可操纵性与独裁权力之间的权衡：吉巴德-萨特斯韦特定理的证明

IF 0.5 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2024-05-09 DOI:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.04.003

Agustín G. Bonifacio

引用次数: 0

摘要

我们利用规则允许代理人拥有的不同程度的可操纵性和独裁权力之间的权衡，为 "唯上和高效社会选择规则 "类赋予了双重秩序结构，从而为吉巴德-萨特斯韦特定理提供了证明。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

Trade-off between manipulability and dictatorial power: A proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem

By endowing the class of tops-only and efficient social choice rules with a dual order structure that exploits the trade-off between different degrees of manipulability and dictatorial power rules allow agents to have, we provide a proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

Mathematical Social Sciences 数学-数学跨学科应用

CiteScore

1.30

自引率

0.00%

发文量

审稿时长

59 days

期刊介绍： The international, interdisciplinary journal Mathematical Social Sciences publishes original research articles, survey papers, short notes and book reviews. The journal emphasizes the unity of mathematical modelling in economics, psychology, political sciences, sociology and other social sciences. Topics of particular interest include the fundamental aspects of choice, information, and preferences (decision science) and of interaction (game theory and economic theory), the measurement of utility, welfare and inequality, the formal theories of justice and implementation, voting rules, cooperative games, fair division, cost allocation, bargaining, matching, social networks, and evolutionary and other dynamics models. Papers published by the journal are mathematically rigorous but no bounds, from above or from below, limits their technical level. All mathematical techniques may be used. The articles should be self-contained and readable by social scientists trained in mathematics.