Cognitive Psychology最新文献

{"title":"Motivation improves working memory by two processes: Prioritisation and retrieval thresholds","authors":"John P. Grogan ,&nbsp;Govind Randhawa ,&nbsp;Minho Kim ,&nbsp;Sanjay G. Manohar","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2022.101472","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2022.101472","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Motivation can improve performance when the potential rewards outweigh the cost of effort expended. In working memory (WM), people can prioritise rewarded items at the expense of unrewarded items, suggesting a fixed memory capacity. But can capacity itself change with motivation? Across four experiments (N = 30–34) we demonstrate motivational improvements in WM even when <em>all</em> items were rewarded. However, this was not due to better memory precision, but rather better selection of the probed item within memory. Motivational improvements operated independently of encoding, maintenance, or attention shifts between items in memory. Moreover, motivation slowed responses. This contrasted with the benefits of rewarding items unequally, which allowed prioritisation of one item over another. We conclude that motivation can improve memory recall, not via precision or capacity, but via speed-accuracy trade-offs when selecting the item to retrieve.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"135 ","pages":"Article 101472"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S001002852200010X/pdfft?md5=c7bff394b0f9a3286f01fdad650d1cb4&pid=1-s2.0-S001002852200010X-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41607918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The development of reasoning by exclusion in infancy","authors":"Roman Feiman ,&nbsp;Shilpa Mody ,&nbsp;Susan Carey","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2022.101473","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2022.101473","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>How do humans develop the capacity to reason? In five studies, we examined infants’ emerging ability to make exclusion inferences using negation<em>,</em><span> as in the disjunctive syllogism (</span><em>P or Q; not P; therefore Q</em>). Inspired by studies of non-human animals and older children, Experiments 1–3 used an exclusion task adapted from Call’s (2004) 2-cup paradigm and Experiments 4–5 used an exclusion task adapted from the blicket detector paradigm (Sobel &amp; Kirkham, 2006). In both tasks, we found failure to make exclusion inferences at 15 months, fragile success at 17 months, and robust success by 20 months of age. These data converge with some prior evidence that fails to find a capacity to represent negation in infants younger than 15 months of age and conflict with other evidence from different paradigms that suggests infants do have this capacity. We discuss three different resolutions of these conflicting data, and suggest lines of further work that might adjudicate among them.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"135 ","pages":"Article 101473"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9926979","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Distinct but correlated latent factors support the regulation of learned conflict-control and task-switching","authors":"Christina Bejjani ,&nbsp;Rick H. Hoyle ,&nbsp;Tobias Egner","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2022.101474","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2022.101474","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><em>Cognitive control</em> is guided by learning, as people adjust control to meet changing task demands. The two best-studied instances of “control-learning” are the enhancement of attentional task focus in response to increased frequencies of incongruent distracter stimuli, reflected in the list-wide proportion congruent (LWPC) effect, and the enhancement of switch-readiness in response to increased frequencies of task switches, reflected in the list-wide proportion switch (LWPS) effect. However, the latent architecture underpinning these adaptations in cognitive stability and flexibility – specifically, whether there is a single, domain-general, or multiple, domain-specific learners – is currently not known. To reveal the underlying structure of control-learning, we had a large sample of participants (<em>N</em><span> = 950) perform LWPC and LWPS paradigms, and afterwards assessed their explicit awareness of the task manipulations, as well as general cognitive ability and motivation. Structural equation modeling<span> was used to evaluate several preregistered models representing different plausible hypotheses concerning the latent structure of control-learning. Task performance replicated standard LWPC and LWPS effects. Crucially, the model that best fit the data had correlated domain- and context-specific latent factors. Thus, people’s ability to adapt their on-task focus and between-task switch-readiness to changing levels of demand was mediated by distinct (though correlated) underlying factors. Model fit remained good when accounting for speed-accuracy trade-offs, variance in individual cognitive ability and self-reported motivation, as well as self-reported explicit awareness of manipulations and the order in which different levels of demand were experienced. Implications of these results for the cognitive architecture of dynamic cognitive control are discussed.</span></span></p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"135 ","pages":"Article 101474"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9554451","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Patterns in CAOSS: Distributed representations predict variation in relational interpretations for familiar and novel compound words","authors":"Fritz Günther ,&nbsp;Marco Marelli","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2022.101471","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2022.101471","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>While distributional semantic models that represent word meanings as high-dimensional vectors induced from large text corpora have been shown to successfully predict human behavior across a wide range of tasks, they have also received criticism from different directions. These include concerns over their interpretability (how can numbers specifying abstract, latent dimensions represent meaning?) and their ability to capture variation in meaning (how can a single vector representation capture multiple different interpretations for the same expression?). Here, we demonstrate that semantic vectors can indeed rise up to these challenges, by training a mapping system (a simple linear regression) that predicts inter-individual variation in relational interpretations for compounds such as </span><em>wood brush</em> (for example <em>brush FOR wood</em>, or <em>brush MADE OF wood</em>) from (compositional) semantic vectors representing the meanings of these compounds. These predictions consistently beat different random baselines, both for familiar compounds (<em>moon light</em>, Experiment 1) as well as novel compounds (<em>wood brush</em>, Experiment 2), demonstrating that distributional semantic vectors encode variations in qualitative interpretations that can be decoded using techniques as simple as linear regression.