{"title":"Order of Explanation: Having it Both Ways","authors":"Kenneth Black","doi":"10.1111/nous.70070","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.70070","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:italic>Order‐of‐explanation</jats:italic> objections say that some philosophical view implies because , when it's more natural to say that because ; and since such mirroring explanations are presumed to be incompatible, the targeted view must be in conflict with the intuitive explanation. I argue that order‐of‐explanation objections are weaker than they seem, focusing on two cases: functionalism/dispositionalism about mental states and Humeanism about laws of nature. Examining our ordinary practices of explanation, I identify two kinds of explanations, which I call conceptual and contextualizing explanations, which can be jointly compatible even when they mirror one another. This suggests a way of responding to order‐of‐explanation objections: if the targeted philosophical views offer conceptual explanations, and the intuitive explanations they mirror are contextualizing, then the order‐of‐explanation objections have no bite.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149251253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How Should Bundle Theorists Account for Symmetrical Universes?","authors":"Chiao‐Li Ou","doi":"10.1111/nous.70071","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.70071","url":null,"abstract":"Symmetrical universes, such as Max Black's famous “two‐sphere” world, are often taken to pose a serious challenge to the universal‐based bundle theory. In response, metaphysicians have either developed more sophisticated versions of the universal‐based account or simply converted to the trope‐based bundle theory. I argue that neither approach is fully satisfactory, for there is a different kind of symmetrical universe, or an alternative interpretation of such universes, that generates comparable challenges to these views. It turns out that neither universal‐based nor trope‐based accounts can fully accommodate symmetrical universes. In light of this, I propose a novel bundle‐theoretic account based on what David Lewis calls “amphibians”—qualities that are neither universals nor tropes—and argue that it accommodates both kinds of symmetrical universes without incorporating unwanted entities, making it preferable to the universal‐based and trope‐based accounts.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149130282","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Theory of the A‐Theory","authors":"Minjun Kang","doi":"10.1111/nous.70069","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.70069","url":null,"abstract":"There is no precise characterization of the A‐ and B‐theories that has won a consensus in the literature. In this paper, we set out to provide clear formulations of these theories in the setting of higher‐order logic in what we call <jats:italic>the operational framework</jats:italic> . In the operational framework, the disagreement between the A‐ and B‐theories centers on the distribution of accuracy among times. We will show that these formulations of the A‐ and B‐theories produce strong predictions about various features of temporal reality. We will address some objections that could be made to the operational framework from both A‐ and B‐theorists. We will also examine how the operational framework helps us think about the ideological commitments of the A‐ and B‐theories. We will close by suggesting ways in which this framework can be applied to other topics in the metaphysics of temporal intervals, spacetime, modality, and first‐person perspectives.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"50 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149123165","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Inferentialism, Compositionality, and Anaphora","authors":"Jacob Hengyun Yang","doi":"10.1111/nous.70062","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.70062","url":null,"abstract":"Inferentialism faces two influential objections: (i) it is not compositional and (ii) there is a lack of fruitful application of inferentialism to problems in philosophy of language and formal semantics. In this paper, I defend inferentialism against both charges. In particular, I do so by focusing on a central problem in philosophy of language and formal semantics—the problem(s) of anaphora licensing. I show that, by developing a compositional version of inferentialism, inferentialism can give more satisfactory solutions to the problem(s) of anaphora licensing compared to rival truth‐conditional theories.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149124090","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Referential Indeterminacy and De Re Thoughts","authors":"Bahram Assadian","doi":"10.1111/nous.70066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.70066","url":null,"abstract":"Referential indeterminacy may seem to leave little room for <jats:italic>de re</jats:italic> or singular thoughts about ordinary objects. I argue that this impression is misleading. We can direct our thoughts at particular objects, even though there is no fact of the matter as to which objects are referred to by the singular terms purporting to stand for them. By distinguishing between weak and strong <jats:italic>de re</jats:italic> attitudes, I show that speakers can retain a weak form of <jats:italic>de re</jats:italic> belief despite the absence of determinate reference. I extend the same distinction to knowledge of reference, thereby explaining how linguistic understanding survives the indeterminacy of reference. I also briefly explore some broader implications of this picture for the theory of reference and for the status of genuine singular terms.