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Monotone Additive Statistics 单调加法统计
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2024-07-30 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA19967
Xiaosheng Mu, Luciano Pomatto, Philipp Strack, Omer Tamuz
{"title":"Monotone Additive Statistics","authors":"Xiaosheng Mu,&nbsp;Luciano Pomatto,&nbsp;Philipp Strack,&nbsp;Omer Tamuz","doi":"10.3982/ECTA19967","DOIUrl":"10.3982/ECTA19967","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The expectation is an example of a descriptive statistic that is monotone with respect to stochastic dominance, and additive for sums of independent random variables. We provide a complete characterization of such statistics, and explore a number of applications to models of individual and group decision-making. These include a representation of stationary monotone time preferences, extending the work of Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982) to time lotteries. This extension offers a new perspective on risk attitudes toward time, as well as on the aggregation of multiple discount factors. We also offer a novel class of non-expected utility preferences over gambles which satisfy invariance to background risk as well as betweenness, but are versatile enough to capture mixed risk attitudes.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2024-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141863775","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Peak-Hour Road Congestion Pricing: Experimental Evidence and Equilibrium Implications 高峰时段道路拥堵定价：实验证据和均衡影响
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2024-07-30 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA18422
Gabriel Kreindler
{"title":"Peak-Hour Road Congestion Pricing: Experimental Evidence and Equilibrium Implications","authors":"Gabriel Kreindler","doi":"10.3982/ECTA18422","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA18422","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Developing country megacities suffer from severe road traffic congestion, yet the level of congestion is not a direct measure of equilibrium inefficiency. I study the peak-hour traffic congestion equilibrium in Bangalore. To measure travel preferences, I use a model of departure time choice to design a field experiment with congestion pricing policies and implement it using precise GPS data. Commuter responses in the experiment reveal moderate schedule inflexibility and a high value of time. I then show that in Bangalore, traffic density has a moderate and linear impact on travel delay. My policy simulations with endogenous congestion indicate that optimal congestion charges would lead to a small reduction in travel times, and small commuter welfare gains. This result is driven primarily by the shape of the congestion externality. Overall, these results suggest limited commuter welfare benefits from peak-spreading traffic policies in cities like Bangalore.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2024-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141968371","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bias-Aware Inference in Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Designs 模糊回归不连续设计中的偏差感知推理
IF 6.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2024-06-05 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA19466
Claudia Noack, Christoph Rothe
{"title":"Bias-Aware Inference in Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Designs","authors":"Claudia Noack,&nbsp;Christoph Rothe","doi":"10.3982/ECTA19466","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA19466","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>We propose new confidence sets (CSs) for the regression discontinuity parameter in fuzzy designs. Our CSs are based on local linear regression, and are bias-aware, in the sense that they take possible bias explicitly into account. Their construction shares similarities with that of Anderson–Rubin CSs in exactly identified instrumental variable models, and thereby avoids issues with “delta method” approximations that underlie most commonly used existing inference methods for fuzzy regression discontinuity analysis. Our CSs are asymptotically equivalent to existing procedures in canonical settings with strong identification and a continuous running variable. However, they are also valid under a wide range of other empirically relevant conditions, such as setups with discrete running variables, donut designs, and weak identification.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA19466","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141251382","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Endogenous Information and Simplifying Insurance Choice 内生信息与简化保险选择
IF 6.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2024-06-05 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA18555
Zach Y. Brown, Jihye Jeon
{"title":"Endogenous Information and Simplifying Insurance Choice","authors":"Zach Y. Brown,&nbsp;Jihye Jeon","doi":"10.3982/ECTA18555","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA18555","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In markets with complicated products, individuals may choose how much time and effort to spend understanding and comparing alternatives. Focusing on insurance choice, we find evidence consistent with individuals acquiring more information when there are larger consequences from making an uninformed choice. Building on the rational inattention literature, we develop and estimate a parsimonious demand model in which individuals choose how much to research difficult-to-observe characteristics. We use our estimates to evaluate policies that simplify choice. Reducing the number of plans can raise welfare through improved choice as well as savings in information costs. Capping out-of-pocket costs generates larger welfare gains than standard models. The empirical model can be applied to other settings to examine the regulation of complex products.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141251385","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Setbacks, Shutdowns, and Overruns 挫折、停工和超支
IF 6.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2024-06-05 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA21548
Felix Zhiyu Feng, Curtis R. Taylor, Mark M. Westerfield, Feifan Zhang
{"title":"Setbacks, Shutdowns, and Overruns","authors":"Felix Zhiyu Feng,&nbsp;Curtis R. Taylor,&nbsp;Mark M. Westerfield,&nbsp;Feifan Zhang","doi":"10.3982/ECTA21548","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA21548","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We investigate optimal project management in a setting plagued by an indefinite number of setbacks that are discovered en route to project completion. The contractor can cover up delays in progress due to shirking either by making false claims of setbacks or by postponing the reports of real ones. The sponsor optimally induces work and honest reporting via a soft deadline and a reward for completion that specifies a bonus for early delivery. Late-stage setbacks trigger randomization between minimally feasible project extension and (inefficient) cancellation. Because extensions may be granted repeatedly, arbitrarily large overruns in schedule and budget are possible after which the project may still be canceled.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141251476","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Comment on: “A Modern Gauss–Markov Theorem” 评论"现代高斯-马尔科夫定理
