发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

Journal of Moral Philosophy最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
The Dark Knowledge Problem: Why Public Justifications are Not Arguments 黑暗知识问题:为什么公开辩护不是论点
2区 哲学
Journal of Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-10-19 DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20234164
Sean Donahue
{"title":"The Dark Knowledge Problem: Why Public Justifications are Not Arguments","authors":"Sean Donahue","doi":"10.1163/17455243-20234164","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20234164","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract According to the Public Justification Principle, legitimate laws must be justifiable to all reasonable citizens. Proponents of this principle assume that its satisfaction requires speakers to offer justifications that are representable as arguments that feature premises which reasonable listeners would accept. I develop the concept of dark knowledge to show that this assumption is false. Laws are often justified on the basis of premises that many reasonable listeners know, even though they would reject these premises on the basis of the further considerations that speakers implicitly rely on for their support. Accommodating the fact of dark knowledge requires us to consider the civic virtue of speakers to be more important for public justification than the acceptability of their arguments to reasonable citizens. I sketch an alternative conception of public justification that incorporates these results and argue that it provides a rationale for ignoring the otherwise sound contributions of some participants in political deliberation.","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":"182 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135781334","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Paternalism Is Not Less Wrong in Intimate Relationships 家长作风在亲密关系中也同样错误
2区 哲学
Journal of Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-10-13 DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20234154
Andreas Bengtson, Søren Flinch Midtgaard
{"title":"Paternalism Is Not Less Wrong in Intimate Relationships","authors":"Andreas Bengtson, Søren Flinch Midtgaard","doi":"10.1163/17455243-20234154","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20234154","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Many believe that paternalism is less wrong in intimate relationships. In this paper, we argue that this view cannot be justified by appeal to (i) beneficence, (ii) shared projects, (iii) vulnerability, (iv) epistemic access, (v) expressivism, or (vi) autonomy as nonalienation. We finally provide an error theory for why many may have believed that paternalism is less wrong in intimate relations.","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135923779","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Big Data and Compounding Injustice 大数据和复杂的不公正
2区 哲学
Journal of Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-09-20 DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20234373
Deborah Hellman
{"title":"Big Data and Compounding Injustice","authors":"Deborah Hellman","doi":"10.1163/17455243-20234373","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20234373","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article argues that the fact that an action will compound a prior injustice counts as a reason against doing the action. I call this reason The Anti-Compounding Injustice principle or aci . Compounding injustice and the aci principle are likely to be relevant when analyzing the moral issues raised by “big data” and its combination with the computational power of machine learning and artificial intelligence. Past injustice can infect the data used in algorithmic decisions in two distinct ways. Sometimes prior injustice undermines the accuracy of the data itself. In these contexts, improving accuracy will also help to avoid compounding injustice. Other times, past injustice produces real-world differences among people with regard to skills, health, wealth, and other traits that employers, lenders, and others seek to measure. When decisions are based on accurate data that itself results from prior injustice, these decisions can also compound injustice. This second dynamic has received less attention than the first but is especially important because improving the accuracy of data will not mitigate this unfairness.","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136263997","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 12
The Right Kind of Reason for the Wrong Kind of Thing 用正确的理由做错误的事情
2区 哲学
Journal of Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-09-20 DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20233685
Laura Tomlinson Makin
{"title":"The Right Kind of Reason for the Wrong Kind of Thing","authors":"Laura Tomlinson Makin","doi":"10.1163/17455243-20233685","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20233685","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper offers a novel solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason problem that afflicts Fitting-Attitude analyses of value. I argue that we can distinguish reasons of the right kind from reasons of the wrong kind by being clear about what our reasons are for . In Wrong Kind of Reason cases, our reason to have a certain affective attitude is a reason for an action , and it is this category-mistake that is the source of the problem.","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136373516","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Myth of Zero-Sum Responsibility: Towards Scaffolded Responsibility for Health 零和责任的神话:对健康的脚手架责任
2区 哲学
Journal of Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-09-07 DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20233725
Neil Levy, Julian Savulescu
{"title":"The Myth of Zero-Sum Responsibility: Towards Scaffolded Responsibility for Health","authors":"Neil Levy, Julian Savulescu","doi":"10.1163/17455243-20233725","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20233725","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Some people argue that the distribution of medical resources should be sensitive to agents’ responsibility for their ill-health. In contrast, others point to the social determinants of health to argue that the collective agents that control the conditions in which agents act should bear responsibility. To a large degree, this is a debate in which those who hold individuals responsible currently have the upper hand: warranted appeals to individual responsibility effectively block allocation of any significant degree of responsibility to collective agents. We suggest that a different understanding of individual responsibility might lead to a fairer allocation of blame. Scaffolded agency is individual agency exercised in a context in which opportunities and affordances are structured by others. Appeals to scaffolded agency at once recognize the role of the individual and of the collective agents who have put the scaffolds in place.","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":"80 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135047866","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
What is “Race” in Algorithmic Discrimination on the Basis of Race? 基于种族的算法歧视中的“种族”是什么?
