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Note on compromise axiom 关于妥协公理的说明
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2024-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.06.003
Aleksandar Hatzivelkos
{"title":"Note on compromise axiom","authors":"Aleksandar Hatzivelkos","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.06.003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.06.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The concept of compromise has been present in the theory of social choice from the very beginning. The result of social choice functions as such is often called a social compromise. In the last two decades, several functions of social choice dedicated to the concept of compromise, such as Fallback bargaining, Majoritarian compromise, Median voting rule or <span><math><mi>p</mi></math></span>-measure of compromise rules, have been considered in the literature. Furthermore, compromise axioms were formed in several attempts. However, we believe that the previous formalizations of compromise did not axiomatically describe this feature of the social choice functions. In this paper we will follow the line of thought presented by Chatterji, Sen and Zeng (2016) and form a weak and strong version of a Compromise axiom, one that should capture understanding of compromise based on an ability to elect a winner which is not top-ranked in any preference on a profile. After that we will analyze an interaction of those axioms and established social choice functions. We will show that the division of SCFs in three classes with respect to these axioms fairly reflect relationship between those SCFs and colloquial expectations from notion of compromise. We then compare the defined axioms with the compromise axioms of Börgers and Cailloux. Finally, for SCFs that satisfy the strong compromise axiom, we define a compromise intensity function that numerically expresses the degree of tolerance of the SCF for choosing a compromise candidate.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"130 ","pages":"Pages 38-47"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141484071","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Extensions of partial priorities and stability in school choice 部分优先和择校稳定性的扩展
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2024-06-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.06.002
Minoru Kitahara , Yasunori Okumura
{"title":"Extensions of partial priorities and stability in school choice","authors":"Minoru Kitahara ,&nbsp;Yasunori Okumura","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.06.002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.06.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We consider a school choice matching model where priorities for schools are represented by binary relations that may not be linear orders. Even in that case, it is necessary to construct linear orders from the original priority relations to execute several mechanisms. We focus on the (linear order) extensions of the priority relations, because a matching that is stable for an extension profile is also stable for the profile of priority relations. We show that if the priority relations are partial orders, then for each stable matching for the original profile of priority relations, an extension profile for which it is also stable exists. Furthermore, if there are multiple stable matchings that are ranked by Pareto dominance, then there is an extension for which all these matchings are stable. We apply the result to a version of efficiency adjusted deferred acceptance mechanisms.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"131 ","pages":"Pages 1-4"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141485922","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Designing information to improve welfare in matching markets 设计信息，提高匹配市场的福利
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2024-06-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.06.001
Sulagna Dasgupta
{"title":"Designing information to improve welfare in matching markets","authors":"Sulagna Dasgupta","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.06.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.06.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In matching markets, objects are allocated to agents without monetary transfers, based on agents’ preferences. However, agents may not have enough information to determine their preferences over the objects precisely. How should a benevolent planner optimally reveal information to maximize social welfare in this context? I show that when agents are symmetric and there are just two options, letting each agent know his <em>rank</em> in the realized distribution of preferences – but not his actual preferences – <em>always</em> improves social welfare over providing no information. When there are more objects, this rank-based information policy generalizes to the Object Recommendation (OR) Signal, which consists of simply recommending each agent to pick his socially-optimal choice. Under a mild regularity condition, I show that, when agents’ a priori relative preferences over the objects are “not too strong”, the OR Signal, used together with any standard ordinal mechanism, not only maximizes welfare, but achieves the unconstrained social optimum — formalizing the intuition that when people do not have strong opinions over several options, it is easy to sway them.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"131 ","pages":"Pages 5-16"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141398833","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal taxation of nonrenewable resources during clean energy transition: A general equilibrium approach 清洁能源转型期间不可再生资源的最优税收：一般均衡方法
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2024-05-14 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.05.002
N. Baris Vardar
{"title":"Optimal taxation of nonrenewable resources during clean energy transition: A general equilibrium approach","authors":"N. Baris Vardar","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.05.002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.05.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this paper we study clean energy transition in a modified version of the Ramsey growth model by including nonrenewable and renewable resources as well as pollution externalities. The main difference from previous works is that we consider imperfect substitution between nonrenewable and renewable resources. We characterize the social optimum and show that the economy converges to a clean state in the long run. We then study the decentralized equilibrium and show that the economy converges to the same state even without regulation, but with higher environmental damage. Further, we investigate the properties of the taxation trajectory that drives the laissez-faire economy to follow the optimal path and show that it can be either increasing or decreasing over time. We identify different channels that influence the path of optimal taxation and show that it depends, among other things, on the level of capital, the cost of renewable energy and the degree of substitution between renewable and nonrenewable resources.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"130 ","pages":"Pages 10-23"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141067397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A solution for abstract decision problems based on maximum flow value 基于最大流量值的抽象决策问题解决方案
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2024-05-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.05.003
Michele Gori
