Minilaterals and Deterrence: A Critical New Nexus

IF 1.3
Asia Policy Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI:10.1353/asp.2022.0068
Arzan Tarapore, Brendan Taylor
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

As countries around the Indo-Pacific strive to manage the challenges of China’s growing power and assertiveness, they have emphasized two concepts. First, they have increasingly embraced “minilateral” groupings—small, issue-based, informal, and uninstitutionalized partnerships—as a way of coordinating international policy action. This trend has been building gradually for over two decades, ever since the emergence of mechanisms such as the U.S.-Japan-Korea Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group in the late 1990s and the U.S.Australia-Japan Trilateral Strategic Dialogue during the early 2000s. But these groupings sharply expanded in number and ambition in the 2010s. The standard-bearer of the minilateral model is the Quad—comprising Australia, India, Japan, and the United States—which was resuscitated in 2017 and now involves regular summit-level meetings. The boldest minilateral is AUKUS, announced in 2021, which brings together alreadyclose allies Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to further deepen defense technology cooperation, including the provision of nuclear-powered submarines to Australia. Second, the United States and its allies, such as Australia and Japan, have renewed their commitment to deterrence to maintain regional stability. Rather than relying on institutions to deepen regional integration, which was their preferred option after the end of the Cold War, they are designing defense policies to dissuade potential adversaries, especially China, from revisionist behavior. For example, “integrated deterrence” has been highlighted as the centerpiece of the Biden administration’s emerging
多边关系与威慑:关键的新关系
当印太地区的国家努力应对中国日益强大的实力和自信带来的挑战时,他们强调了两个概念。首先,他们越来越多地接受“小型”团体——以问题为基础的小型、非正式和非制度化的伙伴关系——作为协调国际政策行动的一种方式。自20世纪90年代末美日韩三方协调和监督小组和21世纪初美澳-贾潘三方战略对话等机制出现以来,这一趋势已经逐渐形成了20多年。但在2010年代,这些组织的数量和雄心急剧扩大。小型横向模式的旗手是由澳大利亚、印度、日本和美国组成的四方会谈,该会谈于2017年恢复,现在定期举行峰会。最大胆的小型潜艇是2021年宣布的AUKUS,它汇集了已经成熟的盟友澳大利亚、英国和美国,进一步深化国防技术合作,包括向澳大利亚提供核动力潜艇。其次,美国及其盟友,如澳大利亚和日本,重新承诺威慑,以维护地区稳定。他们没有依赖机构来深化区域一体化(这是冷战结束后他们的首选),而是在设计国防政策,劝阻潜在对手,尤其是中国,不要采取修正主义行为。例如,“综合威慑”已被强调为拜登政府新兴战略的核心
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来源期刊
Asia Policy
Asia Policy Arts and Humanities-History
CiteScore
0.80
自引率
0.00%
发文量
55
期刊介绍: Asia Policy is a peer-reviewed scholarly journal presenting policy-relevant academic research on the Asia-Pacific that draws clear and concise conclusions useful to today’s policymakers.
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