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A note on Pareto-optimal taxation mechanism in noncooperative strategic bilateral exchange 非合作战略双边交换中的帕累托最优税收机制研究
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102492
Ludovic A. Julien, Gagnie P. Yebarth
{"title":"A note on Pareto-optimal taxation mechanism in noncooperative strategic bilateral exchange","authors":"Ludovic A. Julien,&nbsp;Gagnie P. Yebarth","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102492","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102492","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates the taxation mechanism implemented in strategic bilateral exchange by Gabszewicz and Grazzini (1999). These authors show that endowment taxation with transfers can implement a Pareto-optimal allocation when the preferences of traders are represented by some specific homothetic utility functions. We show that this taxation mechanism can also implement a Pareto-optimal allocation when the preferences of traders are represented by non homothetic utility functions. To this end, we consider a class of quasi-linear utility functions. Furthermore, we illustrate that, with quasi-linear utility functions, by introducing heterogeneity between traders, there are other environments in which this taxation mechanism implements a Pareto-optimal outcome.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"139 ","pages":"Article 102492"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145797485","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Same-sex marriage, the great equalizer 同性婚姻，伟大的均衡器
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-08-08 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102448
Alexei Parakhonyak , Sergey V. Popov
{"title":"Same-sex marriage, the great equalizer","authors":"Alexei Parakhonyak ,&nbsp;Sergey V. Popov","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102448","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102448","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In a search and matching model with Nash bargaining, we find infinitely many asymmetric equilibria in which one sex receives a lower payoff than a similarly productive agent of the opposite sex. The mechanism resembles a social norm: if all agents on the opposite side of the marriage market become more demanding, continued searching yields diminished returns. However, if same-sex marriage is legalized and each side of the market includes a positive, arbitrarily small, share of bisexual agents, then only symmetric equilibria survive. This result highlights how restrictions on same-sex marriage reinforce asymmetries in opposite-sex matchings.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"138 ","pages":"Article 102448"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145010895","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Note on intertemporal preference with loss aversion 关于损失厌恶的跨期偏好的注释
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102469
Kyoung Jin Choi , Junkee Jeon , Hyeng Keun Koo
{"title":"Note on intertemporal preference with loss aversion","authors":"Kyoung Jin Choi ,&nbsp;Junkee Jeon ,&nbsp;Hyeng Keun Koo","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102469","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102469","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study two models of intertemporal preferences exhibiting loss aversion: one based on utility changes relative to a reference point, and another incorporating mental adjustment costs. Within a multi-period (possibly infinite-horizon) framework, we show that the two formulations are theoretically equivalent. The resulting preferences are neither monotone nor concave in general. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for monotonicity and concavity, and provide a continuous-time extension that preserves the equivalence. Our results offer a tractable and rigorous foundation for modeling intertemporal behavior under reference-dependent preferences.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"138 ","pages":"Article 102469"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145266841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On human capital accumulation in times of epidemic 论疫情时期的人力资本积累
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-09-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102466
Stefano Bosi , David Desmarchelier , Cuong Le Van
{"title":"On human capital accumulation in times of epidemic","authors":"Stefano Bosi ,&nbsp;David Desmarchelier ,&nbsp;Cuong Le Van","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102466","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102466","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In the spirit of Goenka and Liu (2020), we study an endogenous growth model à la Lucas (1988) with an infectious disease spreading according to SIS dynamics and slowing human capital accumulation. Our model differs from theirs in some respects. We focus solely on the planner’s solution and cover both bounded and unbounded growth cases, under the assumption of more general preferences. Considering a single capital good allows us to provide a global analysis and in-depth understanding of the transition mechanisms. In the case of decreasing returns, the economy converges towards a stationary stock of human capital which decreases with the severity of the epidemic. In the case of unbounded growth, we recover the main results of Goenka and Liu (2020): the existence of a Balanced Growth Path with a negative impact of disease severity on growth rate. However, in our model, the growth path is only asymptotically balanced and confined within an exponential band during the transition.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"138 ","pages":"Article 102466"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145266843","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Basic research and market concentration 基础研究和市场集中
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102472
Khaled Belkadhi , Hend Ghazzai , Rim Lahmandi-Ayed
{"title":"Basic research and market concentration","authors":"Khaled Belkadhi ,&nbsp;Hend Ghazzai ,&nbsp;Rim Lahmandi-Ayed","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102472","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102472","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We introduce a model with the possibility of investing in basic research prior to non-cooperative applied research and quantity competition, comparing two scenarios: Centralized (C) where the State invests in basic research and makes the results available to firms; and Decentralized (D) where firms have to invest in basic research. Total basic research effort acts as a multiplier of firms’ effort in applied research in the reduction of production costs. Interestingly, (i) there is no upper-bound on the number of viable firms under both scenarios, while there is a lower-bound on that number under (D) scenario; (ii) it may be socially optimal under (C) or (D) to have a finite number of firms; (iii) the firms’ expenses in research is either increasing or inverted U-shaped with market concentration, as in a large part of existing empirical literature; (iv) when the basic research cost is low, under (C), it is possible to implement the first best (the optimal number of firms) and a firm’s taxation to fund the optimal basic research expenses in an acceptable way to firms relative to the (D) scenario. When the basic research cost is intermediate, it is possible to implement the second best number of firms defined to be as the one allowing to cover the basic research expenses in an acceptable way to firms relative to the (D) scenario.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"138 ","pages":"Article 102472"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145416897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Competition through entry fees between auctions for differentiated objects 通过拍卖不同物品的入场费进行竞争