IF 6.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2024-06-05 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA20819
Benedikt M. Pötscher, David Preinerstorfer
{"title":"A Comment on: “A Modern Gauss–Markov Theorem”","authors":"Benedikt M. Pötscher,&nbsp;David Preinerstorfer","doi":"10.3982/ECTA20819","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA20819","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>We show that Theorem 4 in Hansen (2022) applies to exactly the same class of estimators as does the classical Aitken theorem. We furthermore point out that Theorems 5–7 in Hansen (2022) contain extra assumptions not present in the classical Gauss–Markov or Aitken theorem, and thus the former theorems do not contain the latter ones as special cases.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA20819","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141251391","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Walras–Bowley Lecture: Market Power and Wage Inequality 瓦尔拉斯-鲍利讲座：市场力量与工资不平等
IF 6.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2024-06-05 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA21157
Shubhdeep Deb, Jan Eeckhout, Aseem Patel, Lawrence Warren
{"title":"Walras–Bowley Lecture: Market Power and Wage Inequality","authors":"Shubhdeep Deb,&nbsp;Jan Eeckhout,&nbsp;Aseem Patel,&nbsp;Lawrence Warren","doi":"10.3982/ECTA21157","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA21157","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>We propose a theory of how market power affects wage inequality. We ask how goods and labor market power jointly determine the level of wages, the skill premium, and wage inequality. We then use detailed microdata from the U.S. Census Bureau between 1997 and 2016 to estimate the parameters of labor supply, technology, and the market structure. We find that a less competitive market structure lowers the average wage of high-skilled workers by 11.3%, and of low-skilled workers by 12.2%, contributes 8.1% to the rise in the skill premium, and accounts for 54.8% of the increase in between-establishment wage variance.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA21157","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141251381","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Demand Curve for Disaster Recovery Loans 灾后恢复贷款的需求曲线
IF 6.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2024-06-05 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA20417
Benjamin Collier, Cameron Ellis
{"title":"A Demand Curve for Disaster Recovery Loans","authors":"Benjamin Collier,&nbsp;Cameron Ellis","doi":"10.3982/ECTA20417","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA20417","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \t\t\t<p>We estimate and trace a credit demand curve for households that recently experienced damage to their homes from a natural disaster. Our administrative data include over one million applicants to a federal recovery loan program for households. We estimate extensive-margin demand over a large range of interest rates. Our identification strategy exploits 24 natural experiments, leveraging exogenous, time-based variation in the program's offered interest rate. Interest rates meaningfully affect consumer demand throughout the distribution of rates. On average, a 1 percentage point increase in the interest rate reduces loan take-up by 26%. We find a large impact of applicants' credit quality on demand and evidence of monthly payment targeting. Using our estimated demand curve and information on program costs, we find that the program generates an average social surplus of $2900 per borrower.</p>\u0000 \t\t</div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA20417","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141251383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Implementation via Information Design in Binary-Action Supermodular Games 通过二元行动超模游戏中的信息设计来实现
IF 6.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2024-06-05 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA19149
Stephen Morris, Daisuke Oyama, Satoru Takahashi
{"title":"Implementation via Information Design in Binary-Action Supermodular Games","authors":"Stephen Morris,&nbsp;Daisuke Oyama,&nbsp;Satoru Takahashi","doi":"10.3982/ECTA19149","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA19149","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>What outcomes can be implemented by the choice of an information structure in binary-action supermodular games? An outcome is partially implementable if it satisfies obedience (Bergemann and Morris (2016)). We characterize when an outcome is <i>smallest equilibrium implementable</i> (induced by the smallest equilibrium). Smallest equilibrium implementation requires a stronger <i>sequential obedience</i> condition: there is a stochastic ordering of players under which players are prepared to switch to the high action even if they think only those before them will switch. We then characterize the optimal outcome induced by an information designer who prefers the high action to be played, but anticipates that the worst (hence smallest) equilibrium will be played. In a potential game, under convexity assumptions on the potential and the designer's objective, it is optimal to choose an outcome where actions are perfectly coordinated (all players choose the same action), with the high action profile played on the largest event where that action profile maximizes the average potential.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA19149","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141251384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Comment on: “Walras–Bowley Lecture: Market Power and Wage Inequality” by Shubhdeep Deb, Jan Eeckhout, Aseem Patel, and Lawrence Warren 评论"瓦尔拉斯-鲍利讲座：Shubhdeep Deb、Jan Eeckhout、Aseem Patel 和 Lawrence Warren 的 "市场力量与工资不平等
IF 6.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2024-06-05 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA22248
John Van Reenen
{"title":"A Comment on: “Walras–Bowley Lecture: Market Power and Wage Inequality” by Shubhdeep Deb, Jan Eeckhout, Aseem Patel, and Lawrence Warren","authors":"John Van Reenen","doi":"10.3982/ECTA22248","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA22248","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>A burgeoning literature in labor economics is focused on modeling employer labor market power, generally finding nontrivial estimates of monopsony power. A smaller literature also simultaneously incorporates product market power. Deb, Eeckhout, Patel, and Warren (2024) is an example of applying an oligopoly-oligopsony model to the U.S. labor market, arguing for important effects on wage levels and inequality from rising market power. I support combining IO and labor as a fruitful way of studying wages and business dynamism, but argue for looking more broadly at (i) <i>differential</i> degrees of employer power in labor and product markets; (ii) investigating the <i>dynamic</i> sources of markups (e.g., through innovation), and (iii) considering wage <i>bargaining</i> models, not just wage posting models, which have some starkly different implications for wage setting.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA22248","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141251424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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