{"title":"A solution for abstract decision problems based on maximum flow value","authors":"Michele Gori","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.05.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.05.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>An abstract decision problem is an ordered pair where the first component is a nonempty and finite set of alternatives from which a society has to make a choice and the second component is an irreflexive relation on that set representing a dominance relation. A crucial problem is to find a reasonable solution that allows to select, for any given abstract decision problem, some of the alternatives. A variety of solutions have been proposed over the years. In this paper we propose a new solution, called maximum flow value set, that naturally stems from the work by Bubboloni and Gori (The flow network method, Social Choice and Welfare 51, pp. 621–656, 2018) and that is based on the concept of maximum flow value in a digraph. We analyze its properties and its relation with other solutions such as the core, the admissible set, the uncovered set, the Copeland set and the generalized stable set. We also show that the maximum flow value set allows to define a new Condorcet social choice correspondence strictly related to the Copeland social choice correspondence and fulfilling lots of desirable properties.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"130 ","pages":"Pages 24-37"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489624000519/pdfft?md5=fcb6b83c4cd9aa669507660a7219ea84&pid=1-s2.0-S0165489624000519-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141044587","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Output uncertainty mitigation in competitive markets 在竞争性市场中减少产出的不确定性
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2024-05-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.05.001
Bingbing Li , Yan Long
{"title":"Output uncertainty mitigation in competitive markets","authors":"Bingbing Li ,&nbsp;Yan Long","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.05.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.05.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Output uncertainty is a major concern for industries prone to exogenous, persistent and large fluctuations in output, such as agriculture, wind and solar power generation, while technology adoption aimed at mitigating output uncertainty can improve social welfare. This paper constructs a competitive market model with random output fluctuations to examine the scale of technology adoption at the long-term equilibrium and its comparison with the social optimum. We show that the First Welfare Theorem no longer holds in general, and depending on the characteristics of the demand function, the scale of technology adoption in the competitive market may be greater or less than the socially optimal scale.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"130 ","pages":"Pages 4-9"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140914010","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Trade-off between manipulability and dictatorial power: A proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem 可操纵性与独裁权力之间的权衡：吉巴德-萨特斯韦特定理的证明
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2024-05-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.04.003
Agustín G. Bonifacio
{"title":"Trade-off between manipulability and dictatorial power: A proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem","authors":"Agustín G. Bonifacio","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.04.003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.04.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>By endowing the class of <em>tops-only</em> and <em>efficient</em> social choice rules with a dual order structure that exploits the trade-off between different degrees of manipulability and dictatorial power rules allow agents to have, we provide a proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"130 ","pages":"Pages 1-3"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140905831","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Cost allocation and airport problems 成本分配和机场问题
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2024-05-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.03.007
William Thomson
{"title":"Cost allocation and airport problems","authors":"William Thomson","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.03.007","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.03.007","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We consider the problem of dividing the cost of a facility when agents can be ordered in terms of the needs they have for it, and accommodating an agent with a certain need allows accommodating all agents with lower needs at no extra cost. This problem is known as the “airport problem”, the facility being the runway. We review the literature devoted to its study, and formulate a number of open questions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"131 ","pages":"Pages 17-31"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141728590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the difficulty of characterizing network formation with endogenous behavior 论用内生行为表征网络形成的困难
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2024-05-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.10.006
Benjamin Golub , Yu-Chi Hsieh , Evan Sadler
{"title":"On the difficulty of characterizing network formation with endogenous behavior","authors":"Benjamin Golub ,&nbsp;Yu-Chi Hsieh ,&nbsp;Evan Sadler","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.10.006","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.10.006","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>Bolletta (2021)</span> studies a model in which a network is strategically formed and then agents play a linear best-response investment game in it. The model is motivated by an application in which people choose both their study partners and their levels of educational effort. Agents have different one-dimensional types – private returns to effort. A main result claims that (pairwise Nash) stable networks have a <em>locally complete</em><span><span> structure consisting of possibly overlapping cliques: if two agents are linked, they are part of a clique composed of all agents with types between theirs. A </span>counterexample shows that the claimed characterization is incorrect. We specify where the analysis errs and discuss implications for network formation models.</span></p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"129 ","pages":"Pages 107-110"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138527408","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Rawlsian Matching 罗尔斯匹配
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2024-04-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.04.002
Mustafa Oğuz Afacan , Umut Dur
{"title":"Rawlsian Matching","authors":"Mustafa Oğuz Afacan ,&nbsp;Umut Dur","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.04.002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.04.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We apply the Rawlsian principle to a canonical discrete object allocation problem. A matching is Rawlsian if it is impossible to improve the ranking of assignment for the worst-off agent or reduce the cardinality of the set of the worst-off agent-body. None of the well-known mechanisms are Rawlsian. We introduce an efficient and Rawlsian class of mechanisms. Strategy-proofness is incompatible with Rawlsianism; therefore, no Rawlsian mechanism is strategy-proof.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"129 ","pages":"Pages 101-106"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140621877","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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