EconometricaPub Date : 2024-06-05DOI: 10.3982/ECTA22163
Giovanni L. Violante
{"title":"A Comment on: “Walras–Bowley Lecture: Market Power and Wage Inequality” by Shubhdeep Deb, Jan Eeckhout, Aseem Patel, and Lawrence Warren","authors":"Giovanni L. Violante","doi":"10.3982/ECTA22163","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA22163","url":null,"abstract":"<p><span>One of the most exciting new trends</span> in macroeconomics is the development of general equilibrium models with oligopolistic product markets in which a discrete number of firms interact strategically and exploit their market power to set an endogenous wedge between price and marginal cost. This literature is largely motivated by a novel set of empirical findings establishing that market concentration has increased and/or price markups have risen at the aggregate level. Heightened market power has already proved to be helpful in explaining a number of major macroeconomic trends in the United States, such as the decline in the labor share (Autor, Dorn, Katz, Patterson, and Van Reenen (<span>2020</span>)), the fall in business dynamism and innovation rate (<span>Akcigit and Ates</span> (<span>2019</span>)), the investment slowdown (<span>Gutiérrez and Philippon</span> (<span>2017</span>)), and the deteriorating net foreign asset position (<span>Atkeson, Heathcote, and Perri</span> (<span>2022</span>)).</p><p>Jan Eeckhout is a coauthor of one of the earliest and most influential papers on this topic (<span>De Loecker, Eeckhout, and Unger</span> (<span>2020</span>)), and a leader of this literature. In this Walras–Bowley lecture, Eeckhout and coauthors (DEPW, thereafter) ask whether stronger product market power can also quantitatively account for three salient shifts in the U.S. wage structure over the last two decades: growing skill premium, stagnant average wages, and the between-firm component explaining most of the rise in wage inequality.</p><p>For this purpose, DEPW develop a structural model in the spirit of <span>Atkeson and Burstein</span> (<span>2008</span>) and <span>Berger, Herkenhoff, and Mongey</span> (<span>2022</span>), two other seminal contributions in this literature. This approach has been especially successful because it obtains a rich market structure with endogenous markups that nests perfect competition, monopolistic competition, and monopoly, while retaining analytical tractability thanks to the within- and between-sector CES aggregators, and the continuum of sectors assumption implying that no individual firm can affect the aggregate price and wage indexes. The specific contribution of DEPW is to simultaneously apply this elegant framework to both product and labor markets, while also allowing for heterogeneity in the degree of skill-biased technical change (SBTC, thereafter) at the establishment level. As a result, the model incorporates three potential sources of changes in the wage structure: shifts in technology, rising monopsony power, and rising monopoly power.</p><p>The impact of skill-biased technical change on the wage structure is well understood. Market power affects the wage structure via two channels. First, individual firms have monopsony power in both the skilled and unskilled labor markets, that is, they face an upward sloping labor supply curve (e.g., because of frictions in labor mobility or id","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA22163","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141251475","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
EconometricaPub Date : 2024-06-05DOI: 10.3982/ECTA19636
YingHua He, Shruti Sinha, Xiaoting Sun
{"title":"Identification and Estimation in Many-to-One Two-Sided Matching Without Transfers","authors":"YingHua He, Shruti Sinha, Xiaoting Sun","doi":"10.3982/ECTA19636","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA19636","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>In a setting of many-to-one two-sided matching with nontransferable utilities, for example, college admissions, we study conditions under which preferences of both sides are identified with data on one single market. Regardless of whether the market is centralized or decentralized, assuming that the observed matching is stable, we show nonparametric identification of preferences of both sides under certain exclusion restrictions. To take our results to the data, we use Monte Carlo simulations to evaluate different estimators, including the ones that are directly constructed from the identification. We find that a parametric Bayesian approach with a Gibbs sampler works well in realistically sized problems. Finally, we illustrate our methodology in decentralized admissions to public and private schools in Chile and conduct a counterfactual analysis of an affirmative action policy.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA19636","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141251388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
EconometricaPub Date : 2024-06-05DOI: 10.3982/ECTA21653
Andreas Asseyer, Ran Weksler
{"title":"Certification Design With Common Values","authors":"Andreas Asseyer, Ran Weksler","doi":"10.3982/ECTA21653","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA21653","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>This paper studies certification design and its implications for information disclosure. Our model features a profit-maximizing certifier and the seller of a good of unknown quality. We allow for common values as the seller's opportunity cost may depend on the quality of the good. We compare certifier-optimal with transparency-maximizing certification design. Certifier-optimal certification design implements the evidence structure of Dye (1985)—a fraction of sellers acquire information while the remaining sellers are uninformed—and results in partial disclosure to the market. A transparency-maximizing regulator prefers a less precise signal, which conveys more information to the market through a higher rate of certification and unraveling (Grossman (1981), Milgrom (1981)) at the disclosure stage.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA21653","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141251380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
EconometricaPub Date : 2024-06-05DOI: 10.3982/ECTA923PRES
{"title":"The Econometric Society 2023 Annual Report of the President","authors":"","doi":"10.3982/ECTA923PRES","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA923PRES","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141251392","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