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-11-14 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102476
Massimiliano Landi , Domenico Menicucci , Domenico Colucci
{"title":"Competition through entry fees between auctions for differentiated objects","authors":"Massimiliano Landi ,&nbsp;Domenico Menicucci ,&nbsp;Domenico Colucci","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102476","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102476","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper considers two competing auctions with objects differentiated according to the random utility framework introduced in Perloff and Salop (1985): bidders privately observe their values for the two objects, and values are ex ante i.i.d. across objects and across bidders. For the case of uniform distribution of values, we show that competition under entry fees is less intense than competition under reserve prices in the sense that sellers are better off, and bidders are worse off when competition takes place with entry fees rather than under reserve prices. The key difference between the two settings is that undercutting under entry fees is less effective as a business stealing tool than under reserve prices. This reduces each seller’s incentive to undercut, and in turn increases sellers’ equilibrium revenues. This result contrasts with the equivalence between reserve prices and entry fees in a standard one-object monopoly auction.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"138 ","pages":"Article 102476"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145578708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A nonatomic game involving incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes 一种包含不完全信息和一般模棱两可态度的非原子博弈
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-07-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102435
Jian Yang
{"title":"A nonatomic game involving incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes","authors":"Jian Yang","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102435","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102435","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider a nonatomic game involving incomplete information. On top of a player’s own action and the joint distribution of other players’ traits and actions, also influencing the player’s return is a state of the world that incorporates uncertain factors external to all players. Non-exact knowledge about the latter is embedded in a player’s signal. When other players adopt strategies that amount to signal-based action distributions, a given player’s action would be guided by her own preference on the vector made up of the distributions on returns that she anticipates to encounter under all potential states allowed by her signal. There can be two equilibrium notions; namely, the action- and distribution-based ones that depend on whether a player controls individual actions or merely their distributions. Besides the existence of equilibria, we also study relationships between the two equilibrium notions for various special cases. Furthermore, the nonatomic game is shown to approximate its finite counterparts.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"138 ","pages":"Article 102435"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145005423","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The set of pure-strategy equilibria in max–min two-group contests with a private good prize 具有私有商品奖励的最大最小两组竞争的纯策略均衡集
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102471
Mario Gilli, Andrea Sorrentino
{"title":"The set of pure-strategy equilibria in max–min two-group contests with a private good prize","authors":"Mario Gilli,&nbsp;Andrea Sorrentino","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102471","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102471","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We characterize the set of pure-strategy equilibria in a deterministic group contest with the weakest-link impact function and a private good prize, complementing the results obtained by Lee (2012) and Chowdhury et al. (2016). We consider a two-stage two-group model, where in the first stage the agents simultaneously choose the sharing rule, while in the second stage they choose efforts. We find that there are continua of subgame perfect equilibria, which means that in equilibrium players’ behavior is indeterminate. By additional restrictions on the effort levels of each class of effort equilibria, we are able to computationally characterize the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"138 ","pages":"Article 102471"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145362519","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Conformism and name dynamics: A cliometric study of ancient Greek names 符合性与名称动力学：古希腊名称的地理计量学研究
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-08-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102451
Laurent Gauthier
{"title":"Conformism and name dynamics: A cliometric study of ancient Greek names","authors":"Laurent Gauthier","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102451","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102451","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Extending the sociological study of conformism in naming, we develop a dynamic model of name choice, reflecting conformist or non-conformist behavior. This allows us to account for more degrees of freedom than the statistical physics approaches that have generally been used in name modeling. Testing our model empirically, we find that conformist naming accounts for the unique shape of name distributions in ancient Greece, which differs from contemporary name data.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"138 ","pages":"Article 102451"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145005419","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The dynamics of bargaining power in a principal-agent model 委托代理模型中议价能力的动态
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-08-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102452
Sonia Di Giannatale , Itza Tlaloc Quetzalcoatl Curiel-Cabral , Genaro Basulto
{"title":"The dynamics of bargaining power in a principal-agent model","authors":"Sonia Di Giannatale ,&nbsp;Itza Tlaloc Quetzalcoatl Curiel-Cabral ,&nbsp;Genaro Basulto","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102452","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102452","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This article develops a dynamic principal–agent model that integrates bargaining power as an evolving state variable, governed by a bargaining drift coefficient that links its trajectory to firm performance and agent compensation. The model examines how initial bargaining power shapes salary trajectories and how bargaining drift influences its adaptation over time in response to performance outcomes. By modeling these dynamics, the study highlights the role of incentives in driving the evolution of bargaining power, emphasizing the long-term impact of initial conditions on compensation structures. A key contribution is the formulation of an empirical equation that connects agent compensation and performance with bargaining drift, offering a framework for real-world validation. Beyond CEO pay, the framework extends to other performance-based environments, such as sports and academia, where shifting power relationships shape long-term contracts. By introducing a computational algorithm for multiobjective optimization, the study enhances the practical implementation of bargaining power dynamics, offering valuable insights for both theoretical modeling and governance applications.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"138 ","pages":"Article 102452"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145005422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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