The Right Kind of Reason for the Wrong Kind of Thing

IF 1.1 2区哲学 Q3 ETHICS

Journal of Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-09-20 DOI:10.1163/17455243-20233685

Laura Tomlinson Makin

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract This paper offers a novel solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason problem that afflicts Fitting-Attitude analyses of value. I argue that we can distinguish reasons of the right kind from reasons of the wrong kind by being clear about what our reasons are for . In Wrong Kind of Reason cases, our reason to have a certain affective attitude is a reason for an action , and it is this category-mistake that is the source of the problem.

查看原文本刊更多论文

用正确的理由做错误的事情

摘要本文针对困扰价值分析的“错误理性”问题，提出了一种新颖的解决方法。我认为，我们可以区分正确的原因和错误的原因，只要我们清楚我们的原因是什么。在“错误的理性”案例中，我们拥有某种情感态度的理由是采取某种行动的理由，而这一范畴错误正是问题的根源。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

求助全文

约1分钟内获得全文求助全文

来源期刊

Journal of Moral Philosophy Multiple-

CiteScore

1.10

自引率

11.10%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Moral Philosophy is a peer-reviewed journal of moral, political and legal philosophy with an international focus. It publishes articles in all areas of normative philosophy, including pure and applied ethics, as well as moral, legal, and political theory. Articles exploring non-Western traditions are also welcome. The Journal seeks to promote lively discussions and debates for established academics and the wider community, by publishing articles that avoid unnecessary jargon without sacrificing academic rigour. It encourages contributions from newer members of the philosophical community. The Journal of Moral Philosophy is published four times a year, in January, April, July and October.