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"134 ","pages":"Article 101471"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44699475","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Ambivalence in decision making: An eye tracking study","authors":"Agnes Rosner ,&nbsp;Irina Basieva ,&nbsp;Albert Barque-Duran ,&nbsp;Andreas Glöckner ,&nbsp;Bettina von Helversen ,&nbsp;Andrei Khrennikov ,&nbsp;Emmanuel M. Pothos","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2022.101464","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2022.101464","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>An intuition of ambivalence in cognition is particularly strong for complex decisions, for which the merits and demerits of different options are roughly equal but hard to compare. We examined information search in an experimental paradigm which tasked participants with an ambivalent question, while monitoring attentional dynamics concerning the information relevant to each option in different Areas of Interest (AOIs). We developed two dynamical models for describing eye tracking curves, for each response separately. The models incorporated a drift mechanism towards the various options, as in standard drift diffusion theory. In addition, they included a mechanism for intrinsic oscillation, which competed with the drift process and undermined eventual stabilization of the dynamics. The two models varied in the range of drift processes postulated. Higher support was observed for the simpler model, which only included drifts from an uncertainty state to either of two certainty states. In addition, model parameters could be weakly related to the eventual decision, complementing our knowledge of the way eye tracking structure relates to decision (notably the gaze cascade effect).</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"134 ","pages":"Article 101464"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010028522000020/pdfft?md5=c074a8b48e1bc203cf228ca94cef1ee5&pid=1-s2.0-S0010028522000020-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48762379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"An interference model for visual working memory: Applications to the change detection task","authors":"Hsuan-Yu Lin ,&nbsp;Klaus Oberauer","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2022.101463","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2022.101463","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Most studies of visual-working memory employ one of two experimental paradigms: change-detection or continuous-stimulus reproduction. In this study, we extended the Interference Model (IM; Oberauer &amp; Lin, 2017), which was designed for continuous reproduction, to the single-probe change-detection task. In continuous reproduction, participants occasionally report the non-target items instead of the target. The presence of non-target response is predicted by the Interference Model, which relies in part on the interference of non-target items to explain the set-size effect. By presenting a probe matching a non-target item, we can investigate the amount of interference from non-target items in change detection. As predicted by the Interference Model, we observed poorer performance in rejecting a probe matching a non-target item compared to a new probe (i.e., a cost due to intrusions from non-targets). We fitted the IM along with the Variable Precision, the Slot-Averaging, and the Neural-Population model to the data from two change-detection experiments. The models were equipped with a Bayesian decision rule based on the one used in Keshvari, van den Berg, and Ma (2013). The Interference Model and the Neural-Population model successfully predicted the set-size effect and the non-target intrusion cost, whereas the Variable Precision (VP) and Slot-Averaging (SA) models failed to predict the intrusion cost at all. Even with additional assumptions enabling VP and SA to produce intrusion costs, the IM still performed better than the competing models quantitatively.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"133 ","pages":"Article 101463"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39788805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Hypothesis testing, attention, and ‘Same’-‘Different’ judgments","authors":"Bart Farell","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2021.101443","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2021.101443","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Logic and common sense say that judging two stimuli as “same” is the converse of judging them as “different”. Empirically, however, ‘Same’-‘Different’ judgment data are anomalous in two major ways. The fast-‘Same’ effect violates the expectation that ‘Same’ reaction time (RT) should be predictable by extrapolating from ‘Different’ RT. The criterion effect violates the expectation that RTs measured when sameness is defined by a conjunction of matching attributes should predict RTs measured when sameness is defined by a disjunction of matching attributes. The two criteria are symmetrical, yet empirically they differ greatly, disjunctive judgments being by far the slower of the two. This study sought the sources of these two effects. With the aid of a cue, a selective-comparison method deconfounded the contributions of stimulus encoding and comparisons to the two effects. The results were paradoxical. Each additional irrelevant (uncued) letter in a random string incremented RT for conjunctive judgments as much as an additional relevant letter did. Yet irrelevant letters were not compared and relevant letters had to be compared. These results appeared again in a second experiment that used words as stimuli. Contrary to intuition, a distinct comparison mechanism—the heart of relative judgment models—is not necessary in judgments of sameness and difference. It is shown here that encoding can carry out the comparison function without the operation of a separate comparison mechanism. Attention mediates the process by selecting from the set of stimulus alternatives, thereby partitioning the set into the ‘Same’ and ‘Different’ subsets. The fast-‘Same’ and criterion effects result from a structural limitation on what attention can select at any one time. With attention mediating the task, ‘Same’-‘Different’ judgments become, in effect, the outcome of a testing of a hypothesis, bridging the distinction between absolute stimulus identification and relative judgments.