Cognitive Psychology最新文献

{"title":"Ambivalence in decision making: An eye tracking study","authors":"Agnes Rosner ,&nbsp;Irina Basieva ,&nbsp;Albert Barque-Duran ,&nbsp;Andreas Glöckner ,&nbsp;Bettina von Helversen ,&nbsp;Andrei Khrennikov ,&nbsp;Emmanuel M. Pothos","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2022.101464","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2022.101464","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>An intuition of ambivalence in cognition is particularly strong for complex decisions, for which the merits and demerits of different options are roughly equal but hard to compare. We examined information search in an experimental paradigm which tasked participants with an ambivalent question, while monitoring attentional dynamics concerning the information relevant to each option in different Areas of Interest (AOIs). We developed two dynamical models for describing eye tracking curves, for each response separately. The models incorporated a drift mechanism towards the various options, as in standard drift diffusion theory. In addition, they included a mechanism for intrinsic oscillation, which competed with the drift process and undermined eventual stabilization of the dynamics. The two models varied in the range of drift processes postulated. Higher support was observed for the simpler model, which only included drifts from an uncertainty state to either of two certainty states. In addition, model parameters could be weakly related to the eventual decision, complementing our knowledge of the way eye tracking structure relates to decision (notably the gaze cascade effect).</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"134 ","pages":"Article 101464"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010028522000020/pdfft?md5=c074a8b48e1bc203cf228ca94cef1ee5&pid=1-s2.0-S0010028522000020-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48762379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"An interference model for visual working memory: Applications to the change detection task","authors":"Hsuan-Yu Lin ,&nbsp;Klaus Oberauer","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2022.101463","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2022.101463","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Most studies of visual-working memory employ one of two experimental paradigms: change-detection or continuous-stimulus reproduction. In this study, we extended the Interference Model (IM; Oberauer &amp; Lin, 2017), which was designed for continuous reproduction, to the single-probe change-detection task. In continuous reproduction, participants occasionally report the non-target items instead of the target. The presence of non-target response is predicted by the Interference Model, which relies in part on the interference of non-target items to explain the set-size effect. By presenting a probe matching a non-target item, we can investigate the amount of interference from non-target items in change detection. As predicted by the Interference Model, we observed poorer performance in rejecting a probe matching a non-target item compared to a new probe (i.e., a cost due to intrusions from non-targets). We fitted the IM along with the Variable Precision, the Slot-Averaging, and the Neural-Population model to the data from two change-detection experiments. The models were equipped with a Bayesian decision rule based on the one used in Keshvari, van den Berg, and Ma (2013). The Interference Model and the Neural-Population model successfully predicted the set-size effect and the non-target intrusion cost, whereas the Variable Precision (VP) and Slot-Averaging (SA) models failed to predict the intrusion cost at all. Even with additional assumptions enabling VP and SA to produce intrusion costs, the IM still performed better than the competing models quantitatively.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"133 ","pages":"Article 101463"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39788805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Hypothesis testing, attention, and ‘Same’-‘Different’ judgments","authors":"Bart Farell","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2021.101443","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2021.101443","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Logic and common sense say that judging two stimuli as “same” is the converse of judging them as “different”. Empirically, however, ‘Same’-‘Different’ judgment data are anomalous in two major ways. The fast-‘Same’ effect violates the expectation that ‘Same’ reaction time (RT) should be predictable by extrapolating from ‘Different’ RT. The criterion effect violates the expectation that RTs measured when sameness is defined by a conjunction of matching attributes should predict RTs measured when sameness is defined by a disjunction of matching attributes. The two criteria are symmetrical, yet empirically they differ greatly, disjunctive judgments being by far the slower of the two. This study sought the sources of these two effects. With the aid of a cue, a selective-comparison method deconfounded the contributions of stimulus encoding and comparisons to the two effects. The results were paradoxical. Each additional irrelevant (uncued) letter in a random string incremented RT for conjunctive judgments as much as an additional relevant letter did. Yet irrelevant letters were not compared and relevant letters had to be compared. These results appeared again in a second experiment that used words as stimuli. Contrary to intuition, a distinct comparison mechanism—the heart of relative judgment models—is not necessary in judgments of sameness and difference. It is shown here that encoding can carry out the comparison function without the operation of a separate comparison mechanism. Attention mediates the process by selecting from the set of stimulus alternatives, thereby partitioning the set into the ‘Same’ and ‘Different’ subsets. The fast-‘Same’ and criterion effects result from a structural limitation on what attention can select at any one time. With attention mediating the task, ‘Same’-‘Different’ judgments become, in effect, the outcome of a testing of a hypothesis, bridging the distinction between absolute stimulus identification and relative judgments.