On the difficulty of characterizing network formation with endogenous behavior

IF 0.5 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2024-05-01 DOI:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.10.006

Benjamin Golub , Yu-Chi Hsieh , Evan Sadler

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Bolletta (2021) studies a model in which a network is strategically formed and then agents play a linear best-response investment game in it. The model is motivated by an application in which people choose both their study partners and their levels of educational effort. Agents have different one-dimensional types – private returns to effort. A main result claims that (pairwise Nash) stable networks have a locally complete structure consisting of possibly overlapping cliques: if two agents are linked, they are part of a clique composed of all agents with types between theirs. A counterexample shows that the claimed characterization is incorrect. We specify where the analysis errs and discuss implications for network formation models.

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论用内生行为表征网络形成的困难

Bolletta(2021)研究了一个模型，在这个模型中，一个网络被战略性地形成，然后agent在其中进行线性最佳响应投资博弈。该模型是由一个应用程序驱动的，在这个应用程序中，人们可以选择他们的学习伙伴和他们的教育努力水平。代理人有不同的一维类型——努力的私人回报。一个主要的结果声称(成对纳什)稳定网络有一个局部完整的结构，由可能重叠的派系组成:如果两个智能体相连，它们是由所有类型介于它们之间的智能体组成的派系的一部分。反例表明所主张的特征是不正确的。我们详细说明了分析错误的地方，并讨论了网络形成模型的含义。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Mathematical Social Sciences 数学-数学跨学科应用

CiteScore

1.30

自引率

0.00%

发文量

审稿时长

59 days

期刊介绍： The international, interdisciplinary journal Mathematical Social Sciences publishes original research articles, survey papers, short notes and book reviews. The journal emphasizes the unity of mathematical modelling in economics, psychology, political sciences, sociology and other social sciences. Topics of particular interest include the fundamental aspects of choice, information, and preferences (decision science) and of interaction (game theory and economic theory), the measurement of utility, welfare and inequality, the formal theories of justice and implementation, voting rules, cooperative games, fair division, cost allocation, bargaining, matching, social networks, and evolutionary and other dynamics models. Papers published by the journal are mathematically rigorous but no bounds, from above or from below, limits their technical level. All mathematical techniques may be used. The articles should be self-contained and readable by social scientists trained in mathematics.