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Backmatter of Econometrica Vol. 92 Iss. 2 Backmatter of Econometrica Vol.2
IF 6.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2024-03-19 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA922BM
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引用次数: 0
Flexible Moral Hazard Problems 灵活的道德风险问题
IF 6.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2024-03-19 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA21383
George Georgiadis, Doron Ravid, Balázs Szentes
{"title":"Flexible Moral Hazard Problems","authors":"George Georgiadis,&nbsp;Doron Ravid,&nbsp;Balázs Szentes","doi":"10.3982/ECTA21383","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA21383","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper considers a moral hazard problem where the agent can choose any output distribution with a support in a given compact set. The agent's effort-cost is <i>smooth</i> and increasing in first-order stochastic dominance. To analyze this model, we develop a generalized notion of the first-order approach applicable to optimization problems over measures. We demonstrate each output distribution can be implemented and identify those contracts that implement that distribution. These contracts are characterized by a simple first-order condition for each output that equates the agent's marginal cost of changing the implemented distribution around that output with its marginal benefit. Furthermore, the agent's wage is shown to be increasing in output. Finally, we consider the problem of a profit-maximizing principal and provide a first-order characterization of principal-optimal distributions.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140161412","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Adapting to Climate Risk With Guaranteed Credit: Evidence From Bangladesh 利用担保信贷适应气候风险：孟加拉国的证据
IF 6.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2024-03-19 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA19127
Gregory Lane
{"title":"Adapting to Climate Risk With Guaranteed Credit: Evidence From Bangladesh","authors":"Gregory Lane","doi":"10.3982/ECTA19127","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA19127","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>Climate change is increasing the frequency of extreme weather events, with low-income countries being disproportionately impacted. However, these countries often face market frictions that hinder their ability to adopt effective adaptation strategies. In this paper, I explore the role of credit market failures in limiting adaptation. To achieve this, I collaborate with a large microfinance institution and offer a randomly selected group of farmers access to guaranteed credit through an “Emergency Loan” following a negative climate shock. I document three key results. First, farmers who have access to the emergency loan make less costly adaptation choices and are less severely affected when a flood occurs. Second, I find no evidence of adverse spillover effects on households that did not receive the Emergency Loan. Finally, I demonstrate that providing the Emergency Loan is profitable for the microfinance institution, making it a viable tool for the private sector to employ in similar circumstances.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA19127","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140161411","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bargaining and Exclusion With Multiple Buyers 与多个买家讨价还价和排除法
IF 6.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2024-03-19 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA19675
Dilip Abreu, Mihai Manea
{"title":"Bargaining and Exclusion With Multiple Buyers","authors":"Dilip Abreu,&nbsp;Mihai Manea","doi":"10.3982/ECTA19675","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA19675","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A seller trades with <i>q</i> out of <i>n</i> buyers who have valuations <i>a</i><sub>1</sub> ≥ <i>a</i><sub>2</sub> ≥ ⋯ ≥ <i>a</i><sub><i>n</i></sub> &gt; 0 via sequential bilateral bargaining. When <i>q</i> &lt; <i>n</i>, buyer payoffs vary across equilibria in the patient limit, but seller payoffs do not, and converge to \u0000\u0000 </p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140161444","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Frontmatter of Econometrica Vol. 92 Iss. 2 经济计量学前沿》（Frontmatter of Econometrica）第 92 卷第 2 期。2
IF 6.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2024-03-19 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA922FM
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引用次数: 0
The Econometric Society Annual Reports Report of the Editors of the Monograph Series 计量经济学会年度报告 专著丛书编辑报告
IF 6.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2024-01-30 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA921MONO
{"title":"The Econometric Society Annual Reports Report of the Editors of the Monograph Series","authors":"","doi":"10.3982/ECTA921MONO","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA921MONO","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139643916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Backmatter of Econometrica Vol. 92 Iss. 1 Backmatter of Econometrica Vol.1
IF 6.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2024-01-30 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA921BM
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引用次数: 0
Learning in Repeated Interactions on Networks 在网络的重复互动中学习
IF 6.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2024-01-30 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA20806
Wanying Huang, Philipp Strack, Omer Tamuz
{"title":"Learning in Repeated Interactions on Networks","authors":"Wanying Huang,&nbsp;Philipp Strack,&nbsp;Omer Tamuz","doi":"10.3982/ECTA20806","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA20806","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study how long-lived, rational agents learn in a social network. In every period, after observing the past actions of his neighbors, each agent receives a private signal, and chooses an action whose payoff depends only on the state. Since equilibrium actions depend on higher-order beliefs, it is difficult to characterize behavior. Nevertheless, we show that regardless of the size and shape of the network, the utility function, and the patience of the agents, the speed of learning in any equilibrium is bounded from above by a constant that only depends on the private signal distribution.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139643926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Do not Blame Bellman: It Is Koopmans' Fault 不要责怪贝尔曼：这是库普曼斯的错
IF 6.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2024-01-30 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA20386
Gaetano Bloise, Cuong Le Van, Yiannis Vailakis
{"title":"Do not Blame Bellman: It Is Koopmans' Fault","authors":"Gaetano Bloise,&nbsp;Cuong Le Van,&nbsp;Yiannis Vailakis","doi":"10.3982/ECTA20386","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA20386","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>We provide a unified approach to stochastic dynamic programming with recursive utility based on an elementary application of Tarski's fixed point theorem. We establish that the exclusive source of multiple values is the presence of multiple recursive utilities consistent with the given aggregator, each yielding a legitimate value of the recursive program. We also present sufficient conditions ensuring a unique value of the recursive program in some circumstances. Overall, acknowledging the unavoidable failure of uniqueness in general, we argue that the greatest fixed point of the Bellman operator should have a privileged position.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA20386","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139643929","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Drilling Deadlines and Oil and Gas Development 钻探截止日期与石油和天然气开发
IF 6.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2024-01-30 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA18436
Evan Herrnstadt, Ryan Kellogg, Eric Lewis
{"title":"Drilling Deadlines and Oil and Gas Development","authors":"Evan Herrnstadt,&nbsp;Ryan Kellogg,&nbsp;Eric Lewis","doi":"10.3982/ECTA18436","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA18436","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>Oil and gas leases between mineral owners and extraction firms typically specify a date by which the firm must either drill a well or lose the lease. These deadlines are known as primary terms. Using data from the Louisiana shale boom, we first show that well drilling is substantially bunched just before the primary term deadline. This bunching is not necessarily surplus-reducing: using an estimated model of firms' drilling and input choices, we show that primary terms can increase total surplus by countering the effects of leases' royalties, as royalties are a tax on revenue and delay drilling. These benefits are reduced, however, when production outcomes are sensitive to drilling inputs and when drilling one well indefinitely extends the period of time during which additional wells may be drilled. We enrich the model to consider mineral owners' lease offers and find small effects of primary terms on owners' revenue.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA18436","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139655121","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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