{"title":"Humes definitions of virtue","authors":"Hsueh Qu","doi":"10.1111/nous.12531","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12531","url":null,"abstract":"Hume offers not one, but two definitions of virtue: a more famous one in terms of usefulness or agreeability to the self or to others, and a second in terms of eliciting approbation or disapprobation from spectators. Some scholars endorse the former definition as the more fundamental one; others endorse the latter as more fundamental. This paper argues that neither definition is more fundamental than the other. The two definitions are distinct but complementary, in that they have to rely on each other in various ways.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142451368","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Flummoxing expectations","authors":"Hayden Wilkinson","doi":"10.1111/nous.12530","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12530","url":null,"abstract":"Expected utility theory often falls silent, even in cases where the correct rankings of options seems obvious. For instance, it fails to compare the Pasadena game to the Altadena game, despite the latter turning out better in every state. Decision theorists have attempted to fill these silences by proposing various extensions to expected utility theory. As I show in this paper, such extensions often fall silent too, even in cases where the correct ranking is intuitively obvious. But we can extend the theory further than has been done before—I offer a new extension, <jats:italic>Invariant Value Theory</jats:italic>, which deals neatly with those problem cases and also satisfies various desirable conditions. But other prima facie desirable conditions, including <jats:italic>Independence</jats:italic>, the theory violates. Is this a problem for the proposal? It may not be—in a new impossibility result, I show that <jats:italic>no</jats:italic> theory can satisfy Independence in full generality without violating several other conditions that together seem just as plausible.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"102 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142448311","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How do you assert a graph? Towards an account of depictions in scientific testimony","authors":"Corey Dethier","doi":"10.1111/nous.12529","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12529","url":null,"abstract":"I extend the literature on norms of assertion to the ubiquitous use of graphs in scientific papers and presentations, which I term “graphical testimony.” On my account, the testimonial presentation of a graph involves commitment to both (a) the in‐context reliability of the graph's framing devices and (b) the perspective‐relative accuracy of the graph's content. Despite apparent disagreements between my account and traditional accounts of assertion, the two are compatible and I argue that we should expect a similar pattern of commitments in a set of cases that extends beyond the graphical one. I end by demonstrating that the account resolves apparent tensions between the demands of honesty and the common scientific practice of presenting idealized or simplified graphs: these “distortions” can be honest so long as there's the right kind of alignment between the distortion and the background beliefs and values of the audience.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"193 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142431235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Kant's nutshell argument for idealism","authors":"Desmond Hogan","doi":"10.1111/nous.12528","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12528","url":null,"abstract":"The significance or vacuity of the statement, “Everything has just doubled in size,” attracted considerable attention last century from scientists and philosophers. Presenting his conventionalism in geometry, Poincaré insisted on the emptiness of a hypothesis that all objects have doubled in size overnight. Such expansion could have meaning, he argued, “only for those who reason as if space were absolute … it would be better to say that space being relative, <jats:italic>nothing at all has happened</jats:italic>.” The logical empiricists concurred, viewing the universal doubling hypothesis as illustrating the intrinsic metrical amorphousness of continuous manifolds. It is striking, therefore, to find Kant invoking a universal <jats:italic>contraction</jats:italic> in space and time to support his famous doctrine of transcendental idealism. In one of several completely neglected passages, he writes: “The proof that the things in space and time are mere appearances can also be grounded on the fact that the whole world could be contained in a nutshell and the entirety of elapsed time in a second without the least difference being met with.” Kant's “also” may suggest an idealist argument distinct from any proposed in published works. Here I ask: What is the meaning of Kant's Nutshell Argument for Idealism?","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"682 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142321465","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Natural kind reasoning in consciousness science: An alternative to theory testing","authors":"Andy Mckilliam","doi":"10.1111/nous.12526","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12526","url":null,"abstract":"It is often suggested that to make progress in consciousness science we need a theory of consciousness—one that tells us what consciousness is and what kinds of systems can have it. But this may be putting the cart before the horse. There are currently a wide range of very different theories all claiming to be theories of consciousness. How are we to decide between them if we do not already know which systems are conscious and what they are conscious of? In this paper I aim to do two things. First, I explain why a theory‐driven approach to consciousness science, even one sensitive to Lakatosian norms and updating in a Bayesian manner, may lead to divergence rather than convergence. Second, I draw on the history of thermometry and natural kind reasoning to sketch a theory‐neutral route towards progress in consciousness science.