{"title":"The question‐centered account of harm and benefit","authors":"Aaron Thieme","doi":"10.1111/nous.12540","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12540","url":null,"abstract":"The counterfactual comparative account of harm and benefit (CCA) has faced a barrage of objections from cases involving preemption, overdetermination, and choice. In this paper I provide a unified diagnosis of CCA's vulnerability to these objections: CCA is susceptible to them because it evaluates each act by the same criterion. This is a mistake because, in a sense I make precise, situations raise prudential questions, and only some acts—the <jats:italic>relevant alternatives</jats:italic>—are directly relevant to these questions. To answer the objections, we must revise CCA so that its evaluations foreground the relevant alternatives. The result is a question‐centered account of harm and benefit.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"43 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142825424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The bayesian and the abductivist","authors":"Mattias Skipper, Olav Benjamin Vassend","doi":"10.1111/nous.12539","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12539","url":null,"abstract":"A major open question in the borderlands between epistemology and philosophy of science concerns whether Bayesian updating and abductive inference are compatible. Some philosophers—most influentially Bas van Fraassen—have argued that they are not. Others have disagreed, arguing that abduction, properly understood, is indeed compatible with Bayesianism. Here we present two formal results that allow us to tackle this question from a new angle. We start by formulating what we take to be a minimal version of the claim that abduction is a rational pattern of reasoning. We then show that this minimal abductivist principle, when combined with Bayesian updating by conditionalization, places surprisingly strong and controversial constraints on how we must measure explanatory power. The lesson is not that Bayesianism is definitely incompatible with abduction, but that both compatibilism and incompatibilism have hitherto unrecognized consequences. We end the paper by formulating these consequences in the form of a trilemma.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142684214","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Heavy‐duty conceptual engineering","authors":"Steffen Koch, Jakob Ohlhorst","doi":"10.1111/nous.12538","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12538","url":null,"abstract":"Conceptual engineering is the process of assessing and improving our conceptual repertoire. Some authors have claimed that introducing or revising concepts through conceptual engineering can go as far as expanding the realm of thinkable thoughts and thus enable us to form beliefs, hypotheses, wishes, or desires that we are currently unable to form. If true, this would allow conceptual engineers to contribute to solving <jats:italic>stubborn problems</jats:italic> – problems that cannot be solved with our current ways of thinking. We call this kind of conceptual engineering <jats:italic>heavy‐duty conceptual engineering</jats:italic>. As exciting as the idea of heavy‐duty conceptual engineering sounds, it has never been developed or defended. In this paper, we pursue a two‐fold goal. First, to offer a theory of heavy‐duty conceptual engineering that distinguishes it from other kinds of conceptual engineering; second, to show that heavy‐duty conceptual engineering is possible, both in theory and in practice, and to explain how it can be applied in the service of solving stubborn problems. The central idea is that heavy‐duty conceptual engineering can enhance the semantic expressive power of a conceptual system by the use of bootstrapping processes.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"47 41 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142670706","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A style guide for the structuralist","authors":"Lucy Carr","doi":"10.1111/nous.12537","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12537","url":null,"abstract":"Ontic structuralists claim that there are no individual objects, and that reality should instead be thought of as a “web of relations”. It is difficult to make this metaphysical picture precise, however, since languages usually characterize the world by describing the objects that exist in it. This paper proposes a solution to the problem; I argue that when discourse is reformulated in the language of the calculus of relations ‐ an algebraic logic developed by Alfred Tarski ‐ it can be interpreted without presupposing the existence of objects. What is distinctive about the language of the calculus is that it contains no operator that resembles a quantifier, and yet it can be used to paraphrase any sentence expressible in first‐order logic. Since the use of a first‐order quantifier (or some similar operator) is usually what establishes commitment to an ontology of objects, and since the calculus of relations eschews the quantifier in favor of a composition operator that can be given a natural interpretation consistent with structuralist metaphysics, the calculus is an ideal language for the structuralist to use to describe the world.