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"217 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149009856","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Epistemic Actualism","authors":"J. Dmitri Gallow","doi":"10.1111/nous.70067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.70067","url":null,"abstract":"According to veritism, your epistemic goal is to believe what's true. According to <jats:italic>actualist</jats:italic> veritism, your epistemic goal is to believe what's <jats:italic>actually</jats:italic> true. At first glance, it seems that the pursuit of truth and the pursuit of actual truth will lead to the same destination. This will follow for evidential decision theorists; but if we are causal decision theorists (as I am), then pursuing truth and pursuing actual truth will lead us to different destinations. In this paper, I assume causal decision theory and argue for actualist veritism over veritism. My argument is that veritism does not respect the direction of fit of belief, since it incentivizes changing the world to match your beliefs, rather than changing your beliefs to match the world as it is. In contrast, actualist veritism honors the direction of fit of belief, and only incentivizes changing your beliefs to match the world as it is. For this reason, actualist veritism allows epistemic teleologists to escape “epistemic bribery” objections, to doubt self‐verifying propositions like “someone believes this proposition,” and to maintain coherence in the face of self‐falsifying propositions like “I don't believe this proposition.”","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148993695","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Protests as World‐Making Projects","authors":"Lidal Dror, Sukaina Hirji","doi":"10.1111/nous.70068","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.70068","url":null,"abstract":"On one common way of distinguishing forms of protest, civil disobedience is a communicative act that aims to achieve its goals through moral persuasion, whereas direct action has as its goal to directly obstruct or deter a perceived injustice. In this paper, we'll argue that this distinction does not do justice to a wide range of protest tactics, including encampments, riots, and strikes, that combine a symbolic element with an element of material contestation. Instead, we'll argue that, for a range of protest tactics we call “world‐making projects,” the communicative or persuasive value of the action depends on the parts of the action often deemed violent or uncivil. In particular, we'll suggest that actions that employ material contestation have the ability to undermine the justification for certain ideological beliefs by changing, even just temporarily and in small ways, what the world is like. We cannot accurately describe the function of these protests, evaluate their effectiveness, or assess their justification without first recognizing how their communicative function is bound up with the ways they intervene into public spaces.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148964255","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Redeeming Relative Value: Indexicality and Consequentializing Agent‐Centered Norms","authors":"Nathan Robert Howard","doi":"10.1111/nous.70065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.70065","url":null,"abstract":"Robert Nozick doubted forms of consequentialism that employ so‐called “agent‐relative value” because he found them “gimmicky.” This doubt has been sharpened by Don Regan, Mark Schroeder, and others into the objection that agent‐relative value lacks the practical importance we associate with good <jats:italic>simpliciter</jats:italic> . This sharpened objection has prompted agent‐relative consequentialists to replace the agent‐relative value at the foundation of their view with agent‐relative reasons for desire. This paper argues for two claims. First, the turn to agent‐relative reasons is less promising than it seems. Second, concerns about gimmickiness can be allayed directly by showing how standard decision‐theoretic conceptions of outcomes already relativize what agents evaluate without relativizing value itself.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"31 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148909133","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What in the World Are 4D Shapes?","authors":"Jack Himelright, Sebastián Murgueitio Ramírez","doi":"10.1111/nous.70063","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.70063","url":null,"abstract":"It is often said that in special relativity, 4D shapes can be used to explain 3D shape projections onto frames of reference. Perdurantists have frequently used this as a motivation for their view of persistence. Despite this, philosophers never clearly state what 4D shapes are. We take a foundational approach toward this issue, first getting clear on the nature of 4D shapes and then using our analysis of 4D shapes to question the explanatory connection between 4D shapes and 3D shapes. We begin by considering some accounts of 4D shapes that seem implicit in philosophers' remarks, finding them deficient. We then discuss what it takes for two objects to have the same 4D shape, working backward to an account of what 4D shapes are. This leads us to argue that 4D shapes should be understood in terms of the isometries of Minkowski spacetime. Subsequently, we use this analysis to show that 4D shapes do not explain 3D projections onto frames in the way that perdurantists have suggested.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148842952","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reopening the Dutch Book","authors":"Nicholas J. J. Smith","doi":"10.1111/nous.70064","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.70064","url":null,"abstract":"Probabilism is the thesis that the degrees of belief of rational agents behave like Kolmogorovian probabilities. There are quite different lines of argument for probabilism in the literature, including Dutch book arguments, arguments based on representation theorems, and epistemic utility arguments. This paper focusses on the Dutch book line of argument, the core idea of which is that nonprobabilistic degrees of belief generate irrational betting behavior. Different versions of the argument have been presented, often in response to objections to earlier versions. The aim of this paper is to develop a new, stronger version that avoids the problems of previous iterations—indeed to formulate the best possible argument based on the core idea.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148842815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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