{"title":"Familiarity Alters the Bandwidth of Perceptual Awareness","authors":"Michael A. Cohen;Skyler Sung;Zaki Alaoui","doi":"10.1162/jocn_a_02140","DOIUrl":"10.1162/jocn_a_02140","url":null,"abstract":"Results from paradigms like change blindness and inattentional blindness indicate that observers are unaware of numerous aspects of the visual world. However, intuition suggests that perceptual experience is richer than these results indicate. Why does it feel like we see so much when the data suggests we see so little? One possibility stems from the fact that experimental studies always present observers with stimuli that they have never seen before. Meanwhile, when forming intuitions about perceptual experience, observers reflect on their experiences with scenes with which they are highly familiar (e.g., their office). Does prior experience with a scene change the bandwidth of perceptual awareness? Here, we asked if observers were better at noticing alterations to the periphery in familiar scenes compared with unfamiliar scenes. We found that observers noticed changes to the periphery more frequently with familiar stimuli. Signal detection theoretic analyses revealed that when observers are unfamiliar with a stimulus, they are less sensitive at noticing (d′) and are more conservative in their response criterion (c). Taken together, these results suggest that prior knowledge expands the bandwidth of perceptual awareness. It should be stressed that these results challenge the widely held idea that prior knowledge fills in perception. Overall, these findings highlight how prior knowledge plays an important role in determining the limits of perceptual experience and is an important factor to consider when attempting to reconcile the tension between empirical observation and personal introspection.","PeriodicalId":51081,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140289554","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Contributions of Basal Ganglia Circuits to Perception, Attention, and Consciousness","authors":"Michelle J. Redinbaugh;Yuri B. Saalmann","doi":"10.1162/jocn_a_02177","DOIUrl":"10.1162/jocn_a_02177","url":null,"abstract":"Research into ascending sensory pathways and cortical networks has generated detailed models of perception. These same cortical regions are strongly connected to subcortical structures, such as the basal ganglia (BG), which have been conceptualized as playing key roles in reinforcement learning and action selection. However, because the BG amasses experiential evidence from higher and lower levels of cortical hierarchies, as well as higher-order thalamus, it is well positioned to dynamically influence perception. Here, we review anatomical, functional, and clinical evidence to demonstrate how the BG can influence perceptual processing and conscious states. This depends on the integrative relationship between cortex, BG, and thalamus, which allows contributions to sensory gating, predictive processing, selective attention, and representation of the temporal structure of events.","PeriodicalId":51081,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140838015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Neuroethics, Covert Consciousness, and Disability Rights: What Happens When Artificial Intelligence Meets Cognitive Motor Dissociation?","authors":"Joseph J. Fins;Kaiulani S. Shulman","doi":"10.1162/jocn_a_02157","DOIUrl":"10.1162/jocn_a_02157","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, we consider the intersection of cognitive motor dissociation (CMD) and artificial intelligence (AI), hence when CMD meets AI. In covert consciousness, there is a discordance between the observed behavior, the traditional bedside mode of assessment, and the response to volitional commands as depicted by neuroimaging or EEG studies. This alphabet soup of acronyms represents both the promise and peril of nascent technology in covert consciousness. On the diagnostic side, there is the complexity and uncertainty of identifying the discordance between cognitive activity and overt behavior. On the therapeutic side, when AI is used to generate speech, there is the possibility of misrepresenting the thoughts and intentions of those who are otherwise voiceless. This concordance of factors makes the application of AI to CMD worthy of deeper consideration. We offer this analysis in the spirit of anticipatory governance, a prudential process by which one plans to prevent or mitigate unintended consequences of novel technology. We first consider the normative challenges posed by CMD for clinical practice, neuroethics, and the law. We then explore the history of covert consciousness and the relationship of severe brain injury to the right-to-die movement, before introducing three biographies of brain injury that highlight the potential impact of disability bias or ableism in clinical practice, assistive technology, and translational research. Subsequently, we explore how AI might give voice to conscious individuals who are unable to communicate and the ethical challenges that this technology must overcome to promote human flourishing drawing upon what Nussbaum and Sen have described as a “capabilities approach” to promote normative reasoning.","PeriodicalId":51081,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140741321","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Model Virtues in Computational Cognitive Neuroscience","authors":"Saskia Heijnen;Jan Sleutels;Roy de Kleijn","doi":"10.1162/jocn_a_02183","DOIUrl":"10.1162/jocn_a_02183","url":null,"abstract":"There is an abundance of computational models in cognitive neuroscience. A framework for what is desirable in a model, what justifies the introduction of a new one, or what makes one better than another is