Paternalism Is Not Less Wrong in Intimate Relationships

IF 1.1 2区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-10-13 DOI:10.1163/17455243-20234154

Andreas Bengtson, Søren Flinch Midtgaard

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract Many believe that paternalism is less wrong in intimate relationships. In this paper, we argue that this view cannot be justified by appeal to (i) beneficence, (ii) shared projects, (iii) vulnerability, (iv) epistemic access, (v) expressivism, or (vi) autonomy as nonalienation. We finally provide an error theory for why many may have believed that paternalism is less wrong in intimate relations.

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家长作风在亲密关系中也同样错误

许多人认为，在亲密关系中，家长式作风的错误较少。在本文中，我们认为，这种观点不能通过呼吁(i)慈善，(ii)共享项目，(iii)脆弱性，(iv)知识获取，(v)表现主义，或(vi)自治作为非异化来证明。我们最终提供了一个错误理论，解释为什么许多人可能认为家长制在亲密关系中错误较少。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of Moral Philosophy Multiple-

CiteScore

1.10

自引率

11.10%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Moral Philosophy is a peer-reviewed journal of moral, political and legal philosophy with an international focus. It publishes articles in all areas of normative philosophy, including pure and applied ethics, as well as moral, legal, and political theory. Articles exploring non-Western traditions are also welcome. The Journal seeks to promote lively discussions and debates for established academics and the wider community, by publishing articles that avoid unnecessary jargon without sacrificing academic rigour. It encourages contributions from newer members of the philosophical community. The Journal of Moral Philosophy is published four times a year, in January, April, July and October.