Perceptual abstraction

Perception puts us in touch with highly determinate properties of objects, such as fine‐grained color shades and detailed surface shapes. However, most of our immediate perceptual judgments concern more abstract properties, such as the property of being a dog, or of being red simpliciter. So, how does perception attune us to abstract properties despite its evident determinacy? This paper argues that perception can be sensitive to abstract properties in multiple, fundamentally different ways. We articulate a distinction between implicit and explicit perceptual abstraction and explore its ramifications for debates about the role of concepts in perception, the richness of perceptual content, and rationalist versus empiricist views of our innate representational repertoire. We also propose an empirical test for differentiating implicit from explicit perceptual abstraction. Finally, we outline a version of Conceptualism built on the implicit/explicit distinction, on which explicit perceptual abstraction involves the use of concepts, while implicit abstraction can occur non‐conceptually. We argue that this form of Conceptualism is both empirically viable and unscathed by prominent Non‐Conceptualist arguments.