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"120 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142321815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The quest for a qualitative hedonism","authors":"Dale Dorsey","doi":"10.1111/nous.12527","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12527","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I attempt to articulate a version of qualitative hedonism, grounded in the value theory of the British Moralists. I argue that this view is novel, presents substantial advantages over alternative hedonisms (including rival approaches to qualitative hedonism and its quantitative cousin), and can avoid classic challenges to qualitative hedonism that emerged in the post‐Mill era. If I succeed, this is a significant result for substantive value theory, given the dismissiveness with which qualitative hedonism is generally treated in the literature on the good.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142306262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Galileo's ship and the relativity principle","authors":"Sebastián Murgueitio Ramírez","doi":"10.1111/nous.12524","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12524","url":null,"abstract":"It is widely acknowledged that the Galilean Relativity Principle, according to which the laws of classical systems are the same in all inertial frames in relative motion, has played an important role in the development of modern physics. It is also commonly believed that this principle holds the key to answering why, for example, we do not notice the orbital velocity of the Earth as we go about our day. And yet, I argue in this paper that the precise content of this principle is ambiguous: standard presentations, in both physics and philosophy, fail to distinguish between two principles that are ultimately inequivalent, the “External Galilean Relativity Principle” (EGRP) and the “Internal Galilean Relativity Principle” (IGRP). I demonstrate that EGRP and IGRP play distinct roles in physics practice (e.g., EGRP is connected to the concept of Galilean invariance, but IGRP is not) and that many classical systems that satisfy IGRP fail to satisfy EGRP. I further show that the Relativity Principle famously discussed by Einstein in 1905—which is <jats:italic>not</jats:italic> restricted to classical systems—also leads to two inequivalent principles, an external one analogous to EGRP, and an internal one analogous to IGRP. I conclude by highlighting that the phenomenon originally captured by Galileo's famous ship passage is much more general than contemporary discussions in the philosophy of symmetries suggest.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142233326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Action, passion, power","authors":"David S. Oderberg","doi":"10.1111/nous.12523","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12523","url":null,"abstract":"The active/passive distinction, once a hallmark of classical metaphysics, has largely been discarded from contemporary thought. The revival of powers theory has not seen an equally vigorous rehabilitation of the real distinction between active and passive powers. I begin an analysis and vindication with a critique of E.J. Lowe's discussion. I then argue that the active/passive problem is a <jats:italic>metaphysical</jats:italic> one, not a logical or logico‐linguistic one, and so logic is impotent to solve it. Following this is a discussion of the rights and wrongs of Aristotle's and Aquinas's (identical) defence of the distinction. We will see that one main part of their analysis is a bright red herring while the other part contains the solution to the problem. I then state and clarify the key Scholastic principle concerning action and passion, which I call the Fundamental Thesis – one that will appear scandalous to contemporary ears, yet from which we can derive the tools needed to understand action and passion in the right way. I end with a definition of what I call the Minimal Metaphysical Agent, where the formulation is to be understood as an epistemic criterion for identifying agent and patient in a given causal interaction.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142100599","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Symbolic value and the limits of good‐for theory","authors":"Aaron Abma","doi":"10.1111/nous.12518","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12518","url":null,"abstract":"Good‐for theorists claim that to be valuable is to be good for someone, in the sense of being beneficial for them. Their opponents deny this, arguing that some things are good‐simpliciter: good independently of being good for anyone. In this article I argue in favor of good‐simpliciter. I appeal to the category of symbolically valuable acts, acts which seem valuable even when they do not benefit anyone and even when they are costly to the agent. I explore various strategies a good‐for theorist might pursue to address these apparently valuable acts, for example by appealing to the acts’ connection to beneficial character traits or practices, and I argue that none of these strategies succeed. Instead, I propose that the best way to understand the value of these acts involves seeing them as appropriate responses to what is good‐simpliciter, and more specifically, as ways of loving what is worthy of love.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141862322","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Frege cases and rationalizing explanations","authors":"Mahrad Almotahari, Aidan Gray","doi":"10.1111/nous.12522","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12522","url":null,"abstract":"Russellians, Relationists, and Fregeans disagree about the nature of propositional‐attitude content. We articulate a framework to characterize and evaluate this disagreement. The framework involves two claims: i) that we should individuate attitude content in whatever way fits best with the explanations that characteristically appeal to it, and ii) that we can understand those explanations by analogy with other ‘higher‐level’ explanations. Using the framework, we argue for an under‐appreciated form of Russellianism. Along the way we demonstrate that being more explicit about the framework in which debates about attitude content take place allows us to more precisely characterize the space of possible positions and the dialectic between them.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141857764","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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