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Rigidity and necessary application 刚性和必要的应用
Noûs Pub Date : 2024-06-23 DOI: 10.1111/nous.12511
Mario Gómez‐Torrente
{"title":"Rigidity and necessary application","authors":"Mario Gómez‐Torrente","doi":"10.1111/nous.12511","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12511","url":null,"abstract":"The question whether the notion of rigidity can be extended in a fruitful way beyond singular terms has received a standard answer in the literature, according to which non‐singular terms designate kinds, properties or other abstract singular objects, and generalized rigidity is the same thing as singular term rigidity, but for terms designating such objects. I offer some new criticisms of this view and go on to defend an alternative view, on which non‐singular terms designate extensions in general, and generalized rigidity is identity of extension across possible worlds. I develop some fundamental positive considerations that make this view virtually inevitable as a view of generalized rigidity, emphasizing its exclusive ability to offer a purely logical justification of the necessity of several kinds of statements that go beyond true identity statements between rigid singular terms.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"62 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141448399","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Epistemic practices: A unified account of epistemic and zetetic normativity 认识论实践：认识论和规范论的统一论述
Noûs Pub Date : 2024-06-23 DOI: 10.1111/nous.12514
Will Fleisher
{"title":"Epistemic practices: A unified account of epistemic and zetetic normativity","authors":"Will Fleisher","doi":"10.1111/nous.12514","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12514","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents the epistemic practices account, a theory about the nature of epistemic normativity. The account aims to explain how the pursuit of epistemic values such as truth and knowledge can give rise to epistemic norms. On this account, epistemic norms are the internal rules of epistemic social practices. The account explains four crucial features of epistemic normativity while dissolving some apparent tensions between them. The account also provides a unified theory of epistemic and zetetic normativity.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141448353","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Moral understanding: From virtue to knowledge 道德理解：从美德到知识
Noûs Pub Date : 2024-06-01 DOI: 10.1111/nous.12508
Miloud Belkoniene
{"title":"Moral understanding: From virtue to knowledge","authors":"Miloud Belkoniene","doi":"10.1111/nous.12508","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12508","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the nature of the specific grasp involved in moral understanding. After discussing Hills's ability account of that central component of moral understanding in light of problematic cases, I argue that moral grasp is best conceived of as a type of knowledge that is grounded in a subject's moral appreciation. I then show how and why the relevant notion of moral appreciation is connected to moral virtues and to one's affective and motivational engagement with moral reasons. Finally, I discuss the connection between moral appreciation and a subject's ability to offer moral explanations in relation to the debate between pessimists and optimists about moral understanding's testimonial transmission.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141187685","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
‘I didn't know it was you’: The impersonal grounds of relational normativity 我不知道是你》：关系规范性的非个人理由
Noûs Pub Date : 2024-05-23 DOI: 10.1111/nous.12498
Jed Lewinsohn
{"title":"‘I didn't know it was you’: The impersonal grounds of relational normativity","authors":"Jed Lewinsohn","doi":"10.1111/nous.12498","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12498","url":null,"abstract":"A notable feature of our moral and legal practices is the recognition of privileges, powers, and entitlements belonging to a select group of individuals in virtue of their status as victims of wrongful conduct. A philosophical literature on relational normativity purports to account for this status in terms of such notions as interests, rights, and attitudes of disregard. This paper argues that such individualistic notions cannot account for prevailing and intuitive ways of demarcating the class of victims. The paper is focused on the wrongful infliction of harm, and centers on the mediating role played by impersonal “danger‐making properties” in the determination of the class of victims. The paper begins with an analysis of one of the most well‐ known discussions of negligently‐inflicted harm — from the most famous case of the American common law tradition, <jats:italic>Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co</jats:italic>. — and the analysis is then extended to the morality of harm‐doing more broadly, negligent and intentional alike. The paper's chief targets are interest theories of rights — including contractualist theories of moral claim‐rights of the kind defended by R. Jay Wallace — and neo‐Strawsonian Quality of Will theories of “moral injury”.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"213 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141091847","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Knowing what to do 知道该怎么做
Noûs Pub Date : 2024-05-08 DOI: 10.1111/nous.12503
Ethan Jerzak, Alexander W. Kocurek
{"title":"Knowing what to do","authors":"Ethan Jerzak, Alexander W. Kocurek","doi":"10.1111/nous.12503","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12503","url":null,"abstract":"Much has been written on whether practical knowledge (knowledge‐how) reduces to propositional knowledge (knowledge‐that). Less attention has been paid to what we call deliberative knowledge (knowledge‐to), i.e., knowledge ascriptions embedding other infinitival questions, like <jats:italic>where to meet</jats:italic>, <jats:italic>when to leave</jats:italic>, and <jats:italic>what to bring</jats:italic>. We offer an analysis of knowledge‐to and argue on its basis that, regardless of whether knowledge‐how reduces to knowledge‐that, no such reduction of knowledge‐to is forthcoming. Knowledge‐to, unlike knowledge‐that and knowledge‐how, requires the agent to have formed certain conditional intentions. We discuss the philosophical implications for knowledge‐how, deliberative questions, and virtue.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140895737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A defense of back‐end doxastic voluntarism 为后端 "哆嗦自愿主义 "辩护
Noûs Pub Date : 2024-04-30 DOI: 10.1111/nous.12501
Laura K. Soter