lacking, however. In this article, we examine key qualities (“virtues”) that are desirable in computational models, and how these are interrelated. To keep the scope of the article manageable, we focus on the field of cognitive control, where we identified six “model virtues”: empirical accuracy, empirical scope, functional analysis, causal detail, biological plausibility, and psychological plausibility. We first illustrate their use in published work on Stroop modeling and then discuss what expert modelers in the field of cognitive control said about them in a series of qualitative interviews. We found that virtues are interrelated and that their value depends on the modeler's goals, in ways that are not typically acknowledged in the literature. We recommend that researchers make the reasons for their modeling choices more explicit in published work. Our work is meant as a first step. Although our focus here is on cognitive control, we hope that our findings will spark discussion of virtues in other fields as well.","PeriodicalId":51081,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140917336","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Yulia Bezsudnova;Andrew J. Quinn;Syanah C. Wynn;Ole Jensen
{"title":"Spatiotemporal Properties of Common Semantic Categories for Words and Pictures","authors":"Yulia Bezsudnova;Andrew J. Quinn;Syanah C. Wynn;Ole Jensen","doi":"10.1162/jocn_a_02182","DOIUrl":"10.1162/jocn_a_02182","url":null,"abstract":"The timing of semantic processing during object recognition in the brain is a topic of ongoing discussion. One way of addressing this question is by applying multivariate pattern analysis to human electrophysiological responses to object images of different semantic categories. However, although multivariate pattern analysis can reveal whether neuronal activity patterns are distinct for different stimulus categories, concerns remain on whether low-level visual features also contribute to the classification results. To circumvent this issue, we applied a cross-decoding approach to magnetoencephalography data from stimuli from two different modalities: images and their corresponding written words. We employed items from three categories and presented them in a randomized order. We show that if the classifier is trained on words, pictures are classified between 150 and 430 msec after stimulus onset, and when training on pictures, words are classified between 225 and 430 msec. The topographical map, identified using a searchlight approach for cross-modal activation in both directions, showed left lateralization, confirming the involvement of linguistic representations. These results point to semantic activation of pictorial stimuli occurring at ∼150 msec, whereas for words, the semantic activation occurs at ∼230 msec.","PeriodicalId":51081,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140917371","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Perceptual Awareness in Human Infants: What is the Evidence?","authors":"Ghislaine Dehaene-Lambertz","doi":"10.1162/jocn_a_02149","DOIUrl":"10.1162/jocn_a_02149","url":null,"abstract":"Perceptual awareness in infants during the first year of life is understudied, despite the philosophical, scientific, and clinical importance of understanding how and when consciousness emerges during human brain development. Although parents are undoubtedly convinced that their infant is conscious, the lack of adequate experimental paradigms to address this question in preverbal infants has been a hindrance to research on this topic. However, recent behavioral and brain imaging studies have shown that infants are engaged in complex learning from an early age and that their brains are more structured than traditionally thought. I will present a rapid overview of these results, which might provide indirect evidence of early perceptual awareness and then describe how a more systematic approach to this question could stand within the framework of global workspace theory, which identifies specific signatures of conscious perception in adults. Relying on these brain signatures as a benchmark for conscious perception, we can deduce that it exists in the second half of the first year, whereas the evidence before the age of 5 months is less solid, mainly because of the paucity of studies. The question of conscious perception before term remains open, with the possibility of short periods of conscious perception, which would facilitate early learning. Advances in brain imaging and growing interest in this subject should enable us to gain a better understanding of this important issue in the years to come.","PeriodicalId":51081,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140289571","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Integrating Consciousness Science with Cognitive Neuroscience: An Introduction to the Special Focus","authors":"Biyu J. He","doi":"10.1162/jocn_a_02193","DOIUrl":"10.1162/jocn_a_02193","url":null,"abstract":"Consciousness science is experiencing a coming-of-age moment. Following three decades of sustained efforts by a relatively small group of consciousness researchers, the field has seen exponential growth over the past 5 years. It is increasingly recognized that although the investigation of subjective experiences is a difficult task, modern neuroscience need not and cannot shy away from the challenge of peeling away the mysteries of conscious experiences. In June 2023, with the joint support of the U.S. National Institutes of Health and the U.S. National Science Foundation, a 3-day workshop was held at the Bethesda, MD, campus of the National Institutes of Health, convening experts whose work focuses primarily on problems of consciousness, or an adjacent field, to discuss the current state of consciousness