EconometricaPub Date : 2026-06-08DOI: 10.3982/ECTA22488
Kate Ho, Robin S. Lee
{"title":"Fisher–Schultz Lecture: Contracting Over Pharmaceutical Formularies and Rebates","authors":"Kate Ho, Robin S. Lee","doi":"10.3982/ECTA22488","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA22488","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We investigate how formularies used by pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) affect equilibrium manufacturer rebates for branded drugs through tiering and exclusion. We develop a theoretical model of multidimensional contracting in which a PBM negotiates with drug manufacturers over menus of formulary-contingent rebates and chooses a formulary. We then estimate consumer demand responses to tier placement for statins using claims data from Princeton University, a large employer contracting with a single PBM to offer prescription drug coverage to its employees. Combining the theoretical model with demand estimates and observed list prices, we quantify how allowing for differential tier placement and exclusion affect equilibrium rebates. Our predictions are consistent with available aggregate rebate data, and we find that allowing a PBM to place branded drugs on preferred- and non-preferred tiers can substantially increase negotiated rebate payments.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"94 3","pages":"689-728"},"PeriodicalIF":7.1,"publicationDate":"2026-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148193936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
EconometricaPub Date : 2026-06-08DOI: 10.3982/ECTA24060
Battal Doğan, Lars Ehlers
{"title":"Existence of Myopic-Farsighted Stable Sets in Matching Markets","authors":"Battal Doğan, Lars Ehlers","doi":"10.3982/ECTA24060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA24060","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In the context of one-to-one matching markets, we study <i>myopic-farsighted stable sets</i>, which are internally and externally stable when myopic agents consider immediate payoffs from their deviations, while farsighted agents anticipate counter-deviations and consider final payoffs. We constructively prove the existence of a (rational expectations) myopic-farsighted stable set, in which farsighted agents receive a single payoff while myopic agents may receive multiple payoffs. Our existence result extends to settings with enforcing coalitions of arbitrary size, yielding <i>coalitional myopic-farsighted stable sets</i>, and to settings where not all members of an enforcing coalition must strictly gain, yielding <i>myopic-farsighted weakly stable sets</i>. When all farsighted agents have unit demand, our results also extend to many-to-one matching markets. As a key corollary, we provide a foundation for the efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance algorithm by showing that its outcome constitutes a singleton myopic-farsighted stable set when one side is farsighted and the other is myopic.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"94 3","pages":"811-841"},"PeriodicalIF":7.1,"publicationDate":"2026-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA24060","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148193942","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
EconometricaPub Date : 2026-06-08DOI: 10.3982/ECTA21084
Nicholas Ryan
{"title":"Holding up Green Energy: Counterparty Risk in the Indian Solar Power Market","authors":"Nicholas Ryan","doi":"10.3982/ECTA21084","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA21084","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper studies how the risk of hold-up affects procurement. I use data on the universe of solar power auctions in India. The Indian context allows clean estimates of counterparty risk, because solar plants set up in the same states, by the same firms, are procured in auctions intermediated by either risky states themselves or the trusted central government. I find that the counterparty risk of an average state increases solar prices by 10%. This risk premium sharply reduces investment, because demand for green energy is elastic. Contract intermediation by the central government eliminates the counterparty risk premium.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"94 3","pages":"767-810"},"PeriodicalIF":7.1,"publicationDate":"2026-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148193941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
EconometricaPub Date : 2026-06-08DOI: 10.3982/ECTA21097
Pierre-André Chiappori, Carlo Fiorio, Alfred Galichon, Stefano Verzillo
{"title":"Assortative Matching on Income","authors":"Pierre-André Chiappori, Carlo Fiorio, Alfred Galichon, Stefano Verzillo","doi":"10.3982/ECTA21097","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA21097","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We analyze marital matching on income using an extremely rich Dutch data set containing all income tax files over seven years. We develop a novel methodology that directly extends previous contributions to allow for highly flexible matching patterns. Investigating all marriages that took place between 2013 and 2019, we find that marital patterns are particularly intriguing. While a majority of couples match assortatively, a small but significant minority display negative assortative matching. We also show that standard approaches, which consider all married couples using <i>current</i> incomes (as opposed to pre-marriage incomes used in our approach), may generate misleading conclusions.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"94 3","pages":"957-989"},"PeriodicalIF":7.1,"publicationDate":"2026-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA21097","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148194063","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
EconometricaPub Date : 2026-06-08DOI: 10.3982/ECTA24816
Kate Ho, Robin S. Lee
{"title":"Reply to comments on ‘Fisher–Schultz Lecture: Contracting Over Pharmaceutical Formularies and Rebates’","authors":"Kate Ho, Robin S. Lee","doi":"10.3982/ECTA24816","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA24816","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"94 3","pages":"739-740"},"PeriodicalIF":7.1,"publicationDate":"2026-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148193939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
EconometricaPub Date : 2026-06-08DOI: 10.3982/ECTA24210
Rena M. Conti
{"title":"Comment on ‘Fisher–Schultz Lecture: Contracting Over Pharmaceutical Formularies and Rebates’ by Kate Ho and Robin Lee","authors":"Rena M. Conti","doi":"10.3982/ECTA24210","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA24210","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Biopharmaceuticals advance health and economic growth. Unlike central bargaining abroad, the United States uses private firms, pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs), to manage medicine access and spending. Yet, PBMs' roles in advancing efficiency are understudied. Ho and Lee model PBMs' use of tiered formularies, lists of covered medicines, without the use of proprietary data on the price concessions drug makers offer for preferred placement. They find PBMs' use of tiered formularies generate significant payor savings through competition. Complementing Ho and Lee, Feng and Maini (2024) model how patient demand inertia limits PBMs' ability to extract price concessions from drug makers which consequently erodes the efficacy gains of PBM formularies. Conti, Frandsen, Powell, and Rebitzer (2021) model formulary auctions where PBM size drives payor savings, but also spurs endogenously set high list prices, reducing patient access. Future economic research should focus on PBM market entry and vertical integration, pharmacy steering, and effects on innovation.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"94 3","pages":"729-733"},"PeriodicalIF":7.1,"publicationDate":"2026-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148193937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
EconometricaPub Date : 2026-06-08DOI: 10.3982/ECTA943PRES
{"title":"The Econometric Society 2025 Annual Report of the President","authors":"","doi":"10.3982/ECTA943PRES","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA943PRES","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"94 3","pages":"1045-1060"},"PeriodicalIF":7.1,"publicationDate":"2026-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148193883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
EconometricaPub Date : 2026-06-08DOI: 10.3982/ECTA21835
Dita Eckardt
{"title":"Training Specificity and Occupational Mobility: Evidence From German Apprenticeships","authors":"Dita Eckardt","doi":"10.3982/ECTA21835","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA21835","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Apprenticeships play a key role in enabling successful school-to-work transitions in many countries, but in the presence of imperfect information, the specificity of this type of training may entail important costs for those working outside their training fields. I study this issue in one of the most prominent training settings, the German apprenticeship system. Using administrative data and a broad occupational classification, I find that 40% of individuals work in occupations different from their training. I estimate the cost of mismatch using vacancy instruments and extend methodological approaches in high-dimensional selection settings. Lacking training in one's occupation entails an average wage penalty of 14%, the equivalent of two years of work experience. The penalty increases with the task distance between training and occupation. My findings suggest that retraining is crucial to mitigate the adverse consequences from imperfect information in specialized training settings.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"94 3","pages":"741-766"},"PeriodicalIF":7.1,"publicationDate":"2026-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA21835","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148193940","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}