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"132 ","pages":"Article 101443"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2022-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010028521000669/pdfft?md5=c3ca913fd24d6ee67d946caaa4789411&pid=1-s2.0-S0010028521000669-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39685326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Causal invariance as a tacit aspiration: Analytic knowledge of invariance functions","authors":"Jooyong Park ,&nbsp;Shannon McGillivray ,&nbsp;Jeffrey K. Bye ,&nbsp;Patricia W. Cheng","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2021.101432","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2021.101432","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>For causal knowledge to be worth learning, it must remain valid when that knowledge is applied. Because unknown background causes are potentially present, and may vary across the learning and application contexts, extricating the strength of a candidate cause requires an assumption regarding the decomposition of the observed outcome into the unobservable influences from the candidate and from background causes. Acquiring stable, useable causal knowledge is challenging when the search space of candidate causes is large, such that the reasoner’s current set of candidates may fail to include a cause that generalizes well to an application context. We have hypothesized that an indispensable navigation device that shapes our causal representations toward useable knowledge involves the concept of <em>causal invariance</em> – the sameness of how a cause operates to produce an effect across contexts. Here, we tested our <em>causal invariance hypothesis</em> by making use of the distinct mathematical functions expressing causal invariance for two outcome-variable types: continuous and binary. Our hypothesis predicts that, given identical prior domain knowledge, intuitive causal judgments should vary in accord with the causal-invariance function for a reasoner’s perceived outcome-variable type. The judgments are made as if the reasoner aspires to formulate causally invariant knowledge. Our experiments involved two cue-competition paradigms: blocking and overexpectation. Results show that adult humans tacitly use the appropriate causal-invariance functions for decomposition. Our analysis offers an explanation for the apparent elusiveness of the blocking effect and the adaptiveness of intuitive causal inference to the representation-dependent reality in the mind.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"132 ","pages":"Article 101432"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2022-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010028521000554/pdfft?md5=d1a550afba8d852dccc4cf55be71eb54&pid=1-s2.0-S0010028521000554-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39942582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Motivated to learn: An account of explanatory satisfaction","authors":"Emily G. Liquin,&nbsp;Tania Lombrozo","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2021.101453","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2021.101453","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Many explanations have a distinctive, positive phenomenology: receiving or generating these explanations feels <em>satisfying</em>. Accordingly, we might expect this feeling of explanatory satisfaction to reinforce and motivate inquiry. Across five studies, we investigate how explanatory satisfaction plays this role: by motivating and reinforcing inquiry quite generally (“brute motivation” account), or by selectively guiding inquiry to support useful learning about the target of explanation (“aligned motivation” account). In Studies 1–2, we find that satisfaction with an explanation is related to several measures of perceived useful learning, and that greater satisfaction in turn predicts stronger curiosity about questions related to the explanation. However, in Studies 2–4, we find only tenuous evidence that satisfaction is related to actual learning, measured objectively through multiple-choice or free recall tests. In Study 4, we additionally show that perceptions of learning fully explain one seemingly specious feature of explanatory preferences studied in prior research: the preference for uninformative “reductive” explanations. Finally, in Study 5, we find that perceived learning is (at least in part) causally responsible for feelings of satisfaction. Together, these results point to what we call the “imperfectly aligned motivation” account: explanatory satisfaction selectively motivates inquiry towards learning explanatory information, but primarily through fallible perceptions of learning. Thus, satisfaction is likely to guide individuals towards lines of inquiry that support perceptions of learning, whether or not individuals actually are learning.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"132 ","pages":"Article 101453"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2022-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010028521000761/pdfft?md5=5aebb88d43bfa490e7cbcb9741c65ea9&pid=1-s2.0-S0010028521000761-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39699858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Robust priors for regularized regression","authors":"Sebastian Bobadilla-Suarez ,&nbsp;Matt Jones ,&nbsp;Bradley C. Love","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2021.101444","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2021.101444","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Induction benefits from useful priors. Penalized regression approaches, like ridge regression, shrink weights toward zero but zero association is usually not a sensible prior. Inspired by simple and robust decision heuristics humans use, we constructed non-zero priors for penalized regression models that provide robust and interpretable solutions across several tasks. Our approach enables estimates from a constrained model to serve as a prior for a more general model, yielding a principled way to interpolate between models of differing complexity. We successfully applied this approach to a number of decision and classification problems, as well as analyzing simulated brain imaging data. Models with robust priors had excellent worst-case performance. Solutions followed from the form of the heuristic that was used to derive the prior. These new algorithms can serve applications in data analysis and machine learning, as well as help in understanding how people transition from novice to expert performance.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"132 ","pages":"Article 101444"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2022-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8903146/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39942583","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Repeated letters increase the ambiguity of strings: Evidence from identification, priming and same-different tasks","authors":"Iliyana V. Trifonova ,&nbsp;James S. Adelman","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2021.101445","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2021.101445","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Letters are often repeated in words in many languages. The present work explored the mechanisms underlying processing of repeated and unique letters in strings across three experimental paradigms. In a 2AFC perceptual identification task, the insertion but not the deletion of a letter was harder to detect when it was repeated than when it was unique (Exp. 1). In a masked primed same-different task, deletion primes produced the same priming effect regardless of deletion type (repeated, unique; Exp. 2), but insertion primes were more effective when the additional inserted letter created a repetition than when it did not (Exp. 3). In a same-different perceptual identification task, foils created by modifying a repetition, by either repeating the wrong letter or substituting a repeated letter, were harder to reject than foils created by modifying unique letters (Exp. 4). Thus, repetition effects were task-dependent. Since considering representations alone would suggest repetition effects would always occur or never occur, this indicates the importance of modelling task-specific processes. The similarity calculations embedded in the Overlap Model (Gomez et al., 2008) appeared to always predict a repetition effect, but its decision rule for the task of Experiment 1 allowed it to predict the asymmetry between insertions and deletions. In the Letters in Time and Retinotopic Space (LTRS; Adelman, 2011) model, repetition effects arise only from briefly presented stimuli as their perception is incomplete. It was therefore consistent with Experiments 2–4 but required a task-specific response bias to account for the insertion-deletion asymmetry of Experiment 1.