done (and continue to do) in other countries. What Frye shows so well is that Putin is not unique but can be better understood through comparison with other personalist autocrats. Indeed, the challenge for this reviewer is to try to find arguments about how to understand Putin’s Russia that the author did not consider (but might respond to in his reply to this essay). One is that while Putin’s Russia is not a military or party dictatorship, it may be more similar to a theocratic regime such as the Islamic Republic of Iran than a personalist regime. For instance, Putin’s and the Moscow patriarchy’s conflation of Russian Orthodoxy with Russian great-power nationalism is similar to the way in which first Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and then Ayatollah Ali Khamenei have conflated their interpretation of Shiism with Iran’s own great-power nationalism. In addition, the National Guard created under Putin in 2016 plays a similar role to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC) in preserving not just the regime but its ideology. It might be argued that the National Guard is far more powerful in Russia than the Moscow Patriarchy. Scholars studying Iran, however, see the IRGC as having become stronger vis-à-vis the Shiite clergy. 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I n Weak Strongman: The Limits of Power in Putin’s Russia, Timothy Frye presents a strong case for how Russia’s current politics and policies cannot be fully understood as simply “a reflection either of Vladimir Putin’s worldview or Russia’s unique history and culture” (pp. vii–viii). Instead, Russia can—and should—be understood with reference to the growing social science literature on nondemocracies to see how Putin’s Russia is similar to or different from other autocratic regimes. Frye finds that Putin’s Russia is more similar to other personalist autocracies than to autocracies ruled by organizations such as the military or a ruling party. Frye is quite persuasive in making his argument, showing in successive chapters how Putin’s ability to maintain popularity, manipulate domestic elections, manage the economy, use repression, and control domestic media are all similar to what other personalist autocratic leaders have done (and continue to do) in other countries. What Frye shows so well is that Putin is not unique but can be better understood through comparison with other personalist autocrats. Indeed, the challenge for this reviewer is to try to find arguments about how to understand Putin’s Russia that the author did not consider (but might respond to in his reply to this essay). One is that while Putin’s Russia is not a military or party dictatorship, it may be more similar to a theocratic regime such as the Islamic Republic of Iran than a personalist regime. For instance, Putin’s and the Moscow patriarchy’s conflation of Russian Orthodoxy with Russian great-power nationalism is similar to the way in which first Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and then Ayatollah Ali Khamenei have conflated their interpretation of Shiism with Iran’s own great-power nationalism. In addition, the National Guard created under Putin in 2016 plays a similar role to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC) in preserving not just the regime but its ideology. It might be argued that the National Guard is far more powerful in Russia than the Moscow Patriarchy. Scholars studying Iran, however, see the IRGC as having become stronger vis-à-vis the Shiite clergy. The increasingly dominant role the IRGC is playing in
期刊介绍:
Asia Policy is a peer-reviewed scholarly journal presenting policy-relevant academic research on the Asia-Pacific that draws clear and concise conclusions useful to today’s policymakers.