Studies in History and Philosophy of Science最新文献

{"title":"Golden spikes, scientific types, and the ma(r)king of deep time","authors":"Joeri Witteveen","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.02.004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.02.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Chronostratigraphy is the subfield of geology that studies the relative age of rock strata and that aims at producing a hierarchical classification of (global) divisions of the historical time-rock record. The ‘golden spike’ or ‘GSSP’ approach is the cornerstone of contemporary chronostratigraphic methodology. It is also perplexing. Chronostratigraphers define each global time-rock boundary extremely locally, often by driving a gold-colored pin into an exposed rock section at a particular level. Moreover, they usually avoid rock sections that show any meaningful sign of paleontological disruption or geological discontinuity: the less obvious the boundary, the better. It has been argued that we can make sense of this practice of marking boundaries by comparing the status and function of golden spikes to that of other concrete, particular reference standards from other sciences: holotypes from biological taxonomy and measurement prototypes from the metrology of weight and measures. Alisa Bokulich (2020b) has argued that these ‘scientific types’ are in an important sense one of a kind: they have a common status and function. I will argue that this picture of high-level conceptual unity is mistaken and fails to consider the diversity of aims and purposes of standardization and classification across the sciences. I develop an alternative, disunified account of scientific types that shows how differences in ontological attitudes and epistemic aims inform scientists’ choices between different kinds of scientific types. This perspective on scientific types helps to make sense of an intriguing mid-twentieth-century debate among chronostratigraphers about the very nature of their enterprise. Should chronostratigraphers conventionally <em>make</em> boundaries by designating golden spikes, or should they attempt to <em>mark</em> pre-existing ‘natural’ boundaries with the help of a different kind of scientific type?</p></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"106 ","pages":"Pages 70-85"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S003936812400013X/pdfft?md5=55700cfc8852665b9abac57945ec57b7&pid=1-s2.0-S003936812400013X-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141434545","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Kant on the many uses of reason in the sciences: A neglected topic","authors":"Thomas Sturm ,&nbsp;Rudolf Meer","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.05.016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.05.016","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"106 ","pages":"Pages 54-59"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141429432","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Divine mathematics: Leibniz's combinatorial theory of compossibility","authors":"Jun Young Kim","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.05.002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.05.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Leibniz's famous proposition that God has created the best of all possible worlds holds a significant place in his philosophical system. However, the precise manner in which God determines which world is the best remains somewhat ambiguous. Leibniz suggests that a form of \"Divine mathematics\" is employed to construct and evaluate possible worlds. In this paper, I uncover the underlying mechanics of Divine mathematics by formally reconstructing it. I argue that Divine mathematics is a one-player combinatorial game, in which God's goal is to find the best combination among many possibilities. Drawing on the combinatorial theory, I provide new solutions to some puzzles of compossibility.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"106 ","pages":"Pages 60-69"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141429433","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Non-separability, locality and criteria of reality: a reply to Waegell and McQueen","authors":"Paolo Faglia","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.03.004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.03.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Using a ‘reformulation of Bell’s theorem’, Waegell and McQueen, (2020) argue that any local theory which does not involve retro-causation or fine-tuning must be a many-worlds theory. Moreover they argue that non-separable many-worlds theories whose ontology is given by the wavefunction involve superluminal causation, as opposed to separable many-worlds theories (e.g. Waegell, 2021; Deutsch and Hayden 2000).</p><p>I put forward three claims. (A) I challenge their argument for relying on a non-trivial, unquestioned assumption about elements of reality which allows Healey’s approach (Healey, 2017b) to evade their claim. In an attempt to respond to (A), Waegell and McQueen may restrict their claim to theories which satisfy such an assumption, however, I also argue that (B) their argument fails to prove even the so weakened claim, as exemplified by theories that are both non-separable and local. Finally, (C) by arguing for the locality of the decoherence-based Everettian approach (Wallace, 2012) I refute Waegell and McQueen’s claim that wavefunction-based ontologies, and more generally non-separable ontologies, involve superluminal causation. I close with some doubtful remarks about separable Everettian interpretations as compared to non-separable ones.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"106 ","pages":"Pages 43-53"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0039368124000529/pdfft?md5=c2384dec1a5c1fbd0110505c446ec629&pid=1-s2.0-S0039368124000529-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141424460","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Experimental high-energy physics without computer simulations","authors":"Michael Krämer ,&nbsp;Gregor Schiemann ,&nbsp;Christian Zeitnitz","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.05.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.05.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper argues against the claim that high-energy physics experiments done so far could not be carried out without computer simulations. We show that it would be possible to completely dispense with computer simulations for experiments conducted to date, and that computer simulations up to now are mostly used for practical reasons. Our investigation covers all elements of experimental research in which computer simulations have been used. Dispensing with simulations would yield an advantage with regard to the complex theory dependence of experiments. We also point out that computer simulations may play a more essential role for the complex measurements foreseen at the Large Hadron Collider, where subtle dependencies between final state objects in high-energy physics experiments must be accurately described. Therefore, the conceivable complete replacement of computer simulations may have come to an end, and the theory dependence of high-energy physics experiments through computer simulations may be entering a new phase.