EconometricaPub Date : 2024-06-05DOI: 10.3982/ECTA17876
Tom Ahn, Peter Arcidiacono, Amy Hopson, James Thomas
{"title":"Equilibrium Grading Policies With Implications for Female Interest in STEM Courses","authors":"Tom Ahn, Peter Arcidiacono, Amy Hopson, James Thomas","doi":"10.3982/ECTA17876","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA17876","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We show that stricter grading policies in STEM courses reduce STEM enrollment, especially for women. We estimate a model of student demand for courses and optimal effort choices given professor grading policies. Grading policies are treated as equilibrium objects that in part depend on student demand for courses. Differences in demand for STEM and non-STEM courses explain much of why STEM classes give lower grades. Restrictions on grading policies that equalize average grades across classes reduce the STEM gender gap and increase overall enrollment in STEM classes.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141251389","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
EconometricaPub Date : 2024-06-05DOI: 10.3982/ECTA22362
Bruce E. Hansen
{"title":"Reply to: Comment on “A Modern Gauss–Markov Theorem”","authors":"Bruce E. Hansen","doi":"10.3982/ECTA22362","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA22362","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>This note makes a brief response to Portnoy (2022) and Pötscher and Preinerstorfer (2024), and discusses what instructors should teach about best unbiased estimation.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA22362","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141251387","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
EconometricaPub Date : 2024-06-05DOI: 10.3982/ECTA22384
Shubhdeep Deb, Jan Eeckhout, Aseem Patel, Lawrence Warren
{"title":"Reply to: Comments on “Walras–Bowley Lecture: Market Power and Wage Inequality”","authors":"Shubhdeep Deb, Jan Eeckhout, Aseem Patel, Lawrence Warren","doi":"10.3982/ECTA22384","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA22384","url":null,"abstract":"<p><span><span>Violante</span></span> <span>(</span><span><span>2023</span></span><span>) and</span> <span><span>Van Reenen</span></span> <span>(</span><span><span>2023</span></span><span>)</span> offer a comprehensive review of the lecture and point out the key aspects of the paper. We are grateful for their comments which have greatly improved this research.</p><p>Our goals in this paper are twofold: (a) to provide a methodological framework that jointly incorporates goods market power (oligopoly) and labor market power (oligopsony) in a general equilibrium setting, and (b) to propose an empirical strategy for applying such a framework to microdata to estimate key structural parameters and a joint distribution of establishment-level productivity. Combined, these features allow us to quantify the relative importance of technological change and changes in market structure on the labor market, in particular on the evolution of wages, wage stagnation, and wage inequality. The main insight of our model is that market power and wage inequality are both endogenous objects, determined simultaneously in equilibrium by (1) the market structure (the number of competing firms); (2) the dispersion of establishment-level productivity; and (3) the substitutability parameters in the product and labor markets.</p><p>We find that a change in the market structure (excluding changes in the dispersion of productivity and within- and between-market substitutability parameters) accounts for 8.1% of the rise in the skill premium, and 54.8% of the increase in between-establishment inequality. Our analysis also establishes that technology is indeed the main driver of wage inequality, whereas the decline in competition is behind the increasing gap between wages and productivity.</p><p>Both commentators rightly point out that our assumption of perfectly <i>overlapping boundaries</i> between product and labor markets is strong. We agree, and nonetheless maintain this simplifying assumption for two reasons. The first is for computational tractability, as allowing for non-overlapping boundaries greatly increases the dimensionality of the system of equations needed to compute the economy's equilibrium.<sup>1</sup> Second, we estimate market structure without using industry, occupation, or geography-based definitions, which would be considerably more challenging without overlapping boundaries.<sup>2</sup> Additional future work is needed to establish whether, in which direction, and by what magnitude non-overlapping markets will alter our results with multiple skilled inputs. Despite the simplification in our analysis, our model provides a computationally tractable way to analyze the effect of imperfect competition on labor market inequality.</p><p>Both commentators further emphasize the need to carefully disentangle the <i>sources</i> of firms' market power. We agree that it is important to understand whether rising markups are due to lax antitrust enforcement or to past inve","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA22384","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141251425","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
EconometricaPub Date : 2024-03-19DOI: 10.3982/ECTA17513
David Rezza Baqaee, Emmanuel Farhi
{"title":"Networks, Barriers, and Trade","authors":"David Rezza Baqaee, Emmanuel Farhi","doi":"10.3982/ECTA17513","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA17513","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study a flexible class of trade models with international production networks and arbitrary wedge-like distortions like markups, tariffs, or nominal rigidities. We characterize the general equilibrium response of variables to shocks in terms of microeconomic statistics. Our results are useful for decomposing the sources of real GDP and welfare growth, and for computing counterfactuals. Using the same set of microeconomic sufficient statistics, we also characterize societal losses from increases in tariffs and iceberg trade costs and dissect the qualitative and quantitative importance of accounting for disaggregated details. Our results, which can be used to compute approximate and exact counterfactuals, provide an analytical toolbox for studying large-scale trade models and help to bridge the gap between computation and theory.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140161415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}