Econometrica最新文献_第4页

Reply to: Comment on “Presidential Address: Economics and Measurement: New Measures to Model Decision Making” 答复对 "总统演讲 "的评论：经济学与测量：模拟决策的新措施"

IF 6.6 1区经济学

Econometrica Pub Date : 2024-07-30 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA22811

Ingvild Almås, Orazio Attanasio, Pamela Jervis

引用次数: 0

Searching for Approval 寻求批准

IF 6.6 1区经济学

Econometrica Pub Date : 2024-07-30 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA18554

Sumit Agarwal, John Grigsby, Ali Hortaçsu, Gregor Matvos, Amit Seru, Vincent Yao

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引用次数: 0

Frontmatter of Econometrica Vol. 92 Iss. 4 经济计量学前沿》（Frontmatter of Econometrica）第 92 卷第 4 期。4

IF 6.6 1区经济学

Econometrica Pub Date : 2024-07-30 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA924FM

引用次数: 0

Nonparametric Identification of Differentiated Products Demand Using Micro Data 利用微观数据对差异化产品需求进行非参数识别

IF 6.6 1区经济学

Econometrica Pub Date : 2024-07-30 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA20731

Steven T. Berry, Philip A. Haile

引用次数: 0

The State Capacity Ceiling on Tax Rates: Evidence From Randomized Tax Abatements in the DRC 税率的国家能力上限：刚果民主共和国随机减税的证据

IF 6.6 1区经济学

Econometrica Pub Date : 2024-07-30 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA19959

Augustin Bergeron, Gabriel Tourek, Jonathan L. Weigel

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引用次数: 0

Backmatter of Econometrica Vol. 92 Iss. 4 Backmatter of Econometrica Vol.4

IF 6.6 1区经济学

Econometrica Pub Date : 2024-07-30 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA924BM

引用次数: 0

Beyond Unbounded Beliefs: How Preferences and Information Interplay in Social Learning 超越无界信念：偏好和信息如何在社会学习中相互作用

IF 6.6 1区经济学

Econometrica Pub Date : 2024-07-30 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA21470

Navin Kartik, SangMok Lee, Tianhao Liu, Daniel Rappoport

引用次数: 0

The Unequal Effects of Pollution on Labor Supply 污染对劳动力供给的不平等影响

IF 6.6 1区经济学