{"title":"Meddlesome blame and negotiating standing","authors":"Justin Snedegar","doi":"10.1111/nous.12521","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12521","url":null,"abstract":"Blaming others for things that are not our business can attract charges of meddling and corresponding dismissals of blame. Such charges are contentious because the content and applicability conditions of anti‐meddling norms can be difficult to specify. An unappreciated reason they can be contentious is that it is often not settled in advance whether some wrongdoing is or is not the business of a would‐be blamer. Rather than pointing out violation of a pre‐established anti‐meddling norm, charges of meddling may sometimes be aiming to put such a norm in place. Grounds of anti‐meddling norms, including privacy, intimacy, and respect for victims, support giving those involved significant latitude to set their own boundaries on appropriate blame. This brings out the more general point that norms of blame, including standing norms, are often up for negotiation, and dismissals of blame can be moves in such a negotiation of trying to establish boundaries on blame, rather than merely pointing out violations of pre‐established boundaries.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141730516","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Higher‐order being and time","authors":"Lukas Skiba","doi":"10.1111/nous.12509","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12509","url":null,"abstract":"Higher‐order metaphysicians take facts to be higher‐order beings, i.e., entities in the range of irreducibly higher‐order quantifiers. In this paper, I investigate the impact of this conception of facts on the debate about the reality of tense. I identify two major repercussions. The first concerns the logical space of tense realism: on a higher‐order conception of facts, a prominent version of tense realism, dynamic absolutism, turns out to conflict with the laws of (higher‐order tense) logic. The second concerns our understanding of the positions occupying this logical space: on a higher‐order conception of facts, an attractive interpretation of the central tense realist notion of ‘facts constituting reality’ becomes unavailable. I discuss these results in the context of the more general project of higher‐order metaphysics and the (meta)metaphysics of time, drawing out their implications for the nature of the disputes both between realists and anti‐realists about tense and between different tense realist factions.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"160 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141726065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Primitive governance","authors":"Noga Gratvol","doi":"10.1111/nous.12520","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12520","url":null,"abstract":"Laws of nature are sometimes said to govern their instances. Spelling out what governance is, however, is an important task that has only recently received sustained philosophical attention. In the first part of this paper, I argue against the two prominent reductive views of governance—modal views and grounding views. Ruling out the promising candidates for reduction supports the claim that governance is <jats:italic>sui generis</jats:italic>. In the second part of this paper, I argue that governance is subject to a contingency requirement. Laws govern their instances only if those instances are metaphysically contingent. I end by defending the resulting account of governance from two potential objections.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141597246","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do credences model guesses?","authors":"Sophie Horowitz","doi":"10.1111/nous.12519","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12519","url":null,"abstract":"What are credences? Where do the numbers come from? Some have argued that they are brute and primitive; others, that they model our dispositions to bet, our comparative confidence judgments, or our all‐out beliefs. This paper explores a new answer to this question: credences model our dispositions to guess. I argue that we can think of credences this way, and then consider: should we?","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141566086","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Brian Porter, Kelli Barr, Abdellatif Bencherifa, Wesley Buckwalter, Yasuo Deguchi, Emanuele Fabiano, Takaaki Hashimoto, Julia Halamova, Joshua Homan, Kaori Karasawa, Martin Kanovsky, Hakjin Kim, Jordan Kiper, Minha Lee, Xiaofei Liu, Veli Mitova, Rukmini Bhaya, Ljiljana Pantovic, Pablo Quintanilla, Josien Reijer, Pedro Romero, Purmina Singh, Salma Tber, Daniel Wilkenfeld, Stephen Stich, Clark Barrett, Edouard Machery
{"title":"A puzzle about knowledge ascriptions","authors":"Brian Porter, Kelli Barr, Abdellatif Bencherifa, Wesley Buckwalter, Yasuo Deguchi, Emanuele Fabiano, Takaaki Hashimoto, Julia Halamova, Joshua Homan, Kaori Karasawa, Martin Kanovsky, Hakjin Kim, Jordan Kiper, Minha Lee, Xiaofei Liu, Veli Mitova, Rukmini Bhaya, Ljiljana Pantovic, Pablo Quintanilla, Josien Reijer, Pedro Romero, Purmina Singh, Salma Tber, Daniel Wilkenfeld, Stephen Stich, Clark Barrett, Edouard Machery","doi":"10.1111/nous.12515","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12515","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophers have argued that stakes affect knowledge: a given amount of evidence may suffice for knowledge if the stakes are low, but not if the stakes are high. By contrast, empirical work on the influence of stakes on ordinary knowledge ascriptions has been divided along methodological lines: “evidence‐fixed” prompts rarely find stakes effects, while “evidence‐seeking” prompts consistently find them. We present a cross‐cultural study using <jats:italic>both</jats:italic> evidence‐fixed and evidence‐seeking prompts with a diverse sample of 17 populations in 11 countries, speaking 14 languages. Our study is the first to use an evidence‐seeking prompt cross‐culturally, and includes several previously untested populations (including indigenous populations). Across cultures, we <jats:italic>do not find</jats:italic> evidence of a stakes effect with our evidence‐fixed prompt, but <jats:italic>do</jats:italic> with our evidence‐seeking prompt. We argue that the divergent results reveal a tension within folk epistemology: people's beliefs about when it is appropriate to ascribe knowledge differ significantly from their actual practice in ascribing knowledge.