{"title":"A defense of back‐end doxastic voluntarism","authors":"Laura K. Soter","doi":"10.1111/nous.12501","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12501","url":null,"abstract":"Doxastic involuntarism—the thesis that we lack direct voluntary control (in response to non‐evidential reasons) over our belief states—is often touted as philosophical orthodoxy. I here offer a novel defense of doxastic voluntarism, centered around three key moves. First, I point out that belief has two central functional roles, but that discussions of voluntarism have largely ignored questions of control over belief's guidance function. Second, I propose that we can learn much about doxastic control by looking to cognitive scientific research on control over other relevantly similar mental states. I draw on a mechanistic account of control of the guidance function for “emotion‐type states,” and argue that these same cognitive control mechanisms can used to block doxastic guidance. This gives us an account of “back‐end” doxastic control which can be deployed for reasons which are not the right kinds of reasons to support “front‐end” belief formation—i.e., non‐evidential reasons. Third, I argue that comprehensive, self‐directed exercises of this kind of control can amount to an underappreciated kind of voluntarism. This form of voluntarism is available to any account of belief that takes guidance‐instantiation to be at least partly constitutive of believing. Finally, I discuss objections to, and upshots of, the view.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140820011","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Indexicality, Bayesian background and self‐location in fine‐tuning arguments for the multiverse 多元宇宙微调论证中的索引性、贝叶斯背景和自我定位
Noûs Pub Date : 2024-04-29 DOI: 10.1111/nous.12502
Quentin Ruyant
{"title":"Indexicality, Bayesian background and self‐location in fine‐tuning arguments for the multiverse","authors":"Quentin Ruyant","doi":"10.1111/nous.12502","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12502","url":null,"abstract":"Our universe seems to be miraculously fine‐tuned for life. Multiverse theories have been proposed as an explanation for this on the basis of probabilistic arguments, but various authors have objected that we should consider our total evidence that this universe in particular has life in our inference, which would block the argument. The debate thus crucially hinges on how Bayesian background and evidence are distinguished and on how indexical or demonstrative terms are analysed. The aim of this article is to take a step back and examine these various aspects of Bayesian reasoning and how they affect the arguments. The upshot is that there are reasons to resist the fine‐tuning argument for the multiverse, but the “this‐universe‐objection” is not one of them.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"37 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140820047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Does matter mind content? 物质是否介意内容？
Noûs Pub Date : 2024-04-27 DOI: 10.1111/nous.12493
Verónica Gómez Sánchez
{"title":"Does matter mind content?","authors":"Verónica Gómez Sánchez","doi":"10.1111/nous.12493","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12493","url":null,"abstract":"Let ‘semantic relevance’ be the thesis that the wide semantic properties of representational mental states (like beliefs and desires) are causally relevant to behavior. A popular way of arguing for semantic relevance runs as follows: start with a sufficient counterfactual condition for causal or explanatory relevance, and show that wide semantic properties meet it with respect to behavior (e.g., Loewer &amp; Lepore (1987,1989), Rescorla (2014), Yablo (2003)).This paper discusses an in‐principle limitation of this strategy: even the most sophisticated counterfactual criteria systematically misclassify irrelevant properties as relevant when they stand in certain kinds of modal co‐variation or ‘entanglement’ relations to genuinely relevant properties. This entanglement problem, I argue, is more general and more serious than proponents of the counterfactual strategy have recognized: it threatens recent interventionist arguments for semantic relevance, and is not easily solved by appeal to proportionality or naturalness. I end by suggesting that proponents of semantic relevance may need to shift their attention from patterns of counterfactuals to the lawful psychological generalizations that explain them.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140808522","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The epistemology of interpersonal relations 人际关系认识论
Noûs Pub Date : 2024-04-27 DOI: 10.1111/nous.12499
Matthew A. Benton
{"title":"The epistemology of interpersonal relations","authors":"Matthew A. Benton","doi":"10.1111/nous.12499","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12499","url":null,"abstract":"What is it to know someone? Epistemologists rarely take up this question, though recent developments make such inquiry possible and desirable. This paper advances an account of how such <jats:italic>interpersonal</jats:italic> knowledge goes beyond mere propositional and qualitative knowledge about someone, giving a central place to second‐personal treatment. It examines what such knowledge requires, and what makes it distinctive within epistemology as well as socially. It assesses its theoretic value for several issues in moral psychology, epistemic injustice, and philosophy of mind. And it offers an account of the complex content in play if interpersonal knowledge is to be understood in terms of its mental states and their functions.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140808527","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Evidentialism, justification, and knowledge‐first 证据论、理由和知识第一
Noûs Pub Date : 2024-04-24 DOI: 10.1111/nous.12495
Alexander Bird
{"title":"Evidentialism, justification, and knowledge‐first","authors":"Alexander Bird","doi":"10.1111/nous.12495","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12495","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the relationship between evidentialism, knowledge‐first epistemology, (E=K) in particular, and justification. Evidentialism gives an account of justified belief in terms of evidence but is silent on the nature of evidence. Knowledge‐first tells us what evidence is but stands in need of an agreed account of justification. So each might be able to supply what the other lacks. I argue that the combination of evidentialism, (E=K), and some plausible principles leads to the scepticism familiar from the Agrippan trilemma. I develop an Evidentialist Knowledge‐First view of justification that avoids scepticism by rejecting the entailment of justification by knowledge. This combination turns out to have unpalatable consequences. Nonetheless, the process of reaching that conclusion teaches lessons both to the evidentialist (regarding what evidence could be) and to the knowledge‐firster (regarding what justification is).","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140643109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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