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"106 ","pages":"Pages 37-42"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0039368124000426/pdfft?md5=b0e9208357996b1d12752b1d5b425790&pid=1-s2.0-S0039368124000426-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141294519","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Janina Hosiasson and the value of evidence","authors":"Christian Torsell","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.05.013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.05.013","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I.J. Good’s “On the Principle of Total Evidence” (1967) looms large in decision theory and Bayesian epistemology. Good proves that in <span>Savage</span>’s (<span>1954</span>) decision theory, a coherent agent always prefers to collect, rather than ignore, free evidence. It is now well known that Good’s result was prefigured in an unpublished note by Frank Ramsey (Skyrms 2006). The present paper highlights another early forerunner to Good’s argument, appearing in Janina Hosiasson’s “Why do We Prefer Probabilities Relative to Many Data?” (1931), that has been neglected in the literature. Section 1 reviews Good’s argument and the problem it was meant to resolve; call this the <em>value of evidence problem</em>. Section 2 offers a brief history of the value of evidence problem and provides biographical background to contextualize Hosiasson’s contribution. Section 3 explicates the central argument of Hosiasson’s paper and considers its relationship to Good’s (1967).</p></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"106 ","pages":"Pages 31-36"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S003936812400061X/pdfft?md5=dee41446b72e8c6da2e20e62b0eff33e&pid=1-s2.0-S003936812400061X-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141291440","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Some reflections on Robert Batterman's a middle way","authors":"James Woodward","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.05.021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.05.021","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"106 ","pages":"Pages 21-30"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141291441","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Redefining a discovery: Charles Bell, the respiratory nervous system and the birth of the emotions","authors":"James Bradley","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.04.003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.04.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Charles Bell was famous for the discovery of the separate motor and sensory roots of the spinal and facial nerves, although in recent years his right to priority has been challenged by historians and scientists. But Charles Bell did discover something even if has not been accorded the status of a scientific fact. Between 1821 and 1823 he unveiled the ‘respiratory nervous system’, a distinct system of nerves that acted as the ‘organ of the passions’, which he then elaborated upon in his 1824 <em>Essays on the Anatomy and Philosophy of Expression</em>. As Bell and his allies attempted to claim priority in the spinal and facial nerves, the respiratory nerves were pushed to the background, subordinated to the motor and sensory nerves. This essay, therefore, redefines Charles Bell's major discovery as the ‘respiratory nerves’, providing a detailed description of their anatomy and physiology and the way in which they underwrote Bell's theory of the emotions. It also demonstrates how his aesthetics were intertwined with his research programme. It then connects the respiratory nerves to Thomas Dixon's assertion that Bell was one of the founders of the modern psychological category of the emotions, providing a deeper and more nuanced genealogy of the emotions, including the impact that Bell had upon William James's seminal article ‘What is an Emotion?’</p></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"106 ","pages":"Pages 12-20"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0039368124000566/pdfft?md5=f80c013f460faa9c6e2a081fba7bc434&pid=1-s2.0-S0039368124000566-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141291443","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"From the philosophy of measurement to the philosophy of classification: Generalizing the problem of coordination and historical coherentism","authors":"François Papale","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.05.020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.05.020","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The objective of this paper is twofold. First, I present a framework called historical coherentism (Chang, 2004; Tal, 2016; Van fraassen 2008) and argue that it is the best epistemological framework available to tackle the problem of coordination, an epistemic conundrum that arises with every attempt to provide empirical content to scientific theories, models or statements. Second, I argue that the problem of coordination, which has so far been theorized only in the context of measurement practices (Reichenbach, 1927; Chang, 2001; Tal, 2012; Van fraassen 2008), can be generalized beyond the philosophy of measurement. Specifically, it will be shown that the problem is embodied in classificatory practices and that, consequently, historical coherentism is well suited to analyze these practices as well as metrological ones. As a case study, I look at a contemporary debate in phylogenetics, regarding the evolutionary origin of a newly identified archaeal phylum called <em>Methanonatronarchaeia</em>. Exploring this debate through the lens of historical coherentism provides a detailed understanding of the dynamics of the field and a foothold for critical analyses of the standard rationale used by practitioners.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"106 ","pages":"Pages 1-11"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0039368124000682/pdfft?md5=a80c5d4ef8ee65714eb48418c7ac2a34&pid=1-s2.0-S0039368124000682-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141289178","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Berkeley on true motion","authors":"Scott Harkema","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.05.015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.05.015","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Studies of the Early Modern debate concerning absolute and relative space and motion often ignore the significance of the concept of true motion in this debate. Even philosophers who denied the existence of absolute space maintained that true motions could be distinguished from merely apparent ones. In this paper, I examine Berkeley's endorsement of this distinction and the problems it raises. First, Berkeley's endorsement raises a problem of <em>consistency</em> with his other philosophical commitments, namely his idealism. Second, Berkeley's endorsement raises a problem of <em>adequacy</em>, namely whether Berkeley can provide an adequate account of what grounds the distinction between true and merely apparent motion. In this paper, I argue that sensitivity to Berkeley's distinction between what is true in the metaphysical, scientific, and vulgar domains can address both the <em>consistency</em> and the <em>adequacy</em> problems. I argue that Berkeley only accepts true motion in the scientific and vulgar domains, and not the metaphysical. There is thus no inconsistency between his endorsement of true motion in science and ordinary language, and his metaphysical idealism. Further, I suggest that sensitivity to these three domains shows that Berkeley possesses resources to give an adequate account of how true motions are discovered in natural science.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":49467,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science","volume":"105 ","pages":"Pages 165-174"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0039368124000633/pdfft?md5=421f93ad3d41bb8b283010b6869948a7&pid=1-s2.0-S0039368124000633-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141095110","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}