分割价值合适吗?价值差距的回顾

IF 1.1 2区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-10-24 DOI:10.1163/17455243-20050001

Timothy Perrine

{"title":"分割价值合适吗?价值差距的回顾","authors":"Timothy Perrine","doi":"10.1163/17455243-20050001","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Rønnow-Rasmussen’s The Value Gap is an extended argument for Value Dualism, the view that both goodness and goodness for are coherent value concepts that are not fully understandable in terms of each other. In the first part of the book, he criticizes attempts to fully understand one type of value in terms of the other. In the second part of the book, he argues that both concepts are value concepts by appealing to a “Fitting Attitude” analysis of value concepts. This book review exposits Rønnow-Rasmussen’s argument for Dualism, and his proposed analysis of both goodness and goodness for . More critically, it briefly defends a strategy for understanding goodness for in terms of goodness and criticizes Rønnow-Rasmussen’s proposed analysis of goodness for .","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Is It Fitting to Divide Value? A Review of The Value Gap\",\"authors\":\"Timothy Perrine\",\"doi\":\"10.1163/17455243-20050001\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract Rønnow-Rasmussen’s The Value Gap is an extended argument for Value Dualism, the view that both goodness and goodness for are coherent value concepts that are not fully understandable in terms of each other. In the first part of the book, he criticizes attempts to fully understand one type of value in terms of the other. In the second part of the book, he argues that both concepts are value concepts by appealing to a “Fitting Attitude” analysis of value concepts. This book review exposits Rønnow-Rasmussen’s argument for Dualism, and his proposed analysis of both goodness and goodness for . More critically, it briefly defends a strategy for understanding goodness for in terms of goodness and criticizes Rønnow-Rasmussen’s proposed analysis of goodness for .\",\"PeriodicalId\":51879,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Moral Philosophy\",\"volume\":\"44 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-10-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Moral Philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20050001\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ETHICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20050001","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ETHICS","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

摘要

Rønnow-Rasmussen的“价值鸿沟”是价值二元论的延伸，认为“善”和“为”都是连贯的价值概念，彼此之间不能完全理解。在书的第一部分，他批评了试图完全理解一种价值类型的另一种。在书的第二部分，他通过对价值概念的“拟合态度”分析，认为这两个概念都是价值概念。这篇书评阐述了Rønnow-Rasmussen对二元论的论证，以及他提出的对善与善的分析。更重要的是，它简要地捍卫了一种从善的角度理解善的策略，并批评了Rønnow-Rasmussen对善的分析。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

Is It Fitting to Divide Value? A Review of The Value Gap

Abstract Rønnow-Rasmussen’s The Value Gap is an extended argument for Value Dualism, the view that both goodness and goodness for are coherent value concepts that are not fully understandable in terms of each other. In the first part of the book, he criticizes attempts to fully understand one type of value in terms of the other. In the second part of the book, he argues that both concepts are value concepts by appealing to a “Fitting Attitude” analysis of value concepts. This book review exposits Rønnow-Rasmussen’s argument for Dualism, and his proposed analysis of both goodness and goodness for . More critically, it briefly defends a strategy for understanding goodness for in terms of goodness and criticizes Rønnow-Rasmussen’s proposed analysis of goodness for .

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

Journal of Moral Philosophy Multiple-

CiteScore

1.10

自引率

11.10%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Moral Philosophy is a peer-reviewed journal of moral, political and legal philosophy with an international focus. It publishes articles in all areas of normative philosophy, including pure and applied ethics, as well as moral, legal, and political theory. Articles exploring non-Western traditions are also welcome. The Journal seeks to promote lively discussions and debates for established academics and the wider community, by publishing articles that avoid unnecessary jargon without sacrificing academic rigour. It encourages contributions from newer members of the philosophical community. The Journal of Moral Philosophy is published four times a year, in January, April, July and October.