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Journal of Moral Philosophy最新文献

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Threatening Quality of Will 威胁意志品质
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Journal of Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-12-20 DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20234092
David Shoemaker
{"title":"Threatening Quality of Will","authors":"David Shoemaker","doi":"10.1163/17455243-20234092","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20234092","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Quality of Will (qw) theories of responsibility claim the target of someone’s blameworthiness for an action is their poor quality of will. There have been many “threats” to such a theory over the years, coming out of a literature interested in the metaphysical conditions of free will, threats having to do with moral luck, manipulation, and negligence. In this paper, I am more interested in surveying and thwarting two “new school” threats to qw theories, including taking responsibility for inadvertence, and holding reasonable but ostensibly wrongful beliefs. Both of these aim to ground blameworthiness independently of quality of will. I show that none of these new school threats to qw theories succeed.","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":"93 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138954312","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Moral Duty Not to Confirm Negative Stereotypes 不证实负面成见的道德责任
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Journal of Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-12-20 DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20234065
Saul Smilansky
{"title":"The Moral Duty Not to Confirm Negative Stereotypes","authors":"Saul Smilansky","doi":"10.1163/17455243-20234065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20234065","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Social interaction is laden with stereotypes. Throughout history negative stereotypes have been immensely harmful, leading to hatred, vilification, and direct harm such as discrimination, and they continue to be so in almost all societies. It is widely accepted that we ought not to view members of other groups negatively in stereotypical ways, and also ought not to apply negative stereotypes to members of our own group (or even to ourselves). However, is there any special moral obligation on the targets of such negative stereotypes to take care not to confirm them? May one even be blameworthy for not doing so? The very thought seems outrageous. Yet I will argue that it is plausible to think that, in fact, the victims, too, have pro tanto obligations to prevent stereotype confirmation (henceforth sc), in many central contexts. I am not aware of any sustained philosophical discussion making this claim.","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":"76 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138954462","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Robust Normativity and the Argument from Weirdness 稳健规范性与怪异性论证
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Journal of Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-12-20 DOI: 10.1163/17455243-21010014
Victor Moberger
{"title":"Robust Normativity and the Argument from Weirdness","authors":"Victor Moberger","doi":"10.1163/17455243-21010014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-21010014","url":null,"abstract":"J. L. Mackie argued that moral thought and discourse involve commitment to an especially robust kind of normativity, which is too weird to exist. Thus, he concluded that moral thought and discourse involve systematic error. Much has been said about this argument in the last four decades or so. Nevertheless, at least one version of Mackie’s argument, specifically the one focusing on the intrinsic weirdness of the relevant kind of normativity, has not been fully unpacked. Thus, more needs to be said about the issue of how to interpret Mackie’s argument. Moreover, I argue that by looking closely at Mackie’s discussion, we can extract two distinct versions of the argument which together present a tougher, and also more precise, challenge for moral realism than extant versions. In this paper I thus revisit Mackie’s discussion with an eye to making progress on an important issue in contemporary metaethics.","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":"279 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139170178","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Bargaining-Theoretic Approach to Moral Uncertainty 道德不确定性的讨价还价理论方法
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Journal of Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-12-18 DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20233810
H. Greaves, Owen Cotton-Barratt
{"title":"A Bargaining-Theoretic Approach to Moral Uncertainty","authors":"H. Greaves, Owen Cotton-Barratt","doi":"10.1163/17455243-20233810","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20233810","url":null,"abstract":"Nick Bostrom and others have suggested treating decision-making under moral uncertainty as analogous to parliamentary decision-making. The core suggestion of this “parliamentary approach” is that the competing moral theories function like delegates to the parliament, and that these delegates then make decisions by some combination of bargaining and voting. There seems some reason to hope that such an approach might avoid standard objections to existing approaches (for example, the “maximise expected choiceworthiness” (MEC) and “my favourite theory” approaches). However, the parliamentary approach is so far extremely underspecified, making it largely indeterminate how such a model will in fact behave in the respects that those concerned with moral uncertainty care about. This paper explores one way of making it precise. We treat predicaments of moral uncertainty as analogous to bargaining situations alone (setting aside voting), and apply a version of the Nash solution that is standard in bargaining theory. The resulting model does indeed perform in many of the hoped-for ways. However, so also does a version of MEC that employs a structural approach to intertheoretic comparisons. It seems to us an open question which, regarding this version of MEC and the bargaining-theoretic approach, is superior to the other. We identify the key points on which the two differ.","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":"191 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139173303","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Are Algorithms Value-Free? 算法没有价值吗？