science and consider the most fruitful avenues for future research. This Special Focus features empirical and theoretical contributions from some of the invited speakers at the workshop. Here, I will cover the scope of the workshop, the content of this Special Focus, and advocate for stronger bridges between consciousness science and other subdisciplines of cognitive neuroscience.","PeriodicalId":51081,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141184685","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Constructive Memory and Conscious Experience","authors":"Daniel L. Schacter;Preston P. Thakral","doi":"10.1162/jocn_a_02201","DOIUrl":"10.1162/jocn_a_02201","url":null,"abstract":"Episodic memory relies on constructive processes that support simulating novel future events by flexibly recombining elements of past experiences, and that can also give rise to memory errors. In recent studies, we have developed methods to characterize the cognitive and neural processes that support conscious experiences linked to this process of episodic recombination, both when people simulate novel future events and commit recombination-related memory errors. In this Perspective, we summarize recent studies that illustrate these phenomena, and discuss broader implications for characterizing the basis of conscious experiences associated with constructive memory from a cognitive neuroscience perspective.","PeriodicalId":51081,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141184650","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Brain's Sensitivity to Real-world Statistical Regularity Does Not Require Full Attention","authors":"Evan G. Center;Kara D. Federmeier;Diane M. Beck","doi":"10.1162/jocn_a_02181","DOIUrl":"10.1162/jocn_a_02181","url":null,"abstract":"Predictive coding accounts of perception state that the brain generates perceptual predictions in the service of processing incoming sensory data. These predictions are hypothesized to be afforded by the brain's ability to internalize useful patterns, that is, statistical regularities, from the environment. We have previously argued that the N300 ERP component serves as an index of the brain's use of representations of (real-world) statistical regularities. However, we do not yet know whether overt attention is necessary in order for this process to engage. We addressed this question by presenting stimuli of either high or low real-world statistical regularity in terms of their representativeness (good/bad exemplars of natural scene categories) to participants who either fully attended the stimuli or were distracted by another task (attended/distracted conditions). Replicating past work, N300 responses were larger to bad than to good scene exemplars, and furthermore, we demonstrate minimal impacts of distraction on N300 effects. Thus, it seems that overtly focused attention is not required to maintain the brain's sensitivity to real-world statistical regularity. Furthermore, in an exploratory analysis, we showed that providing additional, artificial regularities, formed by altering the proportions of good and bad exemplars within blocks, further enhanced the N300 effect in both attended and distracted conditions, shedding light on the relationship between statistical regularities learned in the real world and those learned within the context of an experiment.","PeriodicalId":51081,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140917372","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Brynn E. Sherman;Isabella Huang;Elaine G. Wijaya;Nicholas B. Turk-Browne;Elizabeth V. Goldfarb
{"title":"Acute Stress Effects on Statistical Learning and Episodic Memory","authors":"Brynn E. Sherman;Isabella Huang;Elaine G. Wijaya;Nicholas B. Turk-Browne;Elizabeth V. Goldfarb","doi":"10.1162/jocn_a_02178","DOIUrl":"10.1162/jocn_a_02178","url":null,"abstract":"Stress is widely considered to negatively impact hippocampal function, thus impairing episodic memory. However, the hippocampus is not merely the seat of episodic memory. Rather, it also (via distinct circuitry) supports statistical learning. On the basis of rodent work suggesting that stress may impair the hippocampal pathway involved in episodic memory while sparing or enhancing the pathway involved in statistical learning, we developed a behavioral experiment to investigate the effects of acute stress on both episodic memory and statistical learning in humans. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: stress (socially evaluated cold pressor) immediately before learning, stress ∼15 min before learning, or no stress. In the learning task, participants viewed a series of trial-unique scenes (allowing for episodic encoding of each image) in which certain scene categories reliably followed one another (allowing for statistical learning of associations between paired categories). Memory was assessed 24 hr later to isolate stress effects on encoding/learning rather than retrieval. We found modest support for our hypothesis that acute stress can amplify statistical learning: Only participants stressed ∼15 min in advance exhibited reliable evidence of learning across multiple measures. Furthermore, stress-induced cortisol levels predicted statistical learning retention 24 hr later. In contrast, episodic memory did not differ by stress condition, although we did find preliminary evidence that acute stress promoted memory for statistically predictable information and attenuated competition between statistical and episodic encoding. Together, these findings provide initial insights into how stress may differentially modulate learning processes within the hippocampus.","PeriodicalId":51081,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140877897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}