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"365 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141553332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Arithmetical pluralism and the objectivity of syntax","authors":"Lavinia Picollo, Daniel Waxman","doi":"10.1111/nous.12510","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12510","url":null,"abstract":"Arithmetical pluralism is the view that there is not one true arithmetic but rather many apparently conflicting arithmetical theories, each true in its own language. While pluralism has recently attracted considerable interest, it has also faced significant criticism. One powerful objection, which can be extracted from Parsons (2008), appeals to a categoricity result to argue against the possibility of seemingly conflicting true arithmetics. Another salient objection raised by Putnam (1994) and Koellner (2009) draws upon the arithmetization of syntax to argue that arithmetical pluralism is inconsistent with the objectivity of syntax. First, we review these arguments and explain why they ultimately fail. We then offer a novel, more sophisticated argument that avoids the pitfalls of both. Our argument combines strategies from both objections to show that pluralism about arithmetic entails pluralism about syntax. Finally, we explore the viability of pluralism in light of our argument and conclude that a stable pluralist position is coherent. This position allows for the possibility of rival packages of arithmetic and syntax theories, provided that they systematically co‐vary with one another.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141495732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The puzzle of mood rationality","authors":"Adam Bradley","doi":"10.1111/nous.12517","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12517","url":null,"abstract":"Moods, orthodoxy holds, exist outside the space of reasons. A depressed subject may change their thoughts and behaviors as a result of their depression. But, according to this view, their mood gives them no genuine reason to do so. Instead, moods are mere causal influences on cognition. The issue is that moods, with their diffuse phenomenology, appear to lack intentionality (<jats:italic>Directionlessness</jats:italic>). But intentionality appears to be a necessary condition on rationality (<jats:italic>The Content Constraint</jats:italic>). Together, these principles conflict with the idea that moods are rational states of mind (<jats:italic>Mood Rationality</jats:italic>). The inconsistency of these three principles is <jats:italic>the Puzzle of Mood Rationality</jats:italic>. Now to many, this puzzle is hardly vexing: we should reject Mood Rationality. But, I argue, Mood Rationality is true despite its unpopularity. Thus, we need another way of resolving the puzzle. To do so, I distinguish intentionality as a first‐personal, phenomenological notion from representation as a third‐personal, cognitive scientific notion. I then argue that moods satisfy a revised version of the Content Constraint and sketch an account of moods as representational but non‐intentional mental states, drawing on the Valuationist paradigm in affective neuroscience. I end by showing how this account enables us to explain moods’ rationality.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"41 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141495781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Metaphysics of risk and luck","authors":"Jaakko Hirvelä","doi":"10.1111/nous.12516","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12516","url":null,"abstract":"According to the modal account of luck it is a matter of luck that <jats:italic>p</jats:italic> if <jats:italic>p</jats:italic> is true at the actual world, but false in a wide‐range of nearby worlds. According to the modal account of risk, it is risky that <jats:italic>p</jats:italic> if <jats:italic>p</jats:italic> is true at some close world. I argue that the modal accounts of luck and risk do not mesh well together. The views entail that <jats:italic>p</jats:italic> can be both maximally risky and maximally lucky, but there is nothing which is both maximally lucky and maximally risky. I offer a novel theory of risk that fits together with the modal account of luck and demonstrate that it is both extensionally and formally superior to extant proposals.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"29 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141461952","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How to be indifferent","authors":"Sebastian Liu","doi":"10.1111/nous.12512","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12512","url":null,"abstract":"According to the principle of indifference, when a set of possibilities is evidentially symmetric for you – when your evidence no more supports any one of the possibilities over any other – you're required to distribute your credences uniformly among them. Despite its intuitive appeal, the principle of indifference is often thought to be unsustainable due to the problem of multiple partitions: Depending on how a set of possibilities is divided, it seems that sometimes, applying indifference reasoning can require you to assign incompatible credences to equivalent possibilities. This paper defends the principle of indifference from the problem of multiple partitions by offering two guides for how to respond. The first is for permissivists about rationality, and is modeled on permissivists' arguments for the claim that a body of evidence sometimes does not uniquely determine a fully rational credence function. The second is for impermissivists about rationality, and is modeled on impermissivists' arguments for the claim that a body of evidence does always uniquely determine a fully rational credence function. What appears to be a decisive objection against the principle of indifference is in fact an instance of a general challenge taking different forms familiar to both permissivists and impermissivists.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"85 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141453078","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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