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Journal of Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-11-22 DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20234372
Gabbrielle M. Johnson
{"title":"Are Algorithms Value-Free?","authors":"Gabbrielle M. Johnson","doi":"10.1163/17455243-20234372","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20234372","url":null,"abstract":"As inductive decision-making procedures, the inferences made by machine learning programs are subject to underdetermination by evidence and bear inductive risk. One strategy for overcoming these challenges is guided by a presumption in philosophy of science that inductive inferences can and should be value-free. Applied to machine learning programs, the strategy assumes that the influence of values is restricted to data and decision outcomes, thereby omitting internal value-laden design choice points. In this paper, I apply arguments from feminist philosophy of science to machine learning programs to make the case that the resources required to respond to these inductive challenges render critical aspects of their design constitutively value-laden. I demonstrate these points specifically in the case of recidivism algorithms, arguing that contemporary debates concerning fairness in criminal justice risk-assessment programs are best understood as iterations of traditional arguments from inductive risk and demarcation, and thereby establish the value-laden nature of automated decision-making programs. Finally, in light of these points, I address opportunities for relocating the value-free ideal in machine learning and the limitations that accompany them.","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":"139 2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139247772","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Moral Twin Earth Strikes Back: Against a Neo-Aristotelian Hope 道德双胞胎地球反击:反对新亚里士多德的希望
2区 哲学
Journal of Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-10-30 DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20234137
Michael Rubin
{"title":"Moral Twin Earth Strikes Back: Against a Neo-Aristotelian Hope","authors":"Michael Rubin","doi":"10.1163/17455243-20234137","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20234137","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A key objection to naturalistic versions of moral realism is that the (meta)semantics to which they are committed yields incorrect semantic verdicts about so-called Moral Twin Earth cases. Recently, it has been proposed that the Moral Twin Earth challenge can be answered by adopting a neo-Aristotelian semantics for moral expressions. In this paper, I argue that this proposal fails. First, however attractive the central claims of neo-Aristotelianism are, they do not for us have the status of analytic constraints on the use of ethical expressions, as they must if they are to block Moral Twin Earth counterexamples. Second, even when the neo-Aristotelian’s claims are taken as non-negotiable analytic constraints, the semantics faces a dilemma: if characteristic human functioning is understood in an ethically neutral way, the semantics yields an incorrect intension for ‘good human.’ If human functioning is understood in an ethically partisan way, the semantics fails to avoid problematic Moral Twin Earth counterexamples.","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136105753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Beyond Virtue: The Politics of Educating Emotions, written by Liz Jackson 超越美德:教育情感的政治，莉兹·杰克逊著
2区 哲学
Journal of Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-10-24 DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20050005
Mousumi Mukherjee
{"title":"Beyond Virtue: The Politics of Educating Emotions, written by Liz Jackson","authors":"Mousumi Mukherjee","doi":"10.1163/17455243-20050005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20050005","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":"138 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135322319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Sexual Ethics in a Secular Age: Is There Still a Virtue of Chastity?, written by Eric Silverman 世俗时代的性伦理:是否还有贞操的美德?，埃里克·西尔弗曼(Eric Silverman)撰写
2区 哲学
Journal of Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-10-24 DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20050008
Matthew Baddorf
{"title":"Sexual Ethics in a Secular Age: Is There Still a Virtue of Chastity?, written by Eric Silverman","authors":"Matthew Baddorf","doi":"10.1163/17455243-20050008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20050008","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":"EM-13 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135322320","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Is It Fitting to Divide Value? A Review of The Value Gap 分割价值合适吗?价值差距的回顾
2区 哲学
Journal of Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-10-24 DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20050001
Timothy Perrine
{"title":"Is It Fitting to Divide Value? A Review of The Value Gap","authors":"Timothy Perrine","doi":"10.1163/17455243-20050001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20050001","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Rønnow-Rasmussen’s The Value Gap is an extended argument for Value Dualism, the view that both goodness and goodness for are coherent value concepts that are not fully understandable in terms of each other. In the first part of the book, he criticizes attempts to fully understand one type of value in terms of the other. In the second part of the book, he argues that both concepts are value concepts by appealing to a “Fitting Attitude” analysis of value concepts. This book review exposits Rønnow-Rasmussen’s argument for Dualism, and his proposed analysis of both goodness and goodness for . More critically, it briefly defends a strategy for understanding goodness for in terms of goodness and criticizes Rønnow-Rasmussen’s proposed analysis of goodness for .","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135321798","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Shape of Agency: Control, Action, Skill, Knowledge, written by Joshua Shepherd 《代理的形态:控制、行动、技能和知识》，作者:约书亚·谢泼德
2区 哲学
Journal of Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-10-24 DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20050003
Zack Bliss
{"title":"The Shape of Agency: Control, Action, Skill, Knowledge, written by Joshua Shepherd","authors":"Zack Bliss","doi":"10.1163/17455243-20050003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20050003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":"46 5","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135321804","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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