{"title":"Symmetries of value","authors":"Zachary Goodsell","doi":"10.1111/nous.12549","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12549","url":null,"abstract":"Standard decision theory ranks risky prospects by their expected utility. This ranking does not change if the values of all possible outcomes are uniformly shifted or dilated. Similarly, if the values of the outcomes are negated, the ranking of prospects by their expected utility is reversed. In settings with unbounded levels of utility, the expected utility of prospects is not always defined, but it is still natural to accept the <jats:italic>affine symmetry principles</jats:italic>, which say that the true ranking of prospects is unchanged by shifts and dilations, and is reversed by negation—even in hard cases where expected utilities are undefined. This paper investigates the affine symmetry principles and their consequences. The principles are found to be surprisingly powerful. Combined with orthodox axioms, they assign precise utility values to previously problematic cases: for example, to the Pasadena prospect (Nover & Hájek, 2004) and to the alternating St Petersburg prospect. They also have important structural consequences, notably vindicating Colyvan's (2008) Relative Expectation Theory. The paper then establishes the consistency of the affine symmetry principles. In light of their fruitful consequences, this consistency result supports the adoption of the affine symmetry principles as fundamental axioms of decision theory.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"71 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143712986","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Farewell to the modal theory of luck","authors":"Chaoan He","doi":"10.1111/nous.12548","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12548","url":null,"abstract":"The modal theory of luck, according to one influential version of it, holds that an event is lucky if and only if it actually obtains but fails to obtain in some close possible worlds, holding fixed certain initial conditions for the event. There have been some notable critiques of the theory. But they are not fully satisfactory, for they succumb to two typical and compelling strategies of defending the modal theory. By invoking a special fair lottery case, adapted from the well‐known Frankfurt cases on free will, this article presents a novel attack on the modal theory. As to be shown, there are cases where someone wins a fair lottery as a matter of good luck, yet there are no close possible worlds where he fails to win it. I also argue that the two typical and compelling strategies of defending the modal theory do not meet our challenge.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143665839","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ability as dependence modality","authors":"Paolo Santorio","doi":"10.1111/nous.12546","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12546","url":null,"abstract":"Some modal expressions in language—for example, “can” and “able”—describe what is possible in light of someone's abilities. Ability modals are obviously related to other modalities in language, such as epistemic or deontic modality, but also give rise to anomalies that make them unique. This paper develops a general theory of ability modals that is broadly compatible with standard modal semantics, while predicting their peculiar behavior. The central idea is that ability modals include reference to a notion of dependence. At the level of truth conditions, “ is able to ” simply says that there is a circumstantially accessible world where . On top of this, a not‐at‐issue element requires that whether <jats:italic>A</jats:italic>s depends, in part, on intrinsic features of . Differently from most analyses, this account divorces ability modals from a notion of agency.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143608031","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Expected value, to a point: Moral decision‐making under background uncertainty","authors":"Christian Tarsney","doi":"10.1111/nous.12544","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12544","url":null,"abstract":"Expected value maximization gives plausible guidance for moral decision‐making under uncertainty in many situations. But it has unappetizing implications in ‘Pascalian’ situations involving tiny probabilities of extreme outcomes. This paper shows, first, that under realistic levels of ‘background uncertainty’ about sources of value independent of one's present choice, a widely accepted and apparently innocuous principle—stochastic dominance—requires that prospects be ranked by the expected value of their consequences in most ordinary choice situations. But second, this implication does <jats:italic>not</jats:italic> hold when differences in expected value are driven by tiny probabilities of extreme outcomes. Stochastic dominance therefore lets us draw a surprisingly principled line between ‘ordinary’ and ‘Pascalian’ situations, providing a powerful justification for <jats:italic>de facto</jats:italic> expected value maximization in the former context while permitting deviations in the latter. Drawing this distinction is incompatible with an in‐principle commitment to maximizing expected value, but does not require too much departure from decision‐theoretic orthodoxy: it is compatible, for instance, with the view that moral agents must maximize the expectation of a <jats:italic>utility</jats:italic> function that is an increasing function of moral value.