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"132 ","pages":"Article 101445"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2022-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39672421","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Distributional social semantics: Inferring word meanings from communication patterns","authors":"Brendan T. Johns","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2021.101441","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2021.101441","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>Distributional models of lexical semantics have proven to be powerful accounts of how word meanings are acquired from the natural language environment (Günther, Rinaldi, &amp; Marelli, 2019; Kumar, 2020). Standard models of this type acquire the meaning of words through the learning of word co-occurrence statistics across large corpora. However, these models ignore social and communicative aspects of language processing, which is considered central to usage-based and adaptive theories of language (Tomasello, 2003; Beckner et al., 2009). </span><span>Johns (2021)</span> recently demonstrated that integrating social and communicative information into a lexical strength measure allowed for benchmark fits to be attained for lexical organization data, indicating that the social world contains important statistical information for language learning and processing. Through the analysis of the communication patterns of over 330,000 individuals on the online forum Reddit, totaling approximately 55 billion words of text, the findings of the current article demonstrates that social information about word usage allows for unique aspects of a word’s meaning to be acquired, providing a new pathway for distributional model development.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"131 ","pages":"Article 101441"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39534014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Word vs. World Knowledge: A developmental shift from bottom-up lexical cues to top-down plausibility","authors":"Anthony Yacovone,&nbsp;Carissa L. Shafto,&nbsp;Amanda Worek,&nbsp;Jesse Snedeker","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2021.101442","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2021.101442","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Both 5-year-old children and adults infer the structure of a sentence as they are hearing it. Prior work, however, has found that children do not always make use of the same information that adults do to guide these inferences. Specifically, when hearing ambiguous sentences like “You can tickle the frog with the feather,” children seem to ignore the aspects of the referential context that adults rely on to resolve the ambiguity—e.g., are there two frogs in the scene, one with a feather and one without? Or is there only one frog to be tickled by using a feather? The present study explored two hypotheses about children’s failure to use high-level, top-down context cues to infer the structure of these ambiguous sentences: First, children may be less likely to use <em>any</em> top-down cue during comprehension. Second, children may only have difficulties with top-down cues that are unreliable predictors of which syntactic structure is being used. Thus, to disentangle these hypotheses, we conducted a visual world study of adults’ and children’s ambiguity resolution, manipulating a more reliable top-down cue (the plausibility of the interpretation) and pitting it against a robust bottom-up cue (lexical biases). We find that adults’ and children’s final interpretations are influenced by both sources of information: adults, however, give greater weight to the top-down cue, whereas children primarily rely on the bottom-up cue. Thus, children’s tendency to make minimal use of top-down information persists even when this information is highly valid and dominates adult comprehension. We propose that children have a systematic propensity to rely on bottom-up processing to a greater degree than adults, which could reflect differences in the architecture of the adult and child language comprehension systems or differences in processing speed.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"131 ","pages":"Article 101442"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39783913","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"How “is” shapes “ought” for folk-biological concepts","authors":"Emily Foster-Hanson, T. Lombrozo","doi":"10.31234/osf.io/k2sfm","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/k2sfm","url":null,"abstract":"Knowing which features are frequent among a biological kind (e.g., that most zebras have stripes) shapes people's representations of what category members are like (e.g., that typical zebras have stripes) and normative judgments about what they ought to be like (e.g., that zebras should have stripes). In the current work, we ask if people's inclination to explain why features are frequent is a key mechanism through which what \"is\" shapes beliefs about what \"ought\" to be. Across four studies (N = 591), we find that frequent features are often explained by appeal to feature function (e.g., that stripes are for camouflage), that functional explanations in turn shape judgments of typicality, and that functional explanations and typicality both predict normative judgments that category members ought to have functional features. We also identify the causal assumptions that license inferences from feature frequency and function, as well as the nature of the normative inferences that are drawn: by specifying an instrumental goal (e.g., camouflage), functional explanations establish a basis for normative evaluation. These findings shed light on how and why our representations of how the natural world is shape our judgments of how it ought to be.","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"139 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2021-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69647707","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}