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Journal of Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-09-05 DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20234369
Lily Hu
{"title":"What is “Race” in Algorithmic Discrimination on the Basis of Race?","authors":"Lily Hu","doi":"10.1163/17455243-20234369","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20234369","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Machine learning algorithms bring out an under-appreciated puzzle of discrimination, namely figuring out when a decision made on the basis of a factor correlated with race is a decision made on the basis of race. I argue that prevailing approaches, which are based on identifying and then distinguishing among causal effects of race, in their metaphysical timidity, fail to get off the ground. I suggest, instead, that adopting a constructivist theory of race answers this puzzle in a principled manner. On what I call a “thick constructivist” account of race, to be raced is to be socially positioned in the way indicated by a certain set of statistical regularities on the basis of particular phenotypical traits. A thick constructivist sees that acting on the basis of correlations that constitute race qua social position just is acting on the basis of race, because races just are social positions that subject their member individuals to a particular matrix of social relations that define the raced position. This conclusion has considerable ramifications for our understanding of discrimination, algorithms and beyond.","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45017271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 11
Absolutism and its Limits 绝对主义及其局限
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Journal of Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-09-05 DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20233831
John Hawthorne, Yoaav Isaacs, Clayton Littlejohn
{"title":"Absolutism and its Limits","authors":"John Hawthorne, Yoaav Isaacs, Clayton Littlejohn","doi":"10.1163/17455243-20233831","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20233831","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Many philosophers think that given the choice between saving the life of an innocent person and averting any number of minor ailments or inconveniences, it would be better to save the life. How, then, should one compare the risk of an innocent person’s life to such minor ailments and inconveniences? If lives are infinitely more important than insignificant factors then any risk cannot be outweighed, and that is untenable. An alternative approach seems more promising: let the values of such insignificant factors be bounded, as then there will be well-behaved tradeoffs between insignificant things and the risk to an innocent life. We argue, however, that bounding the values of insignificant factors poses myriad problems.","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41928303","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Privacy and the Standing to Hold Responsible 隐私和责任立场
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Journal of Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-08-11 DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20234038
Linda Radzik
{"title":"Privacy and the Standing to Hold Responsible","authors":"Linda Radzik","doi":"10.1163/17455243-20234038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20234038","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000In order to be held responsible, it is not enough that you have done something blameworthy; someone else must also have the standing to hold you responsible. But a number of critics have claimed that this concept of ‘standing’ does not hold up to scrutiny and that we should excise it from our analyses of accountability practices. In this paper, I examine James Edwards’ (2019) attempt to define standing. I pose objections to some key features of Edwards’ account and defend an alternative. Reflecting on examples of meddling blame and privacy norms, I argue, helps us see that the concept of standing is useful after all.","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":"86 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41243754","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Can We Turn People Into Pain Pumps? On the Rationality of Future Bias and Strong Risk Aversion 我们能把人变成止痛药吗？论未来偏好与强风险规避的合理性
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Journal of Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-08-03 DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20234084
D. Braddon-Mitchell, A. Latham, Kristie Miller
{"title":"Can We Turn People Into Pain Pumps? On the Rationality of Future Bias and Strong Risk Aversion","authors":"D. Braddon-Mitchell, A. Latham, Kristie Miller","doi":"10.1163/17455243-20234084","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20234084","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Future-bias is the preference, all else being equal, for negatively valenced events to be located in the past rather than the future, and positively valenced ones to be located in the future rather than the past. Strong risk aversion is the preference to pay some cost to mitigate the badness of the worst outcome. People who are both strongly risk averse and future-biased can face a series of choices that will guarantee them more pain, for no compensating benefit: they will be pain pumped. Thus, combining these preferences is rationally impermissible. Dougherty (2011) argues that this gives us reason to think that future-bias is rationally impermissible. This argument, and a similar one presented by Greene and Sullivan (2015), relies on the idea that if several preferences are not rationally combinable, then in the absence of some explanation of why they are not combinable, we should conclude that (at least) one of them is rationally impermissible. We take up this question by, inter alia, reflecting on the empirical results of a study we ran that probes people’s risk averse and future-biased preferences. We argue that the data, in conjunction with other considerations, suggests that we should not infer from the irrationality of the combination of these preferences to the irrationality of one of the preferences singly. We also argue that given the descriptive data about these preferences, there is no reason to think that, if one of them is rationally impermissible, then it is future-bias. Finally, we reflect on the general issue of whether individual preferences are rationally evaluable.","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46787813","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
To Do, To Die, To Reason Why: Individual Ethics in War, written by Victor Tadros 做、死、推理：战争中的个人伦理
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Journal of Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-07-24 DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20030015
Jeremy Williams
{"title":"To Do, To Die, To Reason Why: Individual Ethics in War, written by Victor Tadros","authors":"Jeremy Williams","doi":"10.1163/17455243-20030015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20030015","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43146337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
首页 上一页 下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信