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143528316","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Sleeping Beauty and the demands of non‐ideal rationality","authors":"Wolfgang Schwarz","doi":"10.1111/nous.12545","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12545","url":null,"abstract":"If an agent can't live up to the demands of ideal rationality, fallback norms come into play that take into account the agent's limitations. A familiar human limitation is our tendency to lose information. How should we compensate for this tendency? The Seeping Beauty problem allows us to isolate this question, without the confounding influence of other human limitations. If the coin lands tails, Beauty can't preserve whatever information she has received on Monday: she is bound to violate the norms of ideal diachronic rationality. The considerations that support these norms, however, can still be used. I investigate how Beauty should update her beliefs so as to maximize the expected accuracy of her new beliefs. The investigation draws attention to important but neglected questions about the connection between rational belief and evidential support, about the status of ideal and non‐ideal norms, about the dependence of epistemic norms on descriptive facts, and about the precise formulation of expected accuracy measures. It also sheds light on the puzzle of higher‐order evidence.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143393053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Loops and the geometry of chance","authors":"Jens Jäger","doi":"10.1111/nous.12541","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12541","url":null,"abstract":"Suppose your evil sibling travels back in time, intending to lethally poison your grandfather during his infancy. Determined to save grandpa, you grab two antidotes and follow your sibling through the wormhole. Under normal circumstances, each antidote has a 50% chance of curing a poisoning. Upon finding young grandpa, poisoned, you administer the first antidote. Alas, it has no effect. The second antidote is your last hope. You administer it—and success: the paleness vanishes from grandpa's face, he is healed. As you administered the first antidote, what was the chance that it would be effective? This essay offers a systematic account of this case, and others like it. The central question is this: Given a certain time travel structure, what are the chances? In particular, I'll develop a theory about the connection between these chances and the chances in ordinary, time‐travel‐free contexts. Central to the account is a Markov condition involving the boundaries of spacetime regions.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"73 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142991138","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A trope‐theoretic solution to the missing value problem","authors":"Paul Audi","doi":"10.1111/nous.12543","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12543","url":null,"abstract":"One metaphysical problem about laws is how to find appropriate truthmakers for fully general functional laws. What makes it true, for instance, that an uninstantiated mass would interact with others as prescribed by laws concerning mass? This is the missing value problem. D. M. Armstrong attempted to solve it by appeal to determinable universals. I will offer a trope‐theoretic solution that, while in some ways more metaphysically adventurous than Armstrong's view, avoids commitment to universals and determinables (as different from their determinates). The solution makes use of a special conception of tropes as capable of intrinsic change. It also makes use of a distinction between two ways of having a causal power (a distinction we should make in any case). Existing powers‐based approaches to the problem struggle to avoid the idea that powers mysteriously point beyond themselves. But if tropes are capable of intrinsic change in the way I propose, they can account for the full generality of laws with minimal pointing beyond, and can do so while retaining natures that are credibly intrinsic.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"55 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142988715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The simplicity of physical laws","authors":"Eddy Keming Chen","doi":"10.1111/nous.12542","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12542","url":null,"abstract":"Physical laws are strikingly simple, yet there is no a priori reason for them to be so. I propose that nomic realists—Humeans and non‐Humeans—should recognize simplicity as a fundamental epistemic guide for discovering and evaluating candidate physical laws. This proposal helps resolve several longstanding problems of nomic realism and simplicity. A key consequence is that the presumed epistemic advantage of Humeanism over non‐Humeanism dissolves, undermining a prominent epistemological argument for Humeanism. Moreover, simplicity is shown to be more connected to lawhood than to mere truth.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"70 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142988716","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The question‐centered account of harm and benefit","authors":"Aaron Thieme","doi":"10.1111/nous.12540","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12540","url":null,"abstract":"The counterfactual comparative account of harm and benefit (CCA) has faced a barrage of objections from cases involving preemption, overdetermination, and choice. In this paper I provide a unified diagnosis of CCA's vulnerability to these objections: CCA is susceptible to them because it evaluates each act by the same criterion. This is a mistake because, in a sense I make precise, situations raise prudential questions, and only some acts—the <jats:italic>relevant alternatives</jats:italic>—are directly relevant to these questions. To answer the objections, we must revise CCA so that its evaluations foreground the relevant alternatives. The result is a question‐centered account of harm and benefit.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"43 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142825424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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