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142670711","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"From modality to millianism","authors":"Nathan Salmón","doi":"10.1111/nous.12536","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12536","url":null,"abstract":"A new argument is offered which proceeds through epistemic possibility (<jats:italic>for all S knows, p</jats:italic>), cutting a trail from modality to Millianism, the controversial thesis that the semantic content of a proper name is simply its bearer. New definitions are provided for various epistemic modal notions. A surprising theorem about epistemic necessity is proved. A proposition <jats:italic>p</jats:italic> can be epistemically necessary for a knowing subject <jats:italic>S</jats:italic> even though <jats:italic>p</jats:italic> is a posteriori and <jats:italic>S</jats:italic> does not know <jats:italic>p</jats:italic>. The identity relation is well‐behaved in metaphysically possible worlds but can go rogue in epistemically possible worlds. Whereas it can be epistemically possible that Lewis Carroll is not Charles Lutwidge Dodgson, this is not epistemically possible in the manner that anti‐Millianism requires.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142599304","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The censor's burden","authors":"Hrishikesh Joshi","doi":"10.1111/nous.12534","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12534","url":null,"abstract":"Censorship involves, inter alia, adopting a certain type of epistemic policy. While much has been written on the harms and benefits of free expression and the associated rights thereof, the epistemic preconditions of justified censorship are relatively underexplored. In this paper, I argue that examining <jats:italic>intrapersonal</jats:italic> norms of how we ought to treat evidence that might come to us over time can shed light on <jats:italic>interpersonal</jats:italic> norms of evidence generation and sharing that are relevant in the context of censorship. The upshot is that justified censorship requires the censor to meet a very high epistemic burden regarding the target proposition(s)—importantly, one that exceeds knowledge.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142596536","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Paradoxes of infinite aggregation","authors":"Frank Hong, Jeffrey Sanford Russell","doi":"10.1111/nous.12535","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12535","url":null,"abstract":"There are infinitely many ways the world might be, and there may well be infinitely many people in it. These facts raise moral paradoxes. We explore a conflict between two highly attractive principles: a <jats:italic>Pareto</jats:italic> principle that says that what is better for everyone is better overall, and a <jats:italic>statewise dominance</jats:italic> principle that says that what is sure to turn out better is better on balance. We refine and generalize this paradox, showing that the problem is faced by many theories of interpersonal aggregation besides utilitarianism, and by many decision theories besides expected value theory. Considering the range of consistent responses, we find all of them to be quite radical.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"95 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142596545","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"In defense of value incomparability: A reply to Dorr, Nebel, and Zuehl","authors":"Erik Carlson, Olle Risberg","doi":"10.1111/nous.12533","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12533","url":null,"abstract":"Cian Dorr, Jacob Nebel, and Jake Zuehl have argued that no objects are incomparable in value. One set of arguments they offer depart from a principle they call ‘Strong Monotonicity’, which states that if <jats:italic>x</jats:italic> is good and <jats:italic>y</jats:italic> is not good, then <jats:italic>x</jats:italic> is better than <jats:italic>y</jats:italic>. In this article, we respond to those arguments, thereby defending the possibility of value incomparability.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"68 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142555816","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Who killed the causality of things?","authors":"Robert Pasnau","doi":"10.1111/nous.12525","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12525","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142487430","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Meaning, purpose, and narrative","authors":"Michael Zhao","doi":"10.1111/nous.12532","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12532","url":null,"abstract":"According to many philosophers, “the meaning of life” refers to our <jats:italic>cosmic purpose</jats:italic>, the activity that we were created by God or a purposive universe to perform. If there is no God or teleology, there is no such thing as the meaning of life. But this need not be the last word on the matter. In this paper, I ask what the benefits provided by a cosmic purpose are, and go on to argue that thinking of our lives in a particular way—in terms of <jats:italic>a unified life narrative</jats:italic>—can supply us with many of those benefits. We might lose little if there is no such thing as the meaning of life, since there is still something that can provide much of what is valuable about it.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142452071","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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