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"132 ","pages":"Article 101443"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2022-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010028521000669/pdfft?md5=c3ca913fd24d6ee67d946caaa4789411&pid=1-s2.0-S0010028521000669-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39685326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Causal invariance as a tacit aspiration: Analytic knowledge of invariance functions","authors":"Jooyong Park ,&nbsp;Shannon McGillivray ,&nbsp;Jeffrey K. Bye ,&nbsp;Patricia W. Cheng","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2021.101432","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2021.101432","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>For causal knowledge to be worth learning, it must remain valid when that knowledge is applied. Because unknown background causes are potentially present, and may vary across the learning and application contexts, extricating the strength of a candidate cause requires an assumption regarding the decomposition of the observed outcome into the unobservable influences from the candidate and from background causes. Acquiring stable, useable causal knowledge is challenging when the search space of candidate causes is large, such that the reasoner’s current set of candidates may fail to include a cause that generalizes well to an application context. We have hypothesized that an indispensable navigation device that shapes our causal representations toward useable knowledge involves the concept of <em>causal invariance</em> – the sameness of how a cause operates to produce an effect across contexts. Here, we tested our <em>causal invariance hypothesis</em> by making use of the distinct mathematical functions expressing causal invariance for two outcome-variable types: continuous and binary. Our hypothesis predicts that, given identical prior domain knowledge, intuitive causal judgments should vary in accord with the causal-invariance function for a reasoner’s perceived outcome-variable type. The judgments are made as if the reasoner aspires to formulate causally invariant knowledge. Our experiments involved two cue-competition paradigms: blocking and overexpectation. Results show that adult humans tacitly use the appropriate causal-invariance functions for decomposition. Our analysis offers an explanation for the apparent elusiveness of the blocking effect and the adaptiveness of intuitive causal inference to the representation-dependent reality in the mind.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"132 ","pages":"Article 101432"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2022-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010028521000554/pdfft?md5=d1a550afba8d852dccc4cf55be71eb54&pid=1-s2.0-S0010028521000554-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39942582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Motivated to learn: An account of explanatory satisfaction","authors":"Emily G. Liquin,&nbsp;Tania Lombrozo","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2021.101453","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2021.101453","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Many explanations have a distinctive, positive phenomenology: receiving or generating these explanations feels <em>satisfying</em>. Accordingly, we might expect this feeling of explanatory satisfaction to reinforce and motivate inquiry. Across five studies, we investigate how explanatory satisfaction plays this role: by motivating and reinforcing inquiry quite generally (“brute motivation” account), or by selectively guiding inquiry to support useful learning about the target of explanation (“aligned motivation” account). In Studies 1–2, we find that satisfaction with an explanation is related to several measures of perceived useful learning, and that greater satisfaction in turn predicts stronger curiosity about questions related to the explanation. However, in Studies 2–4, we find only tenuous evidence that satisfaction is related to actual learning, measured objectively through multiple-choice or free recall tests. In Study 4, we additionally show that perceptions of learning fully explain one seemingly specious feature of explanatory preferences studied in prior research: the preference for uninformative “reductive” explanations. Finally, in Study 5, we find that perceived learning is (at least in part) causally responsible for feelings of satisfaction. Together, these results point to what we call the “imperfectly aligned motivation” account: explanatory satisfaction selectively motivates inquiry towards learning explanatory information, but primarily through fallible perceptions of learning. Thus, satisfaction is likely to guide individuals towards lines of inquiry that support perceptions of learning, whether or not individuals actually are learning.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"132 ","pages":"Article 101453"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2022-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010028521000761/pdfft?md5=5aebb88d43bfa490e7cbcb9741c65ea9&pid=1-s2.0-S0010028521000761-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39699858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Robust priors for regularized regression","authors":"Sebastian Bobadilla-Suarez ,&nbsp;Matt Jones ,&nbsp;Bradley C. Love","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2021.101444","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2021.101444","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Induction benefits from useful priors. Penalized regression approaches, like ridge regression, shrink weights toward zero but zero association is usually not a sensible prior. Inspired by simple and robust decision heuristics humans use, we constructed non-zero priors for penalized regression models that provide robust and interpretable solutions across several tasks. Our approach enables estimates from a constrained model to serve as a prior for a more general model, yielding a principled way to interpolate between models of differing complexity. We successfully applied this approach to a number of decision and classification problems, as well as analyzing simulated brain imaging data. Models with robust priors had excellent worst-case performance. Solutions followed from the form of the heuristic that was used to derive the prior. These new algorithms can serve applications in data analysis and machine learning, as well as help in understanding how people transition from novice to expert performance.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"132 ","pages":"Article 101444"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